

**A HISTORY OF THE  
DVAITA SCHOOL OF VEDĀNTA  
AND ITS LITERATURE  
VOLUME I**

**From the Earliest Beginnings to the Age of *Jayatīrtha*  
( C. 1400 A. D. )**

*by*

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**WITH A FOREWORD**

*by*

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श्रीः

*Dedicated to the*

**“TRIMUNI” OF DVAITA-VĒDĀNTA :**

**Srīmad Ānanda Tīrtha Bhagavatpāda**

**Srī Jaya Tīrtha**

**AND**

**Srī Vyāsarāja Svāmin**



निर्मथ्योग्रभवार्णवे निजमनोभीष्टं दिशामीति यः  
सम्यज्ज्ञापयितुं करेण विलसन्मन्थानमन्येन च ।  
रम्यं दामं द्रवन्महेशरजतप्रामथ्रियोऽलङ्कृतिः  
कर्मन्दीश्वरभयितवन्धनवशः प्रीतोऽस्तु कृष्ण. प्रभु.॥



## Foreword

Dr. B. N. K. Sharma gives in this Volume a comprehensive account of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and its Literature, from the earliest beginnings up to the Age of Jaya Tīrtha, 1400 A. D. His book fills a gap in the literature on the Vedānta available in English. While we have many accounts of Saṅkara's Advaita, a competent treatment of the Dvaita philosophy of Madhva has not been written. So, Dr. Sharma, with his equipment in Sanskrit and competence in philosophy, has given us this work. In a large work like this there are bound to be, here and there, legitimate differences of opinion; but on the whole, the account given here is reliable and it is my hope that the book will be widely read,

New Delhi  
20th. February 1960 }

*S. Radhakrishnan*

# PREFACE

## 1

Dvaita, Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita are the principal schools of Vedānta, representing the widest possible points of departure of philosophical thought emerging from the interpretation of the Prasthānatrayī or the trine authority of the Vedānta, in the medieval period of Indian history. To this day, they enjoy the status of living systems of Vedāntic thought (in South India and beyond) each with its own well defined community of followers, religious institutions and extensive philosophical literature in Sanskrit. The Dvaita and the Viśiṣṭādvaita schools have also to their credit a substantial amount of devotional literature in the Kannada and Tamil languages respectively.

Tho' chronologically the last and counting perhaps fewer followers than the other two, the Dvaita system has been the chief rival in thought to the Advaita of Śaṅkara, in the history of Indian philosophy. Tho' the first Theistic reaction to Advaita came from Rāmānuja, yet, it is to the Dvaita-Vedānta of Madhva and his eminent followers that we have to turn for a robust and uncompromising metaphysical resistance to Advaita philosophy and for a complete vindication of Vedāntic Theism in conformity with its oldest and most genuine textual traditions. To give but one instance, the Advaita had tried to strike at the very root of Sāṃkhya realism (accepted by the Upanisads and the Epic) by denying to 'Prakṛti' any *locus standi* in the Sāstras (See Śaṅkara B. S. B., 1, 1, 5). The Rāmānuja school winked at this injustice to Prakṛti despite its own accommodation of Prakṛti within its metaphysics as a distinct and necessary material principle, operating in the Universe, in subordination to Brahman (See R. on B. S. 1, 4, 3). It was the Dvaita school of Madhva which set right this anomaly and injustice to Prakṛti by taking the bold step of rejecting the 'fashionable' interpretation of B. S. 1, 1, 5, and restoring Prakṛti to its rightful place in the Vedānta as a material principle dependent on Brahman and providing the stuff of the Universe. This clear and unambiguous vindication of the position of Prakṛti in Vedāntic metaphysics knocked off the bottom of Pantheism and Māyāvāda.



in Vedānta and helped to reinstate the purely Theistic view of Brahman as the "Kovala-nimitta-Kāraṇa" in respect of the cosmos, as conceived in the hymns of the Ṛg Veda, the Antar-yāmi Brāhmaṇa, the Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad, the Epic and the Purāṇas. Of course, Madhva's conception of Brahman as "nimitta-kāraṇa" did not remain at the purely Deistic level of the Nyāya school. It was metaphysically more penetrative in that it was intimately connected with the concept of Brahman as "Śvatantra" understood as "Sarvasattāpratitipravṛttinimittam" (as explained in the opening chapter of this Volume)

After the downfall of the Sāṃkhya and Nyāya Vaiśeṣika realisms, as a result of the dialectic onslaughts of Advaitins, it was the Dvaita Vedānta of Madhva that stood up for Realism in Indian thought against all forces of idealism and acosmism. It had, accordingly, to fight with Indian monism a battle royal on its own ground, during the last seven centuries. The history of this philosophical polemics has been a glorious chapter in the annals of the Vedānta. It attracted all-India attention and drew some of the redoubtable scholars of the north and south of India, as participants therein. As a result of this high-level polemics which went on between the two schools in the Post Jayatīrtha period, the Dvaita system emerged as a front rank philosophical system of all-India reputation, throwing the Rāmānuja school completely into the shade. As Das Gupta says, "the logical and dialectical thinkers of the Viśiṣṭādvaita were decidedly inferior to the prominent thinkers of the Śāṃkara and the Madhva school. There is hardly anyone in the whole history of the development of the Rāmānuja school whose logical acuteness could be compared with that of Śrīharsa or Citsukha or with that of Jayatīrtha or Vyāsātīrtha" (*His of I. Phil* vol III, p. 111). In the Preface to the fourth volume of his *History of I. Phil*, he says again, "in my opinion, Jayatīrtha and Vyāsātīrtha present the highest dialectical skill in Indian thought. There is a general belief among many that the monism of Śāṃkara presents the final phase of Indian thought. But the readers of the present volume who will be introduced to the philosophy of Jayatīrtha and particularly of Vyāsātīrtha would realize the strength and uncompromising impressiveness of the Dualistic position. The logical skill and depth of acute dialectic thinking shown by Vyāsātīrtha stands almost unrivalled in the whole range of Indian thought" [p. viii. *Italics mine*].



The thinkers of the Dvaita school have made many outstanding contributions to the problems of philosophy. Their works could be studied with profit by modern minds also. The views expressed by Madhva on the nature of Saksi, Vis-sa, Bheda, Substance, the universal, space, time etc., are very much in advance of his times and remarkably suggestive. The *Tarkatandava* of Vyasarāya with its critical review of the principles and definitions of Navya Nyaya of Gangesa put a timely check upon the overgrowth of formalism in Indian logic, and enunciated the principles of a *Novum Organon* in post Gangesa Logic. The Theism of Nyaya would have been a living force to this day if it had cared to follow the lead of Vyasarāya. It is admitted that the birth of neo Advaita in the sixteenth century was largely due to the impact of Madhva dialectics.

The achievements of the Dvaita school outweigh the numerical strength, influence and distribution of its followers. The Caitanya Sampradāya of Bengal derives not only its preceptorial order but its doctrines of Viśesa Siddharupa Bhakti and other tenets from Mādhva thought, as will be clear from Vol. II. The devotional movement of the Haridasas of Karnataka was a spontaneous expression of Mādhva religious thought in the regional language of the majority of its adherents Kannada, and its appeal reached the common people of the country. The vitality of the system could be judged from the fact that it has been able to penetrate and overcome the barriers of language and include among its followers today speakers of five Aryan and three Dravidian languages of India.

In its own right then, this system deserves wider attention in India and abroad than what it has received till now from the public and from our present day scholars. Especially after the attainment of national independence in our country, when former prejudices are being shed and every valuable heritage in the country's past is sought to be studied with an open mind and in a spirit of sympathy and understanding it is reasonable to expect a renewal of interest among our countrymen in the study of the literature and philosophy of the Dvaita school of Vedānta also, which has made a sizable contribution to Indian thought. I earnestly hope that the publication of this 'History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature' at this propitious juncture



would go a long way in rousing public interest in the study of Madhva and his school of thought, and meet the demand for comprehensive works on the subject in English, from an objective standpoint

This is the first complete and systematic work on the origin and development of the Dvaita school of Vedānta and its literature, to appear in print. There is no standard work on this subject, of this size and scope, in the field. It is based on a revised and enlarged version of a part of my thesis approved for the Ph.D. degree of the Madras University, in 1948

# ii

Dvaita Literature is very extensive. Much of it still remains unpublished and unexplored. The early generation of Orientalists had neglected Madhva's philosophy. Later, pioneers like Subbarao and Padmanabhachar translated some works of Madhva into English and expounded some of his tenets. This roused interest among Western scholars as well and at least one foreign scholar, Helmuth Glasenapp, was attracted to Madhva's philosophy and wrote his 'Madhvas Philosophie des Visnu Glaubens', in German (Leipzig, 1923). But the first philosophical account of Madhva's thought, to appear in English, was in Dr Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy* (1927). Then followed further expositions of different aspects of Madhva thought, by some of his own followers like C. R. Krishna Rao, R. Nagaraja Sarma, H. N. Raghavendrachar, Alur Venkatarao, P. Nagaraja Rao and myself during the last three decades. The latest account of the system of Madhva and of his great interpreters Jayatīrtha and Vyāsātīrtha is to be found in Das Gupta's *History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. iv*. He has dealt with their treatment of some important problems in philosophy and has given a general review of certain important topics of Madhva's interpretation of the *Brahmasūtras*. Apart from the fact that even this work does not give us a systematic and coordinated exposition of Madhva's philosophy as a whole or go into the significance and bearings of his philosophical doctrines and their interrelation, its account of Dvaita Literature, as such, is very inadequate, ill-arranged and contains many misstatements of facts. There is thus a real need for a complete and systematic exposition of the history of the Dvaita school and its literature.



Considering the position and achievement of Dvaita thought in Indian philosophy and its literary output, it seemed to me to be a great deficiency that there was no authentic history of its literary and philosophical development, in English or in any other language, on modern lines—in a proper chronological setting and based upon all available materials, literary, historical and epigraphical. The works already in the field, on Madhva, have either not dealt with the extensive literature of his school including his own works in its fulness, or else, only cursorily, with a few works chosen at random. Even the survey of Dvaita Literature in Glaserapp's pioneering work is more or less bibliographical in its nature and by no means full or systematic at it. He has not gone into the contents of the works or the lives and dates of the authors mentioned or presented the literary materials on any orderly plan of topics or division of periods. There is no historical survey of the evolution of thought. A systematic and comprehensive work covering the entire range of this school of thought and its voluminous literature has long been a desideratum. The present work is intended to meet this need.

Two difficulties beset the historian of Dvaita Literature. The first is that of chronology of authors and works and the second is about the works themselves. There has been a surprising amount of ignorance about the writers of the Madhva school, their places in its history and the value of their contribution to thought. As a result, a grave injustice has been done and is still being done, even in accredited works on Indian history, culture and philosophy, by eminent Indian scholars themselves, to the distinguished exponents of this school like Madhva, Jayatirtha, Vyāsaraya, Vijayindra and others, whom every Indian ought to know and would be the better for knowing.

The bulk of the evidence from literary and epigraphic sources has been utilized here for the first time, in a systematic way. New evidence has also been cited at times, from hitherto unexplored sources, literary as well as epigraphical. The dates of almost all the writers have been discussed, some at length and others in brief. Where the dates of some authors have been discussed by me, elsewhere, the details have been omitted here and only the conclusions reached have been indicated, giving references to the sources where fuller information could be had.

last but not least, ( iv ) of the rise of that new genre of religious and devotional literature of the school, in the regional language of Kannada, under the leadership of the celebrated Mystics of the Haridasa Kṛta

It is mainly on account of this stupendous work and many sided activities of his eminent successors that Madhva's system has attained and retained its accredited position as one of the principal schools of Vedānta. By his creative genius Śrī Madhva had evolved his system from the nucleus of thought in the original sources. It was enriched and perfected in its various aspects by his eminent expositors like Jayatīrtha, Vyāsatīrtha and others and attained its full stature under them. It is, however, very remarkable, that throughout this long period of its development, there has been no rift or divergence of doctrine *within* the school,<sup>1</sup> as there has been in the other schools of Vedānta. *The Dvaitins' sense of loyalty to the views of Madhva has been remarkably steady and consistent throughout. But, changes in emphasis on doctrines or in the technique of their presentation according to the exigencies of the times and contemporary thought-trends and variations in methods of treatment and exposition of doctrines have not been wanting. These as well as important landmarks and turning-points in the history and literature of the school have been indicated in the present work, in relevant contexts.*

The present work is being published in two convenient volumes. The first one deals with the origin and development of Dvaita thought in and thro' its source books, its formal enunciation and exposition by Madhva himself, its initial development at the hands of his immediate disciples, and its standardized exposition by Jayatīrtha. The second volume deals, equally exhaustively, with the development of the system in the Post-Jayatīrtha period, down to recent times.

v

In tracing the evolution of Mādhva thought in and thro' its source books, I have, while following the generally accepted views of modern scholars about their successive stages of growth, worked

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I The unorthodox view of "Svarupa-śruti" of Jīvas which H. N. Raghavendrachar has, in recent years, attempted to read into Madhva's works has not found any support in any quarter.



out my own theory regarding the *tone* and *direction* of their ideological development. Most of the important works of Indian and European scholars like Ranade, Das Gupta, Radhakrishnan, Barth, Keith, Carpenter, Deussen, Muir, Macdonell, Griswold, Bloomfield and others have been consulted in this Part. My acknowledgments to these scholars will be found in the body of the work and in the footnotes. I have departed from their theories on many points or given them suitable reorientations ( See under *Āranyakas*, *Ekāyana* and *Post-Śvetāśvatara* periods ).

Under ' the works of Madhva ' I have surveyed and critically summarized the contents of his thirtyseven works ( *Sarva-Mūla* ) and brought out the general tenor of their arguments and drawn attention to their other salient features. This would enable the reader to appreciate fully the subject-matter of their commentaries and glosses noticed for the most part in the second volume. This saves the necessity of traversing the same ground in dealing with the commentaries and glosses on the *Sarvamūla* while setting forth their contributions to thought. It is not possible, in a rapid summary of the *Sarvamūla*, to go into the intricacies of their arguments or the niceties of the logical and interpretational issues raised by the texts. These have been reserved for treatment under certain appropriate sections pertaining to the dialectical contributions of Jayatīrtha, Vyāsarāya and others. Some idea of Madhva's dialectic powers has been given in connection with his *G. T.*, *V. T. N.*, and *AV*.

Besides bringing out the special features of Madhva's literary and philosophical style and his method of exposition, I have devoted some space to a discussion of the ' problem ' of his " Sources ". This and the vindication of the merits of Madhva's interpretation of the *Brahmasūtras* against the severe criticisms of Y. S. Ghate, undertaken here, for the first time, would be particularly useful to Post-Graduate students and teachers of Vedānta, in our Universities. In my opinion, Ghate's critique of Madhva's *Bhāṣya* on the *B. S.* has adversely affected the latter's reputation as an interpreter of the *B. S.*, among our modern scholars, University Professors and students, and it has been allowed to go unchallenged far too long. I intend to bring out an independent work on this subject at a future date. Meanwhile, the discussion which I have raised here over this problem might be taken as my own initial contribution to Dvaita polemics in this direction.



The next section deals with the early development of Madhva's school under his immediate disciples and followers and with their activities and contributions. This period is marked by the emergence of the various Mutts, which have played a major role in the development of the school and its spread in various parts of the country.

Part III deals with the first and at the same time the most important phase in the history of the school after Madhva is presented by the standardization and accredited interpretation of Madhva's thought, by his chosen commentator Jayatirtha. The subsequent developments on the lines inspired by Jayatirtha are dealt with in the second volume.

My work represents the fruit of many years' labor of love. As the literature dealt with is predominantly philosophical in content, it has not been possible to keep out from the purview of the work the discussion of certain logical, philosophical and even theological problems, altogether. A comprehensive treatment of Madhva's philosophy as a whole would, however, require a separate work in itself, which I hope to be able to publish, very soon.

#### VI

The present work deals primarily with the history of the school of Madhva and its entire literature and only indirectly with its philosophical tenets, as contained in it. It is intended to meet the requirements of the general reader as well as the advanced scholar and the specialist in this field. It is addressed not merely to the followers of Madhva, but to all those genuinely interested in having authentic information about the origin and development of the Vedantic school of Madhva and its remarkable contribution to India's philosophical thought and literature. No efforts have been spared to make the work interesting and exhaustive. I have tried to keep close to the standards of modern historical scholarship and research, to the best of my abilities. It is for Sahrdayas and Paniksakas to say how far I have succeeded in placing before them a readable, authentic and properly documented 'History of the Dvaita School of Vedānta and Its Literature'.

Publication of this work had been delayed for over ten years, for want of funds. Often, it seemed a dream impossible of fulfilment. Thanks, however, to the financial assistance given by the revered Heads of the Mathatraya—the Adamar, and the Sode Mutts

of Udipi and of the Bhandarkere, the Gokarna and the Kaśī Mutts, as well as by my esteemed friends and well-wishers ( whose names will appear in the Preface to vol. II ) interested in the dissemination of the knowledge of Dvaita Vedānta and its literature among our educated classes, it has, at least been possible for me to meet the Publisher's stipulation for an unconditional subsidy towards the cost of publication of the whole work. The Publisher : Shri D. M. Tilak, has, indeed, shown a commendable breadth of vision, love of learning and boldness of spirit in coming forward to take up the major share of the financial and other responsibilities of the publication. He deserves the thanks of the entire Mādhva community for this undoubted service to the cause of Dvaita thought.

Words are extremely inadequate to express my sense of gratitude and thanks to Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, the most distinguished philosopher of modern India and Vice-President of India, for his kindness in writing the Foreword to this work as a token of his continued interest in my work.

I thank the staff of the Shri Mudran Mandir, Poona, for the careful and expeditious way in which they have seen the work thro' the Press. What with the use of diacritical marks and the presence of numerous footnotes and Sanskrit texts to be printed in Devanagari in between the running matter in English, this was no easy task. The typewriting of the Press-copy and the correction of the final proofs had to be done wholly by myself, snatching time amidst the normal academic work of a Professor. Despite all possible care taken to eliminate typographical and other errors, a few have remained, eluding detection. The readers are requested to make the corrections, as shown in the Errata, before they begin to read the book through.

I pay my humble respects to the Svamijis ( past and present ) of the several Mādhva Mathas for the personal interest they have shown in my research work on Dvaita philosophy and its literature, since 1930. I have derived much valuable information from them on various points of doctrine and traditions. They have loaned me rare mss., from their Mutt libraries and have permitted me to consult and take notes from those mss. They have also enlightened me on various points concerning the traditions of their Mutts. Their help and guidance have contributed greatly to the authoritativeness of the

materials presented in the two vols of this work. The chief among them has been the late Svami Satyadhyāna Tīrtha of the Uttarādi Mutt.

Before concluding, I express my most grateful thanks and acknowledge my indebtedness to the University of Bombay, for the generous grant-in aid of Rs 750/- received by me from the University towards the cost of publication of this volume

Ruparel College, }  
Bombay-16 }

B. N. K Sharma.

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## Abbreviations

A- Ā.	Aitareya Āraṇyaka
A. U. J.	Annamalai University Journal
A. B. O. R. I.	Annals of Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
Ait. Up. Bh.	Aitareya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya
A. V.	Atharva Veda
AV.	Anu-Vyākhyāna
Bhāg.	Bhāgavata
Bib. Ind.	Bibliotheca Indica
Bṛh. Up.	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
B. S.	Brahma Sūtra
B. S. B.	Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya
B. T.	Bhāgavata Tātparya
C.	Commentary
CC.	Commentaries
Cat.	Catalogue
Catal. Cat.	Catalogus Catalogorum
Chān. Up.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
Choukh.	Choukhamba ( Sanskrit Series )
Cit.	Citsukha
E. I.	Epigraphia Indica
f.	Footnote
ff	and the following
G. B.	Gītā Bhāṣya
G. K.	Gauḍapāda Kārikās
G. O. S.	Gaekwad Oriental Series
G. T.	Gītā-Tātparya
H. O. S.	Harvard Oriental Series
I. A.	Indian Antiquary
I. H. Q.	Indian Historical Quarterly
I. Phil.	Indian Philosophy
J.	Jayatīrtha
J. B.	Jaiminiya Brāhmaṇa
J. B. B. R. A. S.	Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
J. V.	Jayatīrtha Vijaya
K. L.	Kathālakṣana



K N	Karma Nirnaya
M	Madhva
M B S B	Madhva's Brahma Sutra Bhāṣya
Mbh	Mahabharata
Mbh T N	Mahabharata Tātparya Nirnaya
M Kh t	Mithyatvānumana Khandana Tika
Mith Kh	Mithyātvanumāna Khandana
M M Sangha	Madhvamuni Seva Sangha
Ms	Manuscript
Mss	Manuscripts
M Vij	Madhva Vijaya
Mys Arch Rep	Mysore Archaeological Report
Mys O L	Mysore Oriental Library
N I A	New Indian Antiquary
NS	Nyāyasudhā
NV	Nyāya Vivarana
Ny S	Nyaya Sutra
Nym	Nyayamṛta
O L	Oriental Library
Pan	Pāṇini
PL	Pramana Lakṣana
P M K	Prapanca Mithyatvanumāna Khandana
P M S	Purva Mimāṃsa Sūtras
P O	Poona Orientalist
P O C	Proceedings of the Oriental Conference
PP	Pramana Paddhati
R G B	Rāmanuja's Gītā Bhāṣya
R P R	Review of Philosophy and Religion
R V	Rg Veda
R V Kh	Rg Veda Khila
S B E	Sacred Books of the East
S D S	Sarva Darśana Samgraha
S K	Sat Kathā
S M	Stotra Mahodadhī
S V	Sāma Veda
Ś B	Satapatha Brahmana
Śvet Up	Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad
T A	Taittirīya Āraṇyaka
Taitt Up	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
T B	Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa

T. C.	Tātparya Candrikā
T. D.	Tattvapradīpa
Td.	Tattvodyota
TP.	Tattvaparakāśikā
T. P. L.	Tanjore Palace Library
T. S.	Tattva Saṁkhyāna
T. Sṭ.	Tattva Saṁkhyāna ṭikā
T. V.	Tattva Viveka
U. K.	Upādhi Khandana
V. S.	Vaiśeṣika Sūtras
Vij. Sexcent. Vol.	Vijayanagar Sexcentenary Volume
V. T. N.	Visnu Tattva Nirṇaya
V. T. N. ṭ.	Visnu Tattva Nirṇaya ṭikā.



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## CHAPTER I

# THE CONCEPT OF "DVAITA" AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE

### ( INTRODUCTORY )

Before we enter upon a study of the History of the Dvaita school of Vedānta and its Literature, it would be necessary to have a clear definition of the term "Dvaita", commonly used to designate Śrī Madhva's system. The opinion is gaining ground among a section of the followers of Madhva,<sup>1</sup> that this term, though traditionally current for the system, is not really commensurate with or fully expressive of its true metaphysical ideology. It is also argued that the Sanskrit term "Dvaita" and its English equivalent "Dualism" have certain association of ideas with established schools of ancient and modern thought, which are *not true* of Madhva's philosophy and that, therefore, the careless application of such names to designate his philosophy, would be and *has been*, a source of much unfortunate misconception about the highest reach of its thought, tending to its summary dismissal in modern 'philosophical circles', as a "hopeless Dualism".

There is some truth in this contention. A certain misconception *has* already set in, in recent times, even in 'informed circles', about the true and the highest metaphysical position of Madhva. The lay reader cannot be blamed then, if he goes away with an altogether wrong notion of Madhva's "Dualism", or is scared away by it. It is, therefore, necessary to explain the true significance which the term "Dvaita" has had, in the authentic traditions of the school of Madhva and show in what sense it *should be*

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1. See the views expressed by H. N. Raghavendrachar and Alur Venkatarao in their recent works on Madhva's philosophy.

understood, as applied to his system of philosophy. Its association of ideas, elsewhere, should not be allowed to cloud the judgment. One may then consider, keeping in view the modern philosophic temper and its likes and dislikes, the question of the adequacy of this current designation and the desirability of going in for a new and a more expressive one.

Dualism, as understood in Western philosophy, is a "theory which admits two independent and mutually irreducible substances"<sup>1</sup>. In Indian philosophy, the Sāṃkhya Dualism would answer to this definition. But the 'Dualism' of Madhva, while admitting two mutually irreducible principles as constituting Reality as a whole, regards only one of them, viz God, as Independent and the other as dependent. God or the Supreme Being is the ONE AND ONLY INDEPENDENT PRINCIPLE and all finite reality comprising the Prakṛti, Puruṣas, Kāla, Karma, Svabhāva etc., is dependent (Para-tantra). This concept of two orders of reality (tattvas) viz, "Svatantra" and "Paratantra", is the keynote of Madhva's philosophy.

स्वतन्त्रमस्वतन्त्रं च द्विविधं तत्त्वमिष्यते ।

( Tattvasamūhaya of Madhva )

The usual objection to a metaphysical Dualism, in the Western sense of the term, that it is an unphilosophical attitude entailing an "eternal opposition" between the reals, which are "set against each other", in a perpetual strife, could not really be raised against Madhva's view as set forth above. Indeed, it is precisely to avoid such a nemesis of Dualism "in its odious sense that Madhva has taken special care to insist on a difference in status between the two principles accepted by him and make one of them (the finite) dependent completely on the other (Svatantra), for its being and becoming. This is clear from the very definition of the terms "Svatantra" and "Paratantra" given by his commentator Jayatīrtha.

स्वरूपप्रमितिप्रवृत्तिलक्षणसत्तार्त्रविध्यै परानपेक्ष स्वतन्त्रम् । परापेक्षमस्वतन्त्रम् ।

( T S Tika )

It is indeed a pity that in spite of such plain speaking on the part of the Dvanta philosophers, modern critics of the system

<sup>1</sup> Dictionary of Philosophy, Dogbert D Runes, New York, 1955, p 84

should persist in missing Madhva's point and affect to deplore his "hopeless dualism". It is, therefore, imperative to warn the readers to be on their guard against being taken in by the ignorant or deliberate misrepresentation of the true bearings of Madhva's Dualism and to take care to understand the Sanskrit term "Dvaita" and its English equivalent "Dualism" as applied to his philosophy, in a restricted sense of specialised application, not applicable to the older scholastic Dualisms of the East or the ancient and modern Dualisms of the West

Broadly speaking, the term "Dvaita", in Indian thought, signifies a system of philosophy which posits more than one fundamental metaphysical principle or category to explain the Universe,<sup>1</sup> or a fundamental distinction between the human souls and the Supreme Being, for all time. According to Śamkara, Dualists are those who recognise the states of bondage and release as *real states* or experiences pertaining to the Ātman, while "Advaitins" would deny the *reality* of these states *as such for the Ātman*.

आत्मनो बन्धमुक्तावस्थे परमार्थे एव वस्तुभूते मते सर्वेषा द्वैतवादिनाम् ।  
अद्वैतिना पुन ..... अवस्थाभेदवत्त्वानुपपत्ते ॥

( Śamkara's *Gītābhāṣya*, XII, 2 ).

This introduces us to another aspect of Dualistic thought, touching its 'realistic' attitude to the experiences of life, which is true of Madhva's Dualism, as indeed of others, that our finite experiences of embodied existence and our efforts to achieve freedom from bondage, have *both* a real value and validity of their own<sup>2</sup> and are not mere bubbles of Avidyā<sup>3</sup>

The main emphasis of "Dualism" as such, would seem to lie on the *number of ultimate reals* or categories rather than on the question of their mutual independence. For, just as Realists may believe in *one or more* ultimate reals or categories and also regard them as *knowable in themselves or not*, "Dualists" also may hold divergent views regarding the status and mutual interdependence or independence or other relationship between the categories or principles accepted by them.

1. द्वैतिनो हि ते सात्या योगादच नात्मैकत्वदर्शिनः ।

( Śamkara, *B. S. B.* II, 1. 3 ).

2. 'स दुःखी स सुखी चैव स पात्र बन्धमाक्षयो ।'

3. *G. K.* II, 31.



Madhva, however, shows by an analysis of thought<sup>1</sup> that the acceptance of *two equally independent ultimate principles* or reals, would involve a logical monstrosity and a contradiction<sup>2</sup>. There can be only *One Independent Reality* and all else must be rigorously subordinated to it and deemed dependent. In true philosophic spirit then, he dichotomizes reality into Independent and Dependent, as has already been shown.

God or the Supreme Being in the Svatantra or the ONE AND ONLY INDEPENDENT SUBSTANCE, in the Spinozistic sense of the term<sup>3</sup>. All else, such as Prakṛti, Puruṣa, Kāla, Karma, Svabhāva is Paratantra. This dependence is metaphysical and fundamental to the very being and becoming of the Finite which can never outgrow it. The dependent reals exist no doubt from eternity (in the Vedānta), but they do so not in their *own right* but on sufferance of the Supreme. They are not in *despite* of the Lord, but because of Him.

द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।

यदनुग्रहतं सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया ॥

( Bhāg 11, 10, 12, quoted by M )

They owe their very existence, knowledge, activity etc., to Him. This clear definition of the status of the two reals Svatantra and Paratantra enables Madhva to effect a happy rapprochement between the claims of finite reality and the demands of the so called 'Monistic ideal' of the Upanisads, in terms of a mystic idealism. The significance of the Upanisadic concept of "*Ekam eva advitīyam (Brahma)*" and the language of transcendental monism of the Upanisads lies, according to Madhva, not in an

1 Cf " सर्वस्य स्वतन्त्रत्वे नित्यसुखादिप्रसङ्गः । अस्वातन्त्र्ये, न कस्यापि प्रवृत्तिः । अन्धमगुदत स्यादिति चेन्न, प्रत्यासत्तेरेवानुपपत्तेः । यदि सर्वमेव स्वतन्त्रं स्यात् तदा पारतन्त्र्यादिप्रतीतिविरोधः । नित्यसुखादिप्रसङ्गश्च । यदि वा परतन्त्रमेव तत्त्वं भवेत्तदा अनवस्थितेरसंभवाच्च न कस्यापि सत्तादिकं स्यात् । आगमविरोधाच्च ॥

( T. S. Tīkā, Jayatīrtha ).

2 " Monotheism is inevitable with any true conception of God. The Supreme can only be one. We cannot have two Supreme and unlimited beings " ( Radhakrishnan, I Phil 1, p 90 )

3. Of being *res completa*, " complete in itself, determined by itself and capable of being explained entirely by itself "

acosmistic monism of the type of Sankara's but in the thesis of the primacy of the Supreme as the centre of all reality—the explanation of the reality of all other reals (सत्यस्य सत्यम्) and of the eternity of other eternal (नित्यो नित्यानाम्) in short, the explanation of everything in the womb of Nature and of all Nature herself. The realisation of this truth impels a striving for the realisation of such a Being to the exclusion of all other ends, pursuits and attractions of finite life. The presence of finite reality thus acquires a teleological purpose and significance in the scheme of Upanisadic thought. Jayatirtha gives classical expression to this new metaphysical ideology of the Upanisads, adumbrated by Madhva

सर्वाण्यपि हि वेदान्वाक्यान्यसंख्येयकल्याणगुणाकरं सक्त्रदोषाधविधुरं परं ब्रह्म.....प्रतिपादयन्ति । तत्र ( १ ) कानिचित् सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वेश्वरत्वसर्वान्तर्यामित्यमीन्द्रियादिर्यादिगुणविशिष्टतया ( २ ) कानिचित् अपहृतपाप्मत्वनिर्दुःखत्वप्राकृतभौतिकविग्रहरहितत्वाद्विदोपाभावनविशिष्टतया ( ३ ) कानिचित् जतिगहनताज्ञापनाय वाङ्मनसागोचरत्वाकारेण ( ४ ) कानिचित् सर्वपरित्यागेन तस्यैवापादानाय अद्वितीयत्वेन ( ५ ) कानिचित् सर्वमत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तता प्रतिपत्त्यर्थं सर्वात्मकत्वेन, इत्येवमाद्यनेकप्रकारैः परमपुरुषं बोधयन्ति ॥

( *Nyaya Sudha*, on AV , p 124 )

“ All Upanisadic texts proclaim with one voice the majesty of the Supreme as a storehouse of numberless auspicious attributes and free from all imperfections. Of these, ( 1 ) some represent It as endowed with such ( positive ) attributes as omniscience, lordship of creatures, control of beings from within and other excellences, ( 2 ) others describe It *negatively* as free from such blemishes as sin and suffering and liability to material embodiment, ( 3 ) yet others speak of It as beyond the reach of mind and words, in order to bring home to us Its comparative inaccessibility, ( 4 ) many others depict It as the Only One that exists, so as to make it clear that man must seek It to the exclusion of all else, and ( 5 ) a few more proclaim It as the Being that partakes of the nature of all, so that It may be realised as being ultimately responsible for the existence, knowledge, activity etc. of them all. Thus do Scriptures depict the Brahman in diverse ways and from different standpoints all converging towards the one purpose (*mahatapatrya*)—the transcendent and immanent majesty of God in Himself in the Ātman and in the world ”

This means that as the *Only Independent Real* that exists, in its own right and in the highest sense of the term, the Supreme may well be and is at times, referred to in the Scriptures as the *One without a Second*, without any prejudice to the reality and subordinate existence of the finite selves, Prakṛti etc., which, as compared with the Supreme Reality, are *nought as it were* *Quo comparata nec pulchra sunt, nec bona sunt, nec sunt* as St Augustine so aptly puts it. This sentiment is heartily echoed by Madhva

नहि तदधीन पृथगित्येवोच्यते । ( *Brh Up* com 17, 4, 14 )

जगतो नास्तिता सैव या पराधीनता मता । ( *B T* ix, 28, 27 )

This conception of "Svatantra" and "Paratantra" checks all possibility of a 'hopeless Dualism' between the reals without in any way sacrificing the reality of the Finite. The unity, sovereignty and independence of God are thus made consistent with the claims of reason and the demands of metaphysics. A synthesis is thus arrived at which is at once an improvement on the abstract Monism of Śaṅkara on the one hand and a 'hopeless Dualism' on the other. This is Madhva's contribution to Vedāntic thought.

The English term "Dualism" is inadequate to express the full content and depth of meaning that Madhva has put into the term "Dvaita" as it is to be applied to his system. Even the Sanskrit term "Dvaita" is *not literally* capable of expressing *more than the number of fundamental principles accepted*<sup>1</sup>. The details of the mutual relation of the reals and their relative metaphysical status etc., must be supplied by special definition and clarification.

"व्याख्यानसो विशेषप्रतिपत्तिर्न हि सन्देहादलक्षणम्"

It may, therefore, be conceded that there is a good case for considering a more suitable philosophical designation for the system of Madhva.

I would venture to suggest "Svatantra advitiya Brahmapada" as an *alternative* designation for Madhva's system, capable of con-

1 Cf the use of the term, by Madhva himself in such contexts as  
द्वैतस्य सत्यता स्वत एव चेत् ( *AV* )



veying directly rather than by implication or definition, the highest reach of its thought and its metaphysical ideology so often stressed by Madhva and so well expounded by Jayatirtha. It would be seen that such a term would do justice to both the aspects of reality—the finite and the infinite. For, the term "Advitiya" has been interpreted by Madhva, in the *Chandogya Bhasya*, in terms of "absence of a peer and superior" to Brahman, conceding, by implication, the existence and reality of "lesser reals" like Matter and souls, under the aegis of God. The first part of the text has been taken to emphasise the unity of God head by excluding internal distinctions of substance and attributes in Brahman in conformity with texts like नेह नानास्ति किंचन which are understood as negating certain internal distinctions (*nanatva*) alone in Brahman. The only internal distinctions that are logically conceivable in Brahman, are those of attributes. This is negated by way of significant negation. The term "Svatantra" would thus serve to emphasise the transcendence of the Supreme over the other reals and show how the conception of Brahman, here, differs from the "Nirviśeṣadvaita" of Śaṅkara. It would also stand terminologically balanced with the designations of other Vedāntic systems like "Nirviśeṣadvaita", "Śuddhādvaita", and "Viśiṣṭadvaita". It would also lay direct emphasis on the primacy of the Supreme as the "Para Siddhānta" of Madhva's thought, and put the teachings about the finite in their proper place as constituting the "Apara siddhānta" (subsidiary truths)<sup>1</sup>. The name I suggested twenty years ago (in the AUJ and subsequently in my book "Svatantrādvaita", Madras 1942) has had the high Pontifical approval of the late Svāmī Satyadhyāna Tīrtha of the Uttaradī Mutt. Its adoption might help substantially in focussing attention on the highest metaphysical standpoint of the system to a greater extent and much more directly than the current designa-

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1 द्विविध सत्सिद्धांत । परापरमेदांत । ××× अनेनापरसिद्धान्तान्तरमाह ×××  
××× उपलक्षण चेतत् । प्रपचसत्यत्वादिकमपि ग्राह्यम् । (N S p 518b)

tion. It is for the followers of Madhva to consider the suggestion on its merits<sup>1</sup>




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1. In a recent Kannada publication on Madhva, entitled *Madhva-munisraya*, Dharwar 1958, Śrī Viśveśa Tīrtha, Svamiṇi of Pejawar Mutt, holds "Tattvavada" rather than "Dvaita" to be the authentic and traditionally accepted name for the system. But, then, "Tattvavada" would tell us nothing definite about the nature of "Tattva" according to Madhva. Moreover, "Tattvavada" itself in so far as it implies a repudiation of "Māyāvada" would emphasise only the reality of world experience, without touching the nature of the higher reality. In any way, his opinion that "Tattvavada" is the correct designation for the system is not correct. Vyāsarāya, in the colloquial style, has designated his system as "Dvaita" (द्वैत) and his Guru Śrīpadaraya, a leader of "Dvaita-thinkers" (द्वैतकुलतलर), as pointed out by me, elsewhere.



## CHAPTER II

### MANTRAS, BRAHMANAS AND ARANYAKAS

Madhva quotes profusely from the whole range of Vedic and Post-Vedic Literature—from the Vedic hymns and their *Khilas*, the *Brahmanas* *Āranyakas*, *Upanisads*, *Ekayana Śrutis*, *Epics*, *Puranas*, *Pancaratra Samhitas*, *Gita*, *Brahmasūtras* and a large body of interpretative and exegetical tracts based on these, in support of his line of interpretation on the Vedānta. It would be convenient to follow the course of development of religious and philosophical thought in these texts accepted by modern scholars in order to have a proper historical idea of the nature and extent of support that could legitimately be claimed in them for his viewpoint.

According to Madhva,<sup>1</sup> God is the One Supreme Reality. He is the Creator, Preserver etc., of the entire world of Matter and Soul. World experience is real. Souls are many and are dependent for ever on the Supreme. They are delivered from bondage by His grace. Salvation is a state of active enjoyment of supreme felicity. These pivotal points find good support in the Vedic hymns.

Viṣṇu is Madhva's equivalent of the God of religion, the Brahman of the Vedānta and the One Supreme Real (*Ekam Sat*) of the Vedas. He resolves the conflicting testimony of the Mantras, in respect of multiplicity of gods by (1) correlating the various descriptions of Vedic gods in cosmic terms, in the Mantras, to One Supreme who has been clearly recognised in R. V. 1, 164, 45 as the "Sarvanamavan" or the Being who is diversely sung by different names and is the "bearer of the names of all the gods" (x, 82, 3), and (2) by equating this "Sarvanāmavān" with Viṣṇu (understood in the etymological sense of the term), on the evidence of some of the hymns themselves (e.g. x, 82, 6). He

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1 Cf. the oft-quoted verse summarising his chief tenets:

‘श्रीमन्मध्वमत हरि परतर सत्य जगत्तत्त्वतो  
भिन्ना जीवगणा हरेरनुचरा नीचोच्चभाव गता ।  
मुक्तिरजसुखानुभूतिर्मला भक्तिश्च तत्साधन  
ह्यक्षादिनित्य प्रमाणमखिलाग्नायैकवद्या हरि ॥

thus steers clear of the difficulties of Polytheism and Kathenotheism in the Vedas, which face modern interpreters of Vedic thought and establishes after a wide discussion of the problem, that Monotheism ( of Visnu ) is the true faith of Vedic poets

### POSITION OF VISNU

( 1 ) In the opinion of modern scholars, however, Visnu occupies but a subordinate position in the Vedic Pantheon. He is lauded in far fewer hymns than addressed to other gods like Varuna, Indra and Agni. "He is celebrated in not more than five whole hymns (Suktas) and in part of another and his name occurs only about a hundred times altogether in the *Rg Veda*" (Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, p 37) In a large number of short passages, he is introduced just as one among a crowd of divinities from which he is in no way distinguished. Further, the R V. contains numerous hymns, in which the Rsis ascribe to Indra, Varuna and other gods, the same transcendental attributes and functions as to Visnu. In one place, R V viii, 12, 27, the power by which Visnu takes his three strides, is derived from Indra and in ix, 96, 5, he is said to have been generated by Soma. In his original setting in the R V ( i, 22, 17 and *Nirukta* xii 19 ), Visnu appears to have been nothing more than the Sun-god' (Muir, *Sanskrit Texts*, iv, p 98 )

The verdict of modern historical scholarship based on statistical evidence is not, thus, particularly favourable to Visnu. But it is conceded that "his personality there, is at the same time, more important than would appear from the statistical standard alone" (Macdonell, *Vedic Mythology*, p. 37) He is the god of the three strides. He dwells inscrutable in the realm of light where even the birds cannot fly ( i, 155, 5 ) To reach the highest step of Visnu, is the ambition of man, in the Upanisads, too ( *Katha* i, 3, 1 ) Visnu is entrusted with the task of delivering from distress ( v, 149, 13 ) The *Yajur Veda* identifies the yajña with Visnu. In the *Śatapatha Brahmana*, ( v, 2, 5, 2-3 ) men are said to be Visnus. He is the helper of the gods as against the Asuras, in the *At Br.* He becomes a dwarf, to recover the earth from the Asuras, for the gods ( Ś B i, 2, 5, 3 )<sup>1</sup>.

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1. Radhakrishnan, I. Phil i, 492-3.

From the beginning, then, Visnu appears to have been marked out for a great future. The opening line of the *Āitareya Brahmana* of the *R V*

अग्निर्वै देवानामवमो विष्णु परम<sup>1</sup> । तदन्तरा सर्वा देवता ॥

bears testimony to the fact that by the close of the *Rg Vedic* period, Visnu had definitely come to be accepted as the head of the *Vedic Pantheon*. No wonder that he had earlier attained to a position of such warm affection in the hearts of the Seers as to be thought of and mentioned in terms of high regard in *Monotheistic circles*. 1, 164, 36. *Monotheism* is the acknowledgment and worship of the One True God. It implies a denial of other gods, at any rate, of their jurisdiction over the Cosmos. It was not the way of the Hindu mind to rise to the apogee of *Christian Monotheism* by *denying* the national gods. "The Seers of the *Rg Veda* were interested in discovering a single creative principle behind all phenomena, itself uncreated and imperishable. The only logical way of establishing such a *Monotheism* was by subordinating the gods to One Highest Controlling Spirit, which is immanent everywhere (  $\sqrt{vis}$  ) envelopes all (  $\sqrt{vr}$  ) and which regulates the workings of all other powers and gods<sup>2</sup>. This process satisfied the craving for One God and yet allowed them to keep up their continuity with the past. Indian thought, however daring and sincere, was never hard and rude. It didn't usually care to become unpopular and generally made compromises"<sup>3</sup>.

1 There can be no doubt that "Parama" signifies the "highest" and not merely the "first". See विष्णु परम उत्तम । "दयताना सङ्गतानामुत्तमो विष्णुरासीत्" इति मन्त्र । (Sādgurusīśya's com on *A B*, Uni of Travancore Ser cxlix, 1942). Vide also similar uses या ते धामानि परमाणि (*Rv* x 81, 5)

2 Vide विवेश भूतानि चराचराणि (*T A* x 1 1.)

" यच्च किञ्चिज्जगत्सर्वं दृश्यते श्रूयतेऽपि वा ।

अन्तर्बहिश्च तत्सर्वं व्याप्य नारायण स्थित ॥

,, तत्र तत्र स्थितो विष्णु तत्तच्छक्तिप्रबोधक ।

एक एव महाशक्ति कुरुते सर्वमञ्जसा ॥ (Madhva, *AV.*)

3. S Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil*, 1 p 92.



The precise identity of the One Supreme, however, gave no end of trouble to earnest seekers, then, as now. The so called Henotheism of Vedas was just one of the attempts to arrive at such a precision. But its very shifting uncertainty was the cause of its failure. Henotheism was either Polytheism grown cold in service or an opportune Monotheism. In neither case could it give real satisfaction. It had only put off,—but not answered the question कस्मै देवाय हविषा विधेम ?

It was necessary, in order to do so, to find a basis on which the position of the minor gods could be reduced to subordination to the One Supreme. What was to be the principle or criterion on which the supremacy of the One was to be grounded ? That was the whole point. The weakness of Henotheism had been that it had grounded the subordination of other gods to One, more on individual fancy or the passing moods of the hour than on any logical criterion of divine supremacy. The only criterion of such primacy that could possibly be advanced, was what may be termed the principle of “Sarvanamata” as Madhva has so happily phrased it, which came to be clearly adumbrated in the later Mandalas of the *Rg Veda*.

१. इन्द्र मित्र वरुणमग्निमाहु

एक सत् विद्वा बहुधा वदन्ति । (R. V 1, 164, 46)

२. यो देवाना नामधा एक एव (x, 82 3)

The Supreme was the One lauded by all the names of the other gods

Madhva takes his stand on these texts and tries to identify the Sarvanamavān with Visnu. But the identification rests not so much on any express declaration to that effect in the *Rg Veda* as upon the allusion to certain significant personal characteristics of Visnu (मन्त्रलिङ्ग) that are discernible there, according to him अजस्यनामावध्येकमपि यस्मि विश्वा भुवनानि तस्यु (x, 82, 6)

1 Madhva's interpretation of नामधा as "bearer of the names of the gods ( instead of as "giver of names " ) is supported by Śāyana on *Atharva Veda* II, 1, 1, 3 तत्तन्नामानि स्वयमेव धत्ते इति नामधा । तथाचाम्नायन—‘तदेवाग्निस्तदु चन्द्रमा । इन्द्र मित्र ..’ । ‘एक सत्विद्वा’ इति ॥

इति हि दिष्णोर्लिङ्गम्<sup>1</sup> । (M B S B )

As for the other text एक सत विप्रा बहुधावदन्ति (1 164, 46) he draws pointed attention to the express mention of Visnu in terms of unmistakable supremacy, earlier in the same *sukla* सप्तार्चगर्भा<sup>2</sup> भुवनस्य रेतो विष्णोस्तिष्ठन्ति प्रदिशा दिघर्मणि (1, 164 36) This is a point which could not be easily passed over

As for more objective criteria of the Supreme, Madhva enumerates some, which he finds fulfilled in Visnu, more than in any other god of the Vedic Pantheon, in Vedic and post Vedic evidences.<sup>3</sup> But the fact remains that there is no express equation of Visnu with the "Sarvanāmavan" except in a Khila of the Bhallavis

नामानि सर्वाणि यमाविशन्ति त वै विष्णु परममुदाहरन्ति ।

cited by him (in his bhāṣya on B S 1, 1, 1) But the allusion to Visnu (as the Sarvanāmavan) in x 82 6, is endorsed by a passage in the *Mahābhārata*, xii, 47, 58 (Kumbakonam Edn )

The "Being in the Waters" (later Nārāyaṇa) had, by the time of the Nāsadiya Sūta, come to be regarded as the Supreme :

सलिल सर्वमा इद । आनीदवात स्वधया तदेक

तस्माद्वाग्यन्न पर किंच नास । (x, 129, 3 and 2 cd).

एक सुपर्ण स समुद्रमाविवेश । (x, 114, 4)

This Being stands sharply distinguished from both of the Four-faced Brahma and Rudra and many other gods, in the Ambhrin Sūta (x, 125 )

य कामये त तमुग्र कृणोमि त ब्रह्माण तमृषि त मुमेधाम् ।

and in T A iii, 11, 1 These, combined with the testimony of

1 Cf J Gonda *Aspects of Early Visnuism*, p 89.

2 In his recent study of the "Asya Vāmasya Hymn" of the Rg Veda, ( Ganesh and Co, Madras, 1956 ) Dr C Kunhan Raja confesses that " we don't know the exact significance of the seven-fold seed of creation of the world " referred to in this hymn and that we have "lost the clue to the correct interpretation of the poem and do not know many of the symbols and conventions of those days" (Introd pp xxxv and xxxviii) The identification of the 'seven seeds' of creation as the seven evolutes of Prakṛti, in the Madhva tradition, might therefore be deemed certainly helpful in interpreting this line

3 See his *Mbh T. N* (p 3), AV (p 26) and his VTN.

the Post-Vedic literature, which uniformly applies the name "Nārāyaṇa" as a synonym of the primordial being in the waters, to Viṣṇu, leads Mādḥva to assume that he alone, had, from the beginning, the highest claims to be treated as the Supreme Being of Hindu religious philosophy

(ii) The doctrine of 'Sarvanāmavān' did not do away with the other gods. They were not banished. They were simply brought into a position of subordinate relation to the One Supreme, as created by the One (x, 129, 6, 125, 1-2 90, 13) 'as sharers in one life (x, 121 7) or as obedient subjects (x, 121 2, 8, 90, 2) or as ministers of One Lord (x 72, 7, 81, 4). In this capacity, they were not unlike the *malachim* angels in the Old Testament" (Griswold, *Brahman, A Study* 1900, p 54). This is attested by the Brāhmanas, Āranyakas and the Upaniṣads

अग्निर्वै देवानामवमो विष्णु परम	(A B i, 1)
तस्मै त्वा, तेभ्यस्त्वा	(T B iii, 7, 9, 4)
भीषास्माद्वात पवते भीषोदेति सूर्य	(Taitt Up ii, 8)

The love of the national gods and the conservatism of the masses would have proved too strong for the development of any other type of Monotheism in India. Belief in the Sarvanāmavān could be made consistent with the admission of the existence of 'minor' gods, only by agreeing to a dual application of names (*vrtti dvaya*) in their primary and secondary senses. It would be obvious that such a theory of Vedic interpretation forms the basis of the Samanvayadhyāya of the *Brahmasūtras*. Mādḥva successfully adopts it in his interpretation of not only the Sūtras, but of the Vedic hymns as well. He finds anticipations of this approach in such texts as

कश्छन्दसा योगमावद धीर (x, 114, 9)  
 अवस्वराति गर्गरो गोघा परिसनिष्वदत् ।  
 विदुषा पस्विनिष्वददि द्राघ ब्रह्मोद्यम (viii, 49, 9)  
 सर्वे वेदा सर्वे घोषा एकैव व्याहृति प्राणमृच इत्येव विद्यात्  
 (A Ā II, 2, 2).

and clear evidence of its acceptance in अग्निश्चो वायो

तस्मै सोममेभ्यो जुहोमि ( )  
 यो देवाना देवतमस्तपोजा । तस्मै त्वा तेभ्यस्त्वा (T B iii, 7, 9, 4)



## HIERARCHY OF GODS

Tho' we have a tacit acquiescence in the preeminence of One Supreme Being over all other gods, there is in the Mantras, no systematic hierarchy of the gods worked out. There are references to the comparative thralldom and inferiority of many of them<sup>1</sup> Rudra, is in R. V. vii, 40, 5, said to have owed his position to Visnu<sup>2</sup> Some of the major Upanisads, notably *Iśa* and *Chandogya* are conscious of gradation among the gods. The *Taittiriya Up.* affirms, what has been called a 'beatific calculus' and in that connection, grades the gods, Gandharvas, Pitrs, Ājanadevas, Indra, Brhaspati and Brahma in an ascending order. Madhva sees in this a gradation of released souls. But it is only in the Ekayana and Pañcaratra texts cited by him, that we see a full fledged scheme of Devata tārātamyā.

## ETHICS

There is no sign of aversion to the world nor a feverish anxiety to get rid of life on earth in the R. V.<sup>3</sup> The Vedic people had complete confidence in their gods to make their life on earth pleasant and comfortable in every way and bestow on them worldly goods, cattle and progeny. They were not over anxious about the "other world" and were at peace enough with themselves and the world around to pray for a hundred years of life<sup>4</sup>. The note of pessimism of later Upanisads is still absent<sup>5</sup>. The doctrine of transmigration had not yet become an obsession and consequently there was no problem of bondage or a systematic code of Sādhana. But a certain yearning for spiritual knowledge could be detected in texts like यस्त न वेद किमुचा करिष्यति { R. V. i, 164, 39, and in

1 R. V. ii, 38, 9, x, 125, 8, x, 86, 1, ii, 12, 7,

2. See the interpretation of Yamuna, in his *Āgama Pramanya*, p. 44 and of Madhva (AV)

3 R. V. i, 1, 6

4. जीवेम शतम् शतम्

5 "The early Vedic Āryans were full of the zest for life. The vitality and affirmation of life pervading them, are extraordinary" Jawaharlal Nehru, *Discovery of India*, p. 78

R V 1, 164, 5 6 ) The attainment of the world of Yama<sup>1</sup> or of Visnu<sup>2</sup> sometimes was the recognised goal of man. This could be achieved either by pleasing the gods or by sacrifices ( vii 48, 3 ). There was no mention of Bhakti or Jñāna as technical aids to salvation. Germs of the Bhakti<sup>3</sup> doctrine could however be detected in the striking expression “*bhaga bhaktasya*” met with in R V 1, 24, 5, its accent notwithstanding. But it was only in the Upanisads that the nature of God, the world and the souls was fully sought to be elucidated and definite places assigned to Bhakti, Jñāna etc<sup>4</sup>. The earliest recognition of Bhakti is in the *Svetāśvatara*, vi, 23,, tho’ a Khila of the Bhāllavis, cited by Madhva, refers to Bhakti as the sole and only means of salvation<sup>5</sup>. Full fledged eschatological theories also came to be formulated only during the age of the Upanisads, tho’ stray but specific references to the two paths of Devayāna and Pitryāna and to repeated births in this world are found in R V 1, 164, 30-31, 38 and in x, 18, 3, 19, 1; 88, 15, etc.

## HEAVEN AND HELL

There are several passages which lie scattered in the R. V., out of which one could piece together a rosy picture of the joys of Heaven and gruesome pictures of the horrors of hell. Madhva has naturally drawn on these in setting forth his idea of Moksha and of Tamas ( Hell ). Heaven is said to be the abode of eternal,

१ एका यमस्य भुवने विरापाद्.

२ R V Kh ix, 113 1

३ H D Velankar, in his work in Marathi, ‘*Rgvedant’l Bhaktimārga*, Poona, 1952, admits (p 70) that the quality and aim of devotion met with in the hymns of the R V are different and much below the mark associated with the classical Bhakti of later times. He has, however, drawn attention to some interesting passages like i, 24, 1, 62, 11 and vii, 22, 5, giving touching expression to devotion. It is curious, however, that he should have passed over i, 24, 5

४. ‘विद्ययाभूतमश्नुते’ । नान्य पथा विद्यतेऽप्यनाय । ‘विद्यैवतु निर्धारणात्’.

५. ‘भक्तिरेवं न नमति, भक्तिरेवं न दशमति, भक्तिवत् पुरुष’ (M B. S B iii, 3, 54)



unalloyed bliss.<sup>1</sup> There is no support in the R. V., for the monistic conception of the released state as one of isolation, devoid of all company and subject-object consciousness. The authors of the hymns do not evince any sympathy with the desire to get rid of all action, personal existence and enjoyment, in the life to come.

The conception of Hell is equally well-defined in the R. V. It is known by its proper name. "Naraka", with all its horrors and tortures, is familiar enough in the A. V. xii, 4, 36 and V. S, 30, 5. The impious enemies of the gods and unbelieving folk are smashed and annihilated by Indra : घ्नन् शिश्नदेवानभिवर्षसा भूत् (x, 99, 3). They are to be eternally shut out from the truth : मा शिश्नदेवा अपि गुह्यं नः (vii, 21, 5). In R. V. vii, 104, we read :

"Burn, slay, pierce and hurl down the malefactors into bottomless darkness. Let them boil like cauldron on flames. Punish them with your deadly thunderbolt, with your scorching darts. Give them over to the lap of Nirrti. Sweep them away with all their offspring. Let them sink without a sound underneath the might of the worlds" <sup>2</sup>. Indra is conjured to put down with a heavy hand, the undeserving and the Satanic who get on so well in this life, in spite of their wickedness and aspire for Heaven :

मायाभिरुत्तिसृप्सत इन्द्र द्यामारुह्यतः

अव दस्यूनघ्नूथाः (viii, 14, 14).

He puts down the wicked and the unholy and seldom tolerates their undeserved successes in life :

शृण्वे वीर उग्रमुग्रं दमायन् अन्यमन्यमतिनेनीयमानः ।

1. यन्नानन्दाश्च मोदाश्च मुदः प्रमुद आसते ।

देवैः सुकृतकर्मभिस्तत्र माममृतं कृधि ॥ (ix, 113, 1.)

\* \* \* \* \*

यत्र कामा निकामाश्च यत्र व्रध्नस्य विष्टपम् ।

स्वधा च यत्र तृप्तिश्च तत्र माममृतं कृधि (ix, 113, 10.)

Cf. also R. V. x, 135; AV. iii, 29, 3; JB xiv, 7, 1, 32-33.

2. Tr. Ranade *Creative Period in the History of I. Phil.*, p. 27. These passages have been cited by Trivikrama Panditācārya, in his com. on Madhva's *B. S. B.* i, 2, 12. See also *S. B.* 11, 6, 1; *JB.* i, 42, 4.

एषमानद्विद् उभयस्य राजा चीप्स्यते विश इन्द्रो मनुष्यान् ॥ (vi, 47, 16).

Many of these texts have come in handy for Madhva to formulate his theory of the tripartite classification of souls and their innate distinction and the eternal punishment of the sworn enemies of Theism. R V vi, 47, 16, refers to three kinds of beings (1) those whom Indra leads on to Heaven, (2) those whom he repeatedly drags down, and (3) those whom he keeps weltering in the world, thus anticipating, in a remarkable manner, Madhva's theory of Trividhajīvas, consisting of Muktiyogya, Tamoyogya and Nitya samsārins. It is obvious that Hell like Heaven, was in the R V both eternal and beginningless.<sup>1</sup> The "seven hells" of the *Pedānta Sūtra* iii, 1, 15, and the gruesome accounts of the different hells in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* (ii, 6, 25) the *Mahābhārata* (xiii 2 23-25) and the *Garuda Purāṇa* (ii, 2, 3, 3-104) are later developments along the same lines.

### COSMOGONIC THEORIES OF THE VEDAS

(i) The cosmogonic theories of the Vedas are mostly realistic. Several gods like Indra, Varuna and Savitr are spoken of as authors of the world. The process of creation is likened to the art of the carpenter or the smith, but more often, it is a procreative act यो न पिता जनिता (x 82 3)<sup>2</sup> "The origin of the world is conceived in three different ways, as a process of generation as a process of architecture and as a process of sacrificial dismemberment. The notion of building underlies the names Tvasta Viśvakarman (all worker), Dhātṛ and Vidhātṛ (ordainer, creator). It also underlies the question in x, 81, 4, from what material (*Vanam Vrksa*) the world, conceived as a house, was built. Closely con-

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1 The expression "अनारमणे तमसि" is actually to be met with in R V vii, 104, 3. Does it however, merely signify 'supportless' as in R V i, 116, 5 a? The *Viṣṇurāhṣya* puts the argument for eternal hell thus

अयमा वस्तमो यायाद्यदनारमणश्रुतो ।

अनन्त यद्यमित्युक्तं न परावर्तते यत ॥

(P 50 ver 102 Ms. with me)

2 Which, therefore, rules out the material causality of God, according to Madhva अद्वितीयं तत्सर्वमेव विश्वात्मना भव (AV)

connected with this is the conception of the world as a work of creative smith who forges or welds together heaven and earth ( x, 81, 3; 72, 3 ) In these representations we have the argument from design in its crudest form. But the dominant conception of the world is as a process of generation. Thus, whatever is (Sat) is born, including Heaven and earth, Sun and Moon ( x, 90, 13 ), the four Vedas ( 90, 9 ), law and truth ( 190, 91 ) the animals ( 90, 10 ) the gods ( 72, 15 ) original matter conceived as Infinite (Aditi, x, 72, 4) and as primordial watery chaos ( 121, 9 , x, 190, 1 and 90, 5 )"<sup>1</sup>.

In the words of a distinguished historian of Indian philosophy, "there is no basis for any conception of the unreality of the world, in the hymns of the *Rg Veda*"<sup>2</sup>. No doubt, the expression "Mayā" occurs, but it merely conveys the idea of mysterious power, as when Indra is said to have assumed many forms on account of his power इन्द्रो मायाभि पुरुरूप ईयते ( R V. vi, 47, 18 ). Mayā does certainly signify some kind of power, magical or other, in such texts as मायाभिरुत्तिसृप्त ( viii, 14, 4 ). According to Macdonell, "the term signifies occult power, applicable in a good sense to gods and in a bad sense to demons. It has an almost exact parallel in the English word 'craft', which, in its old significance meant occult power, magic, skilfulness, and art, on the one hand and deceitful skill, vile, on the other. By occult power, Varuna standing in the air, measures out the earth with the Sun, as with a measure. . . . And so, the epithet "Mayī", "crafty", is chiefly applied to Varuna among the gods : R. V. vi, 48, 14, vii, 28, 4; x, 99, 10, x, 147, 5"<sup>3</sup>.

The Vedic poets were fully imbued with the beauty and majesty of creation and had been more or less forced by sheer admiration into the consciousness of an All-Powerful Being who could be the author of such a stupendous handiwork.

इय विसृष्टियंत आवभूव ( x, 129, 7 )

A sublime wonder was the father of philosophy in this case. The variety and magnitude of creation, not to say its reality, points to the excellence and sovereignty of the Creator. It would

1. Griswold, *Brahman, A Study*, 1900, p 38

2. S. Radhakrishnan, *I Phil.*, 1 p 103.

3. *Vedic Mythology*, p 24.



appear that we have almost the beginnings of the teleological argument here. The reality of creation is, of course, an obvious presumption in such an argument.

(1) In this connection, we have to consider the Nasadiya Sukta, which is believed by some to "overcome dualistic metaphysics in a higher monism"<sup>1</sup>. The hymn is a rare example of sustained thought, tho' Macdonell thinks, "it has all the defects of the Indian mind, such as its indefiniteness and its tendency to make reasoning depend on mere words"<sup>2</sup>. According to another estimate, the hymn "brings out the inadequacies of our thought-categories to unravel the mysteries of the Universe and establishes the Absolute as its ground"<sup>3</sup>. Sāyana has given a Monistic interpretation to this Sukta, equating "Tamas" mentioned there, with the "Māyā" of the Advaita. Madhva, in his *Tattvodyota*, has disputed the monistic interpretation and tried to give it a Theistic interpretation. Without lingering over the exact sense of the opening terms "Sat" and "Asat"<sup>4</sup>, we may note that the spirit of the Sukta is more theistic than strictly "Advaitic". Tamas is admitted to have existed (तम असौत्) side by side with the One-breathing windless by its own power. It is impossible to resist the feeling that this "Tamas" is the prototype of the Prakṛti of the later Sāṃkhya<sup>5</sup>. There is no room for any illusionism or a colourless monism in all this.

The creative process is no doubt taken to start "automatically" out of the desire of the One. But that does not mean the denial of a pre-existent matter. *Tama asit*. The One sets the Other in motion by the sheer power of its will (*Kama*) and the latter unfolds itself. This will is spontaneous in that it is unconditioned by anything in the nature of the other. It is in this

1. S. Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.*, 1 p. 103.

2. *History of Sanskrit Literature*, p. 137.

3. S. Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.*, 1 p. 101.

4. *The Brh. Up.* II, 3, 2, 3 gives them a technical sense of "Mūṛta" and "Amūṛta", which is followed by Madhva.

5. Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas*, HOS, 37, p. 533. Cf. also the reference to the seven seeds of creation in S 164, 36 which remind us of the seven evolutes of Prakṛti in Sāṃkhya.

sense that the creative process itself is "automatic". And when the hymn goes on to say that the One breathed windless, by itself by its own power (स्वधया), there certainly is the implication that the "other" i. e. "Tamas", lacked such power of self-driven activity. We have here the germ of the idea of 'Svatantra' as the highest Real. If the very existence of a *second* principle were unacceptable to the poet, he would have worded the concluding line accordingly as तस्माद्धान्यन्न किं च नास instead of as तस्माद्धान्यन्न परः किंचनास. This additional term "Para", suggests that what is sought to be denied is *not* the merest existence of an "other" beside the One, but the existence of anything "above" or "higher" than that One, i. e. to say "independent" of it. This force of "Para" could be easily seen in a parallel passage of the *Gītā* : भूतः परतर नान्यकिंचिदस्ति (vii,7). We have already seen that the existence of "Tamas" as a principle has been conceded in the hymn. On the whole, the Sūkta seems to establish that the Supreme is the One independent Real and that matter is dependent. The words of B. S. सत्त्वाच्चावरस्य (ii, i, 16) seem to embody the same idea.

There is thus no possibility of a "Vivartavāda", in this<sup>1</sup> or any other Sūkta of the *Rg Veda*. It is equally misleading to see in *Ekam sad viprā*..R. V. i, 164, 46, any germs of a philosophical monism, as Radhakrishnan does ( *I. Phil.* i, p. 94 ). For, as Kunhan Raja rightly points out, " the context is about the gods known by different names and *not* about the reality of the Universe " ( *Arya Vāmasya Hymn*, introd. p. xxxv ). The acceptance of the two categories of "Tamas" and "the one" ( *Tad ekam* ) would seem to lead up legitimately to "Prakṛtyupādāna" and "Īśvara-nimittakāraṇa" theories. Prof. Ranade's remark<sup>2</sup>, that "in the description of how things stood before creation, we get perhaps, the earliest germs of what later developed into the *Parināmavāda* or doctrine of evolution", comes as a partial confirmation of this. In any case, it would not be correct to interpret the passage as establishing

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1. The Sūkta speaks of "kāma" as the seed of creation. No "vivarta" is brought about by the deliberate "wish" of the substrate.

2. *Op. cit.*, ii, 24.

that "the Absolute Reality which is not characterizable as "Sat" or "Asat", (existent or non-existent), is at the back of the world" <sup>1</sup> For, the opening lines "नासदासीन्नो सदासीत्" in which such negatives are employed, have no reference to the Absolute reality "which is at the back of the world", but to the world itself and its constituent elements like *Rajas vyoman* etc. The Absolute reality itself must indeed be characterizable as "Sat" and has been so characterized, not only in the very act of describing it as an "Absolute Reality" but also in the text तस्माद्धान्यतपर किंचनास and elsewhere आत्मावा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत् । ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीत् । सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् । It would be "sham profundity", as one European critic puts it, to deny even reality or existence to the Absolute. That would throw the Absolute straight into the arms of the "Anirvacaniya", as has been rightly pointed out by Madhva. If the residual Absolute, were neither *Sat* nor *Asat*, it would turn out to be *Anirvacaniya*, i.e., "mithyā", a position which the Indian Monist could ill afford to concede.

We may, therefore, conclude that the reality of the world was taken for granted in the Mantras and that there was no need to establish it with special arguments or emphasis. It is impossible to evade the spirit of realism that pervades a host of texts like the following :

यच्चिकेत सत्यमित् (x, 55, 6) विद्व सत्यम् (ii 24, 6)

प्र धान्वस्य महतो महानि सत्या सत्यस्य करणानि (ii, 15, 1)

ध्रुवा पृथिवी (x, 173, 4) सुपारक्षन् सतो अस्य राजा (vii 88, 6)

ध्रुवासु तासु क्षितिषु क्षियन्तो. (vii, 88, 7).

Some of the above have naturally been cited by Madhva. They may not all of them have been uttered with any conscious or deliberate intention to emphasize the reality of the world, but they speak volumes in favor of an undying and universal faith in a realistic world. Such casual and unintentional testimony is all the more valuable and convincing.

## BRĀHMANAS AND ĀRANYAKAS

(1) During the period of the Brāhmanas, the science of sacrifice and the institution of priesthood gained dominance and as the



interest was mainly sacrificial, no significant advance in higher religion or metaphysics had been made.

But the urge for speculation could not be stifled altogether, sacrifice or no sacrifice. A sense of dissatisfaction with the routine of study and sacrifice was in the air : तद्धेतुस्तद्विद्वान्तो विद्वानो ऋषयः काव-  
पेया आहुः किमर्थो वयमध्येष्यामहे किमर्थो वयं यक्ष्यामह इति । (A. Ā. III. 2-3). Tho' the Brāhmanas did not plunge directly into speculative waters, they paved the way for it to some extent, by their mystic approach to the details of the sacrifice. They assumed a mystic correspondence between things and resorted frequently to fanciful etymology in search of such correspondence. Logical and scientific thought is based on scrutiny of facts of experience, noting differences and avoiding false or facile generalisations. But the early stages of Vedic thought abound in crude and sweeping generalisations based on insufficient and often specious data, slurring over points of difference and ending in identifications bold and bald. "We see in them symbolism gone mad. Everything is equated with everything else. They illustrate the fact that ritualism thrives on symbolism. Still, the wild and incoherent identifications of the Brāhmanas, indicate at least the general trend and direction of Indian speculation".<sup>2</sup> "The religion of the Brāhmanas became overloaded with symbolic subtleties. Every act done, every syllable uttered at a ceremony was important" (Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil*, i, p. 125). But by widening the scope of Polytheism, they were making a steady, if also unconscious, approach to the great truth of everything in the world being permeated by one uniform divine principle. Their innate desire to see correspondences even where they were hidden from profane eyes and thro' them to bridge the gulf between the varying data of sense perception and the requirements of the religious consciousness raises them above the level of wooden sacrificialism with which they are so widely, but uncharitably, identified. The value of these new approaches was soon to be realised in the Āraṇyakas, which probably under the impact of strong opposition to the basic sacrificial cult of the Brāhmanas, tended to lead the course of speculation more and more into mystic and meditative channels and finally ended by replacing their objective and concrete sacrifi-

1. R. V. i, 67, 5; 70, 8; 129, 7; 190, 3; ii, 6, 32; iv, 17, 5; v, 45, 7; 73, 0; viii, 2, 37; 62, 12; vi, 67, 10; ix, 92, 5.

2. Griswold, op. cit, p. 37.

cialism by an abstract and symbolic one. Dim and distant echoes of these new ideas are to be found in the Brahmanas themselves.

"Thought was the ladle, intelligence the ghee, speech the altar, study the grass, insight the fire, knowledge the priest who enkindles, breath the oblation, chanting the Adhvaryu, Vācaspati the Hotr and mind the Upavaṅktr"<sup>1</sup> (*At. Br.* V, 25) Here, we see the Brahmana sacrificialism already tending towards the path of symbolic sacrifice and meditation which were soon to become the regular features of the Aranyakas and partially also of the *Upanisads*. Small wonder, then, that the first chapter of the second Aranyaka of the *Atareya*, should begin with the memorable words एष पन्था एष कर्मतत्सत्यम् । 'He is the way', 'He is the Karma and later on observe', एत ह्येव बहुचा महत्युक्ते मीमासन्ते . (A. Ā III. 2, 3), which recall the words of the Bible "I am the way, and the Truth and the Life" (*John*, xii, 25). There is a movement in all this from naive pluralism to higher Monotheism that is as yet undefined and which may be taken to reach its fulfilment in the Antaryami Brāhmaṇa of the *Bṛhadaranyaka*.

(ii) The Āranyakas were, by their very nature, treatises meant for study in the seclusion of forests,<sup>2</sup> and were cast in a mystic mould. Allegorical interpretation of sacrifices, symbolism, fanciful etymologies<sup>3</sup> of names for purposes of meditation, were the rule in them. A revolt against the concrete sacrificialism of the *Brāhmaṇas* had already been set on foot. It must be said to the credit of the Āranyakas that they succeeded in giving a spiritual turn to the prevailing mysticism and symbolism of the *Brahmanas*. Attention, as a result, was shifted from the sacrifices *per se* to the Supreme Being who was upheld as the centre of all sacrifice and goal of human effort. One or two instances of this far reaching transformation in outlook may be noted.

१. एत ह्येव बहुचा महत्युक्ते मीमासन्ते, एतमन्नावध्वयेव, एत महाव्रते छन्दोगा एतमस्यामेत दिदि एत वायी, एतमावाशे एतमप्स्वेतमोषधीषु . . सर्वेषु भूतेष्वेतमेव ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते" (A. Ā III, 2, 3)

1. Tr. Ranade, *Constructive Survey of I. Phil*, ii p 51.

२ अरण्याध्ययनाच्चैवमारण्यवर्मितोर्यते (*Surośvara, Bṛhadaranyaka*).

3 *Chan Up* viii, 5, 1-2, *Bṛh Up.* i, 1, 1, "We are asked to meditate on the horse sacrifice" Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil*, i, 148.

२ एतदस्मै विद्वांसो ऋषयः कावपेया आहुः किमर्था वयमध्येष्यामहे किमर्था वयं यक्ष्यामह इति ॥ ( *ibid* III, 2, 6 )

३ ऋचोऽक्षरे परमे व्योमन् यस्मिन्देवा अधिविश्वे निषेदुः ।

यस्त न वेद किमुच्चा करिष्यति ? ( R. V 1, 164, 37 )

The old doctrine of “ *Ekam Sad Viprō bahudhā vadanti* ”, was still further extended and harnessed to the spiritual mysticism of the day by attuning everything to God सर्वे वेदा सर्वे घोषा एकैव व्याहृति प्राणऋच इत्येव विद्यात्<sup>1</sup> ॥ ( *A. A.* II, 2, 2 ) The erratic etymologies of *Brahmanas* also, were given a similar turn and the pursuit of the Brahman thro’ all forms of worship and meditation, came to be recognised. In an age of suspicion and distrust of the aboriginal non Aryan<sup>2</sup>, a mystic garb was deliberately given to the utterances of the *Āranyakas*, in order to have the truths confined to the select few. “For the gods love the indirect mode of exposition and hate the direct”<sup>3</sup>. These elaborate precautions taken to keep the esoteric truths closely guarded, were evidently the beginnings of the doctrine of “ *Adhikāra* ”, of later times

1 This text has been fully utilised by Madhva in favor of his far reaching application of the doctrine of *Sarvasabda saman-  
vaya*, in *Brahman*

२ विद्या ह वै ब्राह्मणमाजगाम गोपाय मा क्षेवधिष्टेऽहमस्मि ।

अनार्यकायानृजवेऽयताय न मा ब्रूया ऋजवे ब्रूहि नित्यम् ॥

( *Āhīlasrutī*, Yāska, *Nirukta* )

In *A. B. XXXIII. 6*, the *Āndhras* are included among Non Aryan Dasyus

३ परोक्षप्रिया इव हि देवा प्रत्यक्षद्विष ( *A. Ā. II, 4, 3* ).



## CHAPTER III

### EARLY UPANISADS

(1) The historical traces of the intimate connection between the *Aranyakas* and the *Upanisads* would show how naturally should the air of mysticism, secrecy and symbolism that pervaded the former, have passed on to their logical and chronological successors the *Upanisads*. The latter interpret the sacrifices and allegorize them. In some passages we are asked to meditate on the horse sacrifice. This is as good as performing one. Such meditation helps one to realise the inner purpose of sacrifice. The detailed description of the 'kind of plank, the nature of the wood and references to the number of bricks, their kind and manner of arrangement (या इष्का यावतीर्वा यथा वा *Katha*) show that they were not yet indifferent to sacrifices. But while adhering to their forms they try to improve and refine their spirit. Sacrifices are necessary at a certain stage. But they alone will not do. They have to be harnessed to the soul sense तमेत वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन (*Brh Up* iv 4 22). Else, they would prove to be frail boats across the Ocean of Samsara प्लवा ह्येते अदृढा यज्ञरूपा । (*Mund* 1 2 7). The theme of the *Upanisads* is thus *Jnana*. They condemn the narrow view which is responsible for the performance of rites and sacrifices with the sole object of getting large returns of outward good in this or another life. They set themselves resolutely against the mechanical conception of *Dharma* and *Karma* of the *Brahmanas*. But they are not explicit about "work as worship of God", tho' the idea may be traced to *Isa Up* 1.

(2) We find in the *Upanisads* a steady advance on the Vedic and *Brāhmana* conception of future life. While the *Brāhmanas* allowed for future life only in the next world, the *Upanisads* extended it to this world also.

While the *Mantras* merely sang the glories of the gods and the *Brāhmanas* elaborated the sacrifices whereby to please them,



and the *Aranyakas* meditated on their deeper significance, the *Upanisads* turned attention to the actual problems of religion and philosophy and questions of the interrelation of the data of life here with the life beyond, the nature and limitations of personality, of the ultimate destiny of man, his relation to the world of experience, the status of the gods and the necessity for assuming a Transcendental Principle underlying all phenomena and its relationship to the embodied spirit

( iii ) While the method of treatment was laudatory in the *Mantras* and mandatory in the *Brahmanas* here in the *Upanisads*, the mystic method of the *Aranyakas* was blended<sup>1</sup> with the illustrative<sup>1</sup> Metaphysical discussions were couched in highly elusive terminology<sup>2</sup> with a good deal of apparent contradiction between the opening and the ending<sup>3</sup>, between the crisp, sententious conclusions and the loose, roundabout premises arguments and analogies leading to them. This may be seen to be the case with most of the texts at issue, later, between Monism and Dualism

( iv ) While the *Mantras* and the *Brahmanas* dealt with God as an external Being, the *Aranyakas* turned attention to the immanent aspect of the Deity. The sources of man's spiritual insight are twofold—the objective and the subjective, the wonders of the world without and the light of the inner self. In the *Vedas*,

1 "When the problem of the coexistence of plurality and unity is taken up, the *Upanisads* speak in the language of similes and symbols but do not give any definite answer" Radhakrishnan, *I Phil* 1, 183 ) "Their weakness lies in the fact that their philosophical synthesis is achieved not so much by explicit reason as by intuition" ( *op cit* p 264 )

2 "Even here, it is not unusual to find things equated with and identified with one another on mere syllabic similarities and other fanciful analogies of one sort or another" Ranade, *I Phil* 11, p 144 )

3 "The method of argumentation also, can hardly be called philosophical. Even in one of the best instances of sustained argumentation ( *Chan* vi ) there is, at the best, a mere piling up of similes one over the other" ( *ibid* p 144 ) "There are many inconsistencies and contradictions that largely impede the progress of the argument, and far fetched analogies ( p 141 ) "We meet with fanciful word plays, ritualistic conceits and threadbare symbolizing" ( *ibid* )

the vast order and movement of nature engages attention. In the *Upanisads*, we turn to explore the depths of the inner world (*Katha Up* iv, 1). From the outward physical facts attention is now shifted to the inner immortal self. Thus, it becomes an established fact in the *Upanisads*, to treat of the God in man. Hence the name "Adhyatma Vidya",<sup>1</sup> given to them. With this shifting of emphasis from the outer to the inner world, came the birth of true philosophy. The idea of a central power behind the Universe, had already been reached in the *Samhitās*. But it had remained at the outer level of a power behind the gods. सहैव सन्त न विजानन्ति देवाः । ( *T A* iii 11 5 ) It had not yet been extended to the whole of reality. This the *Upanisads* undertook to do. ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सवम । ( *Chan Up* ) This naturally led to a philosophical inquiry into the human personality in relation to the Deity, etc., on the one hand and the formulation of definite theories of creation and of the life and destiny of man and his relation to his world of action and enjoyment, on the other.

The *Upanisads* assume two spiritual principles, the individual and the Universal, the Atman and Brahman, the psychic and the cosmic. By a vigorous application of the method of psychological elimination they try to separate<sup>2</sup>, the twin principles from all that is impermanent and corporeal and ascribe to them such exalted attributes as reality, knowledge and bliss. Metaphysical systems are to be based on the data of psychological sciences also. Western metaphysics is one sided in that its attention is confined to the waking state alone. Indian thought, on the other hand, undertakes a synthetic survey of the modifications of the waking, dream and dreamless states. As a result of such an investigation of the three states ( *Avasthatraya* ) the essence of the individual is claimed to be that which persists in and thro the changes — the residuum or common factor of all the states of waking, dream, dreamless sleep, death, re birth and release. Hence the discussion of these stages in the *Upanisads* and in the *Brahmasūtras*, where by a deeper inquiry into the conditions of these

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1 Cf अधिरीद्वरे ( *Pan* L 4, 97 )

2 " They arrive at the ground of all things by stripping off the self veil after veil of contingency ". Radhakrishnan, *I Phil* 1, 388.

states, the dependence of the individual on the Supreme is established (B. S. iii, 2, 1-7).

(v) Consistent with their high philosophical purpose, the *Upaniṣads* try not only to derive the world of matter and souls from Brahman, but also to trace it back to it<sup>1</sup>. But their theories in these respects are not at all set out with any clearness. Nor are the isolated and often apparently contradictory and conflicting statements worked out into a coherent system. Not being the productions of a single author or of the same age, they contain matter of manifold variety and order of excellence. They disclose no philosophical synthesis as such. "So numerous are their suggestions of truth and so varied their guesses at God, that almost anybody may seek in them what he wants and find what he seeks".<sup>2</sup> It is, therefore, difficult to reduce them to a definite system of thought.

Indian commentators pledged to the belief in the infallibility of the Scriptures, have, naturally, assumed that the *Upaniṣads* have but one system to propound, one doctrine to teach. On this assumption, they have proceeded to unify the divergent and often hopelessly irreconcilable utterances of the *Upaniṣads* into a single system. The Advaita of Śaṅkara, the Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja and the Dvaita of Madhva, are all the outcome of such attempts. Each one takes his stand on texts or groups of texts that appear to him to represent and agree with the truth arrived at by him after deep independent reflection on the problems of philosophy,—the question of the degree and extent of spiritual satisfyingness, and the logico-metaphysical finality of one or more of the primary data of experience, in all their completeness—the Ego, Matter and God,—and the degree of philosophical prominence to be assigned to one or more of them, in any balanced metaphysical theory. Each one starts with a preestablished outline before him arrived at by intensive thinking and correlates the various groups of texts so as to fit in with such an outline. Each one takes his stand on texts which appear to him to represent the highest truth (arrived at on grounds of independent ratiocination and a general view of the

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1. Cf. यमप्येति भुवनं साम्पराये । ( *Ghṛtasūktā* )  
यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति । ( *Taitt. Up.* )

2. Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.*, i, p. 140.



texts)<sup>1</sup> and these he tries to harmonise with those less favorable to his position and explain (away) the rest which go against his views. In adopting such a procedure, the Indian commentators have shown themselves to be makers of "*Mokṣa-śāstra*" rather than strict historical interpreters of Indian philosophy.

(vi) The possibilities of arriving at the true and original philosophy of the Upanisads, by a process of historical criticism has been debated by scholars. Some have wondered if it would be possible to show that one view in them is fundamental and that all others are derived from it by a process of development or degradation. Others have attempted to discover sufficient data for the construction of a theory of historical development of thought by which each successive stage of thought could be explained as the "outworking" of the ideas contained in the one that went before it. The greatest impediment to such speculative endeavours is the absence of a reliable chronology for the *Upanisads*. The methods of literary criticism may give us some sort of a tentative chronology. The relative order of some of the Upanisads may be fixed thereby, but the question of earlier and later strata of thought in one and the same Upanisad and the problem of the stratification of the texts as we now have them, are all too vague and unsettled to admit of any definite theory of the philosophical evolution of ideas being formulated authoritatively. Duesen pitched upon the "uncompromising idealism" of Yājñavalkya as the *normal* view of Upanisadic philosophy from which all differing views represent a departure and decline,—a steady falling off in course of time, due no doubt to the "interference of religious prejudice" with the genuine spirit of philosophic speculation! He has, no doubt, cleverly argued his thesis and shown the process of gradual decline of thought by which the Pantheistic, Cosmogonic, Theistic, Atheistic and Deistic views followed in the wake of one another. But apart from the glamour and attractiveness of the theory, there are serious difficulties in the way of its acceptance. There is much in the earlier parts of the *Chandogya* and *Bṛhadaranyaka*, which goes against the grain of his theory. The plea that it has all been

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1 "The Indian thinkers first arrive at a system of consistent doctrine and then look about for texts of an earlier age to support their position. They either force them into such support or ingeniously explain them away" (*op. cit.*, 1, 130)



put there with a special pedagogic purpose<sup>1</sup>, viz to prepare the learner for the doctrine of the One Ātman, sounds artificial and partisan. That is not all. The most abstruse and the highest theory of monistic idealism is placed at the beginning and the relatively imperfect views are considered subsequent to it! This is a strange reversal of both the intellectual and the historical order of thought as we understand it. Moreover, granting that Monism is the *norm* of the Upanisads, it is strange that we should have really no evidence of the steps by which the highest insight was obtained. It would be bad enough if the cart were put before the horse, but worse still, if it should, as in this case, be made to draw itself! It would be futile to take shelter under the theory of "Ksatriya origin" of Upanisadic monism, in order to escape this difficulty. Such an assumption is disproved by the continuity of thought of the *Upanisads* with that of the *Brahmanas* and *Aranyakas*. Lastly, there is hardly any hint in the passages which develop the 'Pantheistic' view that they are a falling off from the original idealistic creed.

Duesen's theory, moreover, does scant justice to the prevailing Theism of the earlier periods by coolly ignoring it as if it were of no account. It is very strange also, that the same Yājñavalkya is credited with the "Antaryāmi Brāhmaṇa" which is the bedrock of Theism. It appears, on the contrary, that the language of uncompromising idealism is only occasionally to be met with and does not warrant the assumption of its being the "normal view" of the *Upanisads*. It was at best a "novelty" and felt as such, as could be gathered from the kind of expressions used. मोहान्तमापीषिषत् ( *Brh Up* ) उत्तमादेशमप्राक्ष्योयेनाश्रुत ( *Chan* ) तस्योपनिषदहमिति ।

In the light of the great Theistic orientation undertaken by the *Svetāśvatara*, the more reasonable hypothesis would be to assume that Theism was the normal view of the *Upanisads* and the natural and logical development of Vedic 'polytheism'<sup>2</sup>. The idealism of the *Upanisads* could be regarded as an esoteric presentation of the Immanence and Transcendence of the Deity, in

1. Cf the Advaitic device

'अध्यासापापवादाभ्या निष्प्रपञ्च प्रपञ्च्यते' ।

2. Cf तद्वचन्यादेरप्यस्ति वेदादी (Madhva G B ).

arresting terms<sup>1</sup> As Kunhan Raja says, "The Upanisads are more attempts to preserve and understand an ancient tradition, than a new illumination" (*Asya Vamasya Hymn xxx*) Such an interpretation alone would be consistent with the widely accepted historical and interpretational traditions of the various strata of religious and philosophical literature now available to us<sup>2</sup> It would be clearly unhistorical to ignore the natural order of growth in favor of a fanciful theory dictated by a fashionable regard for certain types of idealistic and illusionistic theories pushed into prominence by a set of commentators on the Vedānta influenced by the idealism of the Buddhists, under a complacent notion of Monism being the only rational world-view

(vii) The *Upanisads* agree in making Brahman the ultimate source of the world of matter and souls Brahman is the "Jagadyoni" But considering the variety of their theories on the subject, it is difficult to determine in what precise sense it is so

(1) There are passages which tend to make It the sole and whole explanation of the Universe, its efficient (*nimitta*) as well as material (*upadana*) cause

यथा सत् पुरुषात्केशलोमानि तथाक्षरात्समवतीह विश्वम् (Mund 1 : 7)

सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति (Chan. iii. 14. 1).

तदेकत बहु स्या प्रजायेय (ibid vi. 2, 3).

इदं ब्रह्म Brh II, 4, 6)

which form the basis of the "Abhinna nimittopadanavada" or the Brahmaparinamavada of the Vṛttikāra, Bhāskara, etc.

(2) There are again traces of another view that Matter exists from eternity, which God fashions but does not create This is characteristic of the Epic Sāṃkhya and is adopted by the Śeṣvara-Sāṃkhya of Patañjali.

(3) It is sometimes admitted, by implication, that God creates the Universe out of nothing as it were

1 Cf सर्वपरित्यागेन तस्यैवोपादानाय अद्वितीयत्वेन, सर्वसत्ताप्रतीति  
श्रद्धातिनिमित्तताप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं सर्वात्मिकत्वेन परपुरुष बोधयन्ति  
(NS p 124)

2 Cf तस्यत्वादनुपपद्यति ह्येक एवेति साधव । (Mbh XII 323,  
56 ).

पुरुष एवेद सर्वं तद्विद्वन्मपजीवति (Purusasūktā)

असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत्ततो वै सदजायत ( Taitt. ii, 7 ).

तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानु प्राविशत् ( Taitt. ii, 6 ).

स ईक्षत लोकान्नु सृजा इति ( A. Ā, ii, 4, 1 ).

नैवेह किञ्चनाग्र आसीत् ( Brh. i, 2 ).

यतः प्रसूता जगतः प्रसूती तोयेन जीवान् व्यससर्ज भूम्याम् ( T. A. x.i, 1 ).

This corresponds to the Christian viewpoint which does not seem to have been paralleled in any of the Indian schools.

(4) There is a fourth view that both Matter and Souls coexist with God tho' always dependent upon Him :

यस्तमसि तिष्ठंस्तमोऽन्तरो यमयति \* \* \* य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्

आत्मानमन्तरो यमयति ( Brh. iii, 7, 13-24 ).

यच्च स्वभावं पचति विश्वयोनिः ( Śvet. v, 5 ).

पाच्यश्च सर्वान्परिणामयेद्यः ( *ibid* ).

ज्ञाज्ञौ द्वावज्ञौ ईशानीशौ ( *op. cit.* i, 9 ).

The act of creation, on this view, would be an emanatory process of making manifest what is unmanifest, the endowing of matter and souls with name and form by the Deity :

अनेन जीवेनात्मना अनुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि ।

It was this view that was destined to attain considerable popularity in the Epics and *Purāṇas*<sup>1</sup>, the *Pañcarātra*<sup>2</sup>, and the *Gīṭā*<sup>3</sup>, and became the basis of the Viśistādvaita of Rāmānuja and the Dvaita of Madhva. It avoids the irrationality of assuming that God alone was, once upon a time<sup>4</sup>, and that at a certain point in His history, He brought matter and souls into existence *de novo* and *ex nihilo*. Instead of making God cause antecedent in time to

१. प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव प्रविश्याशु महेश्वरः ।

चोदयामास संप्राप्ते सर्गकाले व्याव्ययी ॥ ( *Viṣṇu*. i, 2, 29 )

2. See passage from *Paramasamhitā* ( ii, 18-19 ) q. *Śrībhāṣya* ii, 2, 44.

३. प्रकृतिं पुरुषं चैव विधेयनादी उभावपि ।

तासां ब्रह्म महद्योनिरहं बीजप्रदः पिता ।

मम योनिर्महद्ब्रह्म तस्मिन् गर्भं दधाम्यहम् ।

4. " This defect of Creationistic theory lurks even behind the Absolutistic view. We cannot ask how the relationless Brahman is related to the world. The presumption is that the world of relations does not in any way affect the nature of the Brahman. The world is not an essential factor in the existence of the Brahman " ( Radhakrishnan, i, 184 ).



the world, it looks upon its actualisation as the result of the expression of the Divine Will, a sort of self limitation which provides sufficient check against a "Dualism", in that Matter and souls are *ex hypothesi* dependent upon Him

(viii) The *Upanisads* generally assume that "creation", on the whole, is a *real process*, in whatever way it may be effected. The entry of the Creator into His creation, is also frequently referred to तत्सृष्ट्वा तदेवानुप्राविशत (*Taitt* ii 6, *Brh Up* i, 4 and *Chan* vi, 2. Proofs are afforded of His presence in the creature (*Matr Up* ii, 6, *Brh. Up* v, 9)

There are, however, passages which give room for the later doctrine of Illusion (*mayavada*)<sup>1</sup>

एकमेवाद्वितीयम् (*Chan* vi, 2, 1) नेह नानास्ति किंचन (*Brh* iv, 4, 19).  
नीहारेण प्रावृता (*VS* xvii, 31) असगो ह्यय पुरुष (*Brh* iv, 3, 15)  
अयमात्मा ब्रह्म (iv, 5, 19) मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् (*Chan* iv, 1, 4)

"But the Indian doctrine of the identity of cause and effect would seem to be against the conjecture of unreality of creation. Passages like Psalm xxxiii, 6, 9, suggest primarily the lack of the effort with which God creates"<sup>2</sup>

That is why Radhakrishnan repudiates "the popular view which identifies the Upanisadic doctrine with an abstract monism which reduces the rich life of this world to an empty dream"<sup>3</sup>. It is taken to be the intention of the Upanisadic Monism to make the Absolute, "a unity with a difference"<sup>4</sup> or a concrete dynamic spirit. We then reach the self and the not self which interact and develop the whole Universe. Self expression thus becomes the essence of the Absolute "<sup>5</sup>

1. Cf द्रव्य कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च

यदनुग्रहत सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया ॥ (*Bhāg.* ii, 10, 12)

2 Cf 'अकर्माविलम्बकारित्वात्' (q by Madhva) See Śamkara BSB. i, 1, 3, ii, 1, 33

3 Radhakrishnan, *I Phil* i, 186.

4 *Ibid* p 186

5. It would be impossible on this view to hold Brahman to be absolutely "Nir-viśeṣa" or aspectless as Śamkara would have it. The idea of both unity and diversity being real and true (अनेकान्तवाद) is sternly repudiated by Śamkara under (B. S ii 1. 14). Contrast the plea for 'integral idealism' by N. G. Damle, *Contemporary Ind. Phil.* 1952, pp. 188-9.

(ix) As regards the goal of human effort, the Upanisads agree that it is a return to the Absolute. Release is riddance of the cycle of births and deaths and attainment of communion with the Divine ब्रह्म प्राप्तिरविजोऽमृतिमृत्यु (Katha, II, 3, 18). But there is as much vagueness and conflict in their statement of the nature of the goal as there is in the starting point.

There are texts which represent the highest stage in monistic parlance and there are others which presuppose a frank dualism in release. There are positive accounts of the state of release from a purely "Advaitic" point of view, as well as negative ones from the same standpoint. There are dualistic accounts which demand the survival of the human personality side by side with the Supreme and which also invest the former with an amount of godliness almost equal to that of the Supreme. There are pictures of Moksha drawn in frankly "sensuous" colors, depicting the various super-mundane enjoyments which are possible for the released. And, lastly, there are texts which carry this dualism to its logical limit and place certain irrevocable limitations on the freedom and sovereignty of the released and subject them to the sway of God.

I 1 ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति । (Mund III, 2, 9).

2 तत्र को मोहः कः शोकः एकत्वमनुपश्यत (Isa 7)

3 परेऽव्यये सर्वे एकीभवन्ति । (Mund III, 2, 7)

4 स सर्वज्ञः सर्वो भवति । (Praśna, IV, 10).

5 यथा नद्यः स्यन्दमानाः समुद्रेऽस्तं गच्छन्ति नामरूपे विहाय

तथा विद्वान् पुण्यपापे विधूय निरजन्तः Mund. (III, 2, 8)

The above seem to imply that there is no sense of individuality and hence no possibility of action in Moksha.

II 1 यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति (Brh IV, 5, 15)

2. यत्र नान्यत्पश्यति नाप्यच्छृणोति (Chan. VII, 24, 1)

3 न प्रेत्य सजास्ति (Brh II, 4, 12)

4. Brhadaranyaka III, 8, 11

These would appear to insist that on attaining release, the Mukta rests in the contemplation of his own bliss and reality and has no thought for any others स्वे महिम्नि प्रतिष्ठितः । (Chan VII, 24, 1) There is no object consciousness. But the subject-consciousness is not denied तदात्मानमेवावेदह ब्रह्मास्मीति । (Brh I, 4, 10).

अहं विद्वन् भुवनमभ्यभवाम् (Taitt iii, 10, 6)

अविनाशी वा अरेऽयमात्मा अनुच्छित्तिधर्मा (Brh iv, 5, 14).

"The non conscious condition of the self is not also bereft of the power to know, only, there is nothing other than his own self that can be known. Hence, we say he does not know. Knowledge there is indeed, for, knowing is inseparable from the knower because he is imperishable and because it is the very nature of the knower to know, but there is no second, nothing else different from him which he could know. Some sort of Transcendental consciousness seems to be implied in the paradoxical statement that when in that condition, he does not know, yet he is knowing. Here, the soul is its own object or better, there is no distinction there, between subject and object, because the soul is like the Ocean, single and all embracing" (Griswold op cit p 54). Madhva, however, interprets Yajñavalkya's dictum यत्तु सर्वमात्मैवाभूत् " as a *reductio ad absurdum* intended to establish the survival of individual consciousness and subject object relation in Moksha. See my 'Yajñavalkyan Fiction', A Critique, (J A B. M M, 56)

III १. निरञ्जनं परमं साम्यमुपैति (Mund iii, 1, 3)

२ सोऽनुते सर्वान्वामान्सह ब्रह्मणा (Taitt ii, 1, 1)

३ एतत्साम गायनास्ते हावु हावु (ibid 3, 10 5)

IV. 1 Chan Up viii, 12, 3 and viii, 5, 3

2 " viii, 2, 1 10

3 Kausitaki Up i, 3 4 —

"In this world are the great lake Ara, the ageless river Viraja the tree Illya, the station called Salajya and the unassailable place called Aparajita, with Indra and Prajāpati as its door keepers. There is further the audience hall of Brahman called Vibhu. Here the various nymphs are engaged in weaving garlands of flowers. Five hundred nymphs approach the released and receive him in advance, a hundred with fruits, another hundred with perfumes, a third batch with gorgeous apparel and the last with garlands. They adorn him with ornaments. He moves on, crosses the Ara and the Viraja and sinks all the opposites of good and bad. He moves on thro' Illya, Salajya and Aparajita and ultimately reaches the place of Brahman and is received by him".



In the passages of groups III and IV, the survival of the human personality is definitely assumed. However much the soul of man may resemble God in its spiritual excellence, it stands to reason that a certain amount of disparity must still exist between the two having regard, at any rate, to the status of the individual before release and the peculiarities of the two, viz the Nitya-muktatva of God and the "once baddhatva" of the soul of man. Logic cannot reconcile itself to the position that the Supreme shall engage Itself in creation without some kind of bliss arising from it. आनन्दाद्वैव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायन्ते (Taitt Up 3 6), over and above the released souls which do nothing of the kind. जगद्व्यापारवज्रम् (B S 14, 4 17)

The idea must have been prevalent then, that notwithstanding the amount of "equality", in many respects between the two, the Jīva was in some measure, still inferior and subject to the Lord, even in the state of release. This is unmistakably implied in at least one passage उत्तामृतत्वस्येशान (T A III, 12, 1) which receives enthusiastic iteration in subsequent literature<sup>1</sup> अत एव चानन्याधिपति । जगद्व्यापारवज्रम् (B S 14, 4, 9, 17) It is from these and other texts that Madhva draws support for his distinctive view of Mokṣa after giving suitable explanations for the eulogistic and other texts from Groups I and II

The distinction of the human personality from the divine is accepted both in the state of dream and dreamless sleep

स्वप्नान्त जागरितान्त चोभौ येनानुपश्यति

महान्त विभुमात्मान मत्या धीरो न शोचति

(Katha II, 1, 4).

स्वप्नेन शारीरमभिप्रहृत्यासुप्त सुप्तानभिचाकशीति ।

शुरुमादाय पुनरिति स्थान

(Brh. Up 14, 3, 12)

अत्राय पुरुष प्राज्ञनात्मना सपरिप्यक्त

(ibid. 14, 3 21)

and in the state of exit एवमेवाय शारीर आत्मा प्राज्ञेनात्मना बन्धारुढ उत्सज्यति

(ibid, 14, 3, 35).

<sup>1</sup> आधिपत्य विना तुल्या ब्रह्मणस्ते महोजस (Brahmanda Purana, III 2, 81)

मुक्ताना परमा गति । (Mbh)

वृष्णो मुक्तैरिज्यते वीतमोह । (Mbh)

and in release : प्रज्ञानेनोऽलोक. (Ait. Up.) एतस्मिन् \* \* \* प्रतिष्ठां विन्दते ।  
अथसोऽभयं गतो भवति आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न विभेति (Taitt.ii, 7-9).

ब्रह्म प्राप्तो विरजोऽभूत् (Katha. ii, 3, 18). जुष्टं यदा पश्यत्यन्यमीशम्  
(Mund. iii, 1, 2).

On the physical plane itself, the Upanisads do keep the individual and the Supreme clear from each other. The otherness of the human soul from God and its dependence upon Him, are clearly recognised :

द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिपस्वजाते ।  
तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्ति श्वनदनन्नन्योऽभिचाकशीति ॥  
समाने वृक्षे पुरुषो निमग्नोऽजीशया शोचति मूह्यमानः ॥  
(Mund. iii, 1, 1-2).

The need for worshipping the Deity and earning Its grace are beginning to be recognised :

शरं ह्युपासानिशितं समिन्धते (Mund. ii, 2, 3).  
तेन त्यक्तेन भुञ्जीथाः (Īśa, 1).  
एष ह्येव साधुकर्म कारयति यं षमेभ्यो लोदेभ्य उन्निनीपते  
(Kausītaki iii, 9).

यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्य. तस्यैष आत्मा  
विवृणुते तनू स्याम् । (Katha, i, 2, 23).  
ज्ञानप्रसादेन विशुद्धसत्त्व. (Mund. iii, 1, 8).  
एको बहूना यो विदधाति कामान् (Katha. ii, 2, 13).

## CHAPTER IV

### LATER UPANISADS AND SVETĀSVATARA

(1) The period of the major Upanisads was essentially a creative one. The various thought currents at work were never brought to a head. The forces of Realism and Dualism battled freely with those of Idealism and Monism. The pendulum of thought kept swinging from one side to the other. There was no final pronouncement of opinion or even if there had been one, we have no means of knowing it in the absence of a definite chronology for the early Upanisads. Some of the Yājñavalkya passages came perilously near an abstract Monism. न प्रेत्य सज्ञास्ति । ध्यायतीव लेलायतीव । विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात् ? असंगो ह्ययं पुरुष ॥

But, even in the 'great symposium' at Janaka's court, the same Yājñavalkya comes down from his higher metaphysical altitude and "in almost a Deistic vein endows the Ātman (iii, 6, 7-8) with the character of an Omnipotent Lord that indwells and controls all Cosmic operations and even dispenses rewards and punishments" <sup>1</sup>

(2) Texts favorable to Monism had not always been adequately or even properly worded. They afforded plenty of loopholes for Dualism, contained admissions and undercurrents which were thoroughly damaging to the interests of pure monism. In "*Na pretya samjna asti*" we have no doubt, a monistic ideal in view, but it is not the characterless monism of pure being. The text अविनाशी वा अरे अयमात्मा which follows न प्रेत्य declares that the Ātmā is indestructible and so are his attributes (अनुच्छित्तिधर्मा). Madhva's commentator has urged that the first term *avinast* emphasises the personal immortality of the soul as against the Advaitic doctrine of the annihilation of the individual self as such. The second term *Anucchitti dharma*, affirms the indestructibility of its special properties of knowledge, will, activity and so on, as



and in release . प्रज्ञानेनोऽलोक (Art Up) एतस्मिन् \* \* \* प्रतिष्ठा विन्दते ।  
अयसोऽभय गतो भवति आनन्द ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न विमेति (Taitt u, 7-9).

ब्रह्म प्राप्तो विरजोऽभूत् (Katha u, 3, 18). जुष्ट यदा पश्यत्यन्यमीशम्  
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## CHAPTER IV

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( 1 ) The period of the major Upanisads was essentially a creative one. The various thought currents at work were never brought to a head. The forces of Realism and Dualism battled freely with those of Idealism and Monism. The pendulum of thought kept swinging from one side to the other. There was no final pronouncement of opinion or even if there had been one, we have no means of knowing it in the absence of a definite chronology for the early Upanisads. Some of the Yājñavalkya passages came perilously near an abstract Monism. न प्रेत्य सज्ञास्ति । व्यायतीव लेलायतीव । विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयात् ? असंगो ह्ययं पुरुष ॥

But, even in the 'great symposium' at Janaka's court, the same Yājñavalkya comes down from his higher metaphysical altitude and "in almost a Deistic vein endows the Atman (III, 6, 7 8) with the character of an Omnipotent Lord that indwells and controls all Cosmic operations and even dispenses rewards and punishments " 1

( 11 ) Texts favorable to Monism had not always been adequately or even properly worded. They afforded plenty of loopholes for Dualism, contained admissions and undercurrents which were thoroughly damaging to the interests of pure monism. In "*Na pretya samjna asti*" we have, no doubt, a monistic ideal in view, but it is not the characterless monism of pure being. The text अविनाशी वा अरे अयमात्मा which follows न प्रेत्य declares that the Ātmā is indestructible and so are his attributes (अनुच्छित्तिधर्मा). Madhva's commentator has urged that the first term *avinasi* emphasises the personal immortality of the soul as against the Advaitic doctrine of the annihilation of the individual self as such. The second term *Anucchitti dharma*, affirms the indestructibility of its special properties of knowledge, will, activity and so on, as

porary schools of thought Pantheistic, Materialistic and Monistic<sup>1</sup> The way for such a reaction had already been paved by the strong note of realism that had been struck in several of the early metrical *Upanisads*, notably, in the *Iśa*, *Mundaka* and *Katha*. One writer says that "It is noteworthy that the *Mundaka* stands in a sense apart from the other *Upanisads*, in as much as it asserts rather too prominently, a metaphysical realism"<sup>2</sup> Elsewhere, the same writer adds that "the conception of cosmogony in the *Mundaka* is a definitely realistic one, in as much as it calls the physical world, a real world designating it as "satyam" (II, 1)<sup>3</sup> It is impossible not to be struck by the voice of realism in such cases as *Mund.* I, 1, 1, 3, 2, *Iśa* 8, *Katha* I, 2, 12, I, 2, 23; II, 1, 13, etc The loose and ambiguously worded similes coupled with an excessive love of mystery and antithesis, lent an air of plausibility to the Monistic and Pantheistic interpretations of some of the older texts<sup>4</sup> The analogy of rivers emptying themselves into the Sea (*Chāṇ* VI, 10) had been rather too often and freely appropriated by the Monist. The tocsin of revolt had, therefore, to be sounded early in *Katha* II, 4, 15, where there is a passing attempt to draw attention to the fact that there is no room for identity in such cases. When a quantity of water is poured into another, it becomes *like that* (तादृगेव भवति), but not

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1. "It seems in other words as if the *Śvetāśvatara* puts up a philosophy of Saiva Theism against all Naturalism and even against *Samkhya* and *Vedānta* doctrines, although, in this last respect, its attack seems to be directed against the extreme Pantheism of the school" (Ranade, II, 304) The Professor's exclusion of the illusionistic *Vedānta* is unsustainable The statement of issues in the opening verse : कुत स्म जाता जीवाम केन । अधिष्ठिता केन सुखे तरेयुः । (I, 1) make it clear that the experience of pleasure and pain was accepted as real.

<sup>2</sup> *op cit.* II, 282.

<sup>3</sup> *op cit* p. 281.

<sup>4</sup> 'यथादयः शुद्धे शुद्ध' (*Katha* II, 1, 15) इति चैवमादीनि मुक्ति-स्वरूपनिरूपणपराणि वाक्यान्वविभागेनैव दर्शयन्ति, नदीसमुद्रादिनिदर्शनानि च ॥

(Śamkara, *B S B* IV, 4, 4).



against the views of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. The released may not see, hear or smell any *other*, but it is unnecessary to conclude from this text, that they are essentially devoid of the power (*dharma*) to see, hear or smell. Indeed, another text hastens to observe that they do not lack such power : नहि द्रष्टुं विपरिलोपो विद्यते \* \* \* \* \* (Brh iv 3, 23) What are we to infer from such correctives? Can it be that their powers of hearing, sight and smell are intact tho' they do not exercise them? It seems hardly likely, if regard be paid to what is said elsewhere in an allied Upanisad on the question of the enjoyment of certain pleasures by the released स तत्र पर्येति जदारकीडन्, स यदि पितृलोकाकामो भवति, स यदि गन्धमाल्यलाकाकामो भवति (Chan viii 2, 6) Is the entire dialogue, then, beginning with यन्नहि द्वैतमिव भवति a *reductio ad absurdum* on the Absolutist doctrine of release? The epistemological dogma of Monism that "the subject of all experience cannot itself be an object of experience", is negatived in many places in the Upanisads स यो ह वै, तदक्षर वेदयत, स सर्वज्ञ (Praśna iv, 11) तदात्मानमेवावेदह ब्रह्मास्मीति (Brh i, 4, 10) आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्य \* \* \* मन्तव्य (op cit iv 5, 6) The self of the knower may become merged in the Brahman and become one with it. But it is difficult to see how his *works* (कर्माणि) also, could do so

कर्माणि विज्ञानमयश्च आत्मा परेऽध्यये सर्वे एकीभवन्ति। (Mund. iii, 2, 7)

as these are perishable and *jada* (insentient) and are, moreover, already destroyed *before* release

क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे (Mund. ii, 2, 8)

The Monism of the Upanisads had thus its own weak spots. Since no people can afford to remain content with a literature of contradictions, attempts were bound to be made to reduce its teachings to an acceptable system and give a lead one way or the other. Such a system and lead we find in the *Svetasvatara Upanisad*, admittedly the *latest* of the major Upanisads from the standpoint of pure Theism.

(iii) The contents of the *Svetasvatara* show it to have been the outcome of a strong Theistic reaction against several contem-

porary schools of thought Pantheistic, Materialistic and Monistic<sup>1</sup> The way for such a reaction had already been paved by the strong note of realism that had been struck in several of the early metrical *Upanisads*, notably, in the *Īśa*, *Mundaka* and *Katha*. One writer says that "It is noteworthy that the *Mundaka* stands in a sense apart from the other *Upanisads*, in as much as it asserts rather too prominently, a metaphysical realism"<sup>2</sup> Elsewhere, the same writer adds that "the conception of cosmogony in the *Mundaka* is a definitely realistic one, in as much as it calls the physical world, a real world designating it as "satyam" (ii, 1)"<sup>3</sup> It is impossible not to be struck by the voice of realism in such cases as *Mund.* i, 1, 1, 3, 2, *Īśa* 8, *Katha* i, 2, 12, i, 2, 23, ii, 1, 13, etc. The loose and ambiguously worded similes coupled with an excessive love of mystery and antithesis, lent an air of plausibility to the Monistic and Pantheistic interpretations of some of the older texts<sup>4</sup> The analogy of rivers emptying themselves into the Sea (*Chān* vi, 10) had been rather too often and freely appropriated by the Monist. The tocsin of revolt had, therefore, to be sounded early in *Katha* ii, 4, 15, where there is a passing attempt to draw attention to the fact that there is no room for identity in such cases. When a quantity of water is poured into another, it becomes *like that* (तद्गोव भवति), but not

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1. "It seems in other words as if the *Śvetāśvatara* puts up a philosophy of Saiva Theism against all Naturalism and even against Sāṃkhya and Vedānta doctrines, although, in this last respect, its attack seems to be directed against the extreme Pantheism of the school" (Ranade, ii, 304) The Professor's exclusion of the illusionistic Vedānta is unsustainable. The statement of issues in the opening verse 'कुत स्म जाता जीवाम केन । अधिष्ठिता केन सुखेतरेषु । (i, 1) make it clear that the experience of pleasure and pain was accepted as real.

2 *op cit.* ii, 282

3 *op cit* p. 281

4 'यथोदक शुद्धे शुद्ध' (*Katha* ii, 1, 15) इति चैवमादीनि मुक्ति-स्वरूपनिरूपणपराणि चाक्यान्यविभागेनैव दर्शयन्ति, नदीसमुद्रादिनिदर्शनानि च ॥

(Śaṅkara, *B S B* iv, 4, 4).

identical with it<sup>1</sup>. Even so, in respect of the rivers mingling with the sea and the Jivas with Brahman. A similar corrective to ग्रह वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति ( *Mund* iii, 2, 9 ) स य एव वेदाह ब्रह्मास्मीति स इदं सर्वं भवति ( *Brh* i, 4, 10 ) may be detected in *Praśna*, iv, 11. A calm and comprehensive re-examination of these and similar issues was thus urgently needed in the interests not only of clearness of thought but also of bringing the issues to a decision and giving a correct lead to thought. The *Sietasiātara* appears to have addressed itself to this task.

( iv ) It begins by striking at the root of Monism, in dismissing the claims of the individual soul ( *Purusa* )<sup>2</sup> along with those of Time, Nature, Fate, the elements, etc. to be regarded as responsible for world creation. In doing so, it urges the same objection आत्माप्यनीश सुखदुःखहेतो ( 1, 2 ) as is done later on, by the author of the *Brahma Sūtras* हिताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्ते ( ii, 1, 21 ). It posits coexistent matter ( *ajā* ) and souls ( *jñā* ) both of which God actuates to develop and rules over. He is declared to be the supreme ruler of the Cosmos, utterly different from the human soul ( iv, 6 ) and is all knowing ( *sarva* vid vi, 2 ), omnipotent and endowed with attributes ( vi, 2 ). This Upanisad opposes in no uncertain terms the dogma of the Nirguna Brahman, by ascribing to Brahman such attributes as *jñāna*, *bala* and *kriyā* which are not the result of *Avidyā*,<sup>3</sup> but form part of its nature ( *svabhāvikā* )

1 It is only similarity of form that is held in view in such cases. This is proved by the interesting statement of *Manu*, ix, 22, यादृग्गुणेन भर्ता स्त्री सयुज्येत यथाविधा ।

तादृग्गुणा स भवति समुद्रेणेव निम्नगा ।

The husband and the wife do not obviously become one entity. They merely share some attributes in common. Vācaspati Miśra, in his *Bhāmati* ( 1, 4 22 ) is the earliest to explode the myth of identity of rivers and ocean in this analogy, and declare that there is no case for factual identity here.

2 भूतानि योनिः पुरुष इति चिन्त्यम् ।

आत्माप्यनीश सुखदुःखहेतोः ।

( 1, 2 )

3 परास्य शक्तिविविधैव श्रूयते ।

स्वाभाविको ज्ञानबलक्रिया च ।

( vi, 8 )



Texts like • न तत्समश्चाम्यधिकश्च दृश्यते (vi, 8) and साक्षी चेतः केवलो निर्गुणश्च (vi, 11) seem to be striving clearly towards a Theistic reorientation of such seemingly monistic ones as एकमेवाद्वितीयम्, अशब्दमस्पर्शम् and those that make Brahman utterly devoid of attributes<sup>1</sup>. Bhakti is inculcated and the grace of God देवप्रसाद (vi, 21) is said to be the means of release (iv, 7). Nay, the Upanisad goes on to assert in true Theistic fashion that God is the author of the soul's bondage and ergo of its redemption ससारमोक्षस्थितिवन्धहेतु (vi, 16 and vi, 23). This idea is distinctive of Madhva. The visualisation of God as the Ruling Spirit qualifies for Moksha (i, 6) मुमुक्षुर्वै शरणमहं प्रपद्ये (vi, 18) सत्त्वस्यैव प्रवर्तक (iii, 12) तस्मात्प्रपन्नं परिवर्ततेऽप्यम् । ज्ञात्वात्म-सत्यम् (vi 6 and iv, 7)

The idea that God does *not* create *Matter* and its modifications or the potencies of Karma, but merely *actuates* and *directs* them is forcibly put in

यच्च स्वभाव पचति विश्वयोनि पाच्याश्च सर्वान् परिणामयेद्य ।

सर्वमेतद्विश्वमधितिष्ठत्येको गुणाश्च सर्वान् विनियोजयेद्य ॥ (V, 5)

Even this essential nature of things (*svabhava*) cannot work out of its own accord; but is in need of divine direction

पाच्याश्च सर्वान् परिणामयेत् । यश्च स्वभाव पचति । सत्त्वस्यैव प्रवर्तक । These are completely in line with Madhva's view of God being the सर्वसत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिनियामक । As pointed out by him, this idea has received graphic expression in the Epics and Purāṇas

नभो ददाति श्वसता मार्गं यन्नियमादद (Bhāg iii, 30, 43)

द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।

यदनुग्रहत सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया ॥ (ibid ii, 10 12).

We have again similar clarification of quasi Pantheistic texts like यथोर्णनाभि सृजते । यथा सतः पुरुषात्केचलोमानि । The transformation is of Matter alone and *not* of the spirit of *Brahmacaitanya*

1 As pointed out by Madhva, in his *Karmanirṇaya* a string of attributes like *sakṣī*, *ekatva* etc., are ascribed to the Brahman in the first part of this text. The term "Nirguna" at the end must, therefore, be interpreted so as not to contradict the predica- tions already made. The *Svetāśvatara*, accordingly, takes particular care to describe the Supreme as गुणो सर्वविद्य (vi 2),

यस्तूष्णनाभ इव तत्तुभि प्रधानजं स्वभावत आवृणोति । (vi, 10)

The language of identity employed in such passages as तन्मयो भवेत् (Mund 11, 2, 4) सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म (Chan ) तत्त्वमसि (vi, 12, 3) आत्मैवायस्तात आत्मैवोपरिष्ठात् आत्मैवेद सर्वम् (vii, 25, 2) इदक्षत्रमिमं लोका इमे देवा इमानि भूतानि इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा । (Brh 11, 4, 6) is re defined in terms of the special immanence of the Deity in every jot and tittle of Matter and Spirit येनावृत (vi, 2) अणोरणीयान् महतो मही-यानात्मास्य (iii 20) नित्यो नित्याना (vi, 13) and this Immanence of God *within* and outside matter and souls (अन्तर्बहिश्च) is illustrated by the following very expressive similes

तिष्ठेपु तैल \* \* \* एवमात्मनि गृह्यतेऽसौ । (1 15)

सर्वव्यापिनमात्मान क्षीरे सर्पिरिवापितम् । (1, 16)

The most significant fact is perhaps the identification of the *Māyā* of Monistic metaphysics with the "Prakṛti" of Sāṃkhya Realism माया तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात् and the recognition of the three categories of Soul (*jna*) Matter (*Aja* or *Prakṛti*) and an Overlord or God above them क्षरात्मनावीक्षते देव एव । These constitute the quint-essence of Theism and the antithesis of every form and species of Monism and Absolutism . No wonder, Duessen called the *Svetasvatara* "a monument of Theism" (Radhakrishnan, *I phil* 1, p 511) It was natural to find the early Upanisads with their proverbial love of equations, similes, enigmas and equivocations to clothe their thoughts in mystic and esoteric phraseology often bordering on monistic idealism The studied and persistent attempts of the *Svetasvatara* to stick to Theism at all costs and give Theistic reorientations to passages that bear a different hue elsewhere, or are likely to be taken in a monistic sense,<sup>2</sup> render it very probable that as the last and the most definite among the major Upanisads it had come to the conclusion that Theism alone should be regarded as the true basic philosophy of the Upanisads

1 The very manner of the equation *Māyā*=*Prakṛti* not the other way about, is significant, according to the *Satadusanī* of Vedānta Desika नहि तत्र प्रकृत्यनुवादेन मिथ्यात्वं विधीयते, अपि तु मायानुवादेन प्रकृतित्वम् ।

( Sastramuktavali Ser no 48 Conjeeveram 1926, p 204 )

2 Cf यथाणनाभि (Mund 1, 7) and यस्तूष्णनाभ (Svet vi 10)

## CHAPTER V

### POST-SVETĀSVATARA THOUGHT-FERMENT EKĀYANA, KHILA AND OTHER EXPATIATORY LITERATURE

After the Theistic orientation given to the philosophy of the Upanisads in the *Svetāsvatara*, it was natural to expect a rich harvest of Theistic speculation in the succeeding period<sup>1</sup>. Already, during the time of the *Brhadaranyaka* a nucleus of interpretative literature was coming into existence. The *Ekāyana* Srutis, which are the basis of the Theistic philosophy of the *Pāṇcarātra*, (*Chan Up* vii, 1, 2), gained further weight in the light of the undisguised support to Theism in the *Svetāsvatara*. It is significant to note the expression "conclusion of the Vedas", which Madhva applies to them, on the authority of a text<sup>2</sup>. *Brh Up* ii, 4, 10, speaks of *Slokas*, *Sutras*, *Vyakhyanas* and *Anuvyakhyanas*. The "Ślokas" referred to are evidently the literature of the *Pāṇcarātra*, which, as Prof Schrader has shown, so richly deserves the name<sup>3</sup>. Madhva points out on the authority of the *Hayagrīva Samhita* (one of the books of the *Pāṇcarātra* system)<sup>4</sup> that the term "Ślokas" is used in that sense. The appearance of long lists of Seers (*Vamśa Brahmana*) in *Brh Up* iv, 6, containing such names as Pautimasya, Gaṇpavana, Agnivesya, Kausika, Pāraśaryayana, Madhyandinayana, Saukarayana, Kāśāyana, Babhravya and the reference to the views of Kauntha

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1 The lead given by the *Svetāsvatara* in साक्षी चेत्ता केवलो निगुणश्च गुणो सर्वविद्य was taken up by the *Ekāyana* in expressly excluding (for the first time) derogatory attributes Cf निरनिष्टो निरवद्य which is further developed by the *Viṣṇu Purana*, following the same interpretational tradition

2 वाकोवाक्य मूलवेदो वेदसारोऽसहस्रं ।

एवायनमिति प्रोक्तम् ।

3 *Introduction to Pāṇcarātra*, Adyar, 1929, p 14. Also see NS p 426b

4 *op cit* No 208



ravya, Vādhva, Kāvaseya in *Ait Aranyaka* (iii, 1-2) and Indradyumna Bhāllaveya, Udara Sāndilya and Śākarākṣya *Chan Up* v, 15, 1, v, 14, 1 and i, 9, 1, show that there was a mass of independent popular speculation going on, during this period, the bulk of which remained probably uncanonised. Many of the authors of such 'outlandish' Śrūtis, as Bhāllaveya, Kāvaseya, Agniveśya, Saukarayana, Mathara, Paimgi, Tura, etc. cited by Madhva, in his works, are recognisable among the names of the Seers recorded in the extant *Upaniṣads* and *Aranyakas*. The most of the Seers mentioned in the *Vamśa Brāhmanas*, are to us no more than mere names, there is nothing improbable in their having engaged themselves in independent speculation and elaborated certain views. Their utterances were never probably collected together but allowed to float about. Or, not having been carefully preserved, were forgotten after a time, or were superseded by hostile or more fashionable views. Whatever the causes and the circumstances to which this new type of interpretative and expatiatory literature owed its origin and disappearance, there can be no doubt that a vast mass of them did once exist. That they are not altogether mythical, is clear from references to them in the *Srauta Sūtras*<sup>1</sup> and the *Mahābhāṣya*<sup>2</sup> and in the later religious and philosophical writings of Saṃkara<sup>3</sup>, Suresvara<sup>4</sup>, Viśvarūpa<sup>5</sup>, Utpala Vaiṣṇava<sup>6</sup> of Kashmir (10th century), Sudarśana Suri<sup>7</sup> and Vedānta Deśika<sup>8</sup>. Judging from the specimens of the *Khila Śrūtis* cited by Madhva and the other writers named above, it would appear that speculation in them had been directed to various aspects of Esotericism, questions relating

- 1 तप्ते पयसि दध्यानयति सा वैश्वदेव्यामिक्षा वाजिभ्यो वाजिनम् ।  
वसन्ते वसन्ते ज्योतिषा यजेत (Bodhāyana Śrauta Sūtra)  
पशूनां यजेत (Bodhāyana and Satyasadhā)
- 2 न म्लेच्छितवै नापभाषितवै ।
- 3 B S B iii 2 17, iii, 3 26
- 4 *Brhadīrtika* i 4, 14, pp 1263 4, 1928
- 5 *Balakrīda* com on *Yajñavalkya-smṛti* T S S p 8
- 6 *Spanda Kārīkās*, Viz Skt Ser, pp 2, 35 and 40
- 7 *Śrūtaprakāśa* on *Srihṥaya*, (Benares) p 1824 5
- 8 See his com on Rāmanuja's GB Ānanda Press Madras, p 270

the nature and means of release<sup>1</sup>, the personality of God, mōgony, 'dream-psychology, theological problems of Laya<sup>2</sup>, āha<sup>3</sup>, divine attributes, manifestations ( Avatāras)<sup>4</sup>, etymologies terms etc., and solutions on Theistic lines offered. Referring the Pāñcarātra doctrine of Vyāhas, Śaṁkara ( B. S. B. ii, 2, 44) makes a statement on the basis of a quotation from the Pancarātra (uti)<sup>5</sup>, that the Bhāgavatas teach that the Supreme Being, ra-Vāsudeva, is endowed with all the six auspicious attributes and that the manifestations of the Lord—Aniruddha, Pradyumna, m̄karsana, etc. are, at the same time, identical with the original (ūlarūpa) Vāsudeva, in essence and in attributes : ईश्वरा एवैते ज्ञानैश्वर्यशक्तिबलवीर्यतेजोमिरेश्वरैर्धर्मैरन्विताः । वासुदेवा एवैते निर्दोषा निरु-टा निरवद्याश्च " इति । This is sufficient to establish that on the Pāñcarātriaka view, there is no distinction of substance and attributes, in God or among His various manifestations. This is precisely the view of Madhva (technically known as Svagatabhedābhāva—absence of internal distinction) or Saviśeṣābheda or colorful identity of substance and attributes, emphasised by him in many of his works, on the authority of Pāñcarātriaka works like the *Īramopanīṣad* and the *Brahmatarka*. The doctrine attributed to the Bhāgavatas, by Śaṁkara, is in line with many others referred to by Madhva, on the authority of the *Nārada-Pāñcarātra*<sup>6</sup>,

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1. Madhva, B. S. B. iii, 4, 31 and 33.

2. *ibid.* ii, 3, 17.

3. *ibid.* ii, 3, 49.

4. *ibid.* ii, 3, 48.

5. This is clear from the comment of Prakāṣārthavivaraṇa on an early com. on Śaṁkara's BSB. ( vol. ii, p. 333. Madras O. Mss. Lib. Ms.) The commentator is anterior to Ānandagiri.

6. आनन्दमात्रकरपादमुखोदरादिः सर्वत्र च स्वगतमेदविवर्जितात्मा ॥ (Mbh. T. N.) q. by Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa, in his *Prameyaratnāvalī* ( S. B. H. Allahabad.)

*Padma*<sup>1</sup>, *Brahmatarka*<sup>2</sup>, *Mahataraka*<sup>3</sup>, *Caturvedaśikha*<sup>4</sup> etc To the same period of transition of thought from the Vedic to the Purānic period, may be assigned the bulk of semi Vedic literature of an interpretative and expatiatory nature such as the *Brahmasara*, the *Rk*, *Yajus* and *Sama Samhitas* (not the Vedic works of those names), *Mahamīmamsa*, *Taittiriya*, etc cited by Madhva, which, to judge from his quotations, appear to have freely commented on some of the Upanisads or parts thereof The Brh Up speaks, as we have seen, of the presence of Commentaries and Tracts (*vyakhyananī*, *anuvyakhyananī*)<sup>5</sup> The *Harivamsa* (ii, 168, 5) refers to Khilas Upakhilas and Commentaries

“ खिलान्युपखिलान्यपि ।

अगान्युपागानि तथा व्याख्यानानि च शान्तु माम् ॥ ”

Elsewhere, in the *Harivamsa* (110, 79), reference is made to Bhāsyas, Gāthas, etc The various etymological works dealing with the derivation of names, and principles of interpretation, like the *Sabdanirṇaya Namanirukti*, *Vyasanirukti* etc, (cited by Madhva) also bear testimony to the continuation of interpretative and exegetical activity along Theistic lines

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1 B S B i, 1, 9

2 Quoted by Rupagosvami in his *Laghu Bhagavatamṛta*, p. 163 Bombay, 1902

3 *ibid* p 121-22

4 Madhva, B S B ii, 3 49

5 Brh Up ii, 4, 10, iv, 1, 2, iv, 5, 11



## CHAPTER VI

### POST-VEDIC PERIOD

#### EPICS, PURĀNAS, PAÑCARĀTRA AND GITA

The next stage is that of the Epics and Purānas. So far, the truths of the Vedas and Upanisads, had been confined to the higher orders of Brahminical society. The *Brahmanas* had hardened caste. The *Upanisads* could not entirely break away from the bonds of the caste system, even tho' they made occasional attempts to throw the gates of spirituality open to all without distinction of caste or sex. But examples of a Maitreyī here or a Satyakāma Jābāla there or even a Jānaśruti Pautrayana (termed a Śūdra) were few and far between. That these were exceptions to the rule is clear from Brh Up iv, 5, 1, where we are told that of the two wives of Yājñavalkya, Maitreyī alone was philosophically minded (Brahmavadinī), while Kātyayani remained like "most other women" (striprajñā). But the light of the Vedas could no longer be hidden under a bushel. Sooner or later, it had to be made available to all. The claims of the women and Śūdras no less than those of the "fallen Brahmins and the alien races which were being fast absorbed into the Aryan fold, had to be satisfied. The absolute exclusion of these from the highest knowledge might give a handle to the enemies of the Vedic religion who were, by this time, making their first appearance (Haitukas)<sup>1</sup>. Apart from this social need of the hour, the conflicting testimony of the Vedic literature itself had to be reconciled. The divergent currents of thought and the discordant solutions of religious and philosophical questions offered hitherto were enough to drive common men to distraction.

स्मृतिविभिन्ना श्रुतयश्च भिन्ना नैका ऋषियंस्य मनः प्रमाणम् ।

धर्मस्य तत्त्वं निहितं गुहायाम् ।

॥ (Mbh iii, 14, 119)

विरुद्धवत्प्रतीयन्ते आगमा यत्र वै मियः<sup>2</sup> ।

1 अथ ज्ञानापसर्गा \* \* \* \* \* ये चान्ये मिथ्यावादे कुहके-द्रजालैर्वदिकेषु  
परिस्थातुमिच्छन्ति \* \* \* ॥ (Maitrī Up vii, 8)

2 Madhva B S B ii, 1, 18

Humanity was groping in the dark, not having been provided with the right key to the solution of the intricacies of the Scriptures. Something had to be done for the enlightenment of the masses that had no access to the wisdom of the Vedas. This was what the Epics and the Purāṇas undertook to do.

स्त्रीशूद्रब्रह्मवन्धूना नयी न श्रुतिगोचरा ।  
इति भारतमाख्यानं कृपया मुनिना कृतम्<sup>1</sup> ॥  
इतिहासपुराणाभ्यां वद समुपवृहयेत ।  
विभेद्यल्पश्रुताद्वेदो मामयं प्रचलिष्यति<sup>2</sup> ॥  
यो विद्याञ्चतुरो वेदान् साङ्गोपनिषदान्द्विज ।  
न चेत्पुराणं सविद्यान्मैव स स्याद्विचक्षण<sup>3</sup> ॥

We cannot, however, embark on any elaborate or systematic inquiry into the nature of the religious and philosophical viewpoint of the "original kernel" and of the "later accretions" of the Epics and Purāṇas. The problem of the gradual evolution and final stratification of the Epics and Purāṇas, in their present form, is an intriguing one and the several authorities who have given their undivided and scholarly attention to it, have by no means come to any unanimous conclusions. We can do no more than take a comparative view of their philosophical contents, as they stand, and offer our remarks on the particular viewpoint which they appear to adopt. In doing so, we cannot but take the liberty of making broad generalizations.

### EPICS

The Epics and Purāṇas are essentially Theistic in outlook.

वेदे रामायणे चैव पुराणे भारते तथा ।  
आदावन्ते च मध्ये च विष्णु सर्वत्र गीयते ॥

( *Harivamśa*, III, 323, 34 )

The plurality of selves and the acceptance of a Supreme Governor over them, are clearly set forth in reply to Yudhishthira's query

बहवः पुरुषा ब्रह्मण उताहो एक एव तु ?  
बहवः पुरुषा राजन् साययोगविचारिणाम् ॥ १ ॥

1 *Bhāgavata*, I, 4, 24

2. *Mbh* : I, 67-68

3 *Brahmaṇḍa Purāṇa*, ( *Prakriyāpāda* )

नैतदिच्छति पुरुषमेक कुरुकुलोद्वह ।  
 बहूना पुरुषाणां तु यथैका योनिरुच्यते  
 तथा तं पुरुषं विश्वमास्यास्यामि गुणाधिकम्  
 ममान्तरात्मा तव च ये चान्य देहसंस्थिता ॥ ४ ॥  
 महापुरुषशब्दः स विभक्त्यैकः सनातनः ॥ ९ ॥  
 साख्यज्ञाने तथा योगे यथावदनुवर्णितम् ॥ ( *Mbh.* xii, 361, -22 )

There is no reason to suppose that the doctrine of plurality of souls attributed to the thinkers of the "Sāṃkhya and Yoga" here, is only a Purvapaksa view<sup>1</sup>. The occurrence of the phrase साख्यज्ञाने तथा योगे \* \* \* \* \* again, in the concluding portion, shows that only the Siddhanta view is being summed up here, according to which "there is a Supreme Being which is the Source of the many (*bahunam yonih*) and their inner Ruler (*antaratma*) and who is, for that reason, termed "Mahapurusa", in contrast with the ordinary Purusas<sup>2</sup>. This is on a par with the distinction between Purusas and Purusottama, in the *Gita*. It would appear that बहूना पुरुषा ब्रह्मन् and महापुरुषशब्द च \* \* both represent the Siddhanta, while नैतदिच्छन्ति पुरुषमेक ... represents a Purvapaksa of the Monists that there is no Overlord other than the Atman existing in different bodies. The next line and the particle "तु" allude to this purvapaksa and point out the additional peculiarity that the selves are *not* equal, that there is One amongst them that is superior to all (*gunadhika*) and the Creator of all (*bahunam yonih*).

The cosmology of the *Mahabharata* accepts the Sāṃkhya theory of evolution with a *twenty sixth principle added*

अन्यच्च राजन् स पर तथान्य पञ्चविंशक

The world is regarded as a real development. Tho' the distinction of Prakṛti and Purusas is recognised, a Dualism is overcome as they are both dependent on the Supreme

मयाध्यक्षेण प्रकृतिः सूयते सचराचरम् । ( *Gita* )

Many contexts indicate the separate existence of freed souls

मोक्षो दापो महानेप यदि सिद्धिं गतानुपीन ।

प्राप्य \* \* \* \* \*

मग्नस्य हि परज्ञाने किं दुःखतरं भवत् ( *Mbh.* xii 307 S3 )

1 As contended by Śaṅkara in his B S B ii, 1 1

2 That such is the natural purport of the passage, is conceded by Amalananda, in his *Kalpataru*, tho' he seeks to escape this natural interpretation with some special pleading



Narada's visit to Svetadvīpa and his meeting the released souls there and their description, is a typical instance in point

## PURANAS

The usual contents of a Purana

सर्गश्च प्रतिसर्गश्च वक्षो मन्वन्तराणि च ।

show that they are cast in a necessarily theistic and pluralistic mould<sup>1</sup> That they do not all of them preach the worship of the same deity, is an open secret They have perhaps carried the Polytheism of the Vedas to its logical conclusion. Or, perhaps, their conflicting views are the result of an attempt at tempering Theism to suit different tastes ( Cf *Gita* ix, 23 )

There cannot, however, be any difficulty in determining their central vein of thought The *Matsya Purana* ( 53, 68 69 ) makes a three fold distinction of "Sāttvika", "Rājasa" and "Tāmasa" Purāṇas The "Visnuite Purāṇas" are generally classed as "Sāttvika" and the Śaiva ones as "Tāmasa" The former uphold the supremacy of Visnu<sup>2</sup> This comes into conflict with the Śaiva Puranas which extol Śiva as the author of the Universe and the highest Being The conflict is removed by explaining that the Śaiva Purāṇas owe their origin to a 'campaign of deception' ( *mohana* ) on the part of Rudra and some other gods and sages, at the behest of Visnu, to delude and mislead the "Asuric" and the undeserving<sup>3</sup>

1 *Visnu Purana* iii, 6, 25 and *Matsya*, 53, 65 Also

महता च पुराणानां लक्षणं कथयामि त । सृष्टिश्चापि विसृष्टिश्च स्थितिस्तेषां च  
पालनम् । कर्मणां वाचनां वार्ता मनूनां च क्रमेण च । वर्णनं प्रलयानां च मोक्षस्य च  
निरूपणम् । उत्कीर्तनं हरेरेव देवानां च पृथक् पृथक् ॥

( *Brahma-samhita*, Kṛṣṇajñāna-makhanda, Ch 132 )

2 T. "From the  
standpoint

3 I

1 from the

7, 19, 9)

मोहयिष्यति

\* \* \* It would be beside our point to enter into the question of the moral propriety of such a theory From the modern point of view, the 'campaign of deception' may be treated as a "Purāṇic fiction" to harmonise their conflicting utterances and evolve a single unified doctrine However that may be the device has been used by all Vedāntic schools to damn those hostile to their ways of thinking See *Annals B O R I*, xiv, 34

There can be no doubt that the prominence given in the Epics and Puranas to cosmological stories and the various Avatars of God and their exploits, gives them an indisputably realistic and Theistic stamp <sup>1</sup>

The following remarks of Das Gupta, on the philosophical viewpoint of the Purāṇas, are noteworthy : "It is highly probable that at least one important school of ideas, regarding the philosophy of the *Upanisads* and the *Brahmasutras*, was preserved in the Puranic tradition. The theosophy of the Puranas was much influenced by that of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga. Śaṃkara's interpretation of the philosophy of the *Upanisads* and the *Sutras*, seems to have diverged very greatly from the semi realistic interpretations of them found in the Purāṇas. It was probable for this reason, that Śaṃkara seldom refers to the Puranas. But since Śaṃkara's line of interpretation is practically absent in the Puranas, and since the extreme Monism of some passages of the *Upanisads* is softened and modified by other considerations, it may be believed that the views of the Vedānta as found in the *Puranas* and the *Gīta*, present, at least in a general manner, the oldest outlook of the philosophy of the *Upanisads* and the *Brahmasutras*" <sup>2</sup>

On the practical side the Puranas advocate enthusiastic performance of one's Karma in a spirit of dispassionate dedication to God <sup>3</sup>. The individual has no right to arrogate to himself the initiative and conduct of affairs <sup>4</sup>. He must realise his dependence

1 On a truly monistic view, these have really no meaning or purpose -- न चैव सृष्टिविषय किमपि फल श्रूयते । (Śaṃkara, *B S B.* 1, 4, 14) The theist, however, looks upon world-creation as a standing proof, however inadequate, of the unutterable majesty of God. Cf बहुचिन्नजगत् बहुधाकरणात् परशक्तिरनन्तगुण परम (Madhva)

2 Das Gupta, *His of Ind Phil*, iii, p 496.

3 वर्णाश्रमाचारवत्ता पुरुषेण पर पुमान् ।

विष्णुराराध्यते येन नान्यत् ततोपकारणम् ॥ (*Viṣṇu* q by Rāmānuja)

4 *Gīta* iii, 9 Cf Śaṃkara's comment on it, in his bhāṣya on *Sanatsujaliya* (Vanī Vilas edn vol 13, pp 184 5 and

नाह कर्ता न कर्ता त्व, कर्ता यस्तु सदा प्रभु ( *Mbh* xii, 235, 84, 231, 17 )

on God and make his life a continuous worship<sup>1</sup> This is the essence of the doctrine of "Naiskarmya" of the *Pañcarātras* and the *Gīta*, to be referred to presently

## PANCARATRAS

(1) Like the Epics and the Puranas, the *Pañcarātras* also, were intended to expound the truths of the Vedas for the benefit of those who were denied access to the Vedic lore

स्त्रीशूद्रब्रह्मवन्धूना तत्रज्ञानेऽधिकारिता ।

( *Vyomasamhita*, q by Madhva B S B 1, 1, 1 )

The *Mahābhārata* speaks of it as the highest kind of knowledge

ज्ञानेष्वेतत् राजेन्द्र सर्वेष्वेतद्विशिष्यते (xii 309 608)

taught by Narayana himself

The literature of the *Pañcarātras* is a voluminous one, comprising both revealed and non revealed matter<sup>2</sup> The *Īsvara Samhita* says that the *Ekāyana Veda* was the source of all other Vedas and that it originated with Vasudeva and existed in the earliest stage, as the root of all other Vedas which were introduced at a later age and were therefore called 'Vikāra Vedas'<sup>3</sup> (Das Gupta, *I Phil* iii, p 21)

Tho' nothing is known about the nature and extent of the *Ekāyana Sakhā* we are in a position to state from certain quotations in the works of Yāmunaçarya Utpala Vaisnava and others that they consisted of prose as well as metrical passages The *Parama Sṛuti Mula Sṛuti*,<sup>4</sup> *Caturvedasikha* etc, of Madhva, belong to this category Schrader has shown<sup>5</sup> that there are over two

1 तत्कर्म हरितोष यत् ( *Bhag* 17, 29 40 ) वृणीमहे ते परितोषणाय  
( 17, 30, 40 )

2 Schrader, p 2

3 Cf Madhva's q in his *Up bhasya*

' वाकावाक्य मूलवेदा वेदसारोपसंहति ।

एकयनमिति प्रोक्त \* \* \* ॥'

and प्रतिपादकता सिद्धा मूलवदान्वयता द्विजा ॥

4 Vide f n 3, above on "Vikāra Vedas"

5 *Introd. to Pañcarātra*, p 114-115



hundred Samhitās of the Pañcarātra. A very large number of these are still available in manuscripts.<sup>1</sup>

(ii) The metaphysics of the Pañcarātras is essentially Theistic.<sup>2</sup> Śaṅkara himself accepts its tenets in the main, save those relating to the alleged creation of the Jīvas. He makes it clear that the Pañcarātrikas teach Vasudeva to be the Supreme Being with all auspicious attributes. Rāmānuja cites two passages from the *Parama Samhita*

अचेतना पराधी च नित्या सततविक्रिया ।  
सहघनादिरन्तश्च परमार्थेन निश्चित ॥  
त्रिगुणा कर्मणा क्षेत्र प्रकृते रूपमुच्यते ।  
प्राप्तिरूपेण सत्त्वं तस्याश्च पुरुषस्य च ॥ (ii, 18 19)

which clearly prove that the metaphysics of the Pañcarātra was out and out realistic, recognizing an eternal matter (Prakṛti) and equally co-existent souls.

The individual soul transmigrates on account of beginningless Karma associated with Vasanas, at the will of God.

अनादिक्र्मणा बद्धो जीवः ससारमण्डले ।  
वासुदेव जया नित्यं भ्रमति \* \* \* (q by Madhva)

For the removal of these Vasanas, a certain power emanates from Brahman and impelled by His will, so works within the inner microcosm of man that the Jīva is ultimately freed from bondage and his personality and innate bliss are revealed in full. It may perhaps be pointed out that while some of the works of the present Pañcarātra texts betray monistic leanings, there are some works of the school which uphold a sternly non-absolutistic view. The difference may probably be due to the existence of two currents of thought of which the absolutistic one may be the result of the realistic strata becoming overlaid with monistic terminology. The cosmological account of the *Jayākhya Samhita* is

1. Madhva makes copious use of many of these Samhitās. His citations go to show that the special features of his system have good support in them. For example, light thrown on his view of Brahman, by Śaṅkara's reference to this point.

2. "The general trend of the Pañcarātra is clearly non-Advaitic" (Schrader, *ibid.*, p. 91)

thus palpably monistic. It is significant that except for the terminology of "Cidacicchāratva" of the Brahman and the "Brahmatmakatva" of Prakṛti and the souls and a certain peculiar way of putting things the works of Ramanuja and his followers have not drawn upon any of these monistic-looking passages at all, in the exposition of their philosophy but have throughout been all unconscious of the existence of any such strikingly monistic tendency in these Source-books of their system which they hold as sacred. But that a monistic current had been introduced into the Pāñcarātra may be gathered from a quotation given by Vacaspati Miśra in his *Bhāmātī* (on B. S. 1, 4, 21)

आ मुक्तोर्भेद एवस्याज्जीवस्य च परस्य च ।

मुक्तस्य तु न भेदोऽस्ति भेदहेतोरभावतः ॥

which is expressly attributed to the Pāñcarātrikas. But the view is repudiated by Rāmanuja, as hotly as the other one regarding the alleged creation of the Jīvas. This may show how the real doctrine of the Pāñcarātrikas had come to be misunderstood in subsequent times owing to break in continuity of tradition. This lends weight to the presumption that the original genuine elements of the Pāñcarātra philosophy have been better reflected in the numerous texts and Samhitās of the Pāñcarātra, cited by Madhva, in his works.

(iii) On the practical side, the Pāñcarātras teach the cult of Naiskarmya.

तस्य सात्वतमाचष्टे नैष्कर्म्यं कर्मणा यतः । ( *Bhag.* 1, 3, 8 )

But in the light of the emphasis laid by the Pāñcarātra on rituals, and worship ( *vijya*, *abhiṣamāna*, *dāna* etc., as admitted by Śaṅkara, under B. S. 11, 2, 42 ) its Naiskarmya must be radically different from the cult of "no-action". That such action and worship are not confined to any particular state, as the "Avidyāvasthā" of Śaṅkara, but may be continued even after Siddhi or Mokṣa, is the keynote of the Epics, Purāṇas and the Pāñcarātras,<sup>1</sup> Naiskarmya, in other words, is not so much "no action", as enlightened action.

1 नैष्कर्म्यमप्यच्युतभाववर्जितं न क्षाभते ज्ञानमलं निरञ्जनम्

( *Bhāṣya* 1, 5, 12 )

आत्मारामश्च मुनयो निर्ग्रन्था अप्युरुक्रमे ।

कृदन्त्यहेतुको भवितुः \* \* \* \* ॥ ( *Ibid* 1, 7, 10 )

निष्काम ज्ञानपूर्वं तु निवृत्तमिह चोच्यते ।

It is not turning away from action as from a forbidden fruit. In all this, we have a successful reorientation of the ascetic ideal of certain Upanishads न कर्मणा न प्रजया धनेन त्यागेनैकेनमृतत्वमानशु । सत्यास-योगान् यतय शुद्धमत्या ॥

The change was effected without violent break of any kind

बुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिजीविषेच्छत समा । तेन त्यक्तेन भुजीथा ॥

एव न धर्मं लिप्यन् नरे । (Iśa Up)

but by a subtle change of emphasis from Karma tyāga to Phala-tyāga. There was thus no break with the sacrificial tradition of the Vedas, but only a reorientation of outlook, which reached its culmination in the philosophy of action preached by the Gita

अर्धकर्मफलत्यागं प्राहुस्त्यागं विचक्षणा ।

यस्तु कर्मफलत्यागी स त्यागी परमो मतः ॥

सगं त्यक्त्वा फलानि च \* \* \* \* ]

तत्तद्व्याप्नोति मे पार्यं निश्चितं मतमुत्तमम् ॥

It is not action *per se* that binds, but selfish action निष्काम ज्ञानपूर्वं तु निवृत्तमिह चाच्यते । (Vyāsasmṛti) The above view of Naisharmya or Nishṛti Mārga, receives the most remarkable support from the Kūrma Purana

तस्माज्ज्ञानेन सहितं कर्मयोगं समाचरेत् ।

प्रवृत्तं च निवृत्तं च द्विविधं कर्म वैदिकम् ॥

ज्ञानपूर्वं निवृत्तं तु प्रवृत्तं यदतोऽन्यथा ।

निवृत्तं सेवमानस्तु याति तत्परमं पदम् ॥ (1, 2, 63 64)

कर्मणा सहितं ज्ञानात्सम्यग्योगोऽभिधीयते ।

ज्ञानं च कर्मसहितं जायते दोषवर्जितम् ॥

तस्मात्सर्वप्रयत्नेन यत्र कुत्राश्रमे रतः ।

कर्माणीश्वरतुष्टयर्थं कुर्यान्निष्कर्म्यमाप्नुयात् ॥

संप्राप्य परमं ज्ञानं नैष्कर्म्यं तत्प्रसादतः ।

एकाकी निर्ममः शान्तो जीवन्नेव विमुच्यते ॥ (1, 3, 23 25)

Cf also the text from the Pāñcarātra cited by Rāmānuja -

1. For a diametrically opposite view, see Śaṅkara on Gīta

11, 43 ईश्वरो मे तुष्यतु इति सगं त्यक्त्वा ॥



तस्मात्सम्यक् पर ब्रह्म वासुदेवाख्यमव्ययम् ।  
अस्मादवाप्यते दास्यात् ज्ञानपूर्वेण कर्मणा ॥

( *Sribhāṣya*, p 1608 Benares edn )

All these bear out the complete unity of standpoint in regard to the conception of Naiskarmya or Nivṛttimarga taught by the Epics, Puranas and the Pañcarātra, which is faithfully reflected by Madhva, who defines Naiskarmya in the same sense and quotes a similar passage from the *Vyasasmṛiti*:

निष्काम ज्ञानपूर्वं तु निवृत्तमिह चोच्यते ।

( 17 ) There can be no doubt that by the time of the Epic and the Purāṇas, the Pañcarātras had already gained an honored place among the Śāstras<sup>1</sup>. A passage in the *Skanda* reckons them as one of the Śāstras

शास्त्रं च वेदा स्मृतयः पुराणं चादात्मकम् ।

इतिहासः पञ्चरात्रं भारतं च महानते ॥ ( 11, 7, 19, 12 )

The *Mahābhārata* itself, has nothing but eulogy for it, in many places ( xii, 348, 62-63 ). The *Varaha Purāṇa* ( 66, 19 ) not only places it on a par with the Vedas

वेदेन पञ्चरात्रेण भक्त्या यजेत चैव हि ।

दृश्योऽहं नान्यथा दृश्या वर्पकोऽन्विष्टैरपि<sup>2</sup> ॥

but also opines that where Vedic mantras are not available, one may worship according to Pañcarātra rites

अलाभे वेदमन्त्राणां पञ्चरात्रोदितं हि ।

मार्गेण मा यजत यत् ते मा प्राप्स्यन्ति नारद ॥

( *Catalogus Codicum Manuscriptorum Bibliotheca Bodleiana*, p 58, col 2 )

1 Ramanuja ( in his *Sribhāṣya* ) and Jayatīrtha ( in his *Nyayasudha*, B S. 11, 2, adh 12 ) have replied to Śaṅkara's charge of anti-Vediism against the Pañcarātra. Belvalkar ( *Brahmasūtras Tr of Ś B* 11, 2, Poona, 1938 ) also says that such a charge is " untenable " ( p. 206 ).

2. Quoted by Madhva, in his *Anurayakhyana* ( 11, 2, p. 304 )

## BHAGAVAD GITA

(1) It is to the *Bhagavadgita* that we must turn for the most sublime theory of works. The *Gita* transforms the ordinary Vedic theory of sacrifice and reconciles it with spiritual knowledge and perfects the theory of Niskarmya taught in the *Puranas* and the *Pañcaratra* by enlarging the idea of dependence of all on God, as the *raison d'être* of dedication of all Karma. It is freely asserted that "the Bhagavata religion was the immediate stimulus to the synthesis of the *Gita*"<sup>1</sup> and that "the teaching of the *Gita* is identical with that of the doctrine of Bhagavatas"<sup>2</sup>. It is stated by Madhva, on the authority of the *Brahmanavarta Purana*<sup>3</sup> that the *Gita* is, in fact, a summary of the teachings of the *Pañcaratra*.

इति गीता च तच्छास्त्रसक्षेप इति हीरितम् (AV II, 2)

The *Gita* would like to shift the emphasis of the Vedas, as superficially understood, from works to wisdom. Works are not ends in themselves, but only a means to an end.

वदवादरता पार्थ नायदस्तीति दादिन (II 42)

It is not so much a censure on the Vedas as a plea for a higher point of view. The wisdom lies not in looking down upon the Vedas, but in attuning them to God.

अहं हि सर्वज्ञाना नोक्ता च प्रभुश्च च (IX 24)

वेदैश्च सर्वैरहमेव वद (XV, 15)<sup>4</sup>

The *Gita* opposes the superficial understanding of the Upanisadic view that salvation is not to be gained by works or by offspring, but by renunciation alone. Niskarmya interpreted as abstention from Karma, is not the true law of morality, but Nishkamatā or

1 Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil* I, p. 526

2 *Ibid*

3 ब्रह्मरुद्रेन्द्रसूर्याणां यदुक्तं विष्णुना पुरा ।

पञ्चरात्रात्मकं ज्ञानं व्यासाऽदात्पाण्डवेभ्यः ततः ॥

तेषामेवावतारेषु सेनामध्येऽर्जुनाय च ।

प्रादादगीतेति निर्दिष्टं सक्षेपेणायुमुत्सुव ॥ (NS II p 423)

4. Cf. मा विधत्तेऽभिधत्ते मा विक्ल्प्याऽप्राह्य इत्यहम् ।

इत्यस्या हृदयं साक्षान्नान्या मद्देव वदचन ॥ (*Bhag* XI, 21, 43)

disinterested performance<sup>1</sup> All desires are not bad The desire for righteousness is divine<sup>2</sup>

(11) As for the metaphysics of the *Gita*, it is agreed<sup>3</sup> that it "accepts the Sāmkhya theory of evolution of the manifold from heterogeneous indeterminate matter" God puts His seed into Prakṛti (xiv, 3) and hence creation proceeds The *Gita* 'repudiates the view that the world is untrue<sup>4</sup> (xvi 8) We have a real development presided over by Isvara<sup>5</sup> "We cannot say that the *Gita* looks upon the world as real only so long as we live in it"<sup>6</sup>

"The *Gita* does not assert anywhere that Brahman is the only reality and all else that appears is false and unreal The word *Mayā*, is no doubt, used there, in three passages, but its meaning is not what Saṅkara ascribes to it, in his famous interpretation of Vedāntic thought Thus in vii, 14, *Mayā* is described as being of the nature of *Gunas* Saṅkara's phrasing of it as a deception (*chadma* in xviii, 61) is quite inappropriate Thus it is evident that the *Gita* does not know the view that the world may be regarded as a manifestation of *Māyā* or illusion" (Das Gupta I *Phil* 11, 478) "The eternality and plurality of Purusas is assumed in it"<sup>7</sup> (11, 12, xiv, 2) There is no evidence that it permits a duality of standpoints—"the Purusottama level" and the 'stand point of the absolute truth', or that "even the Purusottama

1 न कर्मणामनारभार्थकस्य पुरुषोऽश्नुते (iii, 4)

एतान्यपि तु कर्माणि \* \* सग त्यक्त्वा कर्तव्यानीति (xviii 6)

2 "If it be self seeking to apply to God for help in becoming like himself and doing His Will, this is a form of self seeking indistinguishable from the highest moral aspiration" Peterson, *The Nature of Religion*, Gifford Lectures, p 223 Cf Madhva अन्यफलाभावेऽपि मत्प्रसादाख्यफलसद्भावात् । इच्छा च तस्य युक्ता । वृणीमह ते परितोषणाय' ( भाग ४, ३०, ४० ) इति महदाचारात् । अनिन्दनाद्विशेषत इतर निन्दनात् (G B, 11 47) See also his *Mbh T N* xxix 56 61

3 Radhakrishnan I *Phil* 1, 526

4 Das Gupta I. *Phil* 11, 502.

5 "We cannot doubt that there existed early a Vaisnavism with a Sāmkhya metaphysics". Barth, *Religions of India*, P 190

6 Radhakrishnan I *Phil* 1, 548

7 *Ibid.* p 550



is *imaginary*, since there is in Him, an element of not self"<sup>1</sup> The manner of wording in the so called 'Purusottama level' (xv, 18-20), shows no trace of the consciousness of the presence of a higher stage in the mind of the author of the *Gita* (xiv, 1-3, vii, 2, 7, ix, 1-4, xv, 18-20) The teaching about the 'triple Purusas' Ksara, Aksara and Purusottama, is *not* made with any mental reservation in favor of a still higher stage The distinction holds good "within this world of experience" and in the Scriptures It is concluded to be the "most precious secret (*guhyaṭamam śaṣṭram*) and even Śaṅkara, concedes that it is, indeed, the very essence "not only of the *Gita* but also of the entire Veda"<sup>2</sup>

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1 Radhakrishnan, *I Phil*, p 549

2 सर्वो हि गीताशास्त्रार्थः अस्मिन्मध्याये सुप्रोक्तस्तत् १ न केवलं गीताशास्त्रार्थः एव, किन्तु सर्वं च वेदार्थं इह परिसमाप्त ॥ (Śaṅkara, *G.B.* xv, 20)



## CHAPTER VII

# THE DAWN OF SCHISM AND HERETICAL SCHOOLS

The currents of Theistic Realism, which originated in their fountain-head, the Vedas, and had kept an unbroken course till the days of the Epics and Purānas, had, at last, to face the disintegrating rocks of schism and heresy. Many were the causes of unrest and dissatisfaction. For one thing, the literature of the Vaidikas had grown beyond useful proportions, comprising in its fold the four Vedas and their numerous Śakhās, Brahmanas, Khilas, Upanisads, Aranyakas, Ślokas, Vyākhyānas, Anuvyākhyānas, Itihāsas, Purānas, Āgamas and Tantras. Scared by the voluminosity of this literature, sceptics began to doubt if it was worth their while to wade thro' this ocean of knowledge, in search of God. True, one Upanisad had counselled 'Brood not over a plethora of words, for it is a waste of breath' (*Bṛh* iv, 4, 21). But the warning had gone unheeded. The routine of Vedādhyaṇa, Agnihotra, Aupāsana and the Pañcamahāyajñas became a regular boredom to those who were unable to bear its strain. The creative period in Indian Philosophy seemed to have come to an end, already, by the close of the Epic Period. Too much groping in the dark within an enormous body of revealed texts, which had ceased to be intelligible on account of their sharp mutual conflicts of views and interests, and too many splits in their own camp as a result of honest attempts at trying to evolve order out of chaos had dulled the edge of men's intuition. The only result of their labors was an increase in the bulk of the interpretative literature called *Smṛtis* and *Purānas*<sup>1</sup>. The upshot was a curious medley of loss of courage, blind homage to authority, religiosity, naive emotionalism, scepticism, divided allegiance, intellectual indolence and restlessness leading to Agnosticism. "A congeries of conflicting theories and guesses accepted by some and

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1. 'इतिहासपुराणाभ्यां वेदं समुपबृहयेत्' ।

denied by others changing with men and reflecting the individual characters, emotions and wishes of their authors, filled the air. There was no admitted facts or principles which all recognised, but only dissolving views and institutions \* \* \* Some were busy building up elaborate metaphysical theories, others were equally busy demolishing them. Many theories independent of Vedic tradition arose" (Radhakrishnan *I Phil* 1, 352)

At such a time as this, a few bold attempts were made to explore new avenues of thought under the nominal suzerainty of the Vedas. The Āstika Darśanas like the Purva Mimamsa and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṃkhya were nothing but the responses to the needs of the hour,—attempts to flush out the spiritual stagnation of the race by the supply of fresh blood and currents of thought. But in spite of these attempts to bring comfort and consolation to the distracted, the founding of new schools of thought like the Sāṃkhya and Mimamsa, only added to the prevailing confusion of thought. The Purva-Mīmāṃsā had no doubt, evolved a set of canons of interpretation, to be applied to the bewildering mass of religious literature to arrive at truth. But it had given a false turn to the wheel by making the Scripture hinge on Sacrifices. There was nothing in its Sacrificialism to touch the heart and make it glow. The Mimamsa and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika were barren and cold in the spiritual sense of the term. The Purva-Mīmāṃsā had well nigh abolished God, the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika threatened to solve all problems of the world by the method of 'agreement and difference' <sup>1</sup>. The Sāṃkhya had demonstrated the superfluity of God for metaphysics and the Yoga gave but a grudging place to Him ईश्वरप्रणिधानाद्वा (Y S 1, 2, 3). Even the Nyaya Vaiśeṣika, Dr Banerji thinks "was originally atheistic", tho' "their modern adherents have made theistic systems of them". According to Kumarila, atheistic sentiments were common among the adherents of the Purva-Mīmāṃsā <sup>2</sup>.

The attempt at religious and philosophical renaissance had thus to retreat behind the dust and din of warring creeds which it had helped to raise. Darkness and confusion began to reign

1 × × साधर्म्यवैधर्म्यनानाभिधेयसाधितम् ।

2 Radhakrishnan, *I Phil* 1, 281, f. n



once again स्मृ यनवकाशदोषप्रसंग इति चेन्न, अन्यस्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसंगत (B S II, 1, 1) The *Brahmajala Sutta* mentions sixty two the ones which prevailed at the time of the Buddha Faith in the usefulness of the Vedic literature having been undermined, the ground lay open for atheistic and materialistic invasions

"A period of disintegration followed, when attempts were made to carry out the Upanisadic revolt in a more systematic manner. The illogical combination of Upanisadic Monism and Vedic Sacrificialism could no longer live together Reconstruction was thus the greatest need of the hour Before a true synthesis could be obtained the elements artificially combined required to be torn asunder The Buddhist, Jain and Carvaka pointed to the artificial condition of the prevailing religion" (Radhakrishnan, *I. Phil.* 1, 289) "The ideology of the Upanisads did not penetrate the masses and in course of time there was a powerful wave of material philosophy, Jainism, Agnosticism and Atheism" (Jawaharlal Nehru, *Discovery of India*, 1946, p 97) The stray references to Carvaka, Buddhist and Jain theories in the Epics and Puranas<sup>1</sup> probably represent the first appearance of these ideas and the attempts made to nip these ideas in the bud

The spread of Carvaka, Jain and Buddhist doctrines shook the foundations of Vedic belief and authority The Carvaka soon became world wide (Lokayata)<sup>2</sup> It had an irresistible appeal to the hedonistic instincts of the masses

The Buddhist appealed to the more cultured section of the people, which had a lingering faith in the concepts of right and wrong and inculcated a stern code of ethics, to purge it of all

1 *Valmiki Ramayana*, II, 109, 34, *Gita* XVI, 8 *Manu*, II, 11, 22, 33 *Vishnu Purana* III, 18, 24 26 *Matrî Up* VII, 8 ff Also पापण्डवामर्शवाचैर्वेदमार्गं कलौ भया । (*Bhag* X, 20, 23 V) )

"अहमास पण्डितकां हितुको वेदनिन्दकं  
आन्वीक्षिको तर्कविद्यामनुरक्तो निरर्थिकाम्" (*Mbh* XII, 108, 47)  
Cf *Padma q* by Madhva in his *B T* —  
साख्यमासुरयेऽयस्मै कुतर्कपरिवृद्धितम् ।

1. अत एव तस्य चार्वाकमतस्य लोकायतमित्यन्वयमपर नामधेयम् ।  
(*Sarvadarsana Samgraha*, p 1)

dress and facilitate the attainment of Nirvāṇa. "The majesty of God and prestige of Providence pale into insignificance before the principle of Karma and the noble eightfold Path. Not a hair can drop from the head without the decree of Karma. A God who can neither adapt nor alter, neither produce nor modify is no God at all" (Radhakrishnan, *Ibid*, p. 454). The Buddhist denied the authority of the Vedas, rejected the institution of Varnas and "steered clear of profitless metaphysical discussions. It was essentially psychology, logic and ethics and not metaphysics" (*op. cit* p 353).

The Buddhist's Nirvāṇa was not particularly alluring, but he managed to hide the icy nature of it by a well chosen veil of ineffability<sup>1</sup>. By an adroit turn of emphasis,<sup>2</sup> he impressed upon the world that the question of how to get rid of Samsāra was far more insistent and important than that of how men would spend their leisure hours after they got rid of it! "Buddhism was more concerned with the believers' moral needs than with any intellectual interpretation of the world. Not the Universe and the nature of its cause was the theme of inquiry, but the character of human experience, its dangers and variety" (Carpentier, *Theism in Medieval India*, p 53). "Buddhism, then, had a cure of souls" (Barth, *Religions of India*, p. 120).

Royal patronage was not long in coming<sup>3</sup>. The Jains also

1 Cf अप्रतीतमसंप्राप्तमनुच्छिन्नमशाश्वतम् ।

अविरुद्धमनुत्पन्नमेव निर्वाणमुच्यते ॥ (Nāgārjuna, xxx, 3)

and शून्यताया विशुद्धाया नैरात्म्यान्मार्गलाभत

बुद्धा शुद्धात्मलाभित्वात् गता आत्ममहात्मताम् ॥

(Asanga, ix, 23, *Mahayanasūtrālamkāraśāstra*)

2 The *Majjima Nikaya* i 29, says "For those burning in fire, it is not the time to discuss about it but to escape from it".

3 "Even the proceedings connected with its erection into a State religion by Asoka appear to have been accomplished, if not by violence, at any rate with coercion, as is evident from the expressions ascribed to the Prince: "In less than two years," he says, "the gods who were worshipped as true divinities, in Jambudvīpa, have now been rendered false, and this result is not the effect of my greatness but of my zeal" (Insc of Sabarām, Rupnath and Bairat, I A. vi, 156. (Barth, *op cit* p 135 )

made their influence felt by active propaganda. The austere heights to which they carried their doctrine of Ahimsā, the more elaborate and rigorous system of their Ethics the acceptance by them of the soul as a permanent entity in contrast to Buddhism<sup>1</sup>, and the more colorful conception of Kaivalya put forward by them and the weight and prestige of royal patronage which they too gained before long, also tended to ensure their progress.

The combined strength of these three soon forced orthodox Hinduism to take stock of the situation and meet the danger to its solidarity. The metaphysical objection to a plurality of gods had to be answered. It would appear from the *Lalitavistara* that the sectarian worship of the various gods of Hinduism, like Śiva and Viṣṇu was already well established, at the time of the revolt of Buddhism<sup>2</sup>. If so, we cannot be wrong in having dated the Purāṇic and Pāñcarātra literature, prior to the rise of Buddhism<sup>3</sup>.

The Buddhists opposed the view of a sentient first cause<sup>4</sup> of the Universe which would itself remain uncaused. The Jains had, for their own reasons, repudiated a Creator-God and so did the Cārvāka. "The iconoclastic fervor of the Materialists, the Sceptics and some of the followers of Buddhism had destroyed all grounds of certitude" (Radhakrishnan, *op cit* ii p 19). The Saptabhaṅginaya of the Jainas was an open invitation to Scepticism. In these circumstances, the reality of the world and its

1 Das Gupta *op cit* ii, 521

2 "The *Lalitavistara* describes the state of India at the time the Buddha preached in these words — 'While at Uruvela the Sakya thought Here I am, born in Jambudvīpa among people who have no prospect of intellectual redemption, crowded by Tīrthikas with diverse wishes. Some adore cows, deer, horses and hogs. Some pride themselves on their saluting Brahmā, Indra, Rudra, Viṣṇu, Devī, Kumāra etc (Radhakrishnan *op cit* i 336 f.)

3 See Buhler *I A* xxiii p 248 (1894)

4 'The Buddhists and Jains deny the existence of an intelligent first cause' (Radhakrishnan *op cit* i 289) 'The

... reating Deity, because  
( ... rom a conglomeration

( ... अथ दीयते । (Quoted

from Buddhaghosa's com on a work of the *Abhidharma Piṭaka*, Yamakamī Sōgen, *Systems of Buddhist Thought*, Calcutta, 1912 p 21



values could hardly be upheld. In the interests of the stability of the old faith, it was necessary to silence the various heresies and show a way out of the confusion caused by the enormous overgrowth of the literature of the Hindu faith. There was no use adding to the bulk of the existing literature, which had already grown beyond useful proportions.

What was wanted was a stock-taking,—a brief authoritative pronouncement on the philosophy of the Vedāśāstra, providing not only a key to the solution of the contradictions of thought and conflict of opinions, but a reorientation of some of the older views that had become either corrupted or superseded by hostile views, and last, but not least, a manual of self defence and self-preservation, capable also of a crushing dialectical refutation of all heretical views<sup>1</sup>. This the *Vedānta Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa undertook to supply<sup>2</sup>.

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1. "It is well known that the conflict with the Buddhists has largely stimulated philosophical inquiry in most of the systems of Hindu thought" (Das Gupta, *op cit*, 1, p. 78).

2. "When the Vedic literature became unwieldy, the Sūtra literature arose" (Radhakrishnan, *op cit* II, p. 22) Cf. also वेदान्तकुसुमग्रन्थनार्यत्वात्सूत्राणाम् । वेदान्तवाक्यानि हि सूत्रैरुदाहृत्य विचार्यन्ते । (Śaṅkara, *B S B.* 1, 1, 1).

## CHAPTER VIII

### BRAHMA SŪTRAS

(1) The Sūtras of Bādarāyana are the earliest aphoristic manual of a "system of Vedānta" that has come down to us. Internal evidence shows that there had been other attempts to reduce the conflicting speculative utterances of the Vedas and Upanisads to some order and evolve a single system of thought out of them. Jaimini, Bādarī, Āsmarathya etc., are some of the names which occur in the Sūtras of Bādarāyana, but we cannot be sure, if any or all of them had traversed the entire field of metaphysical system building or had merely confined themselves to partial aspects thereof. It is probable that Bādarāyana's work was of a much wider range than those of his predecessors and that the critique of other Darśanas, given by him, was a decidedly new and original contribution of his. By its merits, this work seems to have eclipsed all others of its kind.

As a full fledged Darśana, this work consists of a constructive exposition (Svapaksa-sthāpana) and a dialectical refutation of other systems (Parapaksa-nirākṛti), whose tenets are likely to challenge its exclusive claims to highest metaphysical satisfyingness.

(2) The date of the *Brahmasūtras* is uncertain. The problem of successive interpolations into the original text of the sūtras, raised by some scholars, would complicate matters still further. In their present form, the Sūtras are clearly Post-Buddhist<sup>1</sup> and are acquainted with a number of orthodox and heteretical schools.<sup>2</sup> That they were cast in the mould of Brahminical orthodoxy is clear from the ban on the study of the Upanisads by the Sūtras (1, 3, 36-38) and their attitude of quietism as to Vedic sacrifices (11, 1, 25), which deserves to be

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1. 11, 2, 18-32

2. 11, 2

contrasted with the Buddhistic and Sāṃkhya aversion to them. They may, tentatively, be assigned to the first two centuries of the Christian era.

(iii) Despite their annoying brevity, the Sūtras disclose a firm realistic and Theistic background, not only in their scheme of topics but in their wording and drift of argument. They are arranged in four chapters: Samanvaya, Avirodha, Sādhana and Phala, of four *pādas* each. The first chapter opens by enjoining metaphysical inquiry into Brahman (for the attainment of Mokṣa). The second sūtra defines Brahman as the Being from which the creation, preservation and dissolution of the Universe proceed. The third shows a partiality for revealed religion, when it affirms that God can be known only thro' Scripture. The objection that Scripture speaks not only of Brahman, but of several other principles as well, such as Pradhāna, Ākāśa and Vaiśvānara as responsible for world-creation, wholly or in part, is met by the fourth sūtra, which provides for the attunement of such texts in Brahman, by means of an elaborate process of textual synthesis called "Samanvaya". This is worked out in the course of practically the whole of the I Adhyāya, which is therefore called "Samanvayādhyāya." It should be noted that this specialised form of "esoteric" Samanvaya is effected without any prejudice to the individuality and *status quo* of the various principles or deities in their own recognised spheres. *Ākāśas talliṅgāt*, for instance, is not tantamount to a denial of Ākāśa as a distinct material principle, altogether.<sup>1</sup> This is conclusively established by the trend of the context and the "Viyada-dhikarāṇa" (ii, 3, 1-7) in particular, which establishes that (*bhūda*)-*ākāśa* is a product. Here, at least, Ākāśa cannot be the Brahman. It should be evident from such sūtras that terms like Ākāśa, Avyakta, etc. are employed, according to the Sūtrakāra, in a dual sense, once in the fulness of their etymological significance that is fulfilled only in Brahman and again in a conventional, popular or secondary sense (*laukika-vyavahāra* or *amukhyārtha*). This is the grammar of Samanvaya attempted by the Sūtrakāra.

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1. Cf. the clinching argument of Jayatīrtha (T. P. i, 4, 27):  
न ह्याकाशादिशब्दानां ग्रहणं समन्वयेऽभिहिते, कथं तर्हि जगदवकाश इति शङ्को-  
त्पन्ना, नापि सूत्रकृता पराकृता ॥



This important aspect of the teaching of the Sutra is fully developed and worked out by Madhva, in his Sutra interpretation, to its fullest extent. The doctrine of twofold application of names and epithets was already mooted in the Vedic age by the idea of the 'Sarva namavān'. The Sutras have shown its application in the Upanisads too and in the entire Cosmos. It underlies Rāmanuja's dictum

सर्वशब्दानां लोकव्युत्पत्त्यवगततत्तत्पदार्थविशिष्टब्रह्माभिधायित्वं सिद्धम् ।

*Sribhāṣya* Medical Hall Press, p 560 and *R G B* x, 21

शरीरवाचकानां शब्दानां शरीरिपर्यन्तवाचकत्वापगमः \* \* यथा देवो भनुष्य इत्यादयः, शरीराणि प्रतिपादयन्तस्तत्तदात्मनि पर्यवस्यन्ति ॥

The second chapter meets objections brought against the thesis of Brahman's authorship of the Universe and refutes a good many anti-theistic theories, in an attempt at strengthening the basic position of the Sutrakara. It also gives an account of the world's dependence on Brahman. The third pāda, here, removes certain internal contradictions in the Scriptural texts themselves<sup>1</sup>. The purpose of this attempt is not merely to establish the validity of the Sāstra as a whole, in a logical sense, but also to establish Brahman alone as the *highest Source* of all origination, preservation etc. wherever found. This could not be done until the true nature of the world is made out. That could not be done until the contradictions of texts which set forth the inner nature of the world are removed. Hence the need for resolution of inner contradictions in the Adhidaiva, Adhibhautika and other spheres of creation etc. From 11, 3, 18, onwards, we have interesting discussions about the nature of the soul, its attributes and relation to Brahman. The III Chapter expounds the ways and means of release (Sādhana). The last deals with the fruits of Brahma-jñāna and gives an elaborate account of the ways of Exit (Devayāna and Pitryāna), the intricacies of the theological problem of Laya (absorption of different principles) in order, and the benefits of lordliness accruing to the released and the scope and extent of such sovereignty and the nature of their bliss.

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1 Cf 'अनादिर्वायमाकारः' । 'आकाशवत्सर्वंगतश्च नित्यः' । 'आत्मन आकाशः समस्तः' ॥

In all this, there is hardly any room for a monistic philosophy. The second sūtra defines Brahman as the author of the Universe,—not surely, of an unreal one! It is with difficulty that the *Pañcapādika* tries to read into this definition the farfetched notion of a 'tatastha laksana' (qualification *per accidens*) and deny the real causality of the Brahman which would render it "Saguna". Dialectic quibblings apart, the Brahman's knowability thro' Scripture alone (1, 1, 3) is clearly opposed to the doctrine of its 'self luminosity' (Svaparakāśatva) defined as अवेद्यत्वे सति अपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वम् । (Citsukha, *Tattvapradīpikā*, Bombay, 1915, p 9) The laborious task of 'Samanvaya' could hardly have any meaning, if Brahman were really and wholly beyond the pale of words (Sarvaśabdāvācyaṃ), as contended by the Advaitins.

(iv) The Sūtrakāra takes great pains to refute Buddhist Idealism which regards the world as a mental projection (and the Śūnyavāda which regards it as a void), thus affirming an intensely realistic attitude. He also refutes Kṣanabhaṅgavāda which regards the phenomena of creation as but a ceaseless and in itself meaningless procession of moments without unity, stability or a co-ordinating perceiver, and the Yogācāra which denies the difference between jñāna and jñeya (Jñānābhinnam jñeyam). The impassioned refutation of these four schools of Buddhism is sufficient proof of the fact that the Sūtrakāra looks upon the world as (1) real (*satya*), (2) *sthira* (stable) and (3) independent of the mind. (4) The Sūtra : *Vaidharmyacca na svapnadivat* (1, 2, 29) shows that he would not be satisfied with a make believe reality of the world, such as is assigned to dreams. This shows that he is not for ascribing mere "Vyāvahārikaśatyatva" (phenomenal reality) to the world, which is already conceded by the Buddhist.

हे सत्ये समुपाश्रित्य बुद्धानां धर्मदेशना ।

लोके सवृत्तिसत्यं च सत्यं च परमार्थतः ॥ (Nāgārjuna)

"The author of the Sūtras could not have refuted the Sāṃkhya and discussed the theories of creation, so seriously, if he had held that the world was an appearance, in which case, its creatorship is out of the question" (Radhakrishnan, *op cit* 11, 443). Under

the sutra "Vaidharmyācca na svapnādivat" even a confirmed Monist like Samkara forgets his own mental reservations and observes that "the objects of the waking state are not similarly sublated (as in a dream) at any time"<sup>1</sup>

(v) The Sutrakara is of opinion that man is a real agent toh not altogether an independent one कर्ता शास्त्रार्थवत्वात्। पराचुतच्छेत् (ii, 3, 33, 41). The Supreme and the Individual dwell in one and the same body, but the former is not subject to the evils and imperfections of life There lies His superiority सभोगप्राप्तिरिति चेन्न वैशेष्यात् (i, 2, 8) He deals out punishment and rewards according to man's deserts (Karma sāpekṣa) and cannot, therefore, be deemed guilty of partiality or pitilessness in having ordered the world as it is (ii, 1, 34) Man's higher nature lies hidden on account of his neglect of God When he wakes up from this estrangement and turns to God, for succour, he is freed

पराभिध्यानात्तु तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययो । (iii, 2, 5).

(vi) The majesty of God is unutterable, inconceivable विवक्षितगुणोपपत्तेश्च । सर्वधर्मोपपत्ते । आत्मनि चैव विचित्राश्च हि । सुखविशिष्टाभिधानादेव च (i, 2, 2 ii, 1, 37 ii, 1, 28, ii, 1, 15) The attributes of Brahman are both negative and positive अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्ते (i, 2, 21) It can be both the subject and the object of its own knowledge कर्मकर्तृव्यपदेशाच्च (i, 2, 4)

(vii) The Sutrakāra holds the individual soul to be more a "fraction" (*ansa*) of the Supreme (ii, 3, 43) than wholly identical with it He uses the term *anśa* in the sense of difference (*nanatvam*) coupled with dependence (*atāntrātva* in the words of Vacaspati on ii, 3, 43), even as admitted by Samkara

1 नैव जागरितोपलब्धं वस्तु कस्याचिदप्यवस्थाया वाध्यते ॥

In the second volume of his *History of I. Phil.*, Das Gupta makes it clear how on many occasions Samkara "tries to wriggle out of the sutras by introducing parenthetical remarks, which are often inconsistent with his own commentary and the context of the Sutrās, as well as their purpose and meaning, so far as it can be made out from such context." Op cit pp 42 3 and 44



जीव ईश्वरस्याशो भवितुमर्हति । कस्मात्पुनः स एव न भवति ? नाना-  
व्यपदेशात् । य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्नित्यादिभेदनिर्देशो, नासति भेदे युज्यते ।  
He also seems to think that the individual, [on release, passes on  
with the best part of his selfhood intact सपञ्चाविहाय स्वेन शब्दात्  
(iv, 4, 1)<sup>1</sup>. The merger of the human soul in the Divine is not  
countenanced by him. "I must give it as my opinion" says  
Thibaut, "that they (the Sūtras) do not (1) set forth the distinc-  
tion of higher and lower knowledge in Sāṃkhya's sense and that (2)  
they do not hold the doctrine of unreality of the world, and (3) do  
not, with Śāṃkhya, proclaim the absolute identity of the individual  
and the Highest Self" (S B E vol 34)

(viii) The Upanisads hold diverse views on the nature of  
Brahman's causality of the Universe. The author of the Sūtras  
has naturally discussed them and pronounced his opinion on them.  
He rejects the doctrine of creation from nothing असद्व्यपदेशान्नेति  
चेन्न \* \* \* (ii, 1, 17) The definition of the Brahman in the  
second sūtra, if it is to rule out the Sāṃkhyan Prakṛti, must  
certainly point to an efficient and intelligent Cause as Creator :  
ईक्षतेर्नाशब्दम् । गीणश्चेत्तात्मशब्दात्, i, 1, 56 (as interpreted by  
Śāṃkhya and others) But it is not so certain if he did regard the  
Brahman as the *material cause* also. True, the Prakṛtyadhikāraṇa  
(i, 4, 24 et seq) has come to be regarded as adumbrating such a  
view. There are, however, serious objections to the acceptance of  
this facile view. In the first place, the context of the Adhikāraṇa  
in question is one of Samanvaya (of names and epithets) and any  
discussion of the precise nature of Brahman's causality would be  
out of place here and should, more properly, be taken up in  
Chapter II. It would be manifestly illegitimate to stretch a  
Samanvaya Sūtra beyond its purview. Nor would the reference  
of terms like Prakṛti, Yoni etc to Brahman, by way of Samanvaya,  
do away with the existence of those principles, as has already  
been made clear. (2) To treat the entire fourth Pāda of the  
Samanvayadhyaṇya as having nothing to do with Samanvaya, (as  
has been done by most commentators—except Madhva) is to  
flout the very plan of the Sūtrakāra's work. (3) The weak-

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1 Śāṃkhya reads आविर्भाव. The term स्वेन रूपेण in the Up is  
anyway significant, in this connection. Cf. Bhag ii, 10, 6

ness and artificiality of the "Abhinna-nimittopādāna" interpretation of 1 4, 24, is betrayed by the fact that one at least among the professedly Abhinna-nimittopādānavādins viz, Ramanuja whose interpretation of the Sūtras is hailed by Thibaut and others as reflecting the true position of the Sūtrakara accepts<sup>1</sup> under this very Sūtra the existence of a material principle (Avyakta) other than the Brahman which provides the stuff of which the material world is made and which is claimed to be *ex hypothesi* dependent on Brahman, unlike the Sāmkhya Prakṛti. Lastly (3) the studied attempts of the Sūtrakāra to distinguish Brahman from the Jiva, gods and material principles विशेषणभेदव्यपदशाभ्या च नेतरी । अत एव न दवता भूत च । कम्पनात् (1 2, 22, 27, 3, 39) also render it unlikely that he could have held the view that Brahman itself transforms itself into the world, which is what is meant by a material cause. The interpretation of the Prakṛtyadhikārana as given by Sāmkara and others, is thus beside the point and inconsistent with the context. Its interpretation in terms of a pure Samanvaya as in the case of any other term like Akāśa given by Madhva, is free from all such difficulties. His procedure finds support in the *Vayu Purana*, where, as Das Gupta has shown, the Brahman is said "to be known by various epithets like Prakṛti, Pradhāna, Prasuti, Ātman, Yoni, Ksetra, Aksara etc (op cit iii, p 502)"<sup>2</sup> According to the *Ahimbudhnya Samhita* "the Brahman is known by many names such as Paramatman, Bhagavan, Avyakta, Prakṛti and Pradhāna" (Das Gupta, op cit iii, p 34). We may, therefore take it that there is hardly any justification to interpret the Prakṛtyadhikārana as attempting anything more than a mere Samanvaya of terms like Prakṛti, in Brahman. In other contexts the Sūtrakara's objection to the Sāmkhya Prakṛti is not to its existence *per se* but to its metaphysical independence (as claimed by the Sāmkhya). The status of Prakṛti according to the Sūtrakara would thus appear to be the same as in the *Gita* and the *Puranas*.

1 न वयमव्यक्तं सत्त्वरिणामविशेषाच्च स्वरूपेण नाम्युपगच्छाम । अपितु, परमपुरुषशरीरतया तदात्मकत्वविरहेण । तथानभ्युपगमादेव तन्नसिद्ध-प्रश्रियानिरसनम् ॥ (Sribhāṣya 1 4 3)

2 Vide also अक्षरमम्बरान्तघृते (1 3, 10)

(ix) The nature of final release set forth in the closing section of the Sūtras, also points to a Theism as the final philosophy of Bādarāyana. The released souls tho' in the enjoyment of perfect innate bliss, (iv, 4, 22) are yet under certain irrevocable limitations as regards their powers and sovereignty जगद्व्यापारवर्जम् (iv, 4, 17) <sup>1</sup> This Sūtra speaks for itself. To all attempts at explaining it away, Thibaut has an effective reply, which hardly admits of improvement. "It is as impossible that the Sūtras should open with a definition of the Lower Principle, as it is unlikely to close with a description of the state of those who know the Lower Brahman only and are thus debarred from obtaining true release" (Tr. Sāṃkhya's *bhāṣya*, S. B. E. p. xcii). Theism, thus, is writ large on the Sūtras.

(x) We cannot say there is any overwhelming support in the Sūtras for the doctrine of the identity of Jīva and Brahman. "I am myself inclined to believe that the dualistic interpretations were probably more faithful to the Sūtras than those of Sāṃkhya", says Das Gupta (*op. cit.* i, 421). "There is strong support for the view that Bādarāyana looks upon the difference between the Brahman and the souls as ultimate, something that persists even when the soul is released" (Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.* ii, p. 440). Apart from the many Sūtras, containing explicit denials of identity and affirming difference अनवस्थितरसमवाच्च नेतर (1, 2, 17) नेतरोऽनुपपत्तेः । अनुपपत्तेस्तु न शरीर । (1, 1, 16, 2, 3) भेदव्यपदेशाच्चान्य (1, 1, 21) पृथगुपदेगात् (ii, 3, 28) शरीरश्चोभयेऽपि हि भेदेनैव मधीयते (1, 2, 20), which have been interpreted by Sāṃkhya himself, in a dualistic sense, he and his commentators have expressly admitted that the language and thought of the Sūtras, are, for the most part, dualistic <sup>2</sup>. Here and there, one meets with a suggestion from them that the utterances of the Sūtrakāra should be

1 P. M. Modi, in his 'A Critique of the Brahmasūtra' i, p. 448, gives a curious and novel explanation of Jagad-  
"vyāpāra", which would be redundant in the light of the last sūtra and at variance with its sense in an identical expression used in तत्रापि च तद्व्यापारात् (B. S. iii, 1, 16)

2 ननु जीवब्रह्मणोरभेद न क्वापि सूत्रकारो भुङ्गतो वक्ति, किंतु सवत्र भेदमव । अतो नैक्यमिष्टम् । तथाह-प्रतिपाद्यत्विति । आदिपदेन आत्मेत्यादिसंग्रहायम् (Anandagiri 1, 3, 19) सूत्रेष्वभेदा नोक्त इति भ्रान्ति निरस्यति-प्रतिपाद्यत्विति । (Ratnaprabha ii on 1, 3, 19)



This is made clear by him in 1, 1, 30 where he designates the "Adhyātmāsambandhabhūmatva" as the "Śāstra dṛṣṭi" or the mystic point of view of the Śāstras. The two are synonymous. But the expressions "adhyātma", "sambandha", "bhūma" and "asmin", would be superfluous and out of place, if mere identity were meant to be conveyed. "Sambandha" is not bound to be 'identity' (tādātmya), unless so stated. It is "dviniṣṭha," requiring two real terms to be related. In the present case, the conditioned self of Indra or Vāmadeva *as such* would have ceased to be, the moment it realised its identity with the All-Soul and could not be putting forth specific claims of identity with X, Y, or Z, as is done by Vāmadeva. Further, if the experiences of Vāmadeva recorded in R V iv, 27, 1 2, cited in the Sutra 1, 1, 30, are any guide to the interpretation of this *adhikarana*, they would be entirely in favor of the view that he was fully conscious of difference between himself and the Supreme and others.

गर्भे नु सन्नन्वेषामवेदमह देवाना जनिमानि विश्वा ।

क्षत मा पुर आयसीरक्षन्ध श्येनो जवसा निरदीयम् ॥

न चा स मामपजोय जभारा भीमास त्वक्षसा वीर्येण ।

ईर्मा पुरधिरजहादरातीरुत वाता अतरत् शूशुवान् ॥

Vāmadeva tells us in the above that (1) his mental faculties were not at all clouded at the time of his birth, as in the case of others, (2) that he was able to rise above the miseries of that state by the power of his enlightenment, (3) that the Supreme Being which sustains all bodies (Puramdhih) had killed the enemies that infest the foetus and so on. It is clear from these and other statements of Vāmadeva, such as that he bestowed land on the Āryan (R V iv, 26, 1) that he had not only *not* lost his individual self consciousness (as living in the womb) or "other-consciousness" of the gods and creatures (*devānam janīmanī*) but that he had a vivid consciousness of the all directing (*īrma*) presence of the Supreme Being (Puramdhi), to whose powers and protection he ascribes his conquest of his foes and every one of his achievements. In these circumstances, his claims to identity with Manu, Kaksīrān etc (R V iv, 26, 1) could only be taken to have been made *in the name of and on behalf of* that Supreme Being itself or by that Being itself speaking thro' Vāmadeva, at the time of his being possessed and flooded by the contact of the Great Antaryāmi.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The standpoint of the Antaryāmi is the same as that of the *Śāntantraditiya Brahma*. It is found adopted in *Mbh* xii, 323, 56 and *Viṣṇu Purana* i 10, 25.

taken *cum grano salis* or hears a protest that there need be no doubt of his undying faith in Monism. On their own showing, there are, however, not more than a couple of Sūtras<sup>1</sup>, which can be said to be unquestionably monistic in tenor. These are (1) आत्मोति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहन्ति च (iv, 1, 3,) and शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेशो वाम देववत् (i, 1, 30). The first is ambiguously worded. The term Ātman may, no doubt, denote the Jīva but it is not its usual sense in the Sūtras<sup>2</sup>. Sankara himself in i, 3, 1, proclaims that the "individual soul" is neither the only sense of the term Ātmā, nor even its primary sense. The purport of Sūtra iv, 1, 3, may well therefore be that the Supreme Being (who is the object of Jijñāṣā) is taught and realised not only as the great Controller of the external Universe and of the gods (as taught in i, 3, 11) but also as the Seeker's own Inner Ruler, Ātmā or Antaryamī. The reference here is obviously to the famous declaration of Yajñavalkya in his Antaryāmī Brahmana, य आत्मनि तिष्ठन् आत्मान-मन्तरो यमयति \* \* \* where the truth is emphasised twenty-one times, with the significant refrain एष ते आत्मा अन्तर्याम्यमृत (Brh iii, 7, 3-23). The ultimate sense of Ātman as Inner Ruler (antaryamī) is clearly established in this passage. It looks almost certain that the Sūtrakāra had this very text in view as his Viśayavākya here. Moreover, it is extremely unlikely that the Sūtrakāra, who has been so anxious to repudiate the "visistaiḥya" of Indra and Brahman, raised in the purvapakṣa in न वक्तुरात्मो-पदेशात् (i, 1, 29) and explain it away in the figurative sense of Adhyatmasambandhabhūma would at all be disposed to identify every ordinary human self who is *prima facie* much inferior to Indra, with the Supreme. Otherwise, there was no reason to reject the supposed identity of Indra and Brahman at the outset. The roundabout way in which the Sūtrakāra tries to justify the identity, in what is obviously a figurative sense, shows that he is not in favor of accepting any essential identity, either between Indra and Brahman or between Jīva and Brahman.

1 See Sankara on i, 3, 19

2 आत्मत्व तावन्मुख्यया सूत्र्या परमेश्वर उपपद्यते । स आत्मा तत्त्वमसीति (Sankara, B S B i, 2, 13)

See the use of आत्मा in this sense in the following Sūtras  
आत्मा प्रकरणात् । आत्मकृते परिणामात् । आत्मशब्दात् (3, 3, 15) आत्मनि चैव विचित्राश्चहि । गोणश्चेनात्मशब्दात् । द्युग्वाद्यायतन स्वशब्दात्



This is made clear by him in 1, 1, 30 where he designates the "Adhyātmasambandhabhumatva" as the "Śāstra drsti" or the mystic point of view of the Śāstras. The two are synonymous. But the expressions "adhyātma", "sambandha", "bhumā" and "asmin", would be superfluous and out of place, if mere identity were meant to be conveyed. "Sambandha" is not bound to be 'identity' (tādātmya), unless so stated. It is "dviniṣṭha," requiring two real terms to be related. In the present case, the conditioned self of Indra or Vāmadeva *as such* would have ceased to be, the moment it realised its identity with the All Soul and could not be putting forth specific claims of identity with X, Y, or Z, as is done by Vāmadeva. Further, if the experiences of Vāmadeva recorded in R V iv, 27, 1 2, cited in the Sutra 1, 1, 30, are any guide to the interpretation of this *adhikarana*, they would be entirely in favor of the view that he was fully conscious of difference between himself and the Supreme and others.

गमं नु सन्नन्वेयामवेदमह देवाना जनिमानि विश्वा ।

इत वा पुर आयसीररक्षन्नघ श्येनो जवसा निरदीयम् ॥

न वा स मामपजोष जमारा भीमास त्वक्षसा वीर्येण ।

ईर्मा पुरधिरजहादरातीक्ष्ण वाता अतरत् दूशुवान् ॥

Vāmadeva tells us in the above that (1) his mental faculties were not at all clouded at the time of his birth, as in the case of others, (2) that he was able to rise above the miseries of that state by the power of his enlightenment, (3) that the Supreme Being which sustains all bodies (Puramdhih) had killed the enemies that infest the foetus and so on. It is clear from these and other statements of Vāmadeva, such as that he bestowed land on the Āryan (R V iv, 26, 1) that he had not only *not* lost his individual self consciousness (as living in the womb) or "other consciousness" of the gods and creatures (*devānam janīmanī*) but that he had a vivid consciousness of the all directing (*īrma*) presence of the Supreme Being (Puramdhi), to whose powers and protection he ascribes his conquest of his foes and every one of his achievements. In these circumstances, his claims to identity with Manu, Kaksirān etc (R V iv, 26, 1) could only be taken to have been made in the name of and on behalf of that Supreme Being itself or by that Being itself speaking thro' Vāmadeva, at the time of his being possessed and flooded by the contact of the Great Antaryāmi<sup>1</sup>.

1 The standpoint of the Antaryāmi is the same as that of the *Satantraditiya Brahme*. It is found adopted in *Mbh* xii, 323, 56 and *Viṣṇu Purana* i 19, 25.



" *Preponderance of Divine Contact* " is, thus, the nearest equivalent of the phrase " *Adhyātmasambandhabhūmā* " used in the Sūtra. Vāmadeva's speech is to be viewed from the standpoint of the Śāstra, as the words of the Antaryāmi. Similar statements of identity, elsewhere, are to be similarly explained. " When Indra says, 'Worship Me', he means 'Worship the God I worship'. On a similar principle, Vāmadeva's declaration that he was Manu and Surya, is explained " ( Radhakrishnan, *op. cit.*, 1, p 521 ). There is, thus, no ground for thinking that the Sūtrakāra had any leaning towards an identity of the kind favored by Śaṅkara



## CHAPTER IX

# EARLY COMMENTATORS ON THE SŪTRAS, REORUDESCENCE OF BUDDHISM, HINDU REVIVAL, THE RISE OF THE ADVAITA VEDĀNTA AND EARLY THEISTIC REACTIONS TO IT.

There is sufficient evidence on record that the early batch of commentators on the *Brahmasūtras* were all Realists<sup>1</sup>. The *Sūtras* themselves were admittedly realistic in tenor and nothing could be more natural than that their earliest commentators also should have adopted a realistic view of them. Some scholars hold that the *Sūtras* themselves rose originally amidst *Bhāgavata* influence. The great *Upavarsa* mentioned by *Śabara Svāmīn*<sup>2</sup>, in his commentary on the *Purāṇamīmāṃsā*, is reported by *Śaṅkara*,<sup>3</sup> to have written a commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*. This *Upavarsa* is commonly identified with the *Vṛttikāra*, quoted and criticized<sup>4</sup> by *Śaṅkara*, in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*. It is clear from *Śaṅkara*'s references to the *Vṛttikāra*, that the latter was a Realist. He has been further identified with the *Vṛttikāra Bodhāyana*,<sup>5</sup> one of the early precursors of the school of *Rāmānuja*. This identification would appear to have the

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1. "Under the influence of *Gaudapāda*, *Śaṅkara* differed from the commentators like *Bhārtṛprapañca*, who had given a realistic interpretation of the *Bṛhadaranyaka Up* by treating the world and souls as real emanations from Brahman. *Śaṅkara* differed from these commentators and propounded a new type of Advaita, the *Māyāvada*" (*Das Gupta, op cit* II, p 13).

2. अयं गौरित्यत्र क शब्द ? गवारोकारविसर्जनीय इति भगवानुपवर्षः  
*Śabara*, PMS 1. 1, 5).

3. *Śaṅkara* on B S III, 3, 53. Also - अत एवोक्तमुपवर्षाचार्येण  
आत्मवाद तु सारीरवे वक्ष्यामिति । (*Bhāskara, B. S B* 1, 1, 1 p. 6).

4. See, i, 1, 19, and iv, 3, 14.

5. See *Mm. Kuppasvami Śāstri*, P. O. C. III (Madras).

support of Viśiṣṭādvaitic literary tradition<sup>1</sup>, which has also preserved the names of nearly half a dozen early commentators of the school, preceding Ramanuja, viz., Bodhāyana, Tanka, Dramida, Guhadeva, Kapardi and Bhārucci<sup>2</sup>. Bhāskara (1, 4, 25) flings one of these early commentators - the Vakya-kāra alias Brahmanandin alias Tanka<sup>3</sup>, in the face of Saṃkara, saying that the Vivartavāda has no support in the ancient tradition of Sūtra commentators. It is with difficulty that the *Bhāmātī* and *Kalpataru* try to defend Saṃkara, on this point<sup>4</sup>. Under iv, 3, 7-14, Saṃkara cuts him self adrift from the established commentaries and turns Siddhānta Sūtras into Pūrvapakṣa, just to avoid the admission of Brahman as a qualified Being,<sup>5</sup> for which he is justly taken to task by Bhāskara<sup>6</sup>. Elsewhere, in his commentary, Saṃkara refers to the existence of Vedāntins, who unlike himself, believed in the reality of the individual soul अपरे पारमार्थिकमेव जैव रूपमिति मन्यन्ते अस्मदीयाश्च केचित् । (1, 3, 19). Most of the older commentaries on the Sūtras appear to have advocated certain types of Pantheistic Realism. The names of Brahmadatta, Bhartṛprapañca, Brahmanandin and Bhāskara stand out in this respect. It is clear from Bhāskara's commentary on the Sūtras, that he counted Tanka or Brahmanandin as a full blooded Parināmavādi, like himself, who looked upon the world of matter and souls as a direct transformation of Brahman and therefore quite as real as Brahman Itself. He treats the relation in which Brahman stands to the world as one of Bheda-bheda. The doctrines of Parināma (of Brahman) and Bheda-bheda seem to have been more or less widely held by the early realistic commentators on the Sūtras. The Sūtras them-

1 वृत्तिकारस्य बोधायनस्यैव हि उपवर्ग इति स्यान्नाम (*Tattvaviveka* of Vedānta Deśika. Conjeeveram 1906, q in P O C III)

2 Vide *Siddhāntarāya* of Yamuna and *Sribhāṣya* (introd.)

3 दंडको ब्रह्मनन्दी (*Sūtrasana Sūtri, Com. on Rāmānuja's Vedarthasamgraha*, Pandit, p 148)

4 भास्करस्त्वह वञ्चाम \* \* । ब्रह्मनन्दिना हि \* \* (*Kalpataru* on B S 1 4, 25)

5 केचित्पुन पूर्वानि सूत्राणि पूर्वपक्षसूत्राणि भवन्त्युत्तराणि सिद्धान्त-सूत्राणीति व्यवस्थामनुरुद्धमाना परविषया एव गतिश्रुती प्रतिष्ठापयन्ति । तदनुप-पन्नम् ; गन्तव्यानुपपत्तेर्ब्रह्मण ॥ (Saṃkara)

6 17, 3, 7 14 Saṃkara treats sūtras 12-14 as Pūrvapakṣa and 7 11 as Siddhānta



selves were so worded as to render such an interpretation *plausible*. Indeed, so pronounced was the influence of Parināmavāda, that even Rāmānuja, who is no Brahma Parināmavādin, in point of actual fact, in as much as he accepts the existence of Prakṛti as a dependent material principle (under B. S. 1, 4, 3), still considered it prudent to adopt its terminology, for a fashion and put forward what is familiarly known as his “Abhinna nimittopādāna” theory of Brahman’s causality. Two conclusions are possible from this (1) that he had not the courage of his convictions to give up the language of Brahmaparināma, or (2) that he could not afford to define his exact position in respect of the actual and precise nature of transformation of Brahman even to himself, much more clearly and unambiguously, on account, presumably of a conflict of loyalties in his mind between the demands of true Theism in which he was an ardent believer and the influence of the interpretational traditions derived by him from Vṛttikara and Brahmanandin, as predecessors of his school of thought. Saṃkara, in his commentary on II, 1, 14, represents the Vṛttikara as a frank Brahmaparināmavādin, and Tanka or Brahmanandī was also indubitably one<sup>1</sup>. The fact, then, that the same Tanka is claimed by both Bhaskara and Rāmānuja as the precursor of their faith, confirms the suspicion that Rāmānuja should have made up his mind to part company with the original unexpurgated Pantheism of his acknowledged precursors and adopt a pure Theism, tho’ in the phrasing of it, he could not extricate himself completely from the misleading terminology of Brahmaparināma, or bid good-bye to it, but continued to indulge in the language of Brahmapadanatva, however far removed from the acceptance of actual parināma of Brahmacaitanya or Brahmasvarupa his position might be. All this would show that there was a long and powerful tradition of realistic interpretation of the Sūtras.

There was, at the same time, a great idealistic revival in Buddhism, in conteraction. The period between the second and the fifth centuries A. D., was one of remarkable activity and noteworthy developments in Buddhist thought. The criticisms of the Hindu Realists and commentators on the Sūtras, had been

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1 As has been shown by Bhaskara who quotes his words  
परिणामस्तु स्यात् दध्यादिवत् ।

met by a number of Buddhist Thinkers. They went a step further and pointed out several inadequacies in the Hindu theories of Causation, God etc.<sup>1</sup> Such of the metaphysical defects of Buddhism, as had been pointed out by the Brahmins, were made good by a number of acute Thinkers and dialecticians like Nāgaseṇa, Buddhaghosa and Nāgārjuna. The result of their labors was to raise Buddhist metaphysics to staggering perfection. The negative dialectic of the Buddhist Logicians created a great sensation and compelled admiration all round. It had an irresistible and instantaneous appeal to the intellectual aristocrats among the Hindus—the Brahmins, who, as a class, were always open to conviction. In a very short space of time, many learned Brahmins went over to Buddhism and became ardent champions of its Subjectivism, Idealism etc. Some of the most distinguished writers on Buddhist metaphysics known to history were converts from Brahminism—Asvaghosa<sup>2</sup>, Nāgārjuna,<sup>3</sup> Vasubandhu,<sup>4</sup> Asaṅga<sup>5</sup>, Buddhaghosa,<sup>6</sup> and Dignāga.<sup>7</sup>

While many Brahmins thus renounced their old faith and went over to Buddhism, there were yet others among them, on whom the Idealism of the Buddhists had made a profound impression, but, whom it was nevertheless powerless to snatch from the fold of Brahminism. These were perhaps too conservative minded for violent breaks of any kind. But so deep was the impression made upon them by the excellences of Buddhist thought and its soaring heights of Subjectivism, Idealism and Acosmism, that they began to search their own literature to see if anything approach-

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1 Vide *Madhyamika Kārikas*, ch. iv. on the contradictions of the causal relation.

2 Keith, *His. of Skt. Literature*, 1928, p. 56. Winternitz, *IL.* II, p. 257.

3 Keith, *op. cit.* p. 495. Winternitz II 342, says Nāgārjuna was a South Indian Brahmin.

4 Winternitz, II, 355.

5 "Asaṅga, more properly, Vasubandhu Asaṅga was the eldest of three brothers, born as the sons of a Brahmin of the Kāśika family at Peshawar (Winternitz, p. 355).

6 Author of *Viśuddhamagga* (400 A. D.), was a Brahmin convert (Radhakrishnan, I 346).

7 "Dignāga, a native of Simhavaktra, a suburb of Kāñci, was a Brahmin" (*Pramāṇasamuccaya*, Mysore Univ. 1930, p. x).

ing its grandeur could be found in them or be made out of them. Looking as they did thro' obviously Buddhistic spectacles, nothing was more *natural* than that they should find in some portions of the Upanisads, many striking approaches to the metaphysical idealism of the Buddhists and their Negative Elenchs. There could be only one result of such growing and undisguised admiration for Buddhistic metaphysics and its methods, and that was that these Brahminical admirers of Buddhism charged with Buddhistic ideologies, soon seized upon the Upanisads with avidity and fell to unconsciously reading into them all that was great and good in the other. "The Mahāyānists themselves seem to have been aware of the similarity of their position to the Upanisadic view, as the *Lankavatara* says that the explanation of the Tathāgatagarbha, as the ultimate truth and reality, is given in order to attract to our view even those who have superstitious faith in the Ātman theory" (Radhakrishnan, *op cit* 1 p 594 fn.) Certain passages in the early Upanisads easily lent themselves to such reorientation. But it was as yet difficult to tackle the Sūtras which were not only openly antagonistic to Buddhism, or even the bulk of the Upanisads which were basically realistic. The fifth and sixth centuries A D brought further support to Buddhism. "In the 6th century, the revivalist philosophy of Nagarjuna received a new impetus at the hands of Buddhapaṇita of Valabhi and of Bhavaviveka<sup>1</sup> of Orissa. The school of the latter came to be known as Mādhyamikasaūtrāntika, in view of its supplementing Nagarjuna's arguments with independent arguments. At the same time, the Yogacara school of Mahayana was developed in the North"<sup>2</sup> "When Yuan Chwang in 640 A D, made his way down to the eastern coast to the Pallava Kingdom and stayed at the capital of Kāñcīpura, he found ten thousand Buddhists in the country with a hundred monasteries and eighty Deva temples, the majority of which were Jain"<sup>3</sup> No wonder that at such a time as this, the Brahmin Bhartṛhari (7th century) wavered and wandered between the cloister and the hearth, seven

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1 Author of *Tarkajvala*

2 , Das Gupta *op cit* II, p 164

3 Carpentier, *Theism in Medieval India*, p 352



times "after the manner permitted to Buddhists"<sup>1</sup> and finally produced a work on Sanskrit grammar in which he advocated a type of monism known as Śabdādvaita (sound monism). His commentary on the Brahmasutras<sup>2</sup>, was also probably written in a monistic vein. Then came Gaudapāda, who, in his Kārikas, laid the foundations of a regular system of Upanisadic Monism and brought the philosophy of the Upanisads, as he conceived it, perilously near Buddhistic Ajativāda. Of the unmistakable influence of Vijñānavāda and Madhyamika schools on his work, there can be no doubt' (Radhakrishnan, II p 464 and also Das Gupta *op cit* I, 423). Das Gupta even holds that Gaudapada was himself probably a Buddhist<sup>3</sup>. Only a very thin and artificial veil of mental reservation separated the subjectivism of Gaudapada from the Acosmism of the Buddhists. He himself was only too well aware of the nearness of his thought to Buddhism नैतत् बुद्धेन भाषितम् (II, 99) which he tried to disguise by pointing to certain other points of contrast. Idealism, verging almost literally on that of the Buddhists, was thus the order of the day and it was only a question of time for actual commentaries on the *Upanisads*, the *Sutras* and the *Gita*, to be undertaken. The *Sutras*, at any rate, gave no quarter to an Idealism à la Gaudapada's, and the *Sutras* had been admitted in orthodox Brahminical circles as the apex of the Prasthanatrayī and the most authoritative exposition of the philosophy of the Upanisads. It was significant that Gaudapāda had not made any use of the *Sutras* of Bādārāyana or attempted to enlist their support on his side. The task of reading his fashionable philosophy of Mayavāda, into the *Sutras* and give it a *locus classicus* in them was reserved for his gifted grand disciple Śaṅkara who, in the 8th century, gave the first systematic and brilliant Māyavāda commentaries on the *Prasthanatrayī*.

Yet, how difficult he himself found the task of making the *Sutras* yield a Monism of his conception, is proved by the artificiality and parenthetical irrelevance of his comments in many places,

1 Keith, *His af Skt Lit* (1928) p 176

2 Mentioned by Yamuna in his *Siddhitraya*

3 "I believe there is sufficient evidence in his Kārikas for thinking that he (Gaudapada) was himself possibly a Buddhist". (*op cit* I p 423)

where he seeks to go against the spirit and letter of the Sūtras and their natural drift of arguments and dialectic. That he was fighting with all his might and ingenuity against a long line of realistic commentaries,<sup>1</sup> is not the only fact that makes his commentary suspect. It is more the disharmony of his metaphysical views and presuppositions with the thought of the Sūtras, so far as they could be made out from their plan, spirit and letter and according to his own objective interpretations, undistorted by his parenthetical notes, innuendos, correctives, asseverations and remarks *ex cathedra* such as इदं विह वक्तव्यम् । सूत्राणि तु एव व्याख्येयानि (1, 1, 19) Cf also on 1. 4. 10, 11, 1, 33, 14, 4, 6

Tho' many protested in his own time, in unmistakable terms against the new fangled Māyavāda<sup>2</sup> and lost no time in exposing its disagreeable resemblances to Buddhism<sup>3</sup>, the speculative daring and eloquence<sup>4</sup> of its champions had raised it to such heights of philosophic eminence that few could hope to bring it down. Māyavāda, in short, had come to stay and even those who did not quite agree with it, had, in course of time, to fall in line with the general trend of its interpretation of the Sūtras.

१ ये तु निर्वन्धं कुर्वन्ति ते वेदान्तार्थं बाधमाना श्रेयोद्वारं सम्यग्दर्शनमेव बाधन् । (Śaṅkara B S B 1, 4, 22)

२ कर्णोऽप्यधत्त सिद्धान्ती भाष्यं तच्छ्रुतवान् मनाक् ।

(*Manuśaṅkari* 1. 49 The reference is to Brahmadatta )

3 The most virulent and uncompromising of such critics was Bhaskara. He was probably the first to equate Māyavāda with Buddhism. And this charge of "crypto Buddhism" was hotly repudiated by Sarvajñatma (*Samkṣepaśārīraka* 11, 25-6 and by the author of the *Vivaraṇa* (Viz Skt Ser. p 84 )

4 The saying शक्रवाचस्पत्यो शक्रवाचस्पती सदृशो is no empty boast. *Mahācārya*, a Viśiṣṭādvaitic writer of the 17th cent pays a grudging tribute to the rhetorical eloquence of the leaders of Advaita and ascribes their influence on the masses and their success to it

वशिकतटिनीवपारमप्रवाहविडम्बकै  
रलघुभिरपञ्चदशगुम्भोपलस्मिन्डम्बरै ।  
उपकरणयन्त्येते बालानुदग्रकुतूहला-  
नुपलनिकरग्रामप्रायैरुपन्यासकम् ॥

(*Candamaruta on Satadīpani Bib Ind.* p 4, sl 1)

Royal patronage was not long in coming. Vacaspati was well established in the Court of Nrga.<sup>1</sup> Sarvajñātman lived in the reign of King Manukulāditya.<sup>2</sup> For four centuries from the eighth, Advaita remained the vanguard of Indian Philosophy.

At last, there came a realistic upheaval. Between the 10th and 11th centuries, a host of brilliant writers like Udayana,<sup>3</sup> Sridhara, Sahkanātha,<sup>4</sup> Sivāditya, Kulārka Pandita, Manamano haral ara,<sup>5</sup> appeared on the scene and began to demolish the foundations and superstructure of Idealistic thought and reinforce those of Logical Realism. They paid a good deal of attention to the formal and material sides of reasoning, revised and perfected their definitions of categories and ushered into vogue improved methods of formalism in thought. Realism began to look the fashionable philosophy of the day, Monism, in the face.

This new danger, had, by the latter part of the twelfth century, assumed such disquieting proportions, that the custodians of Monism were forced to muster their full strength and meet their foes on their own ground. The result was the composition of dialectical classics of matchless brilliance undermining the very foundations of Realism and overthrowing its concepts and categories and thus breaking up the entire mechanism of its thought and thought.

1 श्रीमन्नृगेष्कारि मया निबन्ध । ( *Bhamati* last verse )

2 श्रीमत्पक्षतशासने मनुकुलादित्ये भुव शासति । (iv, 62)

3 For his scathing condemnation of some of the concepts of Advaita see *Kusumanjali* ( *passim* ) and extracts in Citsukha's work.

(a) एत च सति यदुदयनेन तात्पर्यपरिशुद्धौ \* \* \* \* गजित-विमिद-मनिर्धचनीयत्व नाम? किं निरुक्तिविरह \* \* \* \* इत्यादि । Citsukhi, Com (p 70)

(b) यत्त्वनापि तेनैवोक्त तदनूद्य दूषयति—नच परस्परविरुद्धयो निवेद्य समुच्चयोऽनुपपन्न \* \* निवेद्यसमुच्चयस्य तात्त्विकत्वानगीकारात् (p 70)

4 तदस्तदखिल अद्वैतश्रुतीनामन्यथासिद्धिपथपरिधावनव्याक्षिप्तचेतसे शालिक-नायायापि कथयत (Citsukhi p 53)

5 अत्र मानमनोहरकारो नृत्यतिस्म । नच भेदानवस्था बाधिका । भेदान्तर-प्रसक्तौ मूलाभावात् । भेदाभेदिनो भिन्ना इति व्यवहारादशनात् । (p 169)  
नहि द्रष्टुद्रष्टेर्विपरिलोपा विद्यत इति श्रुत्यैव दृग्दृष्टयो सम्बन्धोऽधिगम इति मान-मनोहरकार प्रातिष्ठितम् । (p 22)



measuring devices and questioning the validity of all Experience upon which Realism thrives. Śrīharsa was the foremost writer of this age. His main object in his *Khandanahandakhadya* was to show that "all that is known is undefinable and unreal, being only of a phenomenal nature, having only a relative existence, based purely on practical modes of acceptance and devoid of any permanent value or essence"<sup>1</sup>. In this, he was followed by another great dialectician, Citsukha, who also, commented on Śrīharsa's work. But he was much more than a mere destructive critic. In addition to his concise refutation of Nyaya Vaisesika categories, he gave an acute analysis and clear interpretation of some of the premier concepts of the Advaita Vedānta. His greatest polemical work was the "*Tattvapradīpika*. In addition to this, he wrote a commentary on Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on *Brahmasūtras* and one on the *Brahmasiddhi* of Mandana and another on the *Vivarana*. He is supposed to have lived about 1220 A. D. Anandabodha and Vimuktātman were two other great pioneers in this respect. The former's *Nyayamakaranda*, is a work of refreshing clarity on the concepts of Advaita. The *Istasiddhi* of Vimuktātma was probably very much earlier in date<sup>2</sup>. All these works are permeated by the spirit of neo dialecticism. The *Nyāyasūdhā* and the *Jñānasiddhi* of Citsukha's teacher, Jñānottama,<sup>3</sup> and the *Prakāśārtha* (c on Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on the Sūtras) also belong to this period.

1 Das Gupta, II, p 127

2 M Hiriyanna opines in his Introduction to the edn of the *Istasiddhi* (G O S lxx, 1913) that it cannot be earlier than 850 A. D. "The limits 850 1050 are all that we can fix", p xii)

3 "एष हि न्यायसुधायामाराध्यपादैस्पादितम् ॥" (Citsukhī p 385)  
आराध्यपादा स्वगुरो ज्ञानसिद्धिकारा । तत्प्रणीत च वदान्तप्रकरण  
न्यायसुधा । (Com.)

## CHAPTER X

# DECLINE OF MĀYĀVĀDA, THEISTIC REACTION OF RĀMANUJA AND THE NEED FOR A NEW DARŚANA

(1) About the latter part of the twelfth century when the Doctors of the Advaita Vedānta were thus busy defending their citadel and perfecting the dialectic machinery of their system, signs of a growing discontent with the empty abstractions of Māyāvāda were beginning to be felt. On the philosophical plane itself, it had not long remained unchallenged much less unchanged. Several versions of the Advaita doctrine, often in conflict with one another, on vital points, had been given both by the contemporaries and successors of Saṃkhya. While Saṃkhya stuck close to Bhavadvāita, Maṇḍana gave quarter to "Abhavadvāita". The Ekajīvavāda was soon overpowered by "Nanajīvavāda". Sarvajñātmā's Brahmajñānavāda ran counter to Vacaspati's Jivāsritajñānavāda. The Avacchedavādins disagreed with the Bimbapratibimbavāda. There was no agreement over the definition of 'Mithyātva'. Five different views of its nature came to be formulated. Impossibilities and contradictions of thought came to be hugged to the bosom as profundities of metaphysical insight.

माययामनुपपत्तिरलकार एव । (Vacaspati)

दुर्घटत्वमविद्याया भूषणं न तु दूषणम् ।

कचचित् घटमानत्वेऽविद्यात्वे दुर्घटं भवेत् ॥ (Iṣṭasiddhi 1 140)

अनवस्थादयो दोषा सत्ता निघ्नन्ति वस्तुन ।

अद्वैतिना ते सुहृदः प्रपद्ये तत्प्रसजका ॥ (Quoted in Brahmanandīya)

Differences arose between master and disciples and among disciples themselves<sup>1</sup> in the elucidation of general principles and

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1 See the ingenious way in which Appayya Dīkṣita tries to gloss over these internal conflicts of views

‘प्राचीनव्यवहारसिद्धिविषयेष्वद्वैतसिद्धौ पर

सनह्यद्भिरनादरात्सरण्या नानाविधा दर्शिता ॥

doctrines For over five centuries from the eighth, Monism in some form or other, had held the field Five centuries of robust life is about the longest that could be expected of any metaphysical system with any following Popular interest in and admiration for it must inevitably flag, after that So did it happen in the case of Śaṅkara's Advaita

(ii) The twelfth century had already witnessed the rise of overstrained formalism in Logic and Metaphysics which had its own repercussions on the prevailing philosophy of Advaita Under its spell, philosophy had ceased to be an earnest quest of God and the life eternal It had dwindled into an exercise in definitions and counter definitions and unmitigated dialecticism A reaction was soon bound to set in

(iii) A wave of intense Devotionalism in Religion and Theism in Philosophy was surging thro' the country at this time To the average man of the world, it appeared the Advaitins had perverted the goal of oneness held out in the Upanisads, while the one they offered in its stead was unrealisable.<sup>1</sup> The monistic Brahman was avowedly incapable of coming within the ambit of experience (अवेद्यत्वं स्वप्रकाशत्वं) If it did, it would cease to be self luminous and forthwith become limited and unreal, like everything else in the world ज्ञेयत्वे षडादिवत् अवब्रह्मत्वप्रसङ्गः (Istasiddhi)

The bifurcation of reality into "Vyavaharika and Paramarthika" was deemed a challenge to religion and a fraud on the trusting conscience of humanity<sup>2</sup> "The theory of Maya was but a cloak to cover the inner rifts of the system"<sup>3</sup> The denial of will and

1 इदं तद्वात्मिक्यमुपास्तिचोदिन न मे गुरोरेष्वपरोक्षता गतम् ।

(M Vy iv, 11)

शुको मुक्तो वामदेवो मुक्त इत्यादयस्तु अर्थवादा एव । (Appayya Dikṣita)

2. Cf. Kumārila's tirade against the bifurcation of reality into true and false, which applies with equal force to Advaita

सत्या चेत्सर्वति कथं भूया चेत्सत्यता कथम् ?

मयत्वं न च सामान्यं भूयार्थपरमार्थयोः ॥

तस्माद्यत्रास्ति नास्त्येव यदस्ति परमार्थतः ।

वञ्चनार्थमुपन्यासा लालावक्त्रासवादिवत् ॥

3. Radhakrishnan, *op cit* ii, 472



knowledge to the Deity was something hard to swallow. To be sure, one need not be satisfied with an anthropomorphism, but there are limits even to the sway of reason. It chilled the ardor of even the most non-sentimental of worshippers to be told that the God of their attentions was "after all", unreal and that "even the Purusottama is imaginary!"<sup>1</sup>

(iv) When the Devotionalism of the Southern Vaisnavism reached its height about the 10th century, there was bound to come a demand for a formal alliance with the Vedānta. The Theism of the Vaisnavas could no longer be content with a subordinate place. Its metaphysical potentialities had to be drawn out. The labors of Bodhayana, Dramida etc., had long been forgotten. They had to be revived. Yāmuna had undertaken the task and had called attention to the defects of Māyavāda, in his *Siddhītraya*. It was an eye-opener. The ambitions of the Vaisnavas had been roused by it and once roused, they could not be held in check. There probably was a desire to regain all lost ground. A systematic commentary on the *Prasthānatraya* was a desideratum. Yāmuna himself had restored the lost glory and prestige of the *Pañcarātras* and secured social and philosophical recognition to their followers. But nothing approaching the grandeur of the *Śaṅkaramīmāṃsabhāṣya* of Śaṅkara had been reached. The ancient works of Bodhayana, Tanka, etc., had evidently been lost, or had become completely out of date, in style or method and totally eclipsed by the famous commentary of Śaṅkara. The task of writing a new commentary, on a par with the best in the field, so as to push Vaisnava Theism into the focus of contemporary philosophic thought was an urgent one. It was taken up by Ramanuja, who wrote lengthy commentaries on the *Sūtras* and the *Gīta* and dealt with a number of Upanisadic texts and their philosophy in his *Vedārthasaṃgraha* and thus established Vedāntic Realism on a firm basis, both logical and textual.

(v) Still, there was much that had been left undone or insufficiently done by Ramanuja. In the first place, to put it bluntly, the Advaita had not been dislodged from its pedestal on the Upanisads. A passing notice of a few passages from the principal Upanisads, such as was attempted by Ramanuja, was not sufficient to inspire confidence. The entire bulk of the ten Upanisads, held

in admiration by the Monists, had to be reinterpreted line by line, on Theistic lines. Only then, could the Advaitins' claim to "Aupanisadattva", be taken to have been credibly and effectively challenged.

( vi ) It seemed the Viśiṣṭadvaita had, to some extent, played into the hands of Monists in respect of some of its theological and metaphysical views. By turning a cold shoulder to the entire body of Pre Upanisadic literature and perpetuating the distinction between the Karma and Jñāna Kandas, it had unwittingly put a premium upon indifference to the Vedas and disproportionately exalted the Upanisads over the Mantras.

( vii ) The label and ideology of "Viśiṣṭadvaita" were alike distasteful and compromising to genuine Theism. The majesty, transcendence and personal homogeneity of Godhead were on the brink of extinction, on such a view. Say what one might, no genuine Theist could, for a moment, consent to tie down his Deity ( as does the Viśiṣṭadvaitin ) to an existence perpetually "qualified" by two attributes ( Viśeṣas ) one of which is sentient ( Cit ) and the other insentient ( Acit )<sup>1</sup>. It could never be the highest philosophy to say that in the highest reality, called Brahman, we have "limitation, difference and other being" ( Radhakrishnan, II, 683). The Infinite cannot be a mere cross. The eternal, irrevocable, apposition of the dual attributes of Cit and Acit with the Deity, must, perforce, mar its self completeness. The world of Matter and Souls may be bound to God perpetually, but such relation could neither be essential nor reciprocal. The existence of the others must, in the last philosophical analysis, be immaterial to the innermost constitution of the Supreme<sup>2</sup>. Anything short of that would, be restricting the nature of the Brahman<sup>3</sup>. According to such a view, moreover, God, Matter and Souls would together constitute Brahman,<sup>3</sup> not God alone by Himself! The attributes

1 Cf. नहि जीवप्रकृतिभ्यामीश्वरस्यार्थः 1 (Madhva, B T II, 9, 31)

2 The Viśiṣṭadvaitic view of "Śeṣaśeṣabhava", however, presupposes some 'contribution' by the Śeṣa to the Śeṣin. See *Nīlīmālā*, x, p, 74 ( Annamalai Univ. Sbt. Series )

3 "God is a synthetic unity, consisting of elements animate and inanimate" ( essay on Ramanuja, in the *Great Men of India*, ed. by Rushbrook Williams, p. 478 )

of Brahman could not also be "foreign" to its nature (*tyajya*) or inferior to It—as the Cit and Acit undoubtedly are, with reference to the Viśiṣṭādvaitic Brahman. They must be such as could enter into a homogeneous relation with the Substance. The Jīva and Jada which according to Rāmanuja's own showing, are essentially and eternally distinct from Brahman cannot therefore, be treated as its "attributes" in the same sense in which for instance "Satyam" "Jñānam" "Anantam" and "Ananda" are treated by the Upanisads, as attributes of Brahman, capable of the utmost identification with It (*satyam jñānam anantam Brahma*) tho' isolable in thought, from it. The Viśiṣṭādvaitic conception of the relation between Brahman and its so called attributes of Cit and Acit, was, thus, open to serious logical objections.

Viśiṣṭādvaita, then, was clearly inadequate as the highest conception of God to which a Theist might rise. It failed to take proper note of the supreme transcendence and homogeneity of God. It had tied down its Brahman to a relative existence for all time and in so doing, had merely showed its anxiety to assert and safeguard the reality of the world of Cit and Acit, side by side with the Deity. This was certainly a laudable object. But it prevented the theory from rising higher. The Upanisads themselves, in various contexts, had placed the Brahman *per se*, before the Seeker as an entirely self-contained, single transcendent substance, having no trace of an "Other", in its being (*kevalam*) or "*Ekaṃ eva*" as it is described—where the term "*evam*" stands for the complete absence of any 'internal distinction' (*svagatabheda*) in Brahman. This is clearly impossible on Rāmanuja's view of Cit and Acit being essentially different from Brahman, tho' constituting its attributes and existing inseparably (*apṛthaksiddha*) from it. The Upanisads clearly contemplate the possibility of conceiving of the Brahman alone as it exists *per se*, unrelated to anything else. The Viśiṣṭādvaita, with its solicitude for the Cit and Acit, as unridable adjuncts of Brahman, had not merely not visualised, but had definitely discouraged, attempts at envisaging Brahman in such pristine state of existence. It was, no doubt, risky to stress the abstract and transcendent aspect of Brahman overmuch, for fear of landing in a "Nirviśeṣādvaita," but with a little more thought and circumspection, it was not difficult to reach a position which would avoid such a nemesis, by denying to the world of matter and souls any existence as a matter of right, save by



sufferance of the Supreme and at His Will, and hence *ex hypothesi* subject to Him always, depending always on Him and differing in ever so many ways from Him. It was left to Madhva to make good this deficiency and supply the lacuna in Viśiṣṭādvaitic thought and administer the much-needed corrective to its ideology of "Viśiṣṭa-advaita" thro' that of "Svatantra-advaita".

(viii) The label of "Viśiṣṭādvaita", similarly, betokened a weakness to try to press Theism into a monistic mould, even as regards its appellation and make a watery alliance with it. A "Viśiṣṭaika" of one Substance and two attributes all externally related, is no "aika" at all, except in a very loose and remote sense, more so, when the attributes themselves are heterogeneous and avowedly different in essence from each other and from the Substance itself and when the latter is greater than the former. "Tho' souls and matter are modes of God, they have enjoyed a kind of individual existence which is theirs from all eternity and which cannot be entirely resolved into Brahman" (Radhākṛṣṇan, *Op cit* ii p 698)

(ix) Equally artificial and strained was the doctrine of "Parama samya" (absolute equality) in bliss, in Mokṣa, between the released souls and God preached by this school. Such a doctrine was fraught with serious consequences to Theism. There was no knowing where it would stop. If an absolute equality between God and Man were possible<sup>1</sup>, where would be the horror

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1 That it is not possible is affirmed by the Śrībhāṣya न तत्समश्चाभ्यधिकश्च दृश्यते (vi, 8 ab). The creative activity of God also carries with it a certain *ananda* (Taitt Up ii, 7,) which must necessarily be unique and not available to the released who do not engage in creation etc. Similarly, in respect of every other unique attribute of the Deity such as its "Śesitra". The Viśiṣṭādvaitic acceptance of "Nityasuris" also presupposes some kind of difference and "Tāratamya" in release. The commentaries on the *Tiruvaimozhi* also allude to the unique majesty of God that is beyond the reach and aspiration of the Nityasuris too — *Ivaraku oppuccollalarar Samsarigalilum ilar Nityasurigalilum ilar* (See *Itin Tamilakkom*, Madras University, 1952 vol i. p. 16) The "Paramasāmya Śruti" has, therefore, been reinterpreted by Madhva, in harmony with all these and other considerations and evidences, in terms of the largest measure of possible equality consisting of दुःखमात्र परानन्दो लिङ्गभेद समा मता (G B)

or metaphysical incongruity in pressing for an actual identity ? There can be no hope of any such equality, so long as there is the sutra जगद्ध्यापारवर्जम् (iv, 4, 17) In the light of this irrevocable limitation, the desire for equality with God could only be described as an impious one. No true Rāmānujīya could afford to accept absolute equality of the individual and the Supreme, so long as the former is regarded as the "Śēsas" subservient to the Śēṣi (God)

(x) In spite of their undoubted ardor for the cause of Vaisnavism, neither Rāmānuja nor his predecessors had given it a firm textual footing in the Vedas Upanisads and Sūtras. There originally were a few presumably Vaisnavite commentaries on the Sūtras, prior to Rāmānuja. But, since for some centuries before and after Śaṅkara attention had been totally engrossed by higher metaphysical issues of Monism vs Dualism, and latterly, with purely dialectical questions, the merely theological problems of the relative superiority of the gods of the Vedāntic pantheon and their status or even that of the theological identity of Brahman had no attraction for any commentator. But when the great Bhāgavata religion had come into philosophical prominence, in the 10th and 11th centuries, largely thro' the efforts of the Tamil Vaisnava Saints (Ālvārs), side by side with the speculative systems like those of Śaṅkara it was time to find a place for the highest God of the Bhāgavata cult viz, Viṣṇu Nārāyaṇa, or Vasudeva, in the source books of Hindu philosophy and maintain it. The enthronement of a Personal God in Metaphysics by Rāmānuja, had made the reopening of the old question of the Vedas कस्मै देवाय हविषा विधेम, inevitable. Rāmānuja himself had, in his works, sounded a sufficiently 'sectarian' note and upheld Viṣṇu Nārāyaṇa as the Para Brahman of the Vedānta. Still, it could not be said that he had succeeded in securing for his God that paramount position (for which he had fought and suffered persecution in his own region), in the sacred literature as a whole, inclusive of the Upanisads and the Sūtras. As a matter of fact, he had never at all looked at the Rg Veda, the Aranyakas and the Upanisads from that point of view and with that object. That is perhaps why it appears to Thibaut that "the only sectarian feature of his commentary is that he identifies Brahman with Viṣṇu, but, this in no way affects the interpretations put



on the Sūtras and the Upaniṣads. Nārāyaṇa, in fact, is but another name of Brahman"<sup>1</sup> An orthodox follower of Rāmānuja, writing on him in the *Great Men of India*, observes "with characteristic restraint, his comments on the *Brahmasūtras* were made non-sectarian" (p. 478). But the time had come for a more positive and passionate advocacy of the place of Viṣṇu in Hindu religion and philosophy.

(xi) Rāmānuja had, similarly, omitted to find a place for two other vital principles of his system (1) the Śrī-tattva (Lakṣmī) and the doctrines of "Bhakti and Prapatti" which play a vital part in the Vaiṣṇavism of the Ālvārs and of himself, in the *Sūtras* (See p. 478, *Great Men of India*, article on Rāmānuja). As the *Sūtras* are the most authoritative pronouncement on the system of Vedānta, one must expect to find all one's vital doctrines and details enunciated or foreshadowed in them. They cannot be brushed aside as trivial. These omissions, which might prove detrimental to the interests of Vaiṣṇavism, were remedied by Madhva, who brought these pivotal doctrines<sup>2</sup> of Vaiṣṇava theosophy, directly within the scope of the *Sūtras*, as the last word on the religion, theology and philosophy of the Vedānta.

(xii) For some inscrutable reason, Rāmānuja had shown a touchy indifference to the great gospel of Vaiṣṇavism—the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*<sup>3</sup>. And so had his predecessor Yāmuna. This neglect quite naturally, came in Advaitic circles, to be interpreted as a tacit admission on the part of the Vaiṣṇava Realists of the unquestionable monistic tenor of that Purāṇa. Nothing then

1 Tr. of Rāmānuja's *Bhāṣya* SBE xxiv, p. xxxi (Introduction f. n.). But the fact remains that Rāmānuja clearly denies the supreme place to Śiva or any other god whom he considers subject to *āvidyā* and transmigration and Karma and hence unfit for *dhyāna* and worship. See the quotation from *Viṣṇudharmottara*, given by him in his *Srībhāṣya* in this connection.

2 The Prapatti doctrine is not admitted by Madhva. According to his *Bhāṣya* the status of Bhakti and of Lakṣmī are discussed in the B. S. iii 2 19 21, 48 51 and iii 3, 10 12 iv, 2, 7 10, respectively.

3 It is certainly earlier than Rāmānuja. See my paper on the 'Date of the Bhāgavata Purāṇa,' *A. B. O. R. I.* xiv, 3 f. (pp. 182-218).



was more natural, in the circumstances, than that a few commentators should actually have come forward to enlist the support of that Purāna, in the furtherance of their creed. We learn from Jīva Gosvāmin's commentary,<sup>1</sup> that there were at last *two* such early commentaries on the *Bhagavata*—one by Puṇyāranya (said to have been a predecessor of Madhva, by Jīva)<sup>2</sup> and the other by the celebrated Advaitic dialectician Citsukha<sup>3</sup>. As a result of the labors of these two eminent commentators, Vaiṣṇava Realism must have lost ground and much of its prestige and stood in imminent danger of losing its mainstay in the most popular Vaiṣṇava Scripture unless something was urgently done to rehabilitate it.

(xii) Parallel to all this and during all these centuries, Śaivism had been growing into a power. From as early as the days of the Purāṇas, the cult of Śiva had been the chief rival of Vaiṣṇavism. The period between the sixth and the twelfth centuries was the heyday of Śaivism in the South and was distinguished for its mighty literary activity of the Tamil Śaiva Saints (Nāyanmārs). The great hagiological work of Tamil Śaivism, the *Periapuranam*, was composed in the twelfth century. So great was the influence and ascendancy of Śaivism in the South, then, that Rāmānuja had actually to flee Srirangam and find more congenial haunts for his Vaiṣṇavism in distant Mysore. In the absence of fuller chronological material, it is difficult to fix the date of the great Śaiva commentator on the Brahmasūtras Śrīhantha. He certainly came after Rāmānuja,<sup>4</sup> tho' his

1. *Satsandarbhā*

2. Of course, he was an Advaitin. यदेव किल दृष्ट्वा श्रीमध्वाचार्यचरणै वैष्णवान्तराणां तच्छिष्यपुण्याख्यादिरोक्तिकव्याख्यानप्रवेशशक्या तत्र तात्पर्यान्तरं लिखद्भिः \* \* \* \*

(*Satsandarbhā*, p. 18)

3. His commentary on the *Bhagavata* is often quoted by Jīva, in the course of his own (*Brhadāvan* edn.). Sometimes, Jīva quotes both together: अत्र चित्मुखपुण्याख्यौ । See also under Madhva's "*Bhagavata Tatparya*."

4. This may be gathered from his indebtedness to the latter's *Śrībhāṣya* and to his philosophy as such.

precise chronological relation to Madhva, is uncertain<sup>1</sup> But Śrīkantha himself refers to many earlier Śaiva commentators on the Sūtras as his Purvācāryas,<sup>2</sup> some of whom, at least, if not Śrīkantha himself, might have preceded Madhva

Nearer home, in Upper Karnatak, the Vīraśaiva Movement had already been launched by Basaveśvara, minister of Bijjala (1162-67) It was a revolt of Lutheran proportions against Brahminical Hinduism From its very inception it was an awakening of the masses towards a new social order and spiritual goal. Its Psalmists came from all walks of life and spoke to the people in their own language, with great lyrical force and sincerity of feeling, which went straight to their heart This literary and religious movement, which began a century before Basaveśvara,<sup>3</sup> reached its climax in the twelfth century<sup>4</sup>

The combined effects of all these forces must have driven Vaiṣṇava Theism completely to bay It could not have held out much longer unless some one came forward to rehabilitate its fortunes And such a one was soon to appear on the scene, as the champion of Vedāntic Theism and Vaiṣṇava Realism in the person of Śrī Madhvacārya

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1 For further remarks see under Madhva's B S B.

2 Was Rudrabhatta, mentioned among the Pre Madhva commentators, a Śaiva by faith ?

3 Devara Dasimayya, one of the early Vīraśaiva Vacanakaras is assigned to 1040 A D

4 Among Basavesvara's contemporaries were Prabhudevā, Cennabasava Siddharama and Ekantada Ramayya

## PART II

# THE CREATIVE PERIOD OF MADHVA AND HIS IMMEDIATE DISCIPLES MADHVA AND HIS WORKS

## CHAPTER XI

### DATE, LIFE AND WORKS OF MADHVA

#### I Madhva Hagiology—Predecessors of Madhva

Nothing definite or authentic about the forerunners of Madhva's Theism is known to us, beyond what has been recorded by Nārāyaṇa Panditācārya, in his *Manuṁamāñjarī* <sup>1</sup>

From this and from the evidence of Madhva's own works, it is clear that his system traces its origin from the ancient Monothetism of the Bhāgavatas<sup>2</sup>. But for all practical purposes, Madhva himself is the first *historical founder* and exponent of the system of philosophy associated with his name. Pre-Madhva hagiology is a blank save for the merest names of a few 'forerunners', preserved to us in the *Manuṁamāñjarī* and some of the Mutt Lists. An account in the *Padma Purana*<sup>3</sup>, derives Madhva's school from Brahmā (Brahma sampradāya). The following is the traditional Guruparamparā down to Madhva

- 1 Śrī Hamsa (Nārāyaṇa)
- 2 Brahmā
- 3 The Four Saṁas
- 4 Duryaṣas

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1 A short poem furnishing the necessary mytho poetic cum historical background to his more elaborate 'Life of Madhva' in his *Madhvaṁjaya*

2 *Manuṁamāñjarī*, viii, 33 (तत केवलवशेऽस्मिन्)

3 सप्रदाये ब्रह्मनाम्नि मध्वाचार्य प्रतिष्ठित ॥

(Introd to my *Calussutṛi Bhasya* of Madhva, 1934, p xxiv)



- 5 Jñānanidhi Tīrtha
- 6 Garudavāhana "
- 7, Kaivalya "
- 8 Jñānisa "
- 9 Para "
- 10 Satyaprajña "
11. Prājña "
- \* \* \* \* (Gap of about four hundred years)
- 12 Acyutaprekṣa *alias* Purusottama Tīrtha
- 13 Ānanda Tīrtha *alias* Śrī Madhvācārya

It will be seen from the above, that tradition has preserved the names of at least six historical predecessors of Madhva. There is, however, a gap of some four hundred years between Prājña Tīrtha and Acyutaprekṣa, the immediate predecessor of Madhva. Nothing is known of the persons who flourished in this period. It is alleged that the Saints of the creed, were suffering severe persecution at the hands of the Monists in ascendancy, during the period<sup>1</sup>. A vivid account of this is given in Chapter vii of the *Manuśaṅgī*. The facts of the case would appear to be these:

Driven to desperation by the ascendancy of Advaita, the Dvaita teachers had (outwardly) accepted Monism. All that they could do was to ensure the bare continuation of their preceptorial line and leave the rest to the future<sup>2</sup>. In the course of two or three generations, when the stormy past had been forgotten, the once quasi-Monists, became full blooded Monists and remained in that blissful state of ignorance of their original antecedents, till the days of Acyutaprekṣa. No genuinely historical work on Dvaita could, therefore, have been written or preserved at such times. That is why we do not find Madhva referring to any historical work of his predecessors. The last in this line was Purusottama Tīrtha<sup>3</sup> (*M. Vy* vi, 33) *alias* Acyutaprekṣa,

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1 For parallels see Indian and Classical history

2 Such existence *incognito* is held to account for the non-preservation of the names of the teachers subsequent to Prājña Tīrtha (a contemporary of Śaṅkara).

3 It is by this name he is referred to in the Śrīkūrmam Ins. of Narahara Tīrtha (1281 A. D.)

who was the Sannyāsa Guru of Madhva. It is clear from the *M Vj* that he was a warm Advaitin (v, 25, iv, 8, ix, 33-37),<sup>1</sup> tho' a different impression is created by passages in the *Manimāñjarī* (viii, 33 and 36). The very first work on Vedānta in which this teacher instructed Madhva was the *Iśasiddhi* of Vimuktātman (*M Vj* iv, 44). It is obvious, therefore, that Madhva himself was the actual historical Founder and exponent of his system. No doubt, as we have seen in Part I, the theistic philosophy preached by him had a long and continuous history behind it and goes back to the original and basic literature of Hinduism viz., the Vedasāstra. But there is no evidence of previous literary activity of individual writers connecting the works of Madhva with these original sources of his system, as we have for instance, in the case of the works of Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja. We have seen the peculiar circumstances which are said to have rendered such links impossible, for the early forerunners of the Dvaita school.<sup>2</sup> Such absence, however, cannot in any way lessen the importance or take away the textual authenticity or innate metaphysical worth of the system, for, obviously, in the last resort, such links in the chain must end somewhere and the only appeal, thereafter, would have to be to the basic Scriptures or the logical foundations on which a given system rests its claims. That is why Madhva himself has passed by all his historical predecessors, including Acyutaprekṣa, and claims to have received his inspiration directly from Bādarāyana-Vyāsa.<sup>3</sup> Throughout his works, he acknowledges no other teacher save Vyāsa, and has not even once

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1 It is said there were frequent disagreements between Madhva and his Guru. It was with some difficulty that the latter was ultimately converted to the views of Madhva (*M Vj* ix, 33-37).

2 Even the four names of the (historical) predecessors of Paraśūrtha are purely traditional. They are not recorded either in the *Manimāñjarī* or the *M Vj*, the earliest extant biographical sketches of Madhva. They are, however, found given in the genealogical Tables of the Bhandārkere Mutt of Acyutaprekṣa and of the other Mādhva Mathas.

3 तस्यैव शिष्यो जगदेकभर्तुः (*Mbh. T. N.* xxxii, 170) and similar references in the other works of Madhva and *M Vj* viii, 4.

mentioned the name of Acyutaprekṣa, in his works<sup>1</sup> Of course, no offence was meant to nor any taken by Acyutaprekṣa The history of Dvaita Literature proper, thus, begins with Madhva.

## 2 DATE OF MADHVA.

There has been a controversy within the limits of a century or so, over the date of Madhva Both the 'traditional' date of birth 1199 A D claimed for him on the authority of a passage in his *Mahābhārata Tatparyanirṇaya* (xxxii, 131)<sup>2</sup> and the date Śaka 1040 1120, proposed in some of the geneo chronological tables of the Uttarādi and other Mutts, have now been set at rest by the discovery and publication of the inscriptions of Naraharī Tīrtha (particularly the one dated Śaka 1203)—a direct disciple and second "successor" of Madhva on the "Pīṭha". The evidence of these inscriptions shows that Naraharī was in Kalinga between 1264 and 1293 A D. It appears also that he was the Regent of the kingdom between 1281 93 If the statement of the *Mbh T N.* then, were to be taken in its literal sense, Madhva would have lived up to 1278 only, as he is traditionally assigned a life of seventynine years (See *Anumadhvacarita* of Hṛṣīkeśa Tīrtha) Now, according to the uniform testimony of the Mutt lists he was "succeeded" by Padmanābha Tīrtha, who remained on the "Pīṭha" for seven years, and after him by Naraharī who occupied the "Pīṭha" for nine years On this view, Naraharī would have come to the Pīṭha in 1285 But the evidence of inscriptions shows he was still in Kalinga in the years 1289, 1291 and 1293 The obvious inference from these facts is that he could not have come to the Pīṭha till after 1293 It cannot be supposed that he was allowed to be Regent of Kalinga and to occupy the Pīṭha, at one and the same time, between 1285 93 The Mutt lists agree in placing his demise in the cyclic year of *Sṛimukha* These two facts show that that event could not be placed before 1333 A D Calculating backwards from the

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1 Even in his first work, the *GB*, we have only a salutation to Vyāsa and Acyutaprekṣa is not mentioned.

2 Das Gupta's inability to "discover" this verso (*Op cit.* iv, p 51) is surprising



recorded year of Narahari's demise, we arrive at 1317 (*Pinjala*) as the date of Madhva's exit from the world. Assuming that tradition is correct in placing his birth in *Vilambi*, we get 1238 A D as the year of his birth. This agrees very well with the evidence of the inscriptions of Narahari Tirtha, the terms of one of which (*Śrīkurmam* 1281 A D) imply that Mādhva was in flesh and blood at the time.

1238 1317 A D. thus appears to be the most satisfactory date for Madhva.<sup>1</sup> The relevant materials bearing on this question have been brought together and discussed by me in two papers on the subject contributed to the AUJ, (Vols. III, 2 and V, 1) and to them further attention is invited. Other theories on the subject have also been examined and refuted there.

Recently, however, Mr Shingre<sup>2</sup> of Poona has tried to reopen the date of birth 1199 A D corresponding to that of the *Mbh T N* verse and reconcile it with the epigraphical data by resorting to the device of extending Madhva's span of life from 79 years (as traditionally accepted) to 94½ years.

His new date of 1199 1294 is open to the following objections: (1) It extends the life of Madhva arbitrarily. (2) It flouts the accepted traditions among Mādhva Mutts about the cyclic years *Vilambi* and *Pinjala* being the years of birth and exit of Madhva. (3) The dates accepted by Shingre for Madhva's successors down to Rāmacandra Tirtha, similarly, conflict with

1 This date has been accepted by Saletore, *Ancient Karnataka* (History of Tuluva) Poona, 1936. The *Mbh T. N.* verse could be viewed as a rough statement in terms of centuries, the difference of 39 years being ignored in the circumstances. P. P. S. Sastri, tried to champion the date of the Mutt lists in his paper 'Mādhva Chronology', (*Kunṇusvami Sastri Sam. Vol.*) With more zeal than regard for facts, he adopted 1181 as the date of the *Śrīkurmam* Ins, forgetting there were five more epigraphs of Narahari dated between 1264 and 1293, wherein the chronograms given admit of no emendations. For a refutation of his theory see my paper in BORI xix pt. 3.

2 *Genealogical Tables of the Uttaradi Mutt* with details of period of rule of Pontiffs etc. M. V. Shingre, Sarvodaya Press, Poona. 2 (1953).



श्रीमन्मध्वाचार्याः

व्याप्तिर्यस्य निजे निजेन महसा पक्षे सपक्षे स्थिति-  
व्यावृत्तिश्च विपक्षतोऽथ विप्रये सक्तिर्नघै बाधिते ।  
नैवास्ति प्रनिपक्षयुक्तिरतुलं शुद्धं प्रमाणं स मे  
भूयात्तत्त्वविनिर्णयाय भगवानामन्दतीर्थो मुनिः ॥

the cyclic data accepted for them in the Uttarādi and Rāghavendra Svāmī Mutts, which have a common ancestry up to him. (4) The cyclic data of Vilambi and Pīṅgala for Madhva, are endorsed by the *Anumadhvacaritam* attributed to Hṛṣikeśa Tīrtha, a direct disciple of Madhva. (5) These and the data for the successors of Madhva, are endorsed by the *Gurucaryā*.<sup>1</sup> (6) Shingre himself accepts the number of years of Pontifical rule traditionally assigned to the various Pontiffs up to Rāmacandra Tīrtha (and beyond) without any independent proof and which are calculated only on the basis of the cyclic data handed down by tradition and preserved in old hagiological works like the *Gurucaryā*. If their evidence is reliable for the successors of Madhva, it should be equally valid for Madhva. (7) Antedating Madhva to 1199-1294, would seriously complicate the question of the date of the Ākṣobhya-Vidyāranya disputation on *Tattvam, Asi*, to an extent that might even threaten its historicity and fail to explain why none of the works of so great a commentator on Madhva, as Jayatīrtha, has been cited in the chapter on Pūrnaprañja Darśana in the *Sarvadarśana-Saṅgraha*, which could not be dated before 1360. For all these reasons, 1238-1317, would remain the last word on the subject.

### 3. LIFE OF MADHVA

The *Madhva Vijaya* of Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya is the earliest biography of Madhva, that has come down to us. We get there a fairly complete and authentic account of his life and activities. There are well known accounts in English of the life and teachings of Madhva<sup>2</sup>. A brief sketch of his life would therefore suffice, here.

Madhva was born of Tulu<sup>3</sup> Brahmin parents of humble status, in the village of Pājak<sup>4</sup>, some eight miles S. E. of the

1. See Preface.

2. By C. M. Padmanabhachar, C. N. Krishnaswami Ayyar, S. Subba Rao and C. R. Krishna Rao.

3. He was thus a Tulu, not a 'Kanarese' Brahmin, as supposed by some.

4. Not Kalyāṇpūr as wrongly stated by Carpentier (p. 406), and Barth (p. 195). Pajakakṣetra is known in Tulu as Kakra, where the old family house of Madhva is still preserved.



town of Udipi, in the S Kanara district of the 'present Mysore State. His father's family name was "Naddantillāya" of which the well known "Madhyageha" and "Madhyamandira"<sup>1</sup> are Sanskrit equivalents. His actual name tho' not explicitly stated in the *M. Vj*, is surmised to have been Nārāyana, on the basis of an allusion in the *M Vj Bhaṭṭaprasāda* Madhva's original name was Vasudeva. At the age of seven or so he had his Upanayana and went thro' a course of Vedic and Śāstra studies, under a teacher of the Totantillāya (Pugavana—*M Vj* 11, 49) family.

The next event in his life was renunciation, probably at the age of sixteen (*M Vj* 11, 54-56). His studies in the Śāstras, had, in the meanwhile, created in him a profound dissatisfaction with the prevailing philosophy of Māyāvāda and filled him with a desire to resuscitate the Realistic Theism of the Vedaśāstras, in its pristine purity. The call of the spirit took him to Acyutaprekṣa, from whom he sought and obtained initiation as a monk under the name of Purnaprajña.

Some time after initiation was spent in the study of Vedāntic classics beginning with the *Iśasiddhi* of Vimuktātman. Frequent disagreements between master and disciple terminated the studies before long. Purnaprajña was now made the head of the Mutt of Acyutaprekṣa, under the name of Ānandatīrtha. The name "Madhva," by which he is more widely known, was assumed by him as being synonymous with it and for certain esoteric reasons connected with his claim to be an Avatar of Vayu.

Madhva spent some time in and about Udipi, teaching the other disciples of Acyutaprekṣa and trying conclusions with a number of Pandits—Monistic, Jain and Buddhist. The *M Vj* (v 8-16) mentions his encounters with Vāsudeva Pandita, Vādisinha, and Buddhisāgara. This teaching and constant disputations developed his dialectic abilities and made him an adept in

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1. Not "Madhyamandira" as in Bhandarkar (*Saivism, Vaishnavism etc* Strassburg, 1913, p 58). The equivalent is applied to Madhva also, in the *SDS* which shows it was only a family name. (See *M Vj* 11, 9). As Madhva's father too went by the name, it cannot be "traced" to the fact that it (the village of Naddantādi (Skt Madhyatāla) was the midday halting place of Madhva (Saletero, *op cit* 1, p 416, f. n 11).

polemics that he shows himself to be in his works. Encouraged by these successes he made up his mind to go on a S Indian tour to find a wider field for the propagation of his new ideas. Trivandrum, Cape Camorin, Srirangam and Ramesvaram were among the places visited en route. In Cape Camorin, he fell into a violent clash with an Advaitic monk, wrongly identified by some with Vidyāsamkara Tirtha,<sup>1</sup> the then ( ? ) Svāmi of the Śringeri Mutt. After the conclusion of "Caturmāsya" at Ramesvaram (v, 46), he moved on to the Srirangam, where he must have come into personal contact with the followers of Rāmānuja, there. From Srirangam, he seems to have returned to Udipi thro' a northern route.

The southern tour must have taken two or three years. It must have shown Madhva that breaches had already been effected in the citadel of Māyāvāda and this knowledge must have strengthened his original resolve, to establish a new Siddhānta. No wonder that soon after his return to Udipi, he began his career as an author, with a new commentary on the *Gītā*, which was not however published till after his return from his first North Indian tour and visit to Badari, which came shortly after.

This time, he had a larger retinue. We have no information of the route taken or the places visited or the incidents on the journey. It is, however, stated that while at the hermitage at Badarinath, Madhva left by himself for Mahabadarikāśrama or the abode of Vyāsa, in the upper regions of the Himalayas. He returned after some months, inspired by Vyāsa, and wrote his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, which was transcribed to his dictation by Satyatīrtha (ix, 13). Resuming their homeward march, the party journeying thro' Behar and Bengal, came ultimately to the banks of the *Godavari*. Here, there was a protracted debate with a veteran scholar of those parts, Sobhana Bhatta at the conclusion of which, the worsted adversary became a disciple of Madhva under the ascetic name of Padmanābha Tirtha. The place of meeting has not been definitely mentioned in the *M*. V. Many writers have generally assumed it to have been Rajamundry on the

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1 Cf. C. N. K. Ayyar, C. M. Padmanabhachar, and *Madhvamuni-vijaya* (1958). For a refutation of this identification see my paper "The Madhva-Vidyāsamkara Meeting, A Fiction" *AUJ* III, 1.

Godāvar, under the impression that Sobhana Bhatta was probably a native of Andhra Desa. But the reference to Padmanābha Tīrtha, as a celebrated leader of the Karnātakas, in the *Hṛṣīkeśa Paddhati* (Udipi 1912) renders it probable that he might have been a native of one of the Kannada districts bordering upon the Godāvari ( *M. Vij* xv, 120 ) and that the meeting took place at some important centre of learning on the banks of the Godavari. The conversion of Narahari Tīrtha also, must have taken place about the same time <sup>1</sup>

The N Indian tour had thus made a considerable impression on the people. Till then, Madhva's criticism of the Advaita and other prevailing schools had been merely destructive. He had not offered a new Bhāṣya in place of those he had so ruthlessly criticized ( v 38 ) But with the publication of his commentaries on *Gīta* and the *Brahmasūtras*, no one could say he had no alternative system to offer in place of those he criticized. His first achievement after his return to Udipi was the conversion of Acyutaprekṣa himself, completely, to the new Siddhanta. He fell, not without a fierce resistance ( *M. Vij* ix, 33-37 )

The merits of the new system, the living earnestness of its founder, his irresistible personality, incisive logic and massive learning, soon brought many converts and adherents <sup>2</sup>. To bring and hold them all together the beautiful image of Śrī Kṛṣṇa [ frontispiece ] was installed by Madhva at his Mutt ( ix, 43 ) which became the rallying centre of his followers. He also inaugurated some reforms and introduced some changes in the ceremonial code of his followers, such as the substitution of flour made sheep for

1 Saletore ( *op cit* p 439 ) is not correct in placing Narahari Tīrtha's meeting with Madhva as late as 1270 A D. The ascetic title 'Tīrtha' -- *śrīmadānandācārya* -- was conferred on him by me in *AUJ* iii, 2 p 1 of his dated 1264 A I have taken place in or before 1264

2 Saletore ( *op cit* pp 444-449 ) is incorrect again in connecting the legends touching the conversion of certain members of the Kōṭiśvara and allied groups by a Madhva ascetic, narrated in the Puttige version of the *Gramaradhātī*, with Madhva himself. Suffice it to say that the expression "Kālau yuge Madhvamata pracandam" there would refer to a follower of the Madhva Order. See under Vādirāja" in Vol II



living ones, in Vedic sacrifices (Pistapaśūyajñas) and the rigorous observance of fasts on Ekadaśī days. The *M Vj* IX, 44-50, refers to one such Pistapaśū Yajña performed at the instance of Madhva, with his younger brother as Hotr. We are told that a member of the Maraditāya (Jarāghatita gotra) family organised a protest and a boycott this new type of sacrifice and stirred up a good deal of opposition. But Madhva stood firm and carried the day.

After this, Madhva started on a second N. Indian tour and returned after visiting Delhi, Kuruksetra, Banaras and Goa (x, 52). The subsequent tours were all confined mostly to the S. Kanara district. Visnumangala (near Kasargod) and Kadatala (near Vittal) were his favorite resorts. The years that followed brought further acquisition of disciples and influence to his fold. Many works had, in the meanwhile, been written by Madhva—such as the Bhāṣyas on the Ten Upanisads, the Ten Prakaranas and running expositions of the *Bhagavata* and the *Mahābhārata*, (xv, 74-77). The prestige of the new faith had come to be firmly established by such monumental literary activity. The increasing popularity of the new faith naturally caused no small anxiety and heart burning to the custodians of the established faith, Advaita. Desperate remedies were tried to combat the danger and stem the tide of the new Siddhānta. We are told of an actual raid on the library of Madhva<sup>1</sup> (xiv, 2) which contained a very valuable collection of books. It was, however, partly recovered shortly afterwards and restored to Madhva at the intervention of Jayasimha, Ruler of Kumbla<sup>2</sup>. The incident, naturally, brought Madhva into touch with the Ruler, at whose request he visited his capital. Close on this visit came the momentous conversion of the great Trivikrama Panditācārya (presumably the Court Pandit of Jayasimha) who was the foremost scholar and authority on Advaita Vedānta in

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1. Saletore (p. 424) is mistaken in giving "*Madhvasiddhanta*" as the name of one of the works stolen on the occasion. There does not seem to have been any such work in existence, and none is mentioned in the *M Vj* or other sources. The raid is said in *M Vj* xii, 2, to have been carried out at the instigation of the Advaitic monk Padma Tirtha, of the Cola country and his ally Pundarika Puri.

2. C. M. Padmanabhachar's identification of the King with the Ruler of Travancore, is unsupportable. See *AUJ* ii, 2.

those parts (M Vy xii, 51) This Trivikrama was the father of Madhva's (future) biographer Nārayana Panditacārya After his conversion, Trivikrama was commissioned to write a commentary on Madhva's *Brahmasutrabhāṣya*, which he did, under the name of *Tattvapradīpa* By this time, Madhva himself had composed his masterpiece, the *Anuvyākhyana*, on the *Brahma Sūtras*

Trivikrama's conversion was a turning point in the history of the faith Many more joined the fold and Madhva's fame spread far and wide His parents died about this time ( xv, 91 ) and the next year, his younger brother, and seven other Taulava disciples were ordained monks (M Vy xv, 122-30) These became the founders of what later came to be known as the "Aṣṭa Mathas" of Uḍipi

The last years of Madhva seem to have been spent in teaching and worship His three works the *Nyayasūvarāṇa* the *Karmanir-naya* and the *Ārsnamṛta Mahānata* were all probably composed about this time

His mission was now completed His message to the world had been delivered and he had the satisfaction of seeing it well received He was honored in his own native region and beyond His works had been placed on an enduring basis He had gathered round him a band of ardent and enthusiastic disciples who could be relied upon to carry the light of his teachings all over the country It was time for him to retire from the scene of his labors and leave them in charge of future work Charging his disciples with his last message in the closing words of his favourite Upaniṣad, the *Āitareya*, not to sit still but to go forth and preach and spread the truth among the deserving Śrī Madhva disappeared from view, on the ninth day of the bright half of the month of Māgha, of Pīṅgala 1318 A D —

"एकोनाशीतिवर्षाणि नीत्वा मानुषदृष्टिम् ॥

पिण्डाब्दे माघशुद्धनवम्या वदरी ययौ ॥" ( *Anumadhācarita* )

#### 4 WORKS OF MADHVA

The works of Madhva are thirty-seven, collectively called *Sarva mūla*<sup>1</sup>. They may be classified under four heads (1) commentaries on the *Prasthanatraya*, consisting of the *Gīta* the *Brahmasūtras* and the *Ten Upanisads*. We have two commentaries on the *Gīta* and four works on the *Sūtras* and Bhāṣyas on all the ten *Upanisads*. (2) Then come the ten short monographs *Daśa-Praṅkaras*, some elucidating the basic principles of his system, its logic, ontology, theory of knowledge etc., Others are in the nature of dialectic refutations of certain fundamental theories of Monism. One of them, the *Karma-Nirṇaya*, is a constructive exposition of Madhva's theory of Vedic exegesis in its higher aspect touching the Adhyatma interpretation of the Karma-Kāṇḍa and illustrated with reference to a part of the *Āitareya Brahmana*. The *Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya* and *Tattvadyōta* are brilliant and persuasive expositions of his Siddhanta and contain equally powerful critiques of Advaita. (3) In the third group may be placed his short commentary and notes on the *Bhagavata Purāṇa*, his metrical epitome of the *Mahābhārata*, viewed from a new theosophical angle and his original monotheistic and Adhyātmic interpretation of the first three Adhyāyas of the *Rg Veda*. (4) His minor works include a short Yamaśa Kāvya on the Bharataṇ Epic and the *Dradaśa Stotra* in different metres containing many sublime philosophical ideas, an anthology of verses in praise of Kṛṣṇa (*Kṛṣṇamṛtama-hārnava*), a Tāntric work on rituals and Image worship etc., a compendium of daily conduct and religious routine, a code of the ascetic order and so on.

These works are written in a plain unsophisticated style, without any ornament and flourish. The language of the *Praṅkaras* is so terse and elliptical that their meaning could

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1. Two Devanāgarī editions of the *Sarva Mūla* have been published, one from Kumbakonam and another from Belgaum. Jayatīrtha has commented on eighteen of these works. The authorship of a few more is attested by early references and quotations. There is thus, no 'problem' of authorship in regard to the works of Madhva, as we have, in the case of Śaṅkara and others. A Kannada edn of the *Sarvamūla* with translation etc., has been projected from Udupi and several Vols of it have already been published.



not be fully grasped without a good commentary. This applies to his other philosophical works too. This renders the task of translation into other languages particularly difficult. That is one reason why they have remained a sealed book to the West. But for the illuminating commentaries of Jayatirtha on them, in the 14th century, it would have been difficult for the philosophy of Madhva to have risen to that position of importance as a vital limb of the Vedānta, which it did, in the succeeding centuries.

Madhva's works are characterized by an extreme brevity of expression and a rugged simplicity and directness devoid of all literary flourish and bombast. Never once does Madhva glide into the languid grace of a Saṃkhya or a Vācaspati. His metrical works, particularly the *AV* and *Mbh T N*, show a better diction and breathe the spirit of sombre dignity, loftiness of ideas and serenity of expression. The *Daśa—Prakaranas* rank next in order of stylistic merit, the *VTN* and *Td* being good classics of acute philosophic thought, criticism and analysis. The commentaries on the Upanisads rise to occasional heights of spiritual fervor, tho' written mostly in a truncated style, partly, sometimes, in prose. The introduction of frequent and lengthy quotations from a bewildering variety of works extant and other, very often mars the continuity of ideas and obscures the nature and drift of philosophical doctrines and interpretations. But Madhva's conception of the role of a Bhasyakara and his performance as one, rank him far above his compeers. He explains his texts only where such explanations are absolutely necessary or are called for to obviate a possible misconstruction ( Cf प्रज्ञावादाश्च भाषसे । त्रैगुण्य विषया वेदाः । मा कर्मफलहेतु ( G B ) ईक्षणोयत्वात् वाच्यमेव ( B S B ) ). He expands the ideas of the original texts with apt and ample quotations from a variety of sources covering a very wide range of the sacred literature, extant and other (*M V*, ix, 0). He does not comment on texts whose *anvaya*, purport and philosophical significance are obvious. In this, he stands apart from other Vedāntic commentators whose performance often recalls Bhoja's caustic comment on commentators इति वस्तुविप्लवकृत सर्वेऽपि टीकावृत ( *Bhoja Vṛtti* ).

One or two links in argument are generally skipped over by Madhva and he hidden behind the swift march of his thoughts

His intimate acquaintance with the Vedic and Epic literature is reflected in the numerous citations he makes from their nooks and corners, with prodigious memory and surprising ease. The range of his studies is well brought out by the variety of topics covered by these quotations. The sureness, precision and aptness of these quotations are such as to impress and inspire confidence, in any unprejudiced mind.

There is, however, a touch of deliberate archaism and eccentricity in his grammar and diction. The very first verse in his *Gita Bhasya* has a 'false' or weak *caesura* गुरुश्चान गीतार्थं वक्ष्यामि, which is defended by Jayatirtha on the basis of similar authentic Śāstran precedents like 'य उपाधिलंगति साध्ये सवन्धविशेषणे' from a Tarkika work. We have many departures from Paninian usage: the use of "कारण" in the masculine <sup>1</sup>, "गोचर" in the neuter, "उत" as a copulative, ऋते with the accusative, the Epic "गृह्य" for गृहीत्वा, पतिना for पत्या, and purely Vedic forms like जनिता (for जनयिता), 'विष्णवि' in the locative (AV 1, 4, 5 and BT p 7b, in the citation from *Tantrabhagavata* and मिथ्याया (AV, on which, see NS p 27). He also ignores some Samāsānta terminations prescribed by Pāṇini as in स्त्रीपुंश्च (AV ii, 2, 12 with NS 423 b,) आदिराजान (GB) and permits himself of euphonic and grammatical liberties like "अपोदितुम्" "गुणोत्तताम्" "सन्ताना" and occasional *mesis* as in "चकार चावि," (Mbh T. N) <sup>2</sup>, विद्वस्य मित्र स इहाजगाम (ibid) <sup>3</sup>. He takes the same liberty in versification as Gaudapada, Suresvara and Vidyāranya, in combining passages of different scriptural texts with his own words to make single verses out of them (as in तज्जर्धन्न स्वतवसो in Mbh T N from *Rg-Veda*). These eccentricities have to be explained *à la* Śrīharsa's *Naisadha*, xii, 154). They are not ignorant lapses of a third rate writer, but deliberate departures from the norm, which could be legitimized with reference to special Vyākharana Sūtras and sanctions. But they are few and far between, and all of them have been suitably vindicated by the lynx eyed commentator Jaya-

1 With this cf वासुदेवमनुमान (*Mahabhasya*)

2 Cf *Magha*, x 19, *Raghuramā*, xiii 36

3 Cf पुर महर्षे वपिलस्य वस्तु । (*Buddhacarita*)

tirtha, on the authority and sanctions of Panini, the *Mahābhāṣya* and other sources. Barring these peculiarities of his style, Madhva is, on the whole, to be recognized as a good writer, a sound thinker and a clear expositor.

## 5 PROBLEM OF SOURCES

Another important feature of his writings is the reference, in them, to the authority of a large body of interpretative and expository literature, extant and other—dealing with various aspects of his theology, questions of logic, grammatical derivation of words, theodicy, mysticism, cosmogony and interpretation of particular groups of texts. In this respect also, his works stand out as a class by themselves. Every point of view and detail of doctrine is supported and amplified by him, in the light of these quotations, drawn from a large body of ancillary literature of both Vedic and Post Vedic periods. The inaccessibility of many of these sources, at the present time, and difficulty of tracing many of the quotations in the extant sources also, raises a problem as to the genuineness of these passages and the degree and extent of their reliability and the acceptability of the new line of interpretation of the Vedānta, based on them. But, in fairness to Madhva, it must be stated that while (1) the foundations of his theistic system and its general and main outlines are well supported by the extant literature of the Vedic and Post-Vedic periods, its logical and philosophical superstructure is built upon independent philosophical cogitation and analysis of categories and can bear examination independently of textual authority. (2) The appeal to texts occurs only in respect of purely theological issues and interpretations of disputed texts. But this does not affect the metaphysical bases of his thought, or his ontology and theory of knowledge. This fact is of vital importance to a correct appreciation of true merits of his system and would naturally dispel much of the confusion of thought into which critics of Madhva have been led, in their estimation of his philosophy. Later critics, like Appayya Dīkṣita, have raised the bogey of “untraceable quotations” and tried to make capital out of it<sup>1</sup>. But the matter is not one to be so easily settled *ex parte*.

1. Some modern scholars like Bhandarkar, and Belvalkar have also urged the point against the acceptability of Madhva's interpretations.



most of the works cited by Madhva in the course of his interpretation of extant texts are not now available to us and several of these passages could not be easily traced or located in the extant sources named by him, the possibility of their still representing an old and distinctive line of Theistic interpretation of the philosophy of the Prasthanatrayi could not be overlooked.<sup>1</sup> Traces of the ideas and interpretations analogous to those adumbrated by Madhva have been found to occur in the extant literature of the Epics and Puranas and Pañcarātras tho' at times, in a badly mutilated form.<sup>2</sup> (2) There is nothing in the extant works that is definitely hostile to his line of interpretation. (3) There is no linguistic or philological ground to discredit these as fabrications of an individual commentator, however clever he might have been. The quotations disclose a natural orderliness of thought, internal variation of style, peculiarities of idiom, syntax and vocabulary in common with the genre of works to which they pertain and many other indications of genuineness. (4) The large number of works so named and the variety of topics with which they deal, the natural ease and flow of the quotations, the varying lengths of the passages cited—some *in extenso*, running to more than ten or fifteen verses at a stretch, others to three or four lines or less, and yet others in isolation as single verses, hemistichs or quarters, the unfaltering precision of references to particular contexts from which such passages are taken,<sup>3</sup> and allusions even to the names of certain interlocutors<sup>4</sup> in some contexts, and the general agreement of language and idiom of the citations with the literary patterns of the different strata of literature from which they are drawn are sufficient reasons to establish the *bona fides* of those quotations and accord them due weight and recognition in estimating the value and importance of Madhva's line of interpretation of

1 Cf the text एष प्रवृत्ति \* \* { *Pañc. Sūtri* } cited by Madhva under B S 1, 4, 26 and एष ह्येवाव्यक्त ( *Mahopaniṣad* ) under B S 1, 4, 29 with corresponding views found in *Ahīrbudhnyā Samhitā* and *Vāyu Purāṇa* referred to by Das Gupta III, Pp 34 496 and 502

2 Cf *Brahmaṇḍa Purāṇa* III, 2, 81 with the quotation from the same source given by Madhva ( *Brh Up Bhasya* p 34 ).

3. ता एवापादौ तत्र स ऋषि दक्षितव्रत । ( GB. II, 50 )

4 कर्मोस्तु तदा दाण \* \* ( *Brh Up. Bhasya*, P 47 )

the texts and traditions of the Prasthānatrayi and the systematization of thought propounded by him in the light of an old and genuine phase of Theistic thought preserved and handed down by them ( 5 ) It is also significant that the genuineness of these sources does not appear to have been called into question by any of the critics of Madhva, in his own days We know from the *M V* that he had to encounter serious opposition to his views from the leading Advaitins of the day But there is no trace of opposition to or distrust of the sources on which he propounded his views and version of Vedānta, in any of the writings of the older Advaitins of the period of Madhva or his immediate disciples including Jayatīrtha The *Sarvadarsanasamgraha* of Madhva gives an honorable place to the philosophy of Madhva in the history of Indian thought which, it would not have done, had its textual *bona fides* been open to doubt in those days, as resting upon spurious foundations of fabricated texts on a large scale Nor do the works of Jayatīrtha and Vyasarāya disclose the least sign of such an opinion having been entertained in any quarter This is all the more significant as Jayatīrtha is alive to the criticisms on the Bhāṣya and other works of Madhva including objections taken to the 'ungrammatical' *prayogas* there and addresses himself to the task of meeting them He would not have ignored so serious a matter, as this, if it had actually been raised in his times It is difficult to believe also that erstwhile champions of Advaita like Padmanābha Tīrtha and Trivikrama Panditācārya who tried conclusions with Madhva and afterwards accepted his system would have been convinced by a heap of fabricated texts if that was all that Madhva had to show in his support Nor would they have tamely submitted to them The attempt to discredit the sources of Madhva is of much later origin, springing from the days of Appayya Dīksita He was the first to raise the cry which was assiduously taken up by others like Bhattoji and Venkatanatha<sup>1</sup> ( 6 ) Much of their criticism in this respect suffers from sectarian prejudice and a failure to take note of the enormous loss of original texts in many branches of learning in Sanskrit literature, owing to Moslem vandalism and other causes Madhva draws heavily upon the vast literature of the Samhitās of the Pancarātra

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<sup>1</sup> Appayya's criticisms in this respect have been answered by Vijayindra Tīrtha (See vol II )

of which over two hundred works are reported by Schrader. A good many of these rare works are still fortunately preserved in various Libraries, awaiting publication and exploration at the hands of modern scholars. A careful investigation of this body of extant literature of the Pañcarātras is certainly bound to throw a good deal of light on this problem and vindicate the *bona fides* of Madhva's sources, to a great extent. The Pontiffs of Madhva Mutts would be doing the right thing by Madhva and vindicating his prestige, by arranging for the speedy investigation of this available source. Anyway, it would be preposterous to dismiss all untracable texts of Madhva as forgeries and fabrications without due research. I have probed into this matter to some extent and carried out some work in this direction and have found the results encouraging. (7) Some of the non extant sources mentioned by Madhva, were for example, known to other writers also,<sup>1</sup> both *earlier and later*. The charge of fabrication is, thus, too sweeping and uncharitable. We see from the *GB*, the first work of Madhva, that already at the time of his writing it, he was in a position to lay under contribution most of the important sources which continue to figure more prominently in his later works. It is hard to believe that any sensible philosopher, let alone a rising one seeking to establish a new faith in opposition to a powerful system entrenched in the public affections, would start his career with a cartload of fabricated texts and jeopardize his chances of a sympathetic hearing to his views! (8) Again, some important works like the *Brahmatarka* not cited in the *GB* (his first work), are found quoted in subsequent works ranking as his important authorities. This shows they were secured by him at a later stage. (9) His own clear statement in his *Mbh T. N* (ii, 7-8) shows that he was a patient collector of *Mss* from all parts of the country and possessed a unique collection of *Mss* (which we learn from the *M Vj* xiv, 2, was actually raided and stolen by some disgruntled adversaries, tho' it was subsequently recovered.)

(10) We must, therefore, concede that there must have been some basis for these sources utilized by Madhva. Many causes might have conspired to throw them into oblivion, including the ascendancy of Advaita for some centuries before him. Having

1. For details see my edn. 'Catus Sutrī Bhāṣya', introd. and notes



been largely utilized only by him, they had not evidently found a wider circle of acceptance and remained unfamiliar to or ignored, suppressed or tampered with by others indifferent or hostile to his viewpoint. It is worthy of note that Madhva himself tells us how the textual traditions had suffered and were suffering interference, interpolation, overwriting, mutilation and tampering with:

क्वचित् ग्रन्थान् प्रक्षिपन्ति क्वचिदन्तरितानपि ।

कुर्युः क्वचिच्च व्यत्यास प्रमादात् क्वचिदन्यथा ॥

(Mbh T N 11, 37)

We can only hope that a systematic investigation of this problem of the Sources of Madhva would throw more light on it. Meantime, we must give Madhva the benefit of the doubt and not indulge in unseemly charges against a stalwart in Indian thought who, whatever his differences with his compeers like Saṅkara and Rāmānuja, was, in every respect, as great, sincere and trustworthy as any of them. I have given a consolidated list of the unfamiliar sources drawn upon by Madhva (only titles) in an Appendix at the end of this work, as a preliminary aid to further investigation of the problem by those who may be inclined to undertake it.



## CHAPTER XII

### GĪTĀ AND SŪTRA PRASTHĀNA

Madhva wrote two commentaries on the *Gīta*-*ṛ Bhasya* and a *Tatparya*. The former was the earliest work with which he made his debut in the philosophical world; For this reason it is also of considerable historical importance to us

#### ( 1 ) GĪTA BHASYA

This runs to 1500 granthas ( units of 32 syllables ) opening with salutations to Viṣṇu and Vyāsa. The young and alert mind of Madhva is in evidence on every page of it. So are his earnestness of purpose to serve the cause of Theism and his marvellous equipment for the task of reinterpreting the Vedānta, from a new angle. The work is a revolution in thought and in method. It eschews all purple patches and fine writing, and is as brief and precise as possible. Madhva makes up for the brevity of his comments by quotations from numerous rare sources, not utilized by those who had gone before him. This is a distinctive feature of his other works also. His style is peculiar to himself,—terse and somewhat truncated. He does not indulge in long perorations and explanations, but just puts down important “notes” and “comments” on moot points of interpretation of key words and phrases or parts of verses. He does not comment on all the verses of the text but only a few of them which are in need of critical comment or elucidation. His *Bhāṣya*, thus, marks a new departure in the field.

At the outset, Madhva emphasizes the greatness of the Epic of which the *Gīta* is the pith. The latter is happily and poetically described as the ‘honey of the Epic-Pāṇḍita’ ( *Mahābhārataparījatamadhuhūta* ). In the first six chapters, the performance of Karma in the true spirit of Karma Yoga is shown to be the unfailing means of acquisition of God vision. The next *saṁhita* is taken up with the majesty of God, His manifestations, vibhūtiḥ Viśvarūpa etc. In the last are explained the nature of beliefs and

practices not conducive to spiritual uplift. The work concludes with an insistence on Bhakti as the innermost means of achieving Moksa.

### REORIENTATION OF KARMA YOGA

An outstanding contribution of Madhva, to Gīta-thought is the reorientation given by him to the interpretation of its theory of "Karma Yoga". This reorientation lies in (1) defining its status *vis à vis* the two "Nisthas" of Samkhya and Yoga referred to in chapter vi, and (2) in repudiating the view of Samkhya that such Karma is essentially applicable to the "Avidyavastha" alone, and (3) in stressing that even this Niskama Karma is of comparatively lesser importance, ultimately, with regard to Jñāna, being only a step to it and that, therefore, the final view of the *Gīta* is not "Jñānakarmasamuccaya" nor even "Jñāna-larma<sup>o</sup>adhyā Bhaktiyoga", but pure Aparoksa Jñāna alone, brought about by Bhakti. Niskama karma, however, helps in two ways (1) in cleansing the mind and helping the emergence Bhakti and Jñāna and (2) in being conducive, when practised *after* the attainment of Aparoksa-jñāna, to the manifestation of fresh aspects of bliss, in Moksa.

Madhva admits "Aparoksa Jñāna" (direct vision of God) as the ultimate means of Moksa. This may be attained in two ways (1) by a life of complete renunciation and meditation, or (2) by gradual attainment of Jñāna thro' an active life of Karma enjoined by the Sastras, according to one's station. The former is open *only* to a few highly specialized souls like Sanaka. The rest of humanity has to work its way up thro' Karma (iii, 3). There is nothing to be ashamed of in an active life on earth provided it is nobly lived. Karma-Yoga points the way to such a life. It is different from the one based on a hedonistic interpretation of life. The pith of Karmayoga lies in the discharge of one's Karma (nitya naimittika and even the so called "Kamyā") without the least desire for fruit and eschewing all notions of "I" and "mine". The true Karmayogin looks upon himself as a mere "Pratibimba" of God, whose every wish and activity is derived from and dependent on that of the Supreme (Bimbādhīnakriyāvan). God is the real independent doer and enjoyer in all cases (iv, 24, xviii, 16). It is the performance of one's duties with this consciousness that constitutes true "Naiṣkarmya",—not mere abstention



from Karma. Niskarmya raises the soul from selfishness to god-consciousness. It makes the aspirant see God everywhere and everything in God and trains him to look on himself as no more than an instrument of divine dispensation and thus prepares him for Aparoksa thro' mental and spiritual cleansing. Madhva develops the (peculiar) theory that it is never the intention of Scripture (the so-called Karmakanda) to stop with the mere fleeting rewards of Heaven and make for a never ending transmigration. Such narrow view of the Vedas is "Veda-Vada"<sup>1</sup>. The results promised in connection with the performance of sacrifices like Jvotistoma are not to be interpreted too literally (ii, 44). They are to be viewed as so many inducements to attract the attention of average humanity which is always impressed the promise of rewards (*puspitala*). Madhva finds support for this view in the passages of the *Bhagavata* कर्ममोक्षाय कर्माणि विधत्ते ह्यगद यथा (xi, 3, 45) रात्नार्वा फल्भुति (x, 3, 47) and in *Gita* ii, 42. He also refers to Vedic texts like 'विश्वजिता यजेत' where no results are expressly referred to and infers from them that results are not primarily or necessarily contemplated by Scripture,—its only motive in prescribing sacrifices, being to induce men to take to them kindly, make them perform them in due course in the true spirit of Niskamatā and thus purify them for Aparoksa. (B T. xi, 21, 24 5). This view has the support of xviii, II. This is a new and far-reaching interpretation of the practical philosophy of the *Gita*. It would appear from Śaṅkara's commentary on xviii, 6, that an identical view was held by certain commentators who preceded him. Great, then, is the credit due to Madhva for having revived the old view and presented it in such a striking manner<sup>2</sup>.

Madhva looks upon the greatness and majesty of God as the central thesis of the *Gita* (as indeed of all Śāstra). Other problems discussed in it are all ancillary. The *Gita* emphasizes this "Mahatātparya" (central thought) thro' the twin principles of

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1 Cf the mystic interpretation of Vedic hymns sponsored by Aurobindo Ghose, in our times

2 For detailed estimate of Madhva's place and achievement as an Interpreter of the *Gita*, see my English Introduction to the Kannada tr of Madhva's *Gita Bhasya* M. M. Seva Sangha, Udipi, 1954

Theism—the immanence and transcendence of God, which are both vividly expounded in it. The *Viśvarupadhyāya* and the *Puruṣottama-Yoga* emphasize the transcendental aspect while God's immanence in the Cosmos is elucidated, according to Madhva in a very vivid manner in Ch. vii and x. His commentary on these chapters go to the root of the matter and contain much original exposition. The metaphysical dependence (प्रतिनिम्बभाव) of the Jīvas on God is the basis on which Madhva interprets the whole of the ii chapter and resolves its many seeming contradictions of thought between activism and absorption. सर्वमतत ब्रह्मत्युच्यते तदधीन सत्ताप्रवृत्तिमत्त्वात् । ननु तत्स्वरूपत्वात् ( G B )

He identifies the true Karmayoga of the Lord with the Nivṛtti Mārga and the narrow hedonism of the Mimāṃsākas with Pravṛttimārga. He quotes the authority of *Vyāsa-smṛiti* (not extant \*)

निष्काम ज्ञानपूर्वं तु निवृत्तमिह चोच्यते ।

निवृत्तं सेवमानस्तु ब्रह्माप्येति सनातनम् ॥ १

He does not however confine Karmayoga to the Avidyāvasthā of Samsāra. विदुषः कर्मासम्भववचनात् यानि वर्माणि वास्त्रेण विधीयत ता यविदुषो विहिता इति भगवतो निश्चयः ( ii 21 ), but looks upon it as the right kind of wisdom and action. Even the great Junas like Janaka and Priyavrata (*Bhagavata* V) are shown to have taken to Niskāma Karma at the bidding of God to set an example to others. This is a new orientation of the practical philosophy of the Gita, based on a remarkably original and suggestive reinterpretation of “ ते ” ( in ii 47 )

## (2) GĪTĀ TĀTPARIYA

The *Gītātātpariya* (*Nirnaya*) is a later and more discursive prose commentary on the *Gita* in 1300 granthas. It is written in a more animated style and couched in more elegant form. It seeks to maintain the soundness of the Bhāṣya interpretations with fresh arguments and quotations from the *Brahmatarika* (see under ii, 16) and other works not utilized earlier. This fact has a bearing on the problem of Madhva's sources as already shown.

1 This verse is found to occur in *Manu Smṛiti* 82.3

There is a difference in method of exposition between the two works. While the former comments on selected verses of the *Glā* citing "Pratīkas", the G. T. merely brings out the gist of the verses and expands it with extraneous quotations. Pratīkas are not called regularly as in the *Bhāṣya*:

वृद्धानुकरणाद्यन्तरेण पुनः तात्पर्यमेवोच्यत इति भावः ।

(Jayatīrtha, *G. T. Nyāyadīpikā*, p. 3. Bombay edn). The interpretation of the GB are here augmented by newer and additional ones: ii, 16; ii, 45; ii, 42 etc. The interpretations of other schools are only rarely and impliedly noticed in the GB. (as of Bhāskara on ब्रह्म (iii, 15) and of केशव (ii, 54) and of Śaṅkara on प्रज्ञावादान् (ii, 11). The GT., however, pays greater attention to the refutation of rival interpretations. Among such are those of Śaṅkara<sup>1</sup> and Bhāskara (A forgotten commentator).<sup>2</sup>

The governing thought of the *Glā* is, at the outset, impressively summed up by Madhva in his own words, which are then followed by relevant extracts from the text. He vigorously repudiates the idea that a Karmī can do without Jñāna or a Jñānī without Karma. There is an element of the one in the other. Efficiency implies wisdom. That is way Madhva defines here, Karma Yoga as Karma-pracuro yogaḥ (Bby. p. 674). Kṛṣṇa declares that one who is efficient in *either* reaps the benefits of *both* (v, 4). This could not be, unless both are intertwined and not mutually exclusive, as Śaṅkara would have it. The Jñānī, too, then, has his share of karma which is mostly inward संकोचात् बाह्यकर्मणां (G. T.) ज्ञानिनापि हि कर्मानुष्ठेयं । कर्मिणापि हि ज्ञातव्यो भगवान् । नहि ज्ञानं विना \* \* \*

1. P. 710 b of GT where his interpretation of xii, 3-4, is specially quoted and criticized. The Māyāvāda interpretation of ii, 16, (not actually found in Śaṅkara, but probably accepted by implication) in terms of सदसद्विलक्षणत्व of the Universe, is similarly refuted (p. 63, Jayatīrtha, *Nyāyadīpikā*).

2. His "Satkāryavāda" interpretation of ii, 16, is refuted in GT.

3. For full information re. him and his Bhāṣya on the *Glā*, See my paper 'Bhāskara, A Forgotten Commentator on the *Glā*,' I. H. Q. ix, 1933.



The credit of establishing "Nivṛtta Karma", as a life of healthy participation in Karma dedicated to God, is exclusively Madhva's. Its true activist character had been obscured by the early trappings of monistic acosmism. Even the flaming ideal of Niskāmatā had been reduced to some kind of glorified Pravṛtti Mārga, to be revised and transcended by one of higher asceticism and absolute inaction. Madhva corrects this view of Naiṣkarmya with a well chosen quotation from the *Īyasamṛiti* explaining the true nature of Nivṛttimārga. The passage which is available to us in an allied version from the *Manu Smṛiti* (xii, 58-60, Medhātithi) and in the *Kurma Purana* (1.1.63-64 cited P. 57 art.) establishes the true and original nature of Nivṛttimārga and Naiṣkarmya, to be identical with Niskāmakarma. From this point of view, Madhva should be considered to have done a distinct service to the cause of truth in rescuing the older tradition of interpretation<sup>1</sup> and restoring it to its proper place.

### DIALECTIC CRITICISM IN THE GT

The GT has a powerful critique of the doctrine of Monism that all experience is illusory. Madhva contends that our sufferings and enjoyments in life are quite real, sometimes, vividly so. Such deep and poignant experiences of life are nowhere seen to be mistaken. There is, thus, no justification for dismissing them as illusory. All immediate illusions in experience, proceed from the body towards external reality. But the self and its inmost experiences are not subject to such illusions. No one doubts "Am I myself or not", or mistakes himself for some one else. An experience can be rejected as illusory only when there is clear proof to that effect. The experiences of pleasure and pain are subjective, intensely personal and are intuited by the "Sākṣī". If even these experiences, validated by the Sākṣī, are to be rejected as illusory and liable to error, the ultimate authority on which the final decision of the reality or otherwise of particular experiences and judgments is to be taken, viz., the experiencing self (Sākṣī), would itself be open to doubt in all cases. There would then, be no hope of finality or truth determination anywhere in any sphere of life,

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1 For the presence of such a pure tradition of Theistic interpretation of the philosophy of the Upanisads and Sūtras, see the remarks of Das Gupta, iii, p. 496, (quoted earlier)

secular, scientific or philosophical. It would be futile to plead that we may get on with some sort of conventional standards of truth and error, verification and validity. There is nothing to show that even this convention may not be in the grip of an illusion, so that nothing could be established for certain or taken for granted—whether illusions or realities! It would be impossible to indict all experience as illusory. What should be the proof of it that it is illusory and how are we to make sure of its truth? If all these are to be accepted as a matter of convention, what is the proof of there being such a convention or that there are persons who accept it? If appearances are the proof of their presence, what is the proof of the appearances? If appearances in and by themselves are proof of their presence and if some of them could be mistaken one might legitimately contend that we ourselves are under an illusion that there are such appearances while there is none in fact. The appearances themselves may be “appearances” so to say. The alleged impossibility of an illusion without a basis (*nirālambana*) may itself be due to an illusion of our thought. The proof on which such a thesis is based may itself be an illusion!

Madhva also elucidates his conception of causality and refutes the Anirvacaniya theory under II, 16. “All effects are non-existent *“before causation and after destruction”*. The stuff of the effect may be real and existent in some *other form*. But the particular mode (*viśeṣa*) of the thing must at least be accepted as non-existent before production and after destruction. But Madhva is not an “Asatkāryavādin” in the Buddhist or Nyaya sense of the term. The effect is not *totally* non-existent before i.e., even as an undetermined something. The particular *form, as an effect, is, however, a novelty which has no prior existence*. Even if the Sāṃkhya view of causation as manifestation (*abhivyaññi*) is accepted, it must be conceded that the manifestation itself in *that form*, is a novelty and hence non-existent before manifestation and after its cessation. Otherwise, there would be a *regressus ad infinitum*. It is obvious then, that causation should be understood with reference to the non-existence of something in *some form*. This does not involve the possibility of causation of absolutely non-existent things like the hare’s horn. The fact is that we have really to admit “Sadasatkāryavāda” and not “Asatkāryavāda” alone, or “satakāryavāda” alone. Causation is meaningless and

impossible without a cause stuff (*upadanadraya*) To that extent it is 'satkārya' or rather, 'Sat kārana-vada' But the effect is not pre-existent in the cause qua effect (*karyātmanā*) It is a novelty and has come in there *de novo* To this existent, it is "Asat karya" The cause and effect are thus, 'different cum identical' (*bhinnābhinna*) since both kinds of relation are experienced मूल घ- । इह दितितमगात् ।

In this connection Madhva discusses the interpretation of नास्तो विद्यमान ( II 16 ) given by some Advaitins in terms of Anirvacaniyata The non-existent cannot come into being and the existent could not cease to be The world partaking of the nature of both, in that it has come into being and is certain to cease to exist could not therefore be regarded as either existent or non-existent सच्चन वाध्येन । असच्चेन प्रतीयेत । Hence it should be put down as a *tertium quid* अनिवचनीयम् । indescribable in terms of Sat and Asat Such, in brief is the familiar argument of the Anirvacaniyatādin based on this verse Madhva says this is illogical There is no proof that any such mysterious entity is brought within the range of experience of anyone It cannot be contended that such an entity is presented in our *illusions* or that what is presented in *illusions*, must necessarily be indescribable, on grounds of "Khyatibādhanyatāaupapatti" Madhva says that the presumption in this argument that the non-existent cannot be presented to cognition in *illusions* is itself a gratuitous one For, even to deny the possibility of such presentation one must be in a position to conceive of non-existence and that is as good as presentation If the non-existent had not been presented anywhere, at any time, it would be needless to deny its presentation If it were utterly unrepresentable in *illusions* and valid experiences alike the very idea of "Asat" would be illegitimate and would have to be given up The question is the possibility of presentation of a non-existent 'something' in our *illusions* It is precisely the appearance or presentation of such non-existent forms or aspects as existent that goes by the name of 'illusions', in all experience यदविद्यमान रूप तस्य सत्त्वेन प्रतीतरन भ्रातित्वात् । Even on the Advaitic theory that the content of *illusions* is indefinable no *illusions* could be made out without the experience, say of silver, as if real, tho' actually non-existent there in nacre It is no doubt true, that the reality of silver there, is purely illusory and not a fact



Nevertheless, it leads to some sort of activity on the part of the percipient, only when it is perceived as *real and true* *alter*, for the time being. There could be no illusions so called, if the indescribable (Anirvacaniya) were to appear *qua* indescribable, as it is, in point of fact. There is, thus, no warrant, in or outside illusions, for the acceptance of an "indescribable something" appearing.

The refutation of Anirvacaniya leads on to a critique of "Nirvisesa Brahman". An uncharacterizable thing is indistinguishable from the Void (Sunya). Indeed, what is said to be devoid of *all* characteristics could not be shown to exist in any sense of the term. Its existence must be referred to in words or indirectly suggested. But even such expressibility, or even suggestibility, constitutes characterization. If they do not amount to characterization, propositions like "Brahman is" ( अस्ति ब्रह्म Taitt Up ) would be redundant. Even supposing that such propositions mean nothing more than "Brahman is not non-existent" such negative characterization would be inconceivable without accepting some negative characteristics at least. We cannot establish a Nirvisesa Brahman by suggestion. It is logically impossible to *suggest* what is *absolutely inexpressible*. There is no proof also that a thing that is beyond the pale of every kind of proof exists anywhere. Its non-existence would be easily demonstrable by its being outside the pale of proofs (Pramāṇa) and experience, even as in the case of "a seventh Rasa" (सप्तमरस). It would be useless to contend that such an inexpressible thing is, however, established by right of self-evidence (स्वप्रकाशत्व). For even self-evidence has to be established on the basis of actual proof<sup>1</sup>. If self-evidence is something different from the thing itself, there is the admission of some characteristic and the "thing" would no longer be devoid of traits. If it is the same as the thing itself, it must be equally open to proof. If no proof of its self-evidence is available and if all that is meant by being "self-evident" is the negation of extraneous proof, self-luminosity would be tantamount to "Aprakāśatva" or absence of luminosity. If self-luminosity were to be established thro' a process of Arthāpatti, it must be either as a logical sequent, or by means of other independent proof. In either case, self-luminosity must be *knowable* by the Self itself! But this would be

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1 Of an "experience", in which case, it would be an object of such experience.

against the Advaitic dogma that the subject of all experience, cannot itself be experienced<sup>1</sup>. Thus, in as much as the Advaitin does not understand by self luminosity anything like self knowability, or revelation by another, the concept of Svaprakāśatva must remain unproved and unprovable. The term "Svaprakāśa, would, in such a case, be a misfit and a misnomer. Prakāśa or illumination, moreover, would be inconceivable in the absence of something to be illumined, be it oneself or an "Other". The plea of "Kartṛkarmabhavavirodha", advanced by Advaitins, is opposed to experience and cannot be accepted. Knowledge is never experienced or intuited without reference to a knower and a "known" or "knowable". A knowledge that is devoid of both a subject and an object is an utter Void.

## THE SUTRA PRASTHĀNA

### ( 1 ) *Brahma-sūtra-Bhāṣya*.

( 1 ) Madhva's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras* is, in many ways, a new departure in the history of the Vedāntic thought and interpretation. It is, in the first place, written in a plain and unpretentious style, eschewing all ornament and flourish. It showed that truth told in plain words could expect a patient and respectful hearing. In the history of thought it has so often happened that particular texts have come to be victimized by a dominant line of interpretation, which has, for ever afterwards, prevented critics and commentators from venturing to place them in their proper perspective. The Sūtras of Bādarāyana had suffered the same fate at the hands of Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Rāmaṇuja, whose general interpretation ran more or less parallel to one another<sup>2</sup>. Madhva showed the necessary courage and boldness in breaking the chains that bound commentators to the unwritten laws of fashionable interpretation and chalked out for himself a new line of thought and interpretation, untrammelled by the deadweight of bygone commentators. He wanted men to take a comprehensive view of the Sūtras by themselves and then decide upon the line of interpretation that would do justice to their plan, purpose and wording. His style, tho' not

1. अनुभूतेरनुभाव्यत्वे घटादिवदननुभूतित्वप्रसंगात् ( *Istasiddhi* )

2. See Thibaut, *S. B. E.*, xxxiv, Introd. p. lxxxvi

his line of interpretation,<sup>1</sup> has made at least one notable convert Nimbārka.<sup>2</sup>

(ii) The Sūtras are held in the highest esteem by Madhva. He identifies them with the "Para-Vidyā" of the Upanisads and assigns to them a place and importance altogether unique. He regards them as "Nirṇāyaka-Granthas" and, as such, of more decisive authority than the rest of the sacred literature which are "Nirṇāya granthas".<sup>3</sup>

(iii) There are three other works of Madhva on the Sūtras: the *Anu-Bhāṣya*, the *Nyāyatīkāra* and the *Anu Vyākhyāna*. The *Brahma Sūtrabhāṣya* is sparing in its criticism of other views, which is reserved for the last.

The *M. Vy* (ix, 12) refers to the *B S B* as having superseded twentyone earlier commentaries on the Sūtras. The names of these Bhāṣyakāras are given in Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya's own commentary (*Bhāṣāpralāśikā*) on the text, as follows (1) Bhāratīvijaya (2) Saccidānanda (3) Brahmaghosa (4) Śatānanda, (5) Udvarta (6) Vijaya (7) Rudrabhatta (8) Vāmana (9) Yādava-prakāśa (10) Rāmānuja (11) Bhartṛprapañca (12) Dramida (13) Brahmaḍatta (14) Bhāskara (15) Piśāca (16) Vṛttikāra (17) Vijayabhatta (18) Viśnukrānta (19) Vādindra (20) Mādhavadāsa.<sup>4</sup>

1 With the exception of his interpretation of ii, 2, 42

2 His posteriority to Madhva is established by the non inclusion of his name among the twentyone commentators whose views were refuted by Madhva (*M. Vy* ix, 12). Das Gupta places Nimbārka slightly before Madhva. But he notes the following points in favour of the view that he came after Madhva (1) absence of reference to Nimbārka in the *SDS* (2) Nimbārka's reference to the Vaisnava Sampradāyas of Śrī Pañcāraṇya and Śaṅkara, the latter being that of Madhva, (3) "..." in the *Stadharmabodha* attributed to Nimbārka (N. W. Catal. Ms. no. 274) deposited in Madan Mohan Lib. Benares (*op. cit.* iii, p. 399-400). The last point is evidently due to a mistaken ascription, the work mentioned, being presumably, the same as that of Appayya Dīkṣita. It is unlikely that N. would have so aggressively criticized Madhva or that it would have remained unrefuted by Madhva's followers.

3 द्विविधं शास्त्रं निर्णयितं निर्णेतव्यं च । तत्राद्यं ब्रह्मसूत्रादिकं द्वितीयं वेदादिकं (NS. 536 b)

4 He was defeated by Parāśarbhatta son of Āṇḍal and afterwards became Nāñjiyar (*op. cit.* Das Gupta, iii, p. 110).



against the Advaitic dogma that the subject of all experience, cannot itself be experienced<sup>1</sup> Thus, in as much as the Advaitin does not understand by self luminosity anything like self knowability, or revelation by another, the concept of Svaprakāśatva must remain unproved and unprovable. The term "Svaprakāśa, would, in such a case, be a misfit and a misnomer. Prakāśa or illumination moreover, would be inconceivable in the absence of something to be illumined, be it oneself or an "Other". The plea of "Kartṛkarmabhāvavirodha" advanced by Advaitins, is opposed to experience and cannot be accepted. Knowledge is never experienced or intuited without reference to a knower and a "known" or "knowable". A knowledge that is devoid of both a subject and an object is an utter Void.

## THE SUTRA PRASTHĀNA

### (3) *Brahmasūtra-Bhāṣya*

(1) Madhva's commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* is in many ways, a new departure in the history of the Vedantic thought and interpretation. It is, in the first place, written in a plain and unpretentious style eschewing all ornament and flourish. It showed that truth told in plain words could expect a patient and respectful hearing. In the history of thought it has so often happened that particular texts have come to be victimized by a dominant line of interpretation, which has for ever afterwards, prevented critics and commentators from venturing to place them in their proper perspective. The Sūtras of Badaṛāyana had suffered the same fate at the hands of Saṃkara, Bhaṣaṇa and Ramanuja, whose general interpretation ran more or less parallel to one another<sup>2</sup>. Madhva showed the necessary courage and boldness in breaking the chains that bound commentators to the unwritten laws of fashionable interpretation and chalked out for himself a new line of thought and interpretation, untrammelled by the deadweight of bygone commentators. He wanted men to take a comprehensive view of the Sūtras by themselves and then decide upon the line of interpretation that would do justice to their plain purpose and wording. His style, tho' not

1 अनुभूतेरनुभाव्यत्वे घटादिवदननुभूतिस्वप्नसंगात् (Istasiddhi)

2 See Thibaut, S B E, xxxiv, Introd p lxxxvi

his line of interpretation,<sup>1</sup> has made at least one notable convert Nimbārka.<sup>2</sup>

(ii) The Sūtras are held in the highest esteem by Madhva. He identifies them with the "Para Vidyā" of the Upanisads and assigns to them a place and importance altogether unique. He regards them as "Nirnāyaka Granthas" and, as such, of more decisive authority than the rest of the sacred literature which are 'Nirnāya granthas'.<sup>3</sup>

(iii) There are three other works of Madhva on the Sūtras: the *Anu Bhāṣya*, the *Nyayaṇṇarāṇa* and the *Anu Vyākhyāna*. The *Brahma Sūtrabhāṣya* is sparing in its criticism of other views, which is reserved for the last.

The *M. Vy.* (ix, 12) refers to the *B. S. B.* as having superseded twentyone earlier commentaries on the Sūtras. The names of these Bhāṣyakāras are given in Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya's own commentary (*Bhāṣya-prakāśikā*) on the text, as follows: (1) Bhāratīvijaya (2) Saccidānanda (3) Brahmaghoṣa (4) Satānanda, (5) Udvarta (6) Vijaya (7) Rudrabhatta (8) Vāmana (9) Yādava-prakāśa (10) Rāmānuja (11) Bhartṛprapañca (12) Dramida (13) Brahmadatta (14) Bhāṣkara (15) Piśāca (16) Vṛttikāra (17) Vijayabhatta (18) Viśnukrānta (19) Vādindra (20) Mādhavadāsa.<sup>4</sup>

1 With the exception of his interpretation of ii, 2, 42.

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(NS 538 b)

4 He was defeated by Parāsarabhatta son of Āṇḍal and afterwards became Nañjiyar (*op. cit.* Das Gupta, iii, p. 110).

and (21) Samkara. Of these, the Bhāṣyas of only three, have come down to us<sup>1</sup>—viz., those of Samkara, Bhāṣkara and Rāmānuja. The rest are now more or less irrevocably lost to us. But some of them are known thro' quotations and others by mention in other works. They must very early have been superseded by the more classical Bhāṣyas and have died a natural death for want of following. There is, no doubt that most of them had ceased to have anything but an academic and antiquarian interest long before the time of Madhva. He must therefore have confined his attention chiefly to the more important and living commentaries of his times viz., those of Samkara and Rāmānuja and to a less extent of Bhāṣkara. The Bhasya of Samkara was of course, his main target of attack. Next came that of Rāmānuja and then of Bhāṣkara. There are also traces of a struggle against Saivite commentaries. His interpretation of 1, 1, 3, strikes us as an adroit turning of the tables of the Sūtras upon Śaivism. It is difficult to fix the identity of the Saiva commentators against whom he had to contend. There is no proof that it was Śrīkantha, whose name, moreover, is not included in the list of twentyone Pro-Madhva commentators. The interesting reference to the manner in which the Saiva establishes the validity of his Āgama<sup>2</sup> has no parallel in Śrīkantha's Bhāṣya.

(iv) All the four works of Madhva on the Sūtras, or at least three of them, barring the *Anubhasya* should be taken together to have a complete and proper idea of his interpretation of the Vedānta. Writers who have not been aware of the existence of these other works of his on the Sūtras, particularly the *Anuśaṅkhyāna*, which is Madhva's masterpiece in criticism and constructive exposition, or have not studied it, have often passed hasty and untenable judgments on the value and merit of his interpretation of the Sūtras as a whole or of particular contexts thereof. There can be no excuse, save ignorance, for the following remark of Svami Vivekananda. "That thoroughgoing Dualistic commentator, Madhvacārya deals with this passage (B. S. iv, 4, 17) in his usual summary method (Italics mine) by quoting a verse from the Varāha Purāṇa" (*Bhakti Yoga*, Udbodhan, 1926, sixth edn p. 14)

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<sup>1</sup> For further information on these early commentators, see  
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In the same way, Drs Bhandarkar and Ghate have done grave injustice to Madhva, by passing baseless and distorted remarks on the merits of his performance as a Bhāṣyakara. It is significant that these have not at all taken into consideration Madhva's *Anu-Vyakhyāna*, which discusses, amplifies and critically examines the interpretations of his Bhāṣya and without which no proper estimate of his work as an interpreter of the Sūtras could be made. The Bhāṣya is written in such a terse style as to be intriguing without the aid of a good commentary and is designed to be supplemented by the AV (*M. Vy* 15, 10). Madhva himself says about the condensed nature of his work :

ग्रन्थोऽयमपि बह्वर्थो भाष्य चात्यर्थविस्तरम् ।

बहुज्ञा एव जानन्ति विशेषेणार्थमेतयो ॥

The Bhāṣyas of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, on the Sūtras are, on the other hand, exhaustive—even verbose. Madhva chose to put whatever he had to say on the Sūtras, by way of his own interpretation and his critical examination of the works of his predecessors, in four separate works. It is not difficult to see why he did so, instead of cramming all that matter into one work,—as they had done. The commentaries of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja were already unwieldy. As Madhva had to differ from and comment on their interpretations frequently, it would have enlarged the scope and size of his work beyond convenient limits and proved a hindrance to the readers had he packed all such diversified matter into one work. The fact that he had not only to present his own views but to convincingly refute such powerful commentators as Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Bhāskara not to speak of many others already mentioned, induced Madhva to decide, wisely, to distribute his critical, constructive and expository contributions to the interpretation of the Sūtras, over two or three well planned works of definite scope and proportion. To do him justice, his critics must take all these works into account, instead of rushing to hasty conclusions on insufficient data. Drs Bhandarkar and Ghate have been the worst offenders in this respect. They would have avoided many of their misconceptions about the real position of Madhva and revised their estimate of his performance as a Commentator on

the Sūtras, had they taken his *Bhāṣya* and his *AV*, together, as they should have done. I have dealt with Bhandarkar's comments on Madhva's *Bhāṣya*, in my *Catusūribhāṣya*<sup>1</sup> Ghate's work,<sup>2</sup> published in an English translation in 1926, has been enjoying a wide reputation among University Professors and students, in the Bombay State, for years, on account of its coordinated study of four other *Bhāṣyas* besides Madhva's and its comparative estimate of them all. I have had particular occasion to take into account this work and its critical remarks on Madhva's *Bhāṣya*, as a Post Graduate teacher, in the Bombay and the Karnatak Universities. I have found them to be curt and extremely unfair to Madhva and vitiated by mistaken notions and resting on insufficient data. As the work still commands influence in academic circles, in the absence of any other handy work, it is necessary, in the interests of truth and fairness to correct the distorted and misleading impression of Madhva's performance as an interpreter of the *Brahmasūtras* created by it and to bring out the intrinsic merit, textual fidelity and contextual consistency of his interpretations. I shall, therefore take up some of the main points raised by Ghate's 'Analysis' Madhva's BSB of along with some others deserving attention, leaving out minor and technical objections to the interpretation of individual sūtras, such as i, 1, 5, i, 3, 8, ii, 1, 13-14, iv, 1, 12, iv, 1, 14, and iv, 2, — which could all be effectively disposed of in the light of the penetrating discussions contained in the *Tatparya-Candrīkā*<sup>3</sup> and other later works of the system.

1 Law Journal Press, Madras, 1934

2 V S Ghate, 'The Vedānta' Eng. tr. Bombay Govt O. S., Poona, '26

3 Ghate's trivial objection to Madhva's interpretation of i, 3, 8, (p. 168) on the mere "absence of the particle "ca" has been silenced in the *Candrīkā* showing how it could be supplied from the following sūtra in the same *adhikarana*. The decisive superiority of Madhva's more comprehensive interpretation of this *adhikarana* to Śaṅkara's is also brought out therein with more than half a dozen solid arguments. See under "Candrīkā" in vol. II.

## A REVIEW OF GHATE'S ESTIMATE OF MADHVA'S SUTRA BHĀSYA

Madhva's c on the Sutras differs *widely*, from all those of his predecessors, both in the general drift of interpretation and in the nature of topics raised for discussion under the various *adhikaranas*. The sources from which these topics are chosen for discussion, also cover a wider range of literature embracing the *Sāṃhitās*, *Āraṇyakas*, *Khilas* and *Purāṇas*. But these are no grounds for condemning his work as "a performance of little or no merit" (p. 165) as has been done by Ghate.

Coming as it did after twentyone earlier commentaries in the field, Madhva's Bhāṣya had naturally to differ from them on many vital points of doctrine and interpretation. It could be shown that, in many crucial instances, his interpretations show a decided improvement in quality and details.

(1) The extension of the sense of "ādī" in 1, 1, 2, to include five other important cosmic functions of the Supreme viz, *niyamana*, *jñāna*, *ajñāna*, *bandha* and *mokṣa*, is a step in the right direction, as these are clearly given in the *Prasthanatrayī* as specific cosmic attributes of Brahman<sup>1</sup> and any elucidation and complete interpretation of "ādī" must include and take notice of them. There is no question of their subsumption in 'आदि' when one is explaining what "ādī" in "Janmādī" stands for, in the Sutra. At any rate a special mention must be made of Mokṣa, which is the goal of *Jijñāsā* and which cannot simply be subsumed in *Laya*. See also *Taitt. Up.* यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसविशन्ति (iii, 1). Texts like *Siet. Up.* vi, 16 and *B. S.* iii, 2, 5, mention bondage and release separately as depending on Brahman. A special mention of "mokṣa-hetutva" must needs be made, in the circumstances, in elucidating the significance of 'ādī' in 1, 1, 2. Certainly, for a seeker, it is a more important characteristic of Brahman than the creation or destruction of the world! Madhva, then, has shown greater philosophical vision than others in specifying the other predications of *niyamana* etc. and particularly "mokṣa-hetutva" in the explanation of the term "ādī", in 1, 1, 2.

1, Cf. "Niyamana" (*Brh. Up.* iii, 7, 13-24) "Jñānājñāna" (*Gītā* xv, 15) "Bandha" and "Mokṣa" (*Siet. Up.* vi, 16). See also *B. S.* i, 2, 10, i, 2, 18, ii, 2, 3, i, 3, 2,



(11) The fifth *adhikarana* is interpreted by Madhva as establishing the the Brahman is directly denoted and expressed (*vācya*) by the entire Śāstra, in the fullest and primary sense of the terms employed शास्त्रस्यसर्वशब्दैर्मुर्यतो वाच्यम् । This is necessary in the interests of the "Samanvaya" laid down in the previous *adhikarana*. Here, the question would naturally arise, if one should necessarily accept that Brahman is *vācya* or directly expressed by the words of Scripture or if the Samanvaya proposed could be demonstrated otherwise on the basis of 'Lakṣanāvṛtti' (secondary application) in view of texts like 'Yato vaco nivartante' (Tait Up) Madhva points out that the question has to be mooted in view of the fact that there are other texts which clearly teach that Brahman is directly expressed by the entire Śāstra सर्वे वेदा यत्पदमामनन्ति । वचसा वाच्यमुत्तमम् । and the best and the most proper place to do so would obviously be before actually entering into the details of the Samanvaya from the Ānandamayādhikarana onwards! He is, therefore quite reasonable in having raised the issue and its concomitant details here. He has also argued with great weight that (1) Brahman being 'Aupanisada' (knowable *only* thro' Scripture), there can be no other way of approach to it save thro' Śabda (words) औपनिषदत्वान्नावचनेनेक्षणम्<sup>1</sup> Even Lakṣanāvṛtti would be impossible in the event of a given thing being inexpressible by any word. A reality that is essentially and absolutely inexpressible (*avācya*) could never be brought within the range of Lakṣanā also सर्वशब्दा वाच्यस्य लक्षणायुक्ते<sup>2</sup> ; as all Lakṣanāvṛtti is basically connected with "vācyaiva" वाच्यसंबद्धतया ज्ञातस्यैव लक्ष्यत्वात् (Candrika)<sup>3</sup>

There is, thus, good reason to deal with these logical and philosophical objections to Samanvaya at this stage and to treat the first five *adhikaranas* in the beginning, as introductory (Adhyayapadapīṭha), as has been done by Madhva. It is surprising then, to be told by Ghate, that Madhva's interpretation of 1, 1, 5 is "unsatisfactory and groundless" and that "his interpretation is not supported by the remaining sutras of the

1 स्वप्रकाशतया नित्यसिद्धौ च शास्त्रवैयर्थ्यात् (Candrika, p 210).

2. This point is further elucidated by Jayatīrtha with a syllogistic argument of great force and subtlety विप्रतिषेध न लक्ष्य केनापि पदेनावच्यत्वात्, वैधर्म्येण तीरादिवत् ।

3 Cf मर्यादावाधे तद्वक्तो..... (Sahityadarpana, II, 5)

adbikarana" (p 168 *op cit*) No reason has however been given to substantiate this remark. As a matter of fact, the whole adbhikarana stands cogently explained from the point of view of "Vacyatva-samarthana" of Brahman and the different sutras also fall into their proper places in the argument. The difficulty felt by Ghate, does not, at any rate, exist in any inherent defect in the interpretation of Madhva or its elucidation by his commentators. The sequence of ideas is as follows

The fifth sūtra ईक्षतेर्नाद्वयम् maintains that Brahman can not be regarded as "Asābdam" (i.e. śabdāvacyaṃ or inexpressible by words). It must be accepted as नवद्वयमुच्यते on account of its being the object of knowledge (ईक्षणीय) of all Śāstras<sup>1</sup>. The next sūtra गौणद्वयनात्मज्ञात reinforces this point by showing that *Ikṣanīyatā* pertains to the Supreme Being alone<sup>2</sup> and not to any other being associated with the three guṇas, the Sabala-Brahman or the Jivatman<sup>3</sup>. For, the *Ikṣanīya* is referred to in the Śruti, by the term "Atman", which primarily denotes the Supreme (B S 1, 3, 1). The next two sutras refute possible objections that this Atman could be "Gauna" (associated with the three guṇas) by showing that there are Scriptural statements to the effect that one who knows the Atman attains Mokṣa (and it is accepted by all that it is by the knowledge of the very highest Brahman that mokṣa is attained and not by knowledge of the Saguna (!) and that He alone should be sought by the Seeker, eschewing all other values (हेयत्वावचनाच्च). This means that only the "A-gauna" Atmā is the ultimate object of knowledge of the Śāstras (ईक्षणीय),

1 ईक्षतर्हित्यनेन शब्दमात्रस्यासाधकतया ज्ञानकर्मत्वस्यैव विवक्षणीयत्वात् । (Candrika, p 215)

2 Cf यज्ज्ञात्वा नेह भूयोऽन्यन् ज्ञातव्यम् । (Gita)

3 It would be seen that the use of the term "Gauna" in the masculine, in the sūtra, is more appropriate to Madhva's explanation of the term नच गौण आत्मा दृश्या वाच्यश्च, न निर्गुण इति युक्तम्. than to those of Śaṅkara and Rāmāṇuja to whom ईक्षत in the sūtra stands for the root meaning ईक्षणम् which is claimed to be figuratively applied to the Prakṛti which is Jīva, in the purvapakṣa (See Śaṅkara, सतस्तु न गौणमीक्षितृत्वमित्युक्तम् 1, 1, 6), and in which case, we should have had the neuter noun here गौण चेनात्म-शब्दात् in the Sūtra. This is certainly a more serious objection than the one urged by Ghate against Madhva's explanation of 1, 3, 8, on the ground of "absence of ca" (p 65)



vaçya and Muktaprapya. The ninth sūtra refers to one other characteristic of the Supreme (Agauna-Atma) who is revealed by the Sastras viz, that He is the One 'that emerges from and merges into himself' ( स्वाप्ययात् ). The reference is taken by Madhva to be to *Brh Up* v, 1, 1, referring to the Infinite (Purna) coming out of Itself and going back into itself and always remaining the same Infinite right thro'. The entry of the Gauna (Jiva) into Brahman is put in different words by the Sutrakara (see 1.1.19, avoiding "Sva") This also confirms the correctness of Madhva's interpretation and reference. The point to be noted here is that the Gauna-Atma whoever he is would have to be merged in another who is Agauna and this would not satisfy the condition of "Svāpyaya". And it would be equally preposterous to merge the Agauna in the Gauna. The tenth sūtra strengthens the case for "vācyatva" of Brahman by affirming that there is "Gatisa manya" or complete agreement in the teaching of Scripture about the Agauna alone being the *mukhyaracya*, *jñeya* and *muktagamya* and that there is no dissenting voice to this anywhere in the Scriptures. The Candrika puts the idea of how this sūtra goes to reinforce 'vācyatva' as follows अत एव 'गतिसामान्यात्' इत्यस्य सशब्दाथसमथनरूपतयैक्यादेतदधिकरणान्तर्भवः ॥ शास्त्रांतरे सखादिगुणयुक्तेऽप्यात्मशब्दो मुख्यतयोच्यता, तज्ज्ञाना मोक्षादिश्चोच्यता अतश्च नात्मशब्दादिना निगुणस्य ईक्षणीयत्वमिति शकान्निरासवत्त्वन गतिसामान्यस्य अधिकरणान्तर्गतिः ॥ (p 207)

The last Sūtra श्रुतत्वाच्च rounds off the discussion giving one more reason to support "vācyatva" of Brahman viz that it is "heard", which is tellingly explained by Madhva नह्यशब्द श्रूयत ॥

Thus, the entire exposition of the *Īksatyadhikarana*, according to Madhva's line of interpretation, has not only inner consistency but is also free from logical and contextual objections. This cannot be said of the interpretation of this *adhikarana* by Saṅkara and Rāmānuja in terms of a denial of the causation of the Universe, to *Prakṛti*. Such an interpretation would in the first place, be out of place in this *Samanvayadhyāya*. Secondly, it would involve violent twisting of evidence<sup>1</sup>, special pleading and many liberties with the wording of the text of the Sūtras, in construing them. I shall consider the plea of "Aśabdatvam" of *Prakṛti*, later. Confining our attention, now, to the actual con



struction of the Sūtras, (1) we find no ablative case in "Aśabdam" proposed to be treated as a *hetu* ( Cf Śamkara अशब्द हि तत् ) ( 2 ) The simplest and most natural way of explaining the Sūtra, as it is, would be to take "aśabdam" as the natural predicate of the Sūtra proposition ईक्षतनशब्दम्—the subject being easily understood to be "Brahman" from the first Sūtra or तत् from the immediately preceding one ( 1, 1, 4 ). ( 3 ) There is no justification to abandon this natural drift of the Sūtra and introduce a new subject in the form of Prakṛti, whose Aśabdatvam is yet to be proved, even according to Śamkara and others, in the fourth pāda ( 4 ) It is also doubtful, in spite of all the ingenious efforts of Śamkara and others to do so, if the Prakṛti could really be dismissed as Aśabdam ( 'not supported by the Śruti' ), by any dispassionate student of the sacred texts ( 5 ) On Śamkara's interpretation, we have to introduce a fresh predicate "kāranam" in 1, 1, 5, and ( 6 ) to repeat the expression with a modification of the case into the genitive, in order to make out of a final reason to reject the causality of Prakṛti We would thus have virtually two propositions 1 [ प्रधान ] न [ कारण ] अशब्द [ त्वात् ] 2 [ कारणस्य ] ईक्षते । ( 7 ) As against all this tortuous preceeding, Madhva's straight and simple construction of the Sūtra should certainly be deemed more satisfactory and not less, as there is no point or particular hurry in seeking to refute the Pradhānakāranavāda, here, when the same is to be considered ( over again, at length in the fourth pāda, according to Śamkara and others and ) actually in 11, 2

The refutation of the Sāṃkhya Prakṛti as "foreign to the Vedas" (aśabdam) in the Pre Madhva commentaries on 1, 1, 5, is really a contextual misfit in the "Samanvayadhyāya" This fact must be squarely admitted The Sūtrakāra is refuting the claims of Prakṛti to be regarded as "Jagat kāraṇa" in Adhyaya 11, 2, 1 10 There is no need then to anticipate the issue here The reason given to discredit the Prakṛti, that it is "aśabdam" ( not recognized in the Śāstras ) is untenable for there are clear texts in the Upanisads that accept the Prakṛti as the material principle in the Universe ( Siet Up 1v, 5, 1 ) There are also many other references to the acceptance of Prakṛti, in the sacred literature<sup>1</sup> which cannot be ignored or explained away The question

1 *Culika Up* 3 5 *Siet Up* 1, 9 1v, 5, *Gita* xiii 19, *Mbh* xii, 347, 31, *Bhagavata* iii, 26 10 11, *Viṣṇu Pur* 1, 2, 29 and B S 1 2, 22

of the *status* of Prakṛti (whether operating independently of Brahman, or as a dependent principle) would be an altogether different issue which would not affect the provenness (Śrautātva) of Prakṛti. No modern scholar feels happy over Śaṅkara's *tour de force* in banishing the Prakṛti from the domain of Upanisadic thought. Das Gupta recognizes Madhva's interpretation of the Iksatyadhikarana as a refutation of the dogma of the "Avacyatva" (inexpressibility) of Brahman as surely not less cogent" (*Op cit* vol IV, p 130, fn 1) It would be obvious that an objection based on the Avacyatva of Brahman would have priority over any other topic *vis a vis* the immediate and main thesis of the Chapter viz "Samanvaya" (of names and marks) <sup>1</sup> The fact also that there are subsequent Adhikaranas refuting the causality of Prakṛti (11, 2, 1 and 1, 4, 1, 24 according to Śaṅkara himself), considerably weakens the case for Śaṅkara and others in 1, 1, 5. There is greater cogency and fitness in refuting the objection to Samanvaya based on the ground of the Avācyatva-dogma, immediately after the enunciation of Samanvaya (samanvaya-pratijñā) in 1, 1, 4 than in criticizing the Jagatkaranatva of Prakṛti. There is no immediate contextual urgency or propriety in raising the issue about Prakṛti at this stage. As a matter of fact it has been rightly reserved to the II adhyaya. If any passing refutation of Prakṛti-kāranatva were, however, called for at this stage, it should have been made immediately after the second adhikarana, where Brahman (alone) was defined as the author of the Universe! It is too much to make the Sutrakara digress into that question in one full adhikarana of as many as seven sutras, instead of making a passing reference to it in a *gunasutra* tagged on to 1, 1, 2, if he could not really have waited till Adhyāya II, where he is attacking the causality of Prakṛti, in a full dress debate. All this shows that the true interpretation of this adhikarana has been missed (whether intentionally or otherwise) by the oldest extant commentator on the Sūtras, Śaṅkara, who has sidetracked the issue into a groundless attack on the

1 Cf. सवापि शब्दगोचरतैव प्रथमप्रतिपाद्या स्यात् । अवाच्यत्वेहि ब्रह्मणि शब्दसंबन्ध एवानुपपन्नः । जगत्कारणत्वादिवच्यविचारस्तु दूरः । सामान्यनिराकरणभावे तु, सृष्ट्यादिवच्यत्वमेव समन्वयानुपपत्तिः । अतः प्रथमं वाच्यत्वसमर्थनेन समन्वयसम्भावनायाः सत्याः, वाक्यविशेषनिष्ठस्य विचारस्य पश्चादवसर इति ॥



Saṃkhya Prakṛti, which has no legs to stand upon. Perhaps, it was a shrewd move on his part to avoid a frontal attack on one of the most cherished dogmas of monism – the Avācya of Brahman. This wrong lead has been tamely accepted and followed by all those who came after him, regardless of consistency with Scriptural evidence or even with their own views! For instance, Rāmānuja adopts the same line of the interpretation. But while it is possible for Saṃkara to repudiate the category of Prakṛti by reducing it to his “Maya”, it would be impossible for Rāmānuja to do away with the Prakṛti as such, inasmuch as it is one of the three categories of Viśiṣṭādvaita. The question of the metaphysical dependence of Prakṛti (Acit) is really irrelevant to the discussion here about its *Srautatra* (as a category of his and the Sūtrakara’s Siddhānta). *Accepting, then, the category of Prakṛti or Acit as he does,*<sup>1</sup> Rāmānuja has the least justification to dub Prakṛti “*aśubdam*” following Saṃkara”. This should be sufficient to show that a grave historical blunder has been committed over the interpretation of the fifth adhikaraṇa by almost all the Pre Madhva commentators. Madhva has really opened our eyes by giving a correct lead in the matter. Had Ghate weighed this matter carefully and dispassionately, he would not have pronounced Madhva’s interpretations “a performance of little or no merit!” (op cit p 168).

(iii) Another adhikaraṇa which has been taken to be indubitably in favor of the view that Brahman is itself the material cause of the world, by most commentators, is the Prakṛtyadhikaraṇa (1, 4, 24 ff), which has been looked upon as a sort of trump card of Pantheism in the Sūtras. It may be stated at the very outset that the Sūtra is definitely against Vivartavāda and the *Bhamati* tries to wriggle out of this difficulty by specious special pleading. As for the Parināmavāda interpretation, which has been more widely accepted by modern scholars (and adopted by Bhāskara and Rāmānuja) the context comes in its way. For, this adhikaraṇa occurring in the Samanvayādhāya, must have for its subject matter the bare Samanvaya (attunement) of terms like “Prakṛti”, “Yoni,” etc., in Brahman and nothing more. It would be stretching the Sūtra beyond its legitimate scope to attempt to define the nature

1 न वयमव्यक्तं तत्परिणामविशेषाच्च स्वरूपेण नाम्युपगच्छाम । अपि तु, परमपुरुषदारीरतया तदात्मवत्त्वविरहण । तथानाम्युपगमादेव तद्वसिद्धप्रतिनियानिर-  
हनम् ॥ ( *Sribhāṣya*, 1, 4, 3 )



of Brahman's causality of the Universe in terms of "nimitta" or "Upādāna" or both. The right place for any such discussion would be in the II Adhyāya, not the first (Samanvaya). It is strange that no modern scholar has bothered to question the propriety of dissociating the entire fourth pāda of the Samanvayadhyāya from "samanvaya" proper, and making it discuss a number of miscellaneous topics without any attempt at correlating those topics or the terms under reference there, to Brahman. Does not the "performance" of all the commentators who have done so, amount to a cruel dismemberment and amputation of one Pāda from the Samanvayadhyāya? How could it serve the interests of the attunement of the Śāstra to Brahman (and Brahman alone, 1, 1, 4), if Brahman is not shown to be the real subject of reference, in each of those contexts of the fourth pāda also? Why should we be asked to make an exception (as regards the nature of the subject) in the case of this last pāda alone? What sort of a Brahmanavāda would the Sūtrakāra's be, if he were made to concede that in some cases there is Samanvaya of Śāstra in things other than Brahman? It is utterly pointless to contend under 1, 4, 2, as has been done by Saṃkhya, Rāmaṇuja and others, that the "Avyakta" spoken of in *Kātha Up* (1, 3, 11) is not the Sāṃkhya Prakṛti, by any means, but the three subtle elements (*bhū'sukṣma*) energy, water and food (*tejo abanna*), of which the gross human body is constituted. The quarrel is not over names but over the essence of things. Since the so called *bhūtasukṣmas* are also material and liable to modification (*vikāra*), they would answer to the definition of Prakṛti and its three guṇas and no use ful purpose will be served by insisting that this "avyakta", here, is not Prakṛti. The more pertinent question to be asked would be, "Is this term "Avyakta", here made to stand for Brahman? The answer is no—according to almost all the commentators, except Mādhyama<sup>1</sup>. It is their commentary that seems to be "inferior in character" and "of little or no merit" in the present case. And nothing shows the irrelevance and futility of the interpretation of the Anumānikālikāraṇa (1 + 19) by Saṃkhya, Rāmaṇuja and others than their hazardous identification

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1 जगत्कारणत्वेन सत्यप्राप्ता प्रतीयते । सा ब्रह्मवादिना ब्रह्मवत्तया समयेनीया, तेजाज्जन्मात्मवत्तया समयनर्तिव्याप्त तुल्यवदिति । (NS p 193)

of the "Avyakta" (1, 4, 1) with the human body (*śarīram*) and their laboured explanation that tho' gross in itself, the human body is called "avyaktam" here, in the Upanisad, in view of the fact that it is composed of the subtle elements (*bhūtasukṣma*) viz "tejo abanna" (energy, water and food) which are subtle (*avyakta*). The ultimate futility of this explanation lies in the fact that it is equally fatal to the causality of Brahman, whether "Avyakta" is identified with the Prakṛti or the subtle elements. Moreover, in the last analysis the "bhūtasukṣmas" (which are material in essence and subject to modification), would be indistinguishable from Prakṛti and its three strands of *guṇatraya*. Madhva's commentator Jayatīrtha, in a powerful critique of this explanation of 1, 4, 2, by the other commentators, shows its utter futility, in the course of his comment on the same point raised by Madhva in his AV.

इदं तु वक्तव्यं कथमव्यक्तशब्देन शरीरमुच्यते इति । न ह्येषा रुढिः । नापि योगः सम्भवति । शरीरस्य व्यक्तत्वात् । ननु, परिहृतमेतत् सूत्रकृता 'सूक्ष्मं तु तदर्हत्वात्' इति । \* \* \* कार्यकारणशब्दाश्च सकीर्यन्ते 'गोमि श्रीणीत मत्सरम' इति मयेति । अत्र वक्तव्यम्—किमनेनोक्तं भवतीति? किं शरीरमेवानुच्यतेऽव्यक्त-  
शब्दस्तत्रापचरितः, किंवा \* \* \* पक्षद्वयेऽपि दोषमाह यनेति । \* \* \* अयमभि-  
सन्धिः—सर्वथा तावन्नाव्यक्तपदं ब्रह्मपरं त्वयाच्यत । किंतु भूतसूक्ष्मकार्यशरीरस्य  
भूतसूक्ष्मस्य वाचकमिति । परेण तु, प्रधानवाचकमिति । यदि चाव्यक्तस्य कारणत्व-  
मभिप्रेतं तदा पक्षद्वयमपि ब्रह्मवादस्य प्रतिपक्षभूतमिति, शरीरागीकारेण प्रधान-  
निरासो व्यर्थः । कारणत्वाविवक्षायां तु, पक्षद्वयस्याप्यविहृदत्वात् किमनेनान्यतरं  
निराकरणाग्रहेण? विफलत्वादसंगतत्वाच्च । अथवा, अनादेरुपादानस्य जडस्य  
भूतसूक्ष्मशब्दाभिधेयस्यागीकारे प्रधानं नेति रिक्तं वचः । तल्लक्षणत्वात् प्रधानस्य ।  
नास्मिन् विवादायोगात् इति भावः (NS pp 191 192 b)

It may perhaps be claimed that the "Prakṛtyadhikāraṇa" is intended to clarify the nature of Brahman's causality, in terms of material causality also. But this explanation cannot be accepted, as no satisfactory reason could be given why such a clarification has not been given immediately after 1, 1, 2 where Brahman was defined as the cause of the world, were it really necessary. Clarification moreover, is to be given only when called for. The terms of the definition of Brahman in 1, 1, 2, point in the direction of an *efficient cause only*. This is confirmed by the interpretation of the fifth *adhikāraṇa* according to these commentators, where,

emphasis laid on sentient activity (*īśāpurvaśa kartṛtva*) points to an efficient cause (*nimitta*) alone. If, then, the question whether the Brahman is *not also* the material cause of the Universe is to be raised at some stage it should, naturally, be regarded as a new topic for discussion. Its proper place then, would be in the II Chapter and not in the first.

Perhaps, it may be argued that since the Prakṛti had been denied any Sāstric place and validity in 1, 1 5 and 1, 4 1, the Brahman itself would have to be regarded as the material cause of the world, in the absence of the category of Pradhāna or any other material principle answering to it, and hence this question of the material causality of Brahman is in order in 1, 4, 24. Even this ingenious explanation would be of no avail. For, it should be clarified whether 1, 4, 1, really denies the existence of the category of Pradhāna, *as such*, or, simply that terms like "Avyakta" used in the Śāstras, refer to it. The Samanvayādhyaya is not directly concerned with the denial of categories other than Brahman referred to in the Upanisads, but in correlating their names in a higher Sāstric attunement to Brahman, from certain mystic, metaphysical or meta physico philological standpoints, leaving their individual existence and functioning in their own limited spheres and their right to be designated by their respective names, in a lesser sense, intact. The non existence of Pradhāna as a category, would not, therefore, be a valid inference from the Samanvaya of terms descriptive of Pradhāna, in the Samanvayādhyaya. The question *could not*, therefore, arise, as to which is the material cause of the world, in the absence of Pradhāna. For there is no absence of Pradhāna at all. The second alternative too, would be to no purpose, *unless and until it is also shown in the same breath*, that such terms descriptive of Pradhāna and other entities, discussed in this Samanvayādhyāya, have reference to Brahman, instead. If that is *not done*, those discussions would be outside the scope of Samanvaya. But that is not the line of interpretation adopted by these commentators! The nemesis of their failure to do so, is overpervasion of the definition of Brahman as Jagatkārana, in respect of these others. The only correct interpretation then of the various adhikaranas of the fourth *pada* (of the Samanvayādhyaya), would be to correlate terms like Prakṛti, Avyakta, Jyotiḥ, Pañcājana and Yoni, used there, to Brahman as



the subject of *Samanvaya*. There is, however, no need to fear that such a *samanvaya* would *annul* the existence of *Prakṛti* and other categories *as such*. The non existence of *Prakṛti* as a category would be an illegitimate deduction, as already pointed out, from such *Samanvaya*. "We could not, surely, deduce the non existence of a category like *Ākāśa*, for instance, from the mere fact that that term has been attuned to Brahman, in 1, 1, 22. Nor could we as a consequence of that *adhikāraṇa*, ask, "where should the world exist, in the absence of *Ākāśa*?" Nor has any such issue been raised or answered by the *Sūtrakara*." "Why then should the case be other, with regard to *Prakṛti* alone? It is, thus utterly pointless to contend that Brahman is sought to be established as the material cause of the world, in 1, 4, 24, on account of the annulment of *Prakṛti* as such, as a consequence of the correlation of the term "*Avyakta* (and others) to the Brahman. The whole argument is extremely laboured and flimsy. For, it should be clear from the procedure adopted by the *Sūtrakara*, with reference to terms like *Ākāśa* (1, 1, 22) and their *Samanvaya* in Brahman, where despite such an attunement, the existence of the category of *Ākāśa as such* and its normal function, in its own sphere (*Taitt Up* 11, 1) are *not* denied. *Sūtra* 1, 4, 15, also, establishes Brahman to be the chief and ultimate causal force working in and thro' *Ākāśa* and others in the production of the evolutionary series of *Ākāśa*, *Vāyu*, *Agni*, *Prthvi* etc from one another, in the descending order (*Taitt Up* 11, 1) and therefore entitled to be designated by those epithets of 'intermediary causes' (अवान्तर कारणम्) as well.

1. Madhva has very briefly referred to the untenability of the interpretation of the *Prakṛtyadhikāraṇa* in terms of the "Upādānatva" of Brahman according to other *Bhāṣyakaras*, in his *B S B* नचायत कल्यम् । अप्रामाणिकत्वात् । He has as usual, reserved a full discussion of this problem to his *AV* where he examines the *Parinama* and *Vivartavada* explanations of *Bhaskara* and *Samkhya*, at length. *Jayatīrtha*, in his *NS* on the *AV* has taken the opportunity to examine *Ramanuja's* version of the "Abhinnaṇumittopadanavāda". In his *TP* on Madhva's *B S B*, *Jayatīrtha* has, on the lines summarized above, ably refuted the generally accepted view of the *Upādāna-kāraṇatva* interpretation of this *adhikāraṇa*, given by other schools. He has put the whole problem in a new perspective and his observations would have to be seriously considered by all those who profess to make an objective approach to the question of *Sūtra* interpretation.

(iv) This interpretation is fully consistent with the context of Samanvaya of terms in Braman which is the subject matter of this Adhyāya. According to Śaṅkara however, Sutra 1, 4, 15, purports to show that there is absolute uniformity of opinion in Scripture about Brahman being the ultimate source of the Universe notwithstanding certain internal discrepancies here and there, in the order of evolution of different substances described therein. Such an interpretation is open to several objections : 1) In the first place, it involves a strained additional splitting up of the expression कारणत्वेन into कारणत्वे and न and the ascription of a far fetched meaning of "but" (तु) to the च' in कारणत्वेन च आकाशादिषु यथाव्यपदिष्टोक्ते ( 1, 4, 15 ). It also involves ( 2 ) the importation ( अभ्याहार ) of an additional term विग्रह ( discrepancy ) to complete the sense of the Purvapaksa. ( 3 ) The question of internal contradictions and discrepancies in Scripture, raised by Śaṅkara here, would be entirely out of place in the first Adhyāya. That, would have to be discussed in Adhyāya II. As a matter of fact Śaṅkara himself discusses such internal and mutual conflicts and discrepancies of Scriptural details in 11, 3 and 4 in the Viyad adhi-karana etc. There is no point in the plea advanced on Śaṅkara's behalf that in 11, 2, internal conflicts in Scripture are resolved, while 1, 4, resolves mutual conflicts among texts. Such nice distinction of details might perhaps necessitate their discussion in two different padas ( of the same Adhyāya ) But in no circumstance could their discussion under two different Adhyāyas, as here, be justified. ( 4 ) Moreover, Śaṅkara himself has actually discussed such mutual contradictions of texts pertaining to the origination of Ākāśa etc., 11, 3, and 4. ( 5 ) His interpretation 1, 4, 15 even as it stands, is hardly convincing as it leaves the alleged Scriptural discrepancies in respect of the effects, unresolved, on the one sided plea that notwithstanding them there is unanimity of view about Brahman being the One Cause. If the discrepancies do not at all matter because the Srutis have no real interest in creation as such ( as Śaṅkara puts in ), one would expect the Sutra-kara not to have bothered himself about similar discrepancies in respect of the evolution of Ākāśa etc., in 11, 3. Thus, Śaṅkara's interpretation of 1, 4, 15, is extremely unsatisfactory. Madhva's interpretation of it as establishing that Brahman is not merely the ultimate and primary cause of the evolutionary series, but the proximate cause



as well ( अवान्तरकारणम् ) at every stage of the evolutionary series and therefore entitled to be designated by those terms as well ( as 'Akāśa', 'Vāyu', 'Agni' etc ), has the merit of keeping close to the subject matter of the pāda, viz, Samanvaya of terms and marks in Brahman

(v) The discussion in II, 3, 1-7, over the 'creation' of Akāśa and the ruling given on the point that it ( bhū'akāśa ) is produced<sup>1</sup> clearly presupposes the acceptance by the Sūtrakara, of a theory of dual reference of terms ( Vrtti dvaya ) viz, the 'Parama mukhya vrtti' ( highest reference in the transcendental and fullest etymological sense ) to Brahman and in a 'Mukhya vrtti' or conventional primary sense of ordinary parlance, to express other things. Madhva finds the technique and details of this theory of Samanvaya and its application in one special adhikarana, in this pāda ( 1, 4, 16-23 ) Das Gupta has shown ( *Op cit* III, pp 34 and 502 ) that the *Vayu Purana* and the *Ahimbudhnya* apply " epithets like Prakṛti, Pradhāna, Prasūti, Yoni, Ksetra, Aksara and Avyakta to Brahman " This must suffice to show that Madhva's interpretation of the Prakṛtyadhikarana is neither " fantastic " nor " far fetched " as Bhandarkar has described it<sup>2</sup>. On the contrary, it would appear from the evidence supplied by Das Gupta, to represent faithfully, " the oldest traditional outlook of the philosophy of the Upanisadas and the Brahmasutras preserved in the Purāṇic tradition " ( *Op cit* III, 496 ) Contextual consistency and traditional sanctions are thus, entirely, in favour of Madhva's integral approach to the interpretation of the Samanvayādhyāya and of all its pādas, without any exception, in terms of direct Samanvaya of names and epithets. This is in glaring contrast with the performance of all other commentators on the Sūtra, who have allowed themselves to be victimized by Saṃkara's line of interpretation, which mutilates one whole pāda from the Samanvayādhyāya, to sustain its *tour de force* in banishing the Prakṛti from the Śāstras ( 1, 1, 5 ), which is itself open to serious objection. Madhva's interpretation of the entire fourth pāda also of the I Adhyāya, in strict conformity with Samanvaya of names and epithets, must, unquestionably be recognized as a substantial

1 Cf Saṃkara also तस्मात्, ब्रह्मकार्यं विदत् इति सिद्धम् II 3, 7.

2 *Paismarism, Sairism etc*, Strassburg 1913, p 58



contribution to its correct understanding Ghate himself has complimented Madhva on the remarkable consistency with which he has adhered to the plan of the Sutrakāra, here, tho' for reasons best known to himself, he throws consistency to the winds in taking sides with manifestly indefensible interpretations

( vi ) Among other instances of Madhva's faithfulness to the context of the Sūtras may be noted his interpretation of the Sandhyādhikarana ( in 2, 15 ) in terms of the reality of dream experiences which has a direct bearing on the subject matter of " Sādhana " Samkara's dismissal of dream experiences as unreal projections of the Ātman would have no conceivable bearing on Sādhana vicāra, which is the topic of this pāda and so be out of place

( vii ) Similarly, the interpretation of तस्मिन् च तद्व्यपारादविराग ( in 1, 16 ) Here, the point raised by Madhva has a bearing on the question of Sādhana, while the issue raised by Samkara, viz., whether Yama or Citragupta should be regarded as the real ruler and dispenser of punishments in Hell turns out to be a mere technical triviality which could make no difference to Sādhana anyway, and is therefore, irrelevant to the main context

( viii ) Throughout the Sādhanaadhyāya, neither Samkara nor Ramanuja has been able to find a place for Bhakti directly in the Sūtras This would be a glaring deficiency in a system of Theistic philosophy such as that of the Sutrakāra, who is familiar enough with the Pāñcaratra and other schools and is even claimed by some to have been a Bhāgavata by faith. That apart, even from the standpoint of the Saguna Brahman, whom the Sutrakāra is taken to acknowledge, by Samkara, we have every right to expect a prominent place to be assigned to " Bhakti " within the body of the Sūtras It is only Madhva who has realized the serious nature of this gap in the earlier interpretation of the Sūtras and filled it by his apt and highly suggestive interpretation of समुदप्रहणात् तत्तयात्वम् ( in, 2, 19 ) According to him, समुद्वत् ( like water ) expresses thro' simile, the innate quality of intense love and attachment to God and प्रहणम् stands for knowledge ( ज्ञानम् ) The Sūtra as a whole, is thus taken to emphasize that without such a cohesive attachment and love of God going hand in hand with spiritual knowledge, it would not be possible for the human

soul to realize its intrinsic spiritual affinity to God and attain communion with Him. Considering the context of this pada, viz., Sādhana, it must be conceded that this is quite a happy and reasonable interpretation of the Sutra in question. The aesthetic and exegetical justification for this obviously figurative construction in the Sutra is admirably explained by Vādirāja, in his gloss on Jayatīrtha's ■ on this Sutra, which deserves quotation

अल्पाक्षरत्वलाभाय भक्त्यभावादिति वक्तव्ये, यत् 'अम्बुवदग्रहणात्' इति सूत्रं, तद्भूयस्वरूपनिरूपणार्थमिति भावेनोक्तम्—“अम्बुवत् स्नेहेन ग्रहणं ज्ञातम्” इति । माहात्म्यज्ञानपूर्वकस्नेहा हि भक्तिः । तर्हि, 'स्नेहेनाज्ञानादिति कुतो नोक्तमिति चेत्, सत्यम् । अम्बुनि चिक्कणतारव्य स्नेहो यथा आजानजत्वात् अतिसुदृढः, तथाति-सुदृढस्नेहलाभाय 'अम्बुवत्' इत्युक्तम् । गृण्हाति, कदापि न मुञ्चतीति ज्ञानेऽपि दाढ्यसूचनाय 'ग्रहणम्' इत्युक्तम् । अतः प्रौढशिरोमणि सूत्रकार इति ज्ञेयम् ॥  
( *TP-Gurvarthadīpikā*, Udipi, 1954, p. 139 )

Madhva has made an equally striking contribution to the question of the scope of the Sūtras. He brings the entire Veda śāstra and not merely the ten or twelve Upanisads under the purview of the Sūtras. Modern thought is just beginning to dive deep into Vedic lore and trying to discover the depth of philosophical insight in them, hitherto held back by artificial dogmas of Sayanic tradition. The writings of Aurobindo Ghosh have rightly awakened interest in the hidden mysteries of sublime philosophy in the Vedas clothed in symbolic language. Prof. Maryla Falk, in her thought provoking paper, "The oldest Psychology,—Terminus a quo and Aspects", published in the *Indian Journal of Psychology*, Vol. xviii, pts. 3-4, 1943, has drawn attention to the existence of "a terminology and phraseology relating to a set of psycho-physiological functional hypostases which constitute the basic data of the earliest Yoga theory", in the hymns of the Rg and Atharva Vedas. A seasoned Mīmāṃsaka and Viśiṣṭādvaitic scholar D. T. Tatacharya has in his Krishnaswami Rao Endowment Lectures (1941) at the Madras University, made a strong plea for 'applying to the Rks and hymns of the Rg Veda the principles of interpretation enunciated and employed by Bādarāyaṇa' and asserts that if that is done, "we cannot escape the conclusion that this Veda is as much concerned with the Brahman as the Upanisads"<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> His lectures, it is understood, have since been published in the Journal of the Venkatesvara Oriental Institute, Tirupati.

A text from the *Śāṇḍa* cited by Madhva and others asserts that the *Brahmasūtras* are meant to be decisive of the purport of the "entire sacred literature" सर्वज्ञातस्य सर्वस्य यत्प्रमाणश्च निर्णयः । This must be the significance of the term विश्वतामुखा applied to the *Brahmasūtras*. It is absurd to explain it as "capable of being interpreted in various senses *ad libitum*" as is done by Ghate (op cit p 46). Its true sense is that a sūtra should be able to explain the largest number of concurrent data that could be brought under a single aphorism. The idea is that one should not go on making a Sūtra for each Visayavākya or datum. The Jijñāsa-Sūtra, for instance, should cover all texts emphasizing the need for inquiry into Brahman, wherever they might be found, in the *Vedas* (e.g. यस्तु न वेद किमुच्चा वरिष्यति) *Upanisads* or *Puranas*. There is no harm, then, in Madhva's bringing under the Janmadi sūtra, texts from the *RV*, the *Taitt A*, *Taitt Up* and *Śāṇḍa Purana* and other sources "*ad libitum*" बहुशाखानिर्णयकत्वं, as Madhva's commentator puts it, is what primarily विश्वतामुखम् denotes, as applied to the *Brahmasūtras*<sup>1</sup>. Madhva's references to the Samhitās of the Rg Veda and other sources thus offends against no known interpretational canon. On the other hand, it enriches the thought content of the Sūtras and widens their scope. One should, therefore, be pleased rather than displeased with Madhva, for bringing under their scope, the philosophy of the *Vedas* also, neglected on account of the artificial traditions of Sayanic interpretation and the naturalistic and mythological attitude of the modern scholars. Madhva speaks of the loss of "ars" tradition of Vedic interpretation, and the idea is echoed by the modern mystic interpreter of the Rg Veda, Aurobindo Ghosh.

(Σ) It is indeed surprising that Ghate should have taken Madhva to task for his explanation of the phrase सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययम् (B S m, 3, 1) as सर्ववेदनिर्णयावगम्य ब्रह्म. There is nothing in this explanation to warrant Ghate's conclusion that "Vedānta"

1 Vide B S m 2, 18, m 3, 26 etc where according to Saṅkara himself, reference is made to divergent Sakhas of the *Vedas* (as visayavakyas)

2 गौतमस्य ऋषेः शाखाज्ञाने त्वज्ञानता मते {*Śāṇḍa*}



according to Madhva, signifies only the decision of the Vedas and "not the Upanisads" <sup>1</sup> (p. 168) This is an utter perversion of Madhva's point that the conclusion (*anta*) of the Vedas and the "Upanisads" being the same, Brahman must be understood in the light of the true teachings of the whole Śāstra embracing all the Vedas, Upanisads etc., and that a merely literal or superficial understanding of either the Vedas or the Upanisads, would not represent the true *nirṇaya* of the texts, on the nature of Brahman Madhva holds that the correct *nirṇaya* of the entire sacred lore could only be obtained with help (*stikharana*) of the *Brahmasūtras* which furnish the master key to unlocking the hidden truths of the Śāstra and that without the use of this key neither the Vedas nor the Upanisads would yield their true Siddhanta <sup>1</sup> The actual *Upanisadic* texts cited by Madhva under iii, 3, 1, must show the critic that he has not ruled out the *Upanisads* from being treated as "Vedanta" <sup>1</sup> True, he insists "that the *Samhitas* also are as important to his doctrine as the *Upanisads*" (op cit p 168) But that is certainly not because "it is very difficult for him to find in the *Upanisads*, a support for his doctrine" (p 168) For, the same critic has earlier stated that "Madhva always lays stress on those passages in the *Upanisads* which clearly proclaim the difference between Jīva and Brahman such as *Śvet Up.* i, 6, iv, 5, 4, *Mund* iii, 1, 2, etc" (op cit p 34). No dispassionate student of the *Upanisads* could have the temerity to assert that passages supporting the reality of difference between Jīva and Brahman and other tenets of Realism are not sufficiently numerous or pronounced in the various *Upanisads*. The "Antaryāmi-Brahmana of the Brh Up and the Bhūmavidya of Chāndogya are sufficient to rebut any such facile theory Reference to the chapter on "Upanisads" in this book, would establish this point conclusively There is thus no substance in Ghate's charge that Madhva fights shy of the *Upanisads* and seeks escape in the philosophy of the Vedas Madhva would not have ventured to write commentaries on all the Ten *Upanisads*, had he felt them to be so set against him !

(xi) Madhva's interpretation of the Utpatyadhikarana of the B S. ii, 2, *adh* 12, as a refutation of the Śākta cult and not of

<sup>1</sup> ब्रह्मसौमसाशास्त्रव्युत्पादितन्यायानुपकृता हि वेदादयो विष्णोर्वाचका । तदुपकृताश्च तस्य वाचका भवन्तीति ( NS. p 4 ).

the Pañcaratra system is another significant departure from the other commentators. While Samkara interprets the whole *adhikarana* as a refutation of the Bhāgavata cult, Rāmanuja pleads its defence in the closing sutras, the opening ones being interpreted as the Purvapaksa, and he cites evidence that the Pañcarātra does not really teach the theory of the "creation" of the Jīvas or is hostile to Vedic authority, or is confused and contradictory on the question of the mutual relation between the Supreme Being and its Vyūhas or their interrelation of attributes of divinity. Madhva sees no justification, in these circumstances, for treating the *adhikarana* in question, either as a refutation or as a vindication of the Pañcarātra, in any way. The issue is simple. (1) If the Pañcaratra does not really teach any of the objectionable doctrines attributed to it by Samkara, there is no point at all in introducing a special *adhikarana* in the B S, to chase a shadow नहि वचनमदृष्ट्वा पूर्वपक्षः । (2) The second pada of Adhyaya 11, being devoted to the refutation of hostile Darśanas, the vindication of any particular one out of them as the "Sva siddhanta" of the Sutrakara would be out of place here. (3) The right place for any such establishment of the validity of the Pañcaratra system, if there was any need for it, would have been somewhere else, in the I Adhyaya<sup>1</sup>. Baseless allegations against the Pañcaratra, due to perversion or misunderstanding of its esoteric truths or quibbling over its specialized (esoteric) terminology, could hardly warrant the luxury of an extensive *adhikarana* to refute them. (5) Texts which seem to refer to the Jīvas as "created" are not wanting in the Vedas, Aranyakas and Upanisads यो न पिता जनिता (R V x, 82, 3) तोयेन जीवान् व्यसृजं भूम्याम् (T A, x 11) सर्व एत आत्मानो व्युच्चरन्ति

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1. Madhva, for his part, deftly introduces the question of the validity of the Pañcarātra, under the term "Sāstra" in 1, 1, 3. Jayatirtha in his NS has an elaborate critique of the interpretations of the Utpatyadhikarana, by both Samkara and Ramanuja. He has also expounded the true position of the Pañcarātra re the esoterics of Suddha srsti pertaining to the emergence of the Vyūha forms from Para Vasudeva, under the epithets of Samkarsana, Pradyumna etc., which are the names of the Supreme Himself, as the presiding deity over the production of mind etc. Similarly, the doctrine of "Sa visesābheda" of substance and attributes would meet the difficulties re. the relation between Vasudeva and the Vyūhas and their lordly attributes, raised by Samkara.



( q Sam B S II, 3, 17 ) Similar references in the Pañcarātra could be explained in the same way in which a Vedantin would meet these cases ( 6 ) *Seeming hostility* to or censure of the Vedas is not wanting in the Gita ( II, 45 , II, 46 , II, 52 ) or the Chan Up VII, 1 4 But no Vedantin is perturbed over them Why, then, should a case be made against the Pañcarātras on these grounds which could be explained consistently with the other Scriptures, whose validity is also accepted by the Pañcarātra ? Madhva, therefore, finds that inasmuch as the allegations against Pañcarātra are flimsy and have no legs to stand upon, they are beneath recognition or rebuttal

दूषण पञ्चरात्रस्य वीक्षायामपि न क्षमम् ॥ ( A' )

It should not be supposed from this that Madhva is trying to escape the problem, here. All that he maintains is that the Pañcarātra is impeccable and can take care of itself and needs no special attention at the hands of commentators on II, 2, 42 45 The adhikarana itself, according to him, then, is to be viewed as a criticism of the Śakta system Das Gupta ( op cit IV, p 145 ) is not, therefore, quite correct in saying that Madhva and his commentators interpret the topic ( II, 2 42 45 ) " accordingly " i e , to justify the authority of the Pañcarātra Such is not the actual interpretation of the adhikarana, according to Madhva His answering some of the charges brought against the Pañcarātra, in his A' , ( not in his B S B ) is merely to show the untenability of the interpretations of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, in this connection,—the one wholly and the other even in part Madhva has, thus, shown the correct perspective in interpreting the Utpatyadhikarana, in the light of its context and setting in the Sūtras without allowing himself to be victimized or rattled by the dominant line of interpretation of his predecessors, which cannot, as we have seen, " bear critical scrutiny " <sup>1</sup> Here is another instance of the comparative superiority of his interpretations to those of others.

( XII ) According to Ghate, Madhva's "denial of the Brahman being the material cause of the Universe, is especially against the spirit of the Sūtras" [Italics mine] The presumption that the Sūtras teach such a doctrine rests mostly on the Prakṛtyadhikarana ( I, 4, 24 ) We have already seen the impossibility of pressing

1 " वीक्षायामपि न क्षमम् " as Madhva tellingly puts it



any such interpretation on this adhikarana which is forbidden by the context of Samanvaya (in which the adhikarana occurs) and its implication. We need not, therefore, labour this point further.

(xii) The only adhikarana, then, that could be brought up in support of the material causality of Brahman is तदनन्यत्वादिभ्यः (ii 1 15). Most commentators and modern scholars have sought the help of this adhikarana in support of this theory. But coming close on the heels of the न विलक्षणत्वाधिकरणम् (ii, 1 4 13), as interpreted by Sankara and others, this adhikarana would be redundant for purposes of establishing the identity (अनन्यत्व) of the world and Brahman. For, if the thesis of Brahmopadanatva had been established in the preceding adhikarana (ii 1, 4 13), it would automatically follow that the cause (Brahman) and effect (the world) are identical. Where, then, would be the need to seek to reestablish the same thesis over again in ii, 1, 15? Thus, from the point of view of both the Praśāngyadhikarana (i 4, 23 27) and the Na vilakṣaṇatvadhikarana (ii, 1, 4 13) the तदनन्यत्वाधिकरण (ii 1, 15 seq), would be redundant in sense and for the purpose of establishing the identity of Brahman and the world, as material cause and effect. (2) Apart from this, the Advaitic interpretation of "ananyatvam" as 'superimposed' (aropita), or "unreal", is, to say the least extremely tortuous and goes against the thesis of identity of cause and effect in any direct sense of the term. (2) The identification of the "viśaya vakya" of this sūtra as यथा सोम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन \* \* वाचारम्भणविकारा नामधेय \* \* (Chan Up vi 1 42) in terms of a cause-and-effect relation is also open to difficulties. The cause and effect relation breaks down completely in the case of the example of nail scissors and karṣṇayasa, as pointed out by Jayatīrtha and the explanation of the phrase आरम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः as referring to more than one Scriptural text by Sankara involves defective construction.

In view of all these difficulties, one is justified in looking for some other explanation of the तदनन्यत्वाधिकरण, connected with the creationistic views of the Upanisads. Madhva has suggested for discussion here, a very interesting and vital problem of Theism—whether the causal activity of (God) Brahman is independent of all accessories or is simply dependent on them. In other words,

the question posed is, (1) Does Brahman need or work with the help of other accessories, in its creative activity? (2) Are these accessories created by It, or coexisting always with It? (3) Are they equally independent principles or are they metaphysically dependent on Brahman? If this problem in Theistic thought deserves attention, the onus is on commentators on the Brahmasutras, ancient and modern, to point out where it is discussed by Badarayana, if not in the present context. At any rate, Madhva's interpretation of the adhikarana, raises a new and very important issue not dealt with before, in the Sūtras, whereas the interpretations of the other commentators like Śaṅkara redundantly raise the same point of identity of the world with Brahman, in one way or the other, in as many as three different adhikaranas. It is far more satisfactory to make the Sūtras raise a new problem than make them revert *ad libitum* and *ad nauseam* to the same old question. Even from this point of view, Madhva's interpretation cannot be said to be an "inferior" performance "of little or no merit" (Ghate op cit. p 168). Indeed, it is a refreshingly original and brilliant interpretation of great philosophical value. To dismiss it as "quite irrelevant to the topic" (Ghate, p 168), is to betray one's own philosophical immaturity.

Viewed in the light of ancient and modern thought alike, Madhva's interpretation of this adhikarana assumes very great significance. The wording of 1, 4, 15 (कारणत्वेन चाकाशादिषु यथाव्यपदिष्टोक्त) presupposes the existence of a series of 'causes' in the evolutionary chain. The Svet Up 'स कारण कारणाधिपः' । 'य. कारणानि' (vi 9, 1, 3) recognizes the existence of other 'causes' besides Brahman. Their status must be clearly defined at some stage or other in the Vedānta Sūtras. Christianity, in Western thought, looks upon God as the sole and only cause, everything else being deemed to be created *de novo* and *ex nihilo*, by Him. In India, the Sēśvara-Sāṃkhya posited co-existent Prakṛti which does not owe its existence to Iśvara. This Prakṛti is thus metaphysically independent of God, in the Sēśvara Sāṃkhya Dualism. The question is thus of abiding interest in Indian thought, whether the causes including Brahman, Prakṛti, Puruṣas, Kāla etc., are all merely co-existent principles acting independently of one another, or whether one of them (Brahman) is metaphysically independent and all the others metaphysically dependent on It, for their

existence, and functioning (सत्ताप्रवृत्तिनिमित्त) Since the acceptance of the hypothesis of a plurality of mutually independent co-existent 'causes' would be philosophically unsound, Madhva has done well to pose the problem here and press it to a decision, in the Sūtras themselves. Every true philosopher would thus see in his interpretation of this adhikāraṇa, the discussion of a problem of perennial interest to all philosophy in general and to Indian philosophy in particular. Indian philosophical tradition recognizes a number of eternal substances ज्ञानो (Śvet 1, 9) पाञ्चाश्च सर्वान् \* \*

ibid v, 5) तम आसीत् (Rv x, 129,3) द्रव्य कर्मच कालश्च स्वभावा जीव एव च । यदनुग्रहत सन्ति Bhag 11 10 12) But they should be held to be *ex hypothesi* metaphysically dependent on One Supreme Being. That is precisely what Madhva has done in this adhikāraṇa. He interprets the Sūtra as laying down that Brahman is the one Independent Cause, in creation, — all the other factors (like Prakṛti, Puruṣa, Kāla etc) being metaphysically dependent accessories. The proposition is purposely put in a double negative form (Tad ananyatvam) to wit the Independent (Cause) is not different from (or other than) Brahman, because of the "arambhana" and other grounds", — to emphasize the point that Brahman alone is the Independent Cause and that the rest are by implication *ex hypothesi* metaphysically dependent on It. Cf

द्रव्य कर्मच कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।

यदनुग्रहत सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया ॥ (Bhag 11, 10 12) There is no specific affirmation of Brahman being the only Independent Cause, earlier<sup>1</sup>. Hence there is no redundancy in Madhva's interpretation of this adhikāraṇa, as there is in those of the others. Such affirmation is necessary to dispose of an objection that might be raised on the analogy of production in general, which presupposes and involves the existence of other pre-existing or co-existent causes independent of the producer, to which He gives a new name and form. The affirmation thro' negation of the contrary that Brahman alone is the Independent Cause, clinches the matter beyond doubt.

1 Cf \* इति युक्तिविरुद्धत्वात् जन्मादिभूतेऽभिप्रेतं यत् ब्रह्मण स्यान्मयं ततोपपद्यते । न च श्रुतिविरोधः । श्रुतीनां ब्रह्मणो जगत्कारणत्वमात्रपरत्वात् । स्वतन्त्रकारणान्तरनिरासे श्रुतेरेवाभावात् । भावदा, \* \* (NS p 297)



The visayavākya here, is किं त्विदानीदधिष्ठानमारभण कथमस्त्वित् कथासौत् R V x, 81, 2, where, the existence of independent accessories in creation is challenged (āksepa) The query by āksepa elicits an answer in the negative that there are no other Independent causes than Brahman, in other words, that Brahman Itself is (the same as) the Independent Cause, (स्वतन्त्रकारणम्) It is also significant that the Sutra refers to "आरम्भणम्" as the key word in the context of the visayavākya One expects this key-word to be an independent expression in the text in question This condition is satisfied in R V X, 81, 2, which is the visayavākya according to Madhva's interpretation. It is not satisfied in the interpretations of Saṃkara and others, according to whom the text cited is Chan Up vi 1, 4 wherein the term "आरम्भणम्" (as explained by Saṃkara himself), is used syntactically compounded with another (as दाचारम्भणम्) The wording of the next sutra also (सत्त्वाच्चावरस्य ii, 1, 17), confirms the reasonableness of Madhva's interpretation of ii, 1, 15 as it affirms the existence of inferior (अवर) i.e. dependent reals as accessories in creation This interpretation of सत्त्वाच्चावरस्य is based on the primary sense of अवर, whereas Saṃkara's rendering of it as कार्य because it is posterior in time (अपर) is more a secondary sense. The next sutra असद्वचनदेशानेति चेन्न धर्मान्तरेण वाक्यशेषात् (ii, 1, 18) also receives a natural explanation on this interpretation that the denial of other substances but the One Supreme prior to creation, in the Nasadiya Sukta (x, 129, 1) and elsewhere is not to be taken as an absolute negation of their existence as such, but on account of their obvious limitations such as unmanifestedness, dependence, liability to modification and decay

(xiv) I shall consider one more point raised by Ghate, before concluding this review of his critique of Madhva's performance "When we consider the fact that the Sutras represent an attempt to reconcile the different passages of the Upanisads like "Tattvam asi", "Dva suparna", it is impossible to believe that the doctrine of absolute duality not having anything to do with unity can be the teaching of the Sutras" (Op cit p 170) [Italics mine] This comment only betrays the author's deplorable ignorance of the nature of synthesis of "Bheda" and "Abheda" Srutis, brought

about by Madhva, thro' his doctrine of "Bimbapratibimba-bhāva" and his metaphysical ideology of "Svatantrādvītiya tattvarāda" which are specially designed to effect the necessary rapprochement between the two sets of Srutis consistent with the modicum of difference that must be accepted on the basis of reason, revelation and the verdict of Sākṣi-Pratyakṣa. The sublime heights of unity in the Supreme, for the entire world of matter and souls visualized by Madhva, in virtue of its deriving its very existence, knowledge, activity etc., from the One Supreme source of all existence knowledge and activity (सर्वसत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिनिमित्त), has the merit of not doing any violence to the Pramānas which establish and ratify the reality and validity of world experience and its values, of not denying the world of matter and souls as an unreality and a myth, in order to achieve an abstract, artificial unity with the Supreme. It is a living sense of unity born of the full realization of the world's metaphysical dependence on the Brahman<sup>1</sup> that Madhva has tried to impress upon us by his doctrine of the Bimbapratibimbabhāva between God and man and by his ideology of a Svatantra advītiya tattva. The full significance of this synthesis, presented by Madhva, in harmonizing the reality of the Universe (and of the souls) with the transcendence and immanence of Brahman has been explained in the introductory Chapter of this book. It is, therefore, a travesty of truth to say that Madhva has not striven to establish any synthesis of the conflict of Bheda and Abheda Srutis or of Bheda Pratyakṣa and Aikya Srutis.

Indeed, every commentator on the Vedānta has tried to solve this conflict of Bheda and Abheda Srutis on the one hand and Bheda Pratyakṣa (experience) and Aikya Srutis, on the other, in his own way. Madhva is no exception to this. He has not shelved the issue or ignored the need for a synthesis, as Ghate would have us believe. It would have been a different matter if he had been unable to approve of the particular line of synthesis adopted by Madhva. But ignorance of the nature of the synthesis propounded by Madhva is altogether inexcusable. Apart from that, it is not clear what sort of a synthesis or reconciliation of Bheda and Abheda Srutis, would have Ghate's approval. He

1 मदीय त्वदीयमिति भेदमपहाय सर्वमोक्षराशीनमिति स्थिति (Madhva B.T.)

merely asserts a truism when he says that the Sūtras represent an attempt to reconcile the Bheda and Abheda Śrūti. But, he himself has not been able to put his finger on the ultimate view of the Sūtras which, in his opinion, represents the true and happy synthesis, beyond confessing that "the phraseology of the Sūtras (iii, 2, 27-28) leaves on our mind an impression of *uncertainty* as to the Sūtrakāra's opinion on the point" (*Op cit.* 182) He refers to the "vague and general words" of the Sūtrakāra, "not capable of being explicitly defined", which lead us to believe that the Sūtras, tho' intended to formulate a system from the Upanisads, reconciling the contradictions which meet us at every step, represent a stage of transition from the absolute want of a system to a cut and dry system of the Commentators" (p 183) He has not claimed that the Sūtrakāra favors absolute identity between Jīva and Brahman. Sūtra iv, 4, 17, declares that the released soul does not participate "in the power of creating and sustaining the world" (p 164) This posits an irreducible difference between the two even in release. This must naturally be reckoned with in any synthesis that might be attempted in the last analysis. But it would be no synthesis to say that difference and identity should both be accepted as equally true and real in the same sense, in the last analysis. However Ghate seems to have a soft corner for the Bhedābheda ideal of Nimbarka, which he is, nevertheless, afraid of advocating openly, as he considers it a rather "clumsy stage" from the "philosophical point of view" (183) Why then should he blame Madhva, for not being satisfied with such a clumsy patchwork of reconciliation which is no reconciliation at all, but an affirmation of the *status quo* of the conflicting Śrūti—and exploring the possibility of a more consistent and logically satisfactory solution of the problem by broadening the content of identity in terms of (1) metaphysical dependence (2) similarity of essence (3) coexistence (4) harmony etc ,

स्वातन्त्र्ये च विशिष्टत्वे स्थानमत्यैक्ययोरपि ।

सादृश्ये चैक्यवाक् सम्यक् सावकाशा यथेष्टत ॥ ( A V )

instead of viewing it in a narrow sense of "Svarupaikya" that would be strongly opposed to the "Dvaita Śrūti" like द्वा सुपर्णा and above all to Sakṣi Pratyakṣa, which is the basis of all other Pramanas and the guarantor of their validity, and which would further involve a number of unproved assumptions like (1) the



invalidity of Experience on account of (ii) obscuration of the Ātman by Avidyā. It should be noted that Madhva's way of harmonizing the two sets of texts involves fewer assumptions and is less circuitous. It does not stigmatize the Bheda Śruti as non-truth declaring (*atattvavedaka*) and does not introduce the fiction of higher and lower validity and so on. It is a practical solution of recognizing the absolute majesty and independence of the Supreme and bringing the world of matter and souls to a realisation of its metaphysical dependence तत्तन्त्रत्वादेतदात्म्यम्<sup>1</sup> ।

Ghate concedes that Madhva's interpretation of II 2, 29 that statements of identity (तद्वचनपदेन) between Jīva and Brahman as due only to the fact of the Jīva being endowed with a nature closely akin to that of Brahman, in point of reality *jñāna*, *ananda* etc (तद्गुणसारत्वात्) \* \* \* is 'a good interpretation' (p 97), "to which, we cannot object" (169). If so, other connected interpretations based on the principle of "Tadadhīnatva" and others, met with in the Upanisads and good support for them in the interpretational canons of the Mīmāṃsakas<sup>3</sup> should also be acceptable to him.

The Sutrakara uses the ideas of *aṃśa* and *abhāsa* to define the relation between the Jīva and Brahman (II, 3, 43-50). He is said to define *aṃśa* "in such a way as to make room for both difference and identity" (p 102). But not in the sense of difference and identity being both equally true in the literal sense and in an equal measure<sup>2</sup>. In that case, the Sutrakara would as well have used the plain term "Bhedabheda" as being more clearly expressive of his meaning, instead of beating about the bush or coining a new term "*aṃśa*" whose *literal sense* of "part" or "fraction" would be unacceptable to any philosopher, including himself as Brahman is partless. Moreover, difference and identity, being contradictories, could not co-exist in one. The utmost that could be claimed in such a case, would be that difference in *one sense* and identity in *another* are possible. In that case, Ghate must give up his preference for the Bhedabheda solution of Nimbarka "according to which both difference and identity are equally real without

1. Madhva's comment on ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वम् (*Chan Up*)

2. *Chan. Up* v, 1, 15. Also Saṃkara and Bhaṃatī on BS II, 4, 17-19

3. *P. M. S.* I, 4, 23

the idea of the subordination of one to the other" (p 183), as coming nearest to the Sutrakāra's "transitional view" [Italics mine] The actual definitions of Bheda and Abheda, according to Nimbarka, quoted by Ghate, are "Abheda": *absence of independent existence* ( स्वतन्त्रसत्ताभाव ) and "Bheda" *separate and dependent existence* ( p 31 ) or परतन्त्रसत्ता ( भाव ) These fail to support his contention that difference and identity are here retained in their primary sense, "without (any) subordination of one to the other" It should be obvious to anyone that on Nimbarka's own showing, difference and identity are both reduced to the same thing viz *difference and dependence*! The one is a paraphrase of the other स्वतन्त्रसत्ताऽभाव = परतन्त्रसत्ता-भाव । They are not the logical negations or contradictories of each other in their primary sense The so called "identity" between Jiva and Brahman, thus consists, on Nimbarka's view, only in "the impossibility of any independent existence (p 31) for the Jiva from the Brahman! How is this, in any way different from Madhva's description of it as —

तत्तन्त्रत्वादितदात्म्यम् ।

‘यदधीना यस्य सत्ता तत्तदित्येव भण्यते ।

विद्यमाने विभेदेऽपि मिथो नित्य स्वरूपतः ॥’

सर्वं ब्रह्मेत्युच्यते तदधीनसत्ताप्रवृत्तिमत्त्वात् । न तु तत्स्वरूपत्वात् ।

Only, Madhva puts the matter less mystifyingly and without all the circumlocution of Nimbarka when he says that difference and identity cannot both be accepted in their primary sense (मुख्यार्थ) equally

भेदाभेदो न मुख्यतः ।

( B S B II, 3, 43 ).

and that therefore, *difference* must be accepted as essential (स्वरूपतः) and identity as *figurative* (गोण) based on intimacy of relation due to resemblance (II, 2, 29) primacy (I, 4, 3) and independence (I, 1, 30)

सादृश्याच्च प्रधानत्वात् स्वातन्त्र्यादपि वाऽभिदाम् ।

आहुरीशेन जीवस्य न स्वरूपाभिदा क्वचित् ॥ (A.P)

1 This quotation does not at all mean that "separateness and non separateness ought not to be understood literally", as mistranslated by J E Carpenter *Theism in Medieval India*, London, 1921, p 411) We need not, therefore, deplore with him that "unhappily, Madhva did not adhere to this suggestion" ! ( *ibid* ).

An equal and literal emphasis on both difference and identity could never be laid, without logical inconsistency, between two distinct reals such as the Jīva and Brahman. Sāṃkhya would reduce the difference to an "appearance" and retain only identity as factual. Rāmānuja's explanation of "Viśiṣṭāīya" is ultimately, only a figurative explanation of identity in terms of dependence (शेषत्व) and inseparableness (अपृथक्सिद्धि) of the Jīva from Brahman, which are compatible only with difference as foundational. In no case, would it be possible to establish any reconciliation without depreciation of sense somewhere, i.e., subordinating one idea to the other. The objection, in the last analysis, would be, not to the subordination as such, but to its manner, direction and *raison d'être*. The manner of subordination should at least not impugn the status or validity of one set of Śrūtis against another, or degrade it to a lower level as error ridden. But that is what is done by Sāṃkhya! This impugning of the validity of Bheda Śrūtis rests on the assumption that the perception of difference and diversity is due to a projection of Ignorance (Avidyā), the why of it being avowedly a mystery. Thus the Advaitic way reconciling the conflict rests on a series of unwarranted assumptions and is also vitiated by Upajīvyapramanavirodha<sup>1</sup>. The procedure adopted by Madhva, on the other hand, is a smooth one involving no logical interdependence or other defects.

So long as "Abheda" is not accepted as the logical negation of difference, it cannot be regarded as essential identity of Svārūpa. What Nimbarka has done is merely to resort to "Gaunārtha" when he reduces "identity" to "impossibility of an independent existence" (स्वतन्त्रसत्ताभावः p. 31). This is in no way different from Madhva's interpretation of "Abheda" as a figurative one based on the ideas of सादृश्य, प्रधानत्व and स्वात्मन्वय. It is thus but a vain boast that anybody could accommodate the logically incompatible ideas of identity and difference in their primary sense (मूलार्थ). They would certainly cancel each other, if they are equally powerful. If identity is the stronger force, it would swallow up the experience of difference. If, to safeguard difference, "identity" were to be deemed less powerful, it would be impotent and futile. It would thus be impossible to hug to oneself both of them, literally.

1. See under *Anuryakhyāna*



That is why Madhva shows better philosophical judgment and logical discernment in accepting difference as a natural and primary fact of experience (of the Sākṣi and not merely of the senses), and interprets the "identity" spoken of in some of the Scriptural texts, in conformity with (1) the other Scriptural texts that teach the difference between God and the souls and (2) Sākṣi-Pratyakṣa of difference which is inviolable as a primary condition of all certitude, in terms of "Amsatva." Ghate has not, therefore, correctly appraised Madhva's position when he says that he includes both the meanings of Bheda and Abheda in the connotation of the word Amsa (p. 103). The fact, however, is that the idea of amsa, is introduced by Madhva to rationalize the Scriptural references to "identity" with the basic fact of their foundational difference established by experience, reason and revelation. Amsatva is not thus, a substitute for both, but of identity alone. This would have been clear had Ghate looked up Jayatirtha's clear and illuminating commentary on the point, in Madhva's B S B न च साक्षात् भेदाभेदावुपपत्तौ । विरोधान् । अतः श्रुतिद्वयान्ययानुपपत्त्या, भेदमङ्गीकृत्य, अभेदस्याने अशक्यं वक्तव्यमिति भावः ॥ (TP II, 3, 43).

Madhva has also made it clear in his AV that Amsatva stands for a peculiar relation of metaphysical dependence, similarity, and "belonging to" God तत्संबन्धित्वमेवाशत्वम् (J) तत्सादृश्यं तदधीन-सत्तादिमत्त्वम् (NS II, 453)

Ghate has thus foundered badly, in his critical estimate of Madhva's performance as an interpreter of the *Brahmasutras*, partly on account of his superficial knowledge of the general principles of Madhva's Siddhānta and partly on account of his not having taken the AV also into consideration in attempting a critical estimate of Madhva's Sutra-interpretation, and, above all, in not having taken the help of the indispensable commentary of Jayatirtha on the Bhāṣya itself. Had he done so, he would have fared better and revised his estimate of Madhva's Bhāṣya.

#### (4) ANU BHĀŚYA

The *Anu Bhāṣya* is a short metrical summary of the adhikāraṇas of the *Brahmasutras*, in thirtyfour Anuṣṭubhs, said to have been composed to meet a special need of Acyutaprekṣa. The AV

refers to it as a work teeming with a thousand ideas in each verse

अनन्तोऽयं प्रकटितस्त्वयाणी भाष्यसग्रहः । (xv 82)

It is divided into four Adhyāyas, each being the summary of one full chapter of the Būtras. The first chapter shows how the Supreme Being is lauded by a number of names like Prana, Jyotiḥ etc. The second resolves the conflict of Scripture with historical systems and their doctrines and the contradictions of the Scriptures themselves in the statements of the order of creation and dissolution etc. The third deals with the majesty of God and the ways of worship and realisation. The last summarizes the views on Laya and the nature of released state. The work can be described as an Index to the Dvaita interpretation of the Sūtras. The *Tattvamūjari* of Rāghavendra is the best known commentary on the text. There is also an earlier, tho' little known, gloss by a son of Nārāyaṇa Paṇḍitācārya, which will be noticed later.

### (5) ANU-VYAKHYĀNA

(1) The *Anuvyākhyana* (AV) is both a dissertation on the Sūtras and a running commentary and critical supplement to the B S B स्वयं कृतापि तद्व्याख्या त्रियन स्पष्टतार्थतः । Its extent is 1935 granthas as against the 2000 of the Bhāṣya. It is a work in which Madhva has put forth his best efforts at interpretation and criticism. It is undoubtedly a classic in the full sense of the term. It is his *magnum opus*. It has logic, dialectic fire, unity, eloquence and a certain stately music of words. Says Madhva of his own work

अन्योऽयमपि बहुर्यो भाष्य चाख्ययंविस्तरम् ।

बहुज्ञा एव जानन्ति विशेषेणार्थमेतयो ॥

Each line and phrase of it is a veritable seed of ideas. The celebrated commentator Trivikrama Paṇḍitācārya, speaking about it in his *Tattvapradīpa* (vi, 2, 7) says that few can do justice to its meteoric swiftness of thought and the resplendent variety of ideas contained in its lines<sup>1</sup>.

1 कयापि च मुखतो विवृतमपि किमपि पदमभिमुखधिकसितकरत्नलविलसिता मलकवदविरतमनुवीक्ष्यमाणसूत्रार्थजाताना दुर्विगाहमतिमहासमुद्राणा मितपद चेद भाष्य बहुर्यमिह कुर्वता कृपालूनामनुग्रहादर्थक्षिप्तमर्थं दर्शयाम इति । (TD)

(ii) The AV, was written by Madhva, at the request of his favorite disciple Trivikrama Pandita, after his conversion (M V, xv, 86 9) Criticism and constructive exposition are its twin features The author is not satisfied merely with amplifying the meaning of the sutras as explained in the Bhāṣya The explanations of Śaṅkara, naturally, come in for the largest share of his criticism He deals with all shades of Advaitic thought and interpretation The views of Śaṅkara, no less than those of his commentators and elaborators are examined in detail He refutes in full both the Ekajīva-jñāna and Bahujīva-jñānavādas (P 14 b Belgaum Edn) \* The expression "Ataḥ" in the opening sūtra, is explained here in four different ways and one of them is directed against the plea of the unreality of the world of bondage read into it, by the author of the *Samksepasarirāṭa* Cf. —

ब्रह्मज्ञान सूत्रयः सूत्रकारो बन्धोत्पत्तेर्हेतुविध्वसनाय ।

एतत्सर्वं सूचयामास तस्मादेतत्सर्वं भाष्यते भाष्यकारे ॥

and the commentary of Rāmatīrtha on it (p 66) अतो ज्ञानेन बन्धनिवृत्तिः सूचयता, तस्य मिथ्यात्वमपि सोपपत्तिकं सूचितं भवतीति गम्यते ॥ The views of the Vivaraṇakāra on Bhāvarupajñāna and Tatasthalakṣaṇa (in i, 1, 2) are criticized The destructive dialectic of Śrīharsa, is incidentally referred to (AV i, 4, ver 94 95) In ii, 2, 146 48, Ānandabodha's critique of Difference and the special arguments adduced by him are refuted The Iśasiddhi's admission of the irrationality of the concept of Avidyā, is commented upon on two occasions (i, 1, 5 śloka 10 12 and iii, 4, sl 99).

### CRITIQUE OF ADVAITA

In addition to his criticisms of Śaṅkara's interpretations of various Sūtras and adhikāraṇas *passim* Madhva has undertaken a general refutation of some of the fundamental theories of the Advaita Vedānta such as (1) the identity of Jīva and Brahman, (2) the concept of Anirvacanīya, (3) the Advaitic theory of Error, (4) the falsity of the world, (5) and of Difference (p 13 14), (6) the untrustworthiness of empirical means of proof etc These criticisms have a distinct stamp of originality and freshness They are not a *rechauffe* of those of earlier critics of Advaita



## 1. IDENTITY OF JIVA AND BRAHMAN

Madhva opens his attack on the doctrine of Identity by drawing a sharp contrast between the miserable lot of man on earth and the perfect eternal peace and freedom of God. It were blasphemy<sup>1</sup> for a creature like man to think of identity with God. Each moment of his life, man is keenly alive to his thousand imperfections and limitations. These experiences can never be dismissed as illusory. They are felt to be real and true, by the inmost self of man—the Sākṣi,<sup>2</sup> and are never proved to be false within one's own conscious experience ( P. 29, śl 53 )

A hundred texts cannot make a crow white<sup>3</sup>. There may be any number of monistic texts which appear to declare the Jiva and Brahman to be one, still, they cannot be accepted at their face value. For, there is the conflict with the consolidated experience of humanity, which no philosophy can flout with impunity. Not all the texts are admitted at their face value, even by the monist. There is, for instance, a text which says that the handful of grass ( darbha ) is the Sacrificer : *Yajamānāḥ prastarah*. But no one is prepared, on that ground, to identify the grass with the man !

The conviction that the Jīva is other than Brahman is not merely a matter of ordinary experience ( *Pratyaksadrṣṭi* ), but one derived from the teaching of the Scripture itself ( *Sāstradrṣṭi* ). Scripture, when and where it speaks of Brahman and reveals its existence, does so *ex hypothesi* as all knowing, all powerful Controller of the Universe. The "identity texts" can operate, if at all, only after the existence of Brahman is first established. And there is no other way of establishing it, save thro' Śāstra ( B S 1, 1, 3 ). If the identity texts should still have their way, they

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\* Page references to the *Sarva Mūla* ( works of Madhva ) are henceforth to this Edn.

1 Cf Lectures and Addresses by Rabindranath Tagore ed by Anthony X. Soares, Macmillan, 1928 p 152, lines 11 12

2 The doctrine of Sākṣi is a distinctive contribution of Madhva to Indian epistemology. It plays a vital role in his Realism. For a full exposition of the doctrine and the place of Sākṣi in Madhva's philosophy, see my paper in *Siddha Bharati* ( Siddhesvar Varma Com. Vol ) 1950

3 न ह्यागमा सहस्रमपि घट पटयिन्मुनीशत । ( *Bhāmata*, p 6 )

must necessarily give the lie to those august attributes with which the former set of texts had invested the Brahman. But that is hardly possible, or even permissible, since of the two sets of texts, the one that establishes the nature of Brahman as *ex hypothesi* omniscient etc., constitutes the basis (Upa-Jivya) of the other and as between the Upajivya and the Upajivaka (supported), the former is more powerful than the latter.

सावश्चादिगुण जीवाद्भिन्न ज्ञापयति श्रुति ।

ईश सामुपजीव्यैव वर्तते ह्येक्यवादिनी ।

उपजीव्यविराजेन नास्यास्तन्मानता भवेत् ॥ (AV)

These twin principles of (1) agreement with Upajivyaśruti and (2) Sākṣi-Pratyakṣa are the corner-stone of Madhva's interpretation of Advaita Śrutis and their reconciliation with the Bheda-Śrutis (and experience). They are his unique contributions to the problem of harmonizing the two sets of Śrutis. They are foreshadowed in the famous Upanisadic text :

विश्वमवेद पुरुष , तद्विश्वमुपजीवति ।

In view of Upajivya-virodha then, the surface interpretation of the monistic texts must be surrendered so as to make them consistent with the reality of the ईशित्वव्यप्रपञ्च and the implication of the Upajivyaśruti. This can be done with a slight modification of or departure from their literal sense and interpreting the identity spoken of by them in a figurative sense, in any of the following ways (AV 1, 1, sl. 39)

स्वातन्त्र्ये च विशिष्टत्वे स्थानमत्यैक्यमारपि ।

सादृश्ये चैक्यवाक् सम्यक् सावकाशा यथेष्टत ॥

## 2 ATTRIBUTELESS BRAHMAN

Madhva opposes the idea of Brahman as devoid of all attributes (nirviśeṣa). The Sūtrakara ascribes to Brahman such negative attributes as अदृश्यत्व (1, 2, 21). If negative attributes could be admitted and raised to the rank of attributes (guṇa) here अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्ते there is no reason why positive ones could not be admitted. There is no use contending that the Advaitin has no fear of "negative attributes" in Brahman (Abhāvadvaita)<sup>1</sup>, for, every negation implies an affirmation

1 Cf अभावस्या धर्मा नास्ति निघ्नन्ति । (Mandana)

An attribute is an adjective that serves to mark off a given thing from all others. Judged in this light, there is no difference in function between positive and negative attributes. The ascription of negative attributes to Brahman, would still leave it qualified (Sa-viśeṣa) if not Sa dvitīya. Moreover, like negative attributes, the Śrutis predicate positive ones also, such as Sattvam (reality), Jñanam (knowledge) and Anantya (infinity). There is *prima facie* no reason to reject the positive attributes directly. If it is feared that the acceptance of a plurality of positive attributes would shatter the unity of Brahman, the proper solution would seem to lie *not* in denying all characteristics to Brahman, but in trying to find out other ways of conserving the attributes and their reality, without prejudice to the homogeneity of Brahman. The doctrine of Saviśeṣabheda (of Substance and attributes) propounded by Madhva is precisely intended to achieve such a result. The Advaitin, however, thinks that only negative attributes could be accommodated in Brahman. Terms like 'Satyam', 'Jñanam', 'anantam', have power only to deny their opposites of unreality, ignorance and limitation. But unless the denial of opposites affirms some positive features in Brahman, the denial would be in vain, as it would be unable to point out to Brahman *that* from which the opposites are to be distinguished. किं ब्रह्मविशेषणत्वेनासत्त्वादिव्यावृत्तिबोधः प्रयोजनमुच्यते ? उत स्वतत्र एव व्यावृत्तिबोधः ? नाहम् । निविशेषत्वात् । न द्वितीयः, अजिज्ञासितत्वात् । (NS, p. 103) The definition of Brahman in the second sūtra bestows attributes on It by making It the author of the Universe, its protection etc. There is room neither for negative attributes nor for a Nirguna, in this व्यावकाशोऽन निर्गुणे ? (AV) The Monist contends that all attributes like omniscience, which presuppose an "other" (sāpekṣa) are relative and cannot be admitted. If so, he must deny even "existence" to Brahman, for, existence is an idea bound up with the notion of space and time. Knowledge, similarly, implies knowledge "of" something, be it one's own self or an "other". Consistently with his own dictum, the Monist could not also establish Brahman to be "Nirguna", as the conception of Nirguna is *relative* to gunas, and one can't think of Brahman as "Nirguna" without the aid of "Gunas".

We can have no knowledge of Brahman, save thro' Scripture. And if the same Scripture should ascribe attributes to It,



why should we fight shy of them or presume to reject them ? What are we to think of a Scripture which attributes false attributes to Brahman ? If what is taught by Scripture could be untrue in one respect, what assurance is there that the thesis of identity, said to be taught by it, may not be equally untrue ? The explanation of attributes as being due to a superimposition, is of no avail, as superimposition itself presupposes at least one or two general characteristics. But a thing which is claimed to be wholly and utterly devoid of any sort of characteristics whatever, can never become the subject of a superimposition.

सवधर्मविहीनस्य धर्मारोपः कः दृश्यते ?

It would lead to a regress to assume a prior superimposition of some attributes in order to facilitate a subsequent one and so on *ad infinitum* (p. 33)

(iii) The AV in many places supplements the B S B. The equation of Brahman with Visnu in the latter, is here supported by two Sūtras from the *Daśa Mīmamsā* or *Samlarsa-Kanda*, as it is called. So far as at present ascertainable, Madhva is the earliest to cite these two Sūtras and make use of them. They are vouched for by the Viśiṣṭadvaitic literary tradition also. The question whether the definition of Brahman proposed by the Sūtrakāra is an intimate ( *svārūpa* ) or an accidental ( *tatastha* ) one is settled for the first time, in the light of a passage from the *Bhagavata*. The identification of all the five forms of Annamaya, Prāṇamaya, Manomaya, Vijñānamaya and Ānandamaya, as Brahman ( B S B 1, 1, 12-19 ), is supported by a passage from the Vādhula Sākhya. While the Bhāṣya on the fifth adhikāraṇa stops with a criticism of the doctrine of Brahman's *avacyatva* saying सर्वशब्दावाच्यस्य लक्षणायुक्ते the AV goes a step further to anticipate and refute a further line of defence of the Advaitic position, based on Dandin's statement :

इक्षुक्षीरगुडादीनां माधुर्यस्यान्तरं महत् ।

तथापि न तदाख्यातुं सरस्वत्यापि शक्यते ॥

Madhva gives a powerful rejoinder to this, citing from a *Sūdaśāstra* ( work on culinary science )

विशदं क्षीरमाधुर्यं स्थिरमाज्यस्य तीक्ष्णकम् ।

गुडस्य पनसादीनां निर्हारीत्यभिधीयते ॥

The *B S B* makes a summary disposal of Śaṅkara's interpretation of "asabdam" (1 1, 5) नचाशब्दत्वमितरसिद्धम् The *AV.* follows this up with a full statement of the textual evidence in favor of the Śāstraic validity of Prakṛti as a metaphysical category The brief notices of the different systems refuted in 11, 2, is enlarged upon, in the *AV.* The obscurity touching the illustration in 11, 3, 48, is removed and the doctrine of Amsas, in its two-fold aspect, is fully explained

Madhva takes many opportunities afforded by the Sūtras to discuss some of his own metaphysical doctrines and their logical and ontological bearings He discusses for instance his doctrine of Viśeṣas, Difference (as fundamental to things), Sakṣi, natural gradation of souls and Anandataratamya in release

There are two interesting references to Śaivite views in the *AV.*, neither of which is traceable in Śrīkantha's Bhāṣya One of them refers to the way in which the Śaiva philosopher seeks to establish the validity of his Āgamas by a process of inference from one portion of it which is fruitful The other is to the interpretation of the *Tapanīya Śruti*

ऋत सत्य पर ब्रह्म पुरुष कृष्णविद्भगवत् ।

कृष्णरेत विरुपाक्ष शंकर नीललोहितम् ॥

on the basis of which the Śaiva seeks to identify Brahman with Śiva There is no trace of *this Śruti* in Śrīkantha, tho' the three quarters of *T A x*, 12, 1, cited by him, agree with those of the *Tapanīya* cited by Madhva But the crux of the problem here hinges on the fourth pada of the *Tapanīya*, which is nowhere cited by Śrīkantha It is evident that Madhva is trying with some difficulty, to give a suitable explanation<sup>1</sup> of the text cited by a Śaiva commentator He is probably one of the Pro Madhva commentators named in the list of Nārāyaṇa Pandita

1 Madhva splits the text into two halves one referring to Viṣṇu (in the accusative) and the other to Rudra in the nominative (neuter) implying the latter's subordination to Viṣṇu

विरुपाक्षमपर ब्रह्मैव तद्वन्न स्यितम् । (*AV*)

## (6) NYĀYA VIVARAṆA

The *Nyāyavivaraṇa* is a small prose tract in 420 granthas giving the gist of the leading Adhikaranas of the B.S., and explaining their Pūrvapakṣa and Siddhānta yuktis. It deals with the technical formalities of interpretation. It is later than the *B.S.B.* and the *AP* : कृत्वा साध्यानुभाष्ये (p i.) \* \* \* \* \*

व्याख्यानुव्याख्ययोरेव विस्तरौ यदुदीरितः ।

तन्व्यायोद्धरणे शक्ता ॥ ( p. 16 ).

It gives a clear outline of Madhva's interpretation of the crucial adhikaranas,—all side-issues being eschewed and quotations reduced to the barest minimum.





## CHAPTER XIII

### PURĀNA PRASTHĀNA

#### (7) BHĀGAVATA TĀTPARYA

As is well known, the *Bhagavata Purana* ranks as one of the Gospels of Vaisnavism and has, as such been held in high esteem by all Vaisnava thinkers of India. The systems of Vallabha and Caitanya have been very much influenced by the doctrine of erotic devotion (प्रेमभक्ति) associated with this Purāṇa. Rāmānuja, in the 11th century, had, however, ignored it, probably because, it had not been cited by Saṅkara and had not so much ostensible support to give to his doctrine of "Abhinnaṇimittopadanavāda" as the *Viṣṇu Purana*<sup>1</sup>. Taking advantage of this silence of the great Vaisnava philosopher, the note of extreme transcendentalism of that Purāṇa and the general ambiguity of its utterances

यत्र त्रिसर्गो मृपा ( 1, 1, 1 ) तत्त्व यज्ज्ञानमद्वयम् ( 1, 2, 11 )

पश्यत्यात्मनि चात्मानम् ( 1, 2, 12 )

सत्तामात्र तु यत्किञ्चित् सदसच्चाविशेषितम् ( 1, 2, 12 )

निर्विकल्प ( 1, 4, 4 )

समधिगतोऽस्मि विधूतभेदमोह ( 1, 9, 49 ), 11, 1, 31 35,

एकरसम् ( x, 87, 19 ).

एक पर ज्योतिरनन्यमद्वयम् ( x, 94, 18 )

एतावानेव वेदार्थं शब्द आस्थाय भाषिदाम् ।

मायामात्रमनूद्यन्ते प्रतिविध्य प्रशाम्यति ॥ ( xi, 21, 44 )

मनोमात्रम् ( xi, 21, 44 ) अद्वितीयम् ( xi, 28, 36 )

अमूलम् ( xi, 28, 18 ), केवलम् ( xi, 28, 19 ),

xi, 28, 4, 7, 22; 33, अयंवाद ( xi, 28 37 ).

अनृतम् ( xi 29 22 ),

many exponents of the Advaita school had written commentaries on it. The commentaries of Citsukha and Punyaranya mentioned

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1. Cf भूतानि विष्णुर्भुवनानि विष्णु and other numerous passages cited in the *Śrībhāṣya*

by Jivagosvāmin, in his *Satsandarbhā*<sup>1</sup>, evidently belong to this class. Of these, the commentary of Panyāranya is definitely said to have been overthrown by Madhva, in his *B T*<sup>2</sup>. The evidence furnished by Madhva in his *B T*, shows that he was contending with powerfully established Advaitic commentaries on the Purāṇa. His comments, being as usual, too brief, it is not possible to fix the identity of those assailed by him. That it was not Śrīdhara Svāmin is clear from a careful comparison of passages. The Advaitic interpretations of Śrīdhara, are, for one thing, different from those assailed by Madhva<sup>3</sup>. Secondly, Śrīdhara himself, is not so obdurately monistic in the interpretation of passages, which on Madhva's showing, appear to have been monistically interpreted by certain leading Advaitic commentators. Cf Śrīdhara on आ लयम् ( 1, 1, 3 )<sup>4</sup> पर न यत्पदम् ( 11, 9, 9 ) and Madhva's comments on these. It seems probable that Śrīdhara came some time after Madhva and was also to some extent influenced by his views and interpretations, without prejudice to his devotion to Advaita and was even indebted to him for one or two of his quotations<sup>5</sup> (known to us only thro' Madhva)

Madhva's *Bhagavata Tatparya* (*B T*) is a running commentary in some 3600 granthas. Out of a total of 18,000 verses of the Purana, he has commented upon some 1600. The comments are,

1 His commentary on the *Bhagavata*. See iv, 4, 13, iv, 7, 37, and iv, 20, 11 etc

2 यदव किल दृष्ट्वा श्रीमध्वाचार्यचरणैर्वैष्णवान्तराणां तच्छिष्यपुण्याख्या-  
दिरीतिकव्याख्याप्रवेशशङ्कया तत्र तात्पर्यन्तिर लिखद्भिः \* \* \* \*

( *Satsandarbhā*, p 18, with c of Baladeva )

3 Cf स्वलक्षणं ( x, 70, 5 ) विद्यात्मनि भिदाबोध ( xi, 19, 14 )

4 Madhva does not expressly interpret the आ here as "inclusive of", tho' he is definitely in favor of the continuation of Bhakti, in Moksa, as Śrīdhara has interpreted here. It may, however, be noted in passing, that the injunction पिवत and the presence of the term मुवि would not favor Śrīdhara's view here

5 The text आततत्वाच्च मातृत्वादामा हि परमा हरिः | quoted by Śrīdhara ( *Bhag* xi, 2, 45 ) from "Tantra" ( 1 e Pañcarātra ), is the same as that cited by Madhva, in his *VTN* from the *Paramaśruti* of the Pancaratra literature ( p 7 Bby edn with Jayatīrtha's com. Similarly, another text cited by Śrīdhara from *Skanda* (under *Bhag* xi, 11, 3) बन्धको भवपाशेन, is evidently borrowed from Madhva

as usual with him, very brief and always to the point and augmented by quotations from a variety of sources, particularly from the *Saṃhitās* of the *Pañcarātra* and their subsidiary literature, which are profusely cited by him, in the *B T*. His object is to reconcile all the seeming contradictions of the text and bring out the essentially Theistic and transcendental realism of the *Purāṇa*, that appears here and there, to be pushed into the background by a monistic note. He does not, therefore go into all the verses, but only into the "Tātparya" or purport of such crucial passages. The contradictions are perhaps due to an undercurrent of "implicit monism" running thro' the text emphasizing the transcendent majesty of God, to the exclusion of all else side by side with its basic philosophy of *Seśvara-Sāṃkhya* thought, emphasizing the reality of the created world and its values and preaching the ethics of *Niskāma-karma*, *Jñāna* and *Bhakti*, as means of Salvation. Madhva reconciles all these contradictions with the help of his ideology of *Svatantradvītiya-tattvavāda*.

ऐकात्म्यज्ञानतो याति तमो, भेदात्पर पदम् ।

स्वातन्त्र्यपारतन्यादिज्ञान भेददृशिर्भवेत् ॥

इति ब्रह्मवैवर्ते (B T x, 4, 19)

The i, ii and iii Skandhas are cursorily treated by Madhva. His attention is mainly directed to the x and xi Skandhas, which strike a strong note of Transcendentalism, verging on a Monism. The chapters on *Kṛṣṇa-Uddhava Samvāda* (xi, 6-29) are particularly tinged with monistic phraseology and ideas, which have been fully exploited by monistic commentators. Madhva tones down these passages and brings them into line with his Transcendental Theism of *Svatantradvītiya Brahmapada*, with the help of a large number of texts drawn from the unexplored *Pañcarātra* literature (some of which seem to have been intimately connected with the thought of the *Bhāgavata* and its interpretation, as may be seen from the close correspondence of thought disclosed by Madhva's citations from them with that of the *Purāṇa* and also from independent evidence,) <sup>1</sup> such as the *Brahmatarka*, *Tantra-Bhagavata*, *Mayāraṃbhava*, *Padma (tantra)*, *Tattvaviveka*, *Sattatva*, *Praṇīta* etc. It is possible that like the *Purāṇas*, the *Pañcarātra-Saṃhitās* too had "softened and modified" the extreme monism of some of the *Upanisadic* passages and that they also represent



or contain at least one important school of ideas regarding the philosophy of the Upanisads and the Sūtras (cf Das Gupta, *op cit* iii, 496) It is interesting to note that Madhva, in his commentary on *Bhagavata* 1, 1, 1, gives an extract from the *Tantra-Bhagavata*, which is a close Theistic paraphrase of that verse

The other Skandhas, where controversial points are few and far between, are skipped over by Madhva, in a few pages His text shows many interesting and important variants from Sridhar's vulgate Some of them<sup>1</sup> have important bearing on doctrinal issues

Despite the popularity enjoyed by Advaitic commentaries on the Purāṇa, there is good support for the essential aspects of Madhva's distinctive type of Theism, in it This is clear from a general view of important passages

द्रव्यं कर्म च कालश्च स्वभावो जीव एव च ।

यदनुग्रहतं सन्ति न सन्ति यदुपेक्षया ॥ ( ii 10, 12 )

इदं हि विश्वं भगवानिन्देत्तरो यतो जगत्स्थाननिरोधसम्भवः ( i, 5, 20 )

These two represent the corner-stone of Madhva's philosophy He cites them often in his works The first teaches the eternal dependence of 'nityapadarthas' like Prakṛti, Jīvas, Time, etc on Brahman and shows that their very existence, eternity and other characteristics are metaphysically dependent on the Divine Will His conception of Brahman as the One Independent Reality in the sense of being सर्वसत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिनियामकम् is directly derived from this verse The other text gives Madhva his clue to the reconciliation of Identity texts (like सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म) with the reality of the world (See his *B S B* i, 1, 17). There are passages that distinctly recognize the existence of Prakṛti as a distinctive material principle, which is energized by God These are cited by Madhva to rebut the charge of "Asabdatvam" brought against Prakṛti, by other commentators on *B S* i, 1, 5

सदसद्रूपया चासौ गुणमय्यागुणो विभुः ( i, 2 30 )

यत्तन्निगुणमव्यक्तं नित्यं सदसदात्मकम् ।

स एव भूयो निजवीर्यचोदिता स्वजीवमाया प्रकृतिः सिसृक्षतीम् (i, 10 22)

प्रधानं प्रकृतिं प्राहुरविशेषं विशेषवत् ॥

पञ्चभिः पञ्चभिर्ब्रह्म चतुर्भिर्दशभिस्तथा ।

एतच्चतुर्विंशतिकं गणं प्राधानिकं विदुः ( iii, 28, 10 11 )

त्वं देव शक्त्या गुणकमयोनी रेतस्त्वजाया कविरादधेऽजः ( *op cit* )

1 स्वलक्षणं ( x, 70, 5 ) भिदाबोधः ( xi, 19 40 )

There is clear recognition of the view that "Bheda Jñāna" or realisation of difference between God and souls and the world, constitutes saving knowledge. These texts are cited by Madhva in his B S B

विद्यात्मनि भिदाबोध ( xi, 19 40 ) भेददृष्ट्याऽभिमानेन (iii, 33 12)  
The Brahman is declared to be Saguna, nay, infinite, in its attributes

कर्तृत्वात्सगुण ब्रह्म ( iii, 33, 12 )

मय्यनन्तगुणेऽनन्ते गुणतोऽनन्तविग्रहे ( vi, 4, 48 )

and expressed by all sacred texts:

नारायणपरा वेदा ( ii, 5, 15 )

मा विघत्ते ऽभिधत्ते मा विकल्प्योऽपाह्य इत्यहम् ( xi 21, 43 )

Bhakti is the means of redemption

श्रेयं स्रुतिं भक्तिमुदस्य ये विभा तुष्यन्ति ये केवलबोधलब्धये  
तेषामसौ वलेदाल एव शिष्यते \* \* ॥ ( x 14 4 )

पानेन ते देव कथासुधाया प्रवृद्धभक्त्या \* \* ( iii, 6, 24 )

There is gradation ( *taratamya* ) in Bhakti and Moksa

भक्तिं सिद्धेर्गरीयसी ( iii, 25, 33 ) नैकात्म्यता मे स्पृहयन्ति केचित्  
(iii, 25, 34) नैकस्वमप्युक्त दीयमानं न गृण्णन्ति (iii, 29, 13).

Moksa is the realization of innate bliss of selfhood:

मुक्तिर्हित्वान्यथारूपं स्वरूपेण व्यवस्थिति (ii, 10, 6)

Personality persists in Moksa

तस्मै स्वलोकं भगवान्सभाजितं सदशायामास परं न यत्पदम्

\* \* कराति मानं बहुधा विभूतिभिः (ii 9, 9-13)

The Supreme is Vishnu

सत्त्वं रजस्तम इति प्रकृतेर्गुणास्तैर्युक्तं परं पुरुष एव इहास्य धत्ते ।

सृष्ट्यादिना हरिविरिचिहरेतिसत्ता श्रेयासि तत्र खलु सत्त्वतनौ नृणां स्युः  
(1 2 24)

निमित्तमात्रमोक्षस्य विश्वसर्गेनिरोधयो ।

हिरण्यगर्भं शवंश्च कालाख्यारूपिणस्तव ॥ (x, 71, 8).

Only difficult words and obscure passages are explained by Madhva. In all cases, he supports his interpretations with suitable authorities. Such citations are an outstanding feature of this work. More than one hundred and ninetyfive works, other than the well

known ones, are cited. Where occasion demands, certain fundamental questions of religion and philosophy are raised and discussed with reference to authorities. The bulk of quotations are from the numerous *Saṁhitās* and other works of the *Pañcarātra* notably the *Brahmatarka*, *Kapileya*,<sup>1</sup> the *Tantrabhagavata*<sup>2</sup> and the *Mahā (sanātkumara) Saṁhita*<sup>3</sup>

### (8) MAHĀBHĀRATA-TATPARYA-NIRNAYA

Long before the time of Madhva, the great Epic had attained its present encyclopaedic character and was universally accepted as a great authority on philosophical questions, too. Great Vedantic teachers like Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja had quoted frequently from it. Its essentially Theistic background was considered a great point of strength by Madhva. He therefore went a step further and claimed it as one of the important source books of his system, next only to the Vedas, in authority.

ऋग्यजु सामाथर्वाश्च भारत पञ्चरात्रवम् ।

मूलरामायणं चैव शास्त्रमित्यभिधीयते ॥

(*Shānda*, q by Madhva B S B 1, 1, 1)

The Epic is called the 'fifth Veda'. Madhva claims it contains esoteric truths not to be found even in the Vedas. He reads an esoteric and allegorical meaning into the Epic kernel which has important bearing on the theology of his system, on its hierarchical side. His epitome of the Epic may be described as an encyclopaedia of the religious and philosophical tenets of the Dvaita system and its theology.

On the basis of some significant authorities which he brings together in the second chapter of his work, and by virtue of its position as the fifth Veda, Madhva regards the Epic as furnishing the key to the correct interpretation of the theosophy of the *Vedaśāstra*.

1 Schrader, 'Introd to Pañcarātra,' List No 28

2 We are told by Jiva Gosami that it was a sort of running commentary on the *Bhagavata* and mentioned as such in the *Hayasirsa Pañcarātra* तस्यैव श्रीमद्भागवतस्य भाष्यभूत श्रीहयशीर्षपञ्चरात्रे शास्त्रप्रस्तावे गणितं तत्र भागवताभिधं तन्त्रम् ॥ (*Satsandarbhā*, with c of Baladeva, p 17) Madhva's *BT* has numerous quotations from this work, which is not now available to us.

3 Schrader, no 113



भारतव्यपदेशेन ह्याम्नायार्थश्च दक्षित ।

The Epic is an illustrative commentary on Vedic philosophy and religion. It provides, under the guise of a historical narrative a vivid allegory of the incessant conflict between the forces of Theism and Atheism in life and the ultimate triumph of Theism and morality. There is thus a striking parallel to Zoroastrian and Hebraic ideology of Theism vs anti Theism, in this reading of the esoteric significance of the Epic, by Madhva with this difference that to Madhva as a Vedāntin the reality of the conflict is made the keener by the said forces being not merely symbolized by the gods and their enemies presiding over these forces but by their being actually worked out by them, in and thro their own lives also, as participators in the drama of life, thereby shaping their own destinies and evolving themselves to their fullest stature, as units in the Cosmic evolution and serving as models of good and bad to human beings. The Adhyātmic allegory of the Epic is worked out by Madhva (*Mbh T N* 11, 144-48)

• भक्तिर्ज्ञानं सुवेराग्यं प्रज्ञा मेधा घृति स्थिति ।

योग प्राणो बलं चैव वृकोदर इति स्मृत ॥

सर्वविद्या द्रौपदी च यस्मात्सर्वं सरस्वती ।

अज्ञानादिस्वरूपस्तु कलिर्दुर्मोघतः स्मृत ॥

विपरीतं तु यज्ज्ञानं दुःशासन इतीरित ।

नास्तिक्यं शकुनिर्नाम सर्वदोषात्मका परे

घातं राष्ट्रास्त्वहकारो द्रौणो ह्यद्रात्मको यत ।

द्रोणाद्य इन्द्रियाण्येव पापान्यन्ये तु सैनिका

पाण्डवेयास्तु पुण्यानि येषां विष्णुर्नियामकः ॥

and 11, 66 तन्मिममेव सुरासुरसन्धये हरिकृतं प्रविशेत्पुनरीक्षितुम् ।

प्रतिविभज्य च भीमसुयोधनो स्वपरपक्षभिदा कथिता कथा ॥

According to Madhva, the cosmic purpose of God,—the deliverance of the gods and the damnation of the Āsuric—is signified in one of its introductory verses

सृष्ट्वा ब्रह्मादयो येन निहता येन दानवा ।

तस्मै दवादिदेवाय नमस्ते शाङ्गपाणये ॥

Bhīma is the chosen instrument of this divine purpose

भूभारहरणे विष्णो प्रधानाङ्गं हि मारुति ।

The character of Bhīma is therefore idealized and shown to the

best advantage, over all the Epic characters, next to Kṛṣṇa,<sup>1</sup> Madhva cites valuable and interesting evidence of the tributes paid to Bhīmasena by Kṛṣṇa<sup>2</sup> Yudhiṣṭhira<sup>3</sup> and Duryodhana (iv, 28, 16 21)<sup>4</sup>, in the Epic, to show that he is by common consent, regarded as the central hero of the Epic and the chosen instrument of the Lord to carry out his purpose. He has naturally softened incidents like Bhīma's drinking the blood of Duśśasana ( *Mbh T N* xxvii, 146 48 ) the hitting of Duryodhana below the belt in the *gadayuddha* ( xxviii, 74 87 ) and the falling off of Bhīma's body in the *Mahāprasthānaparva* ( xxxii, 67 82 )

The Epic is, thus a theistic document in essence नारायणकथा as it is called therein. The story as such is but the outer vesture. The central thesis is the supremacy of God Viṣṇu ( Kṛṣṇa ) who is the conductor of the cosmic drama. Madhva devotes the first two chapters of his work to an elucidation of the main principles of his interpretation on these lines and the theological sanctions upon which this ideology rests. The most important tenet is of course, the transcendent majesty of God. He is unique. There is no one like Him along all the gods, nor any equal to Him. As equality itself is an impossible idea, any identity of the human self with the Divine is out of the question ( p 20 21 ) God is the Lord of all. The world of matter and souls, is forever, dependent on Him and is distinct for ever from Him. He is the perfect Being, endowed with all the auspicious attributes. But this theoretical perfection of the Deity is often belied by the weaknesses and imperfections betrayed by the Avatars of the Deity in their earthly careers said to be undertaken for the edification of humanity. The Hindu philosopher, has thus a difficult task of trying to "justify the ways of God to man",—ways, which, in some cases, human logic and ethical standards find it difficult to reconcile with its ideas of godliness. These difficulties would be seen to

1 Cf Bhattanarayana, *Viṇṣaṃhara* 1, 23 *Mbh T N* 27, 149

2 यत्किञ्चात्मनि कल्याण सभावयसि पाण्डव ॥

महत्तुगुणमप्येतत् त्वयि सभावयाम्यहम् ॥ ( v. 75, 3 Critical Edn )

अस्मिन्त्युद्धे भीमसेन त्वयि भार समाहित ।

धूरजुनेन वोढव्या वोढव्या इतरे जना ॥ ( v 75 18 Critical Edn )

3 धर्मश्चार्यश्च कामश्च मोक्षश्चैव यशो ध्रुवम् ।

त्वय्यायसमिद सर्वं सर्वलोकस्य पश्यत ॥

4 Found in Mss, of Southern Recension of the Epic

create a serious problem in theology and dogmatics. They are not, however, peculiar to Hinduism. Every religion has its own share of them. But a Hindu Theist pledged to the doctrine of Chavkazatā between the two currents of Hindu religious philosophy,—between the rich Vedic mythologies and the sectarian legends of the Puranas, which abound in such difficulties and inconvenient situations,—the problem of “ethicizing” the behavior of the gods, and the dealings of the Avatars, is a difficult one. Madhva rises equal to the occasion and develops a network of theological technique to solve these contradictions between the actual and the ideal nature of the deities, between the theory and the practical behavior of the Avatars of God, celebrated in the Epics and Purānas and maintain a satisfactory and balanced conception of the Deity. He has been the *only Indian thinker* who has given his special attention to this important problem of Theology and shown the necessary boldness and resourcefulness in tackling it. Of course, the solutions proposed by him, rest mostly on *textual sanctions and theodicies*, but, within the limits of the texts and traditions of Hindu thought, that have come down to us, it is not possible to adopt a different method or draw a different conclusion.

The historical value of the *Mbh T N*, lies in its being the earliest *datable* running commentary on the Epic, in Sanskrit. It is not, of course, a commentary, in the strict sense of the term. But, in so far as it traverses the entire course of the history of the Kuru Pandavas, without omitting any of the major incidents, its importance to the “text criticism” of the Epic, becomes considerable, all the more so, when we have it from Madhva himself that he had travelled all over the land in search of mss., of the Epic, collected a good number of them of various recensions and then fixed the standard text for himself to follow and comment upon.

देशे देशे तथा ग्रन्थान् दृष्ट्वा चैव पृथग्विधान् । (*Mbh T N* II, 7)

He even complains in the manner of a modern scholar, that the text of the Epic, had, in most cases, been sadly mutilated beyond recognition or restoration, that numerous interpolations had crept in, and that, therefore, he has had to take all possible care, advice and guidance in establishing the correct and genuine text (*Mbh T N* II, 36) :—



क्वचित् ग्रन्थान् प्रक्षिपन्ति क्वचिदन्तरितानपि ।  
 कुर्युः क्वचिच्च व्यत्यास प्रमादात्क्वचिदन्यथा ॥  
 अनुच्छिन्ना अपि ग्रन्था व्याकुला इति सर्वशः ।  
 उत्सन्ना प्रायशः सर्वे कोट्यशोऽपि न वतत ॥  
 कलावव व्याकुलित निर्णयाय प्रचादित ।

\* \* \* \*

The Editors of the "Critical Edition" of the Mahabhārata ( the M O R I ) have really missed much valuable material for their work, in having utterly ignored the existence of such a work as this. It ought to have been consulted at least as one of the Testimonia (See p xxv Prolegomena, Critical Edn ) It should not have been passed over because of its religio philosophical standpoint in epitomizing the Epic

In the Prolegomena to his epitome, Madhva elaborates his theory of a threefold interpretation of the Epic into (1) historical, (2) allegorical, and (3) metaphysical

मन्वादि भारत केचिदास्तिकादि तथापरे ।

तथापरिचराद्यन्ये भारत प्रवदन्ति हि<sup>1</sup> ॥ ( Mbh 1, 1, 50 )

The historical (*astika*) is the one normally associated with the actual Epic setting. The allegorical (*manvadi*) sees in the internecine warfare of the Kuru Pāndavas, the eternal conflict between the forces of good and bad, on the moral plane. The metaphysical (*nyasa-cara*) attempts an Adhyātmic attunement of the text ( Mbh T N 11 43 ), drawing its inspiration mainly from those contexts which elaborate the nature of the Supreme

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1 Modern scholars treat this verse as referring to three different "beginnings" of the Epic text. See C V Vaidya, *Mahabharata, A Criticism* 1945 p 5, fn 2, 'tho' there is no śloka beginning with Manu, in the Ādi Parva". Moreover, the Āstika, Manu and Uparicara chapters are not so widely separated from each other in the Epic and it seems pointless to recognise three different beginnings for this reason. The verse seems to have a symbolic meaning as suggested by Madhv. The late Dr V S Sukthankar *Mahabharata* ( Asiatic Soc of I into the "gestalt" of the Epic at what he calls the *mundane, ethical and metaphysical planes*

## SUMMARY

The work runs to thirtytwo chapters. The first two provide the necessary theosophic background to the author's exposition of the philosophy of the *Epico*. The work opens with a brief account of primeval creation and goes on to emphasize the supremacy of Visnu besides discussing the relative validity of texts and methods of their harmonized interpretation. Reasons are given for setting aside the Saiva Purāṇas, when they contradict the Vedaśāstra. The threefold classification of souls, accepted by Madhva, is referred to in 1, 87 ff. A hierarchical system like Madhva's has inevitably to make room for varying standards of spiritual fitness and efficiency as well as of means and ends (*Sādhana*), such as Karma, Jñāna, and Bhakti and their fruit. Dāna, Tīrtha, Tapas and Yajna are declared to be inferior *Sādhana*s. Unalloyed devotion, alone, qualifies for salvation. Verse 1, 86, gives an almost classical definition of Bhakti, what it is and what it is not (1, 113). In respect of *Sādhana*s, Brahmā alone, as the highest of souls can concentrate on all the infinite attributes of Godhead. Human beings cannot concentrate on more than four fundamental attributes of Divinity. सच्चिदानन्द आत्मेति । The Devas can concentrate on a few more, according to their capacity.<sup>1</sup>

Chapters iii ix, are devoted to a critical summary of the *Ramayana*. Madhva shows an amount of pious ingenuity in explaining away such episodes as reflect unfavorably on his heroes and heroines. The supremacy of Rama as Visnu and the divinity of Sita are zealously and courageously upheld, with many reorientations of "compromising situations", with profuse reference to

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1 Cf "There are only two attributes of God of which we, humans have any knowledge at all. The being of God is not however confined within the limits of human experience. Our knowledge of God is real so far as it goes. But reality is beyond us. There are an infinite number of other aspects of the Deity along which we cannot travel since we are restricted to two lines of approach only, viz mind and matter." W. G. Bond *Three Things that Matter—Religion, Philosophy and Science*, p. 73, Watts, London.

authorities, and fictions of theodicy.' The encounter of Paraśurāma with Rama and the former's 'defeat' are skilfully explained away. Ravana is made to carry away not the real Sītā but a "Pratikṛti" into which life had been breathed. Rama is aware of the fact all along, but just 'pretends' to go thro' all the suffering and privation like a human lover. Madhva relies on *Bhāgarata* (v, 19, § 6) also, in this connection.

The story of the *Mahabhārata* is elaborately dealt with, following the Epic narrative with "critical" comments on the above lines wherever called for, from Chapters x to xxxii.<sup>2</sup> The work concludes with an account of the rise of Buddhistic and Jain schools and the rise of Mayāvada in the Kali Age and the advent of Madhva himself for the rehabilitation of Theism.

Madhva handles a variety of metres with remarkable skill and consistency. There is a ring of Epic dignity about his style. The *Mbh. T. N.* is the biggest metrical work of Madhva and is, by no means, a negligible performance—judged even from the point of view of extent, which is about 6000 granthas. There is no doubt he possessed a natural gift for poetry, but the plan and purpose of his work have made anything more than a few passing flashes of his aptitude in that direction, impossible. It is not, therefore, a Kāvya in the accepted sense of the term.

1. In the encounter with Paraśurama, the demon Atula is introduced (iv). See also episode of *Nagapaśa*.

2. Chapters xiii and xvi-xvii, are based on the *Bhāgarata* Purana story.



## CHAPTER XIV

### DASA PRAKARANAS

"Daśa-Prakaranas" is the name collectively given to ten minor philosophical tracts of Madhva. They are (1) the *Pramana laksana* (PL), (2) the *Katha-Laksana* (KL), (3) the *Upadhi khandana* (UK), (4) the *Mayavada-khandana* (MK), (5) the *Prapañca Mithyatanumana-Khandana* (PMK), (6) the *Tattvasamikhuana* (TS), (7) the *Tattvaviveka* (TV), (8) the *Tattvodyota* (Td), (9) the *Viśnu-Tattva-Nirnaya* (VTN), and (10) the *Karma Nirnaya* (KN). They deal with the various aspects of the Dvaita system, its logic, ontology, theology, theory of knowledge etc. Five of them (nos 3, 4, 5, 8 and 9) are refutations of the Monistic Idealism of Śaṅkara, from various points of view. Nos 6-9, may be described as constructive works devoted to the exposition of Madhva's cosmic scheme, ontological categories and general metaphysics. The language of these Prakaranas is throughout tough and terse. But for the lucid commentaries of Jayatīrtha on them, they would still have remained obscure. Except the VTN, all the others are short works.

#### (9) PRAMANA LAKSANA

(1) In traditional accounts of systems of Indian thought it is usual to begin with a statement of the number and nature of *Prāmāṇas*, i.e., sources or guarantors of correct knowledge, recognized by a given system. Max Muller expresses great admiration for this practice of Indian writers, as it removes a good deal of misunderstanding and makes the task of philosophical assessment of a given system easy.

Following this time honored practice, Madhva indicates in his PL, the number of *Prāmāṇas* admitted by him, their definitions, modes of functioning and the nature of reality apprehended by them. We are told at the end of the work that the exposition follows the *Brahmatarka* of Vyasa, not now extant.

(ii) The attacks made by the Advaitins, pursuing the dialectic method of inquiry and refutation of the Buddhists, on the Nyaya-Vaiśeṣika Realism, its categories and thought-measuring devices seem to have been responsible in its turn for the composition of such works as the PL, by Madhva, in an attempt obviously at perfecting his own system and making it proof against similar attacks<sup>1</sup>. He has therefore taken due note of the criticisms of Advaitic dialecticians like Vimuktatman and Anandabodha, against various types of realism and has endeavoured to discard much that was superfluous or illogical, in the older systems of Realism, while improving upon all that was of permanent value and metaphysical merit in them.

(iii) The Naiyayikas themselves, had, as a result of outside criticism, introduced many new changes in the *minutiae* and methodology of their system. Much of the old looseness of thought and vocabulary had been shed and a new school of logic inaugurated by Gaṅgeśa Upadhyaya, with a staggering paraphernalia of technical jargon, had come into being.

(iv) Tho' a realist himself, Madhva had his own differences with the Nyaya Vaiśeṣikas<sup>2</sup>. He had therefore to traverse the entire field of realistic logic and metaphysics over again with a newer outlook. A certain measure of constructive exposition of one's own views becomes necessary in such cases, from a comparative and critical standpoint. It was to these tasks then, that Madhva addressed himself, in his Prakaranas.

A Pramana, as ordinarily understood, is a means or guarantor of valid knowledge प्रमाकरण प्रमाणम्. But to Madhva, it has a wider and a higher denotation also, viz., the core of reality itself यथार्थं प्रमाणम्. Pramana embraces, in its fold, reality, knowledge and the means of such knowledge. True knowledge *per se* is "Kevala Pramana". What leads to it is "Anu Pramana".

1 It is significant that one of Vimuktatman's works bears the title of "Pramanavrttanirnaya" (See his *Istasiddhi*, p. 37, G O S). Madhva's dialectic style and method and many turns of expression, often recall the *Istasiddhi* (which was one of the works studied by him under his Guru). The work seems to have given a powerful incentive to his critical zeal.

2 See Part III Chap. xx

Sense-perception, Inference and Verbal testimony come under the latter.

Madhva accepts but three Pramāṇas<sup>1</sup> as fundamental Pra-tyaksa (sense perception) Anumāna (inference) and Āgama (verbal testimony or Scripture) The additional Pramāṇas recognized in other systems, such as the Upamāna of Gautama and the Arthapatti of the Mīmāṃsakas are subsumed under Inference "Anupalabdhi" of the Bhattas, is subsumed partly under Inference and partly under Perception, and "Sambhava" and "Parīkṣa" under Inference The scheme of Pramāṇas is thus considerably simplified and reduced to the barest limits of logical necessity The subject of fallacies is similarly treated The number of अवयव terms or members indispensable for an adequate statement of a syllogism is cut down to the barest minimum Madhva makes no fetish of the exact number of Avayavas that will have to be recognized for a complete syllogism As a general rule, he is for three प्रतिज्ञा, हेतु and दृष्टान्त and dispenses with the well-known scheme of five membered syllogism (पञ्चावयववाक्य) of the Naiyāyikas<sup>2</sup> Even a bare proposition implying a probans (hetu) will do, or even a proposition involving a middle term The subject of Nigrahasthānas (points for closure of a debate) is also similarly treated The Nyāya definition of Pramāṇa as सम्यगनुभवसाधनम् is analysed and refuted The validity of Smṛti (recollection) denied by some philosophers, is resolutely maintained<sup>3</sup> Madhva says, in this connection, that the very edifice of experience would collapse, if the validity of our recollection is impugned अप्रामाण्या गीकारे, अनुभूत मयेत्यत्र प्रमाणाभावात् । To try to establish the validity of our past experience thro' inference involves needless strain

1 Like the Sāṃkhya (cf *Sāṃkhyaparīkṣā*, 4), the Yogas and Bhasarvajña among Naiyāyikas.

2 *Nyāyasūtra* I 1, 32

3 On the validity of Smṛti cognition see Umesh Miśra's article in the Pathak Com Vol pp 177-86 The vindication of the status of Smṛti as a valid experience within the meaning of "यथार्थम्" is one of the distinctive and outstanding contributions of Madhva, to Indian thought He establishes its right to validity both in the extended sense of प्रमाण as यथार्थम् and in the narrow sense of अनधिगतार्थगन्तु—as admitted by the Bhattas and the Advaitins (See *AV* III, p 34)



and violence to experience लिङ्गत्वेन प्रामाण्यकल्पने, कल्पनागौरव, दृष्ट-  
हानिश्च । The domain of prameyas is then exhaustively dealt with.  
The number of granthas in the PL is 50

### (10) KATHĀ LAKSANA

This is a metrical monograph in 25 anustubhs devoted to the exposition of the subject of debate, and the rules and regulations governing its conduct. Here also, the exposition is said to follow the *Brahmatarka*.

Debates and disputations for the purpose of settling doctrinal differences and for the ascertainment of truth were common enough in the intellectual life of the 12th and 13th centuries, in India. In the ancient days, the Buddhists, Jains and Naiyāyikas had been the makers of Logic and the leaders in debate. Between the 10th and 12th centuries, the shield was entirely with the Advaitins. Madhva's object in writing the *Kathalakṣaṇa*, must have been to train his disciples to become adepts in the art of debate and be able to carry fire and sword into the enemies' camp. Some of his peculiar views on the different aspects of the subject, also, called for a suitable medium of presentation.

Madhva insists upon the recognition of three types of debate - वाद, जल्प, and वितण्डा, rejecting the other classifications attempted by the Buddhists, Śrīharsa and the Naiyāyikas. Vāda, is the purest form of debate carried on solely for the ascertainment of truth. Jalpa is a less exalted form of it, which may be indulged in either as a test of ability or for victory.<sup>1</sup> Vitandā is cleansed of much of its bad odour and raised to the rank of an independent kind of disputation, perfectly legitimate and laudable where an honest soul is confronted with a particularly vicious or villainous opponent वितण्डा तु सतामन्यै । It is an occasion where one refuses to throw pearls before swines. In such extremities, the Siddhāntin merely adopts the Vaitandika or destructive attitude demolishing the arguments of his adversary and exposing their hollowness without in any way, disclosing his own view तत्रमेव निगूहितम्. Such a procedure may not be flattering to one's higher ideals of truth-determination, but it takes all sorts of men to

1 यातिलाभपूजा etc.

make a debate Vitanda is the honest man's armour against hypocrisy and falsehood masquerading as goodness and truth It is a safeguard against unscrupulous argument कण्टकशालावरणवत् (Ny. S iv, 2, 50 )

### ( 11 ) UPĀDHI KHANDANA

This is a short metrical tract in 20 granthas, criticizing the concept of "Upadhi" ( the pluralising agency ) which plays so large and necessary a part in the Brahmajñānavada of Śaṅkara The world of plurality is believed by the Advaitin to be the outcome of fontal ignorance playing upon the One Real The oneness of existence is the truth of things; and all plurality is ascribable to this fontal ignorance (अनाद्यविद्या) Madhva, naturally, opens his attack by pointing out that the very idea of suchnescience descending upon Brahman, is unthinkable, unaccountable and impossible अज्ञताखिलसदेतुर्धंदत न कुतश्चन । If Brahman is the only thing that is, where and whence can Ignorance come in ? If it is to be rendered possible by the intervention of an "Upadhi", the question naturally arises as to how this Upādhī itself is to be conceived of whether as a real and essential feature of Brahman-or as itself being due to an earlier layer of Ignorance A real Upadhi spells danger to a Monism To rely on a previous Ignorance to create a subsequent Upadhi, is to court the double fallacy of a *regressus ad infinitum* and mutual interdependence in reasoning It is thus impossible to make out any rational and intelligible relation between the Upadhi and Brahman The progress of Ignorance being thus arrested at the very outset, there is no individual soul resulting therefrom, and no fit subject for metaphysical investigation<sup>1</sup>

A Dualism has no such difficulties In it a spiritual aspirant, ( not identical with Brahman ) knowing something of Brahman and wanting to know *more*, is the proper person (Adhikari) to undertake metaphysical quest, undergo the necessary discipline laid down in the Sastras and reap the benefit of his labors Every thing is thus intelligible in a Dualism

1 Cf G K ii, 31 Also यद्येव प्रतिबुद्धोऽसि नास्ति कस्यचिदप्रबोध ( Śaṅkara, B S B iv, 1, 3 ) and यद्यद्वैते न तोषोऽस्ति मुक्त एवासि सर्वदा ( Vacaspati on the above )

## ( 12 ) PRAPANCA-MITHYĀTVANUMANA KHANDANA

The well known syllogism of the monist विमत मिथ्या, दृश्यत्वात्, जडत्वात् परिच्छिन्नत्वात् शुक्तिरूप्यवत् । intendend to establish the unreality of the world, is analysed and refuted in minute detail, in this Prakarana of 29 lines

The minor term of the syllogism itself is shown to be unestablished in respect of abode (आश्रयासिद्ध) The concept of Anirvacaniya is avowedly irrational<sup>1</sup> and no inference can be based on it Criticisms are urged from the point of view of both formal and inductive logic

## ( 13 ) MĀYAVĀDA-KHANDANA

In this Prakarana of twenty granthas, Madhva contends that none of the fourfold traditional requisites of system building viz , the Adhikāraṇī Visaya etc , can be satisfactorily made out on any kind of Monism, much less on the Nirvīśesadvaita of Saṃkara The identity of Jīva and Brahman, which is the central thesis of Advaita, is shown to be riddled with contradictions How is this identity to be conceived of ? Is it anything other than the Brahman, or *one with it* ? If the former, we have a dualism In the latter case, there is a "Siddha-sādhana" For, Brahman is conceived by the Advaitin as essentially self revealed ( Svaprakāśa ) in that it is outside the pale of Pramānas and unknowable अवेद्यत्व सति, अपरोक्षव्यवहारयोग्यत्वम् । (Citsukha) अनुभूतरनुभाव्यत्व, घटादिवत् अननुभूतित्वप्रसगात् ( *Istasiddhi* )

If then, the identity that is the thesis (visaya) of Monism were *one with Brahman*, it would, like Brahman itself, be equally self revealed and outside the pale of any Pramānas or Sāstra, such as the Advaita Vedānta There would thus be no need or justification for any Sāstra of the Monist A Pramāna, moreover, is (admitted by the Advaitin to be) what makes the unknown known अनविगतार्थमन्तु<sup>2</sup> The Advaita Sāstra, cannot surely be

1 दृष्टत्त्वमविद्याया भयं न तु दूषणम् ।

कथञ्चित् घटमानत्वं विद्यात्वं दुर्घटं भवति ॥ ( *Istasiddhi* 1, 140 )

2 This is the Bhāṭṭa definition of Pramāna, which is admitted by the Advaitins for all practical purposes व्यवहारे महत्तमम् । See also *Bhāmānī* on B S n, 1, 14



claimed to be valid (प्रमाण) in *this sense* So long as Advaita stands committed to the Nirviśeṣadvaita of Śaṅkara, there is no way out of the difficulty Since ऐक्य is necessarily characterless, there can be no point in saying that Scripture enables us to know those *aspects* of the Brahman (or Atman) which are *not already known* निर्विशेषत्वादात्मना नानधिगतो विशेष This disposes of the plea made by Śaṅkara under B S 1, 1, 1 तत्पुनर्ब्रह्म प्रसिद्धमप्रसिद्धं वा स्यात् \* \* \* \* and his reply to it One can also raise the question if the identity, preached by the Monist, is *real* or *fictitious* Neither alternative can be welcome to him The impossibility of Ignorance affecting Brahman vitiates the whole of Monistic metaphysics अज्ञानासम्भवादेव सन्मतमखिलमपि निरस्तम् । In view of the said identity, there can be no real Adhikari, entitled to philosophize or undergo spiritual discipline For this same reason, Mokṣa cannot be the goal of metaphysics, as, on the monistic doctrine, everybody is *free, here and now* and release is not a state to be attained hereafter स्वरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य पूर्वमेव सिद्धत्वात् Cf Śaṅkara मोक्षस्य अकार्यत्वात् ( G B III, 1 ) अस्माकं तु, न मोक्षं साध्यम् । अपि तु, ब्रह्मस्वरूपं, तच्च नित्यमिति ( *Bhāmali*, II, 3, 40 )

Towards the close of his *MA*, Madhva refutes briefly the view of Śrīharsa that अविद्यानिवृत्ति (cessation of Ignorance) is indistinguishable from the Atman आत्मैवाज्ञानहानि as well as that of Vimuktātman that it belongs entirely to a fifth order of predication (पञ्चमप्रकार) - " न सनासन्न सदसदनिर्वाच्योऽपि तत्क्षयः ।

यक्षानुरूपो बलिरित्याचार्या प्रत्यपीपदन् । "

( *Ānandabodha, Nyayamakaranda* )

These defects and pitfalls of Monism force a Dualism on all thinking minds

#### (14) TATTVA SAMKHYANA\*

The *Tattvasamkhyana* (11 granthas) enumerates the categories

1 Cf न सनासन्न सदसत्तत्त्वाप्यनुभयरूपकम् ।


चतुष्कोटिविनिर्मुक्तं तत्त्वं माध्यमिका विदुः ॥

( Buddhist Kārikā, q by Vedānta Deśika, *Satadūṣani*, S S Mukta-  
vali Ser p 65 )

2 Not "Tattva Samkhyāyana" as in Saletore's *History of  
Tuluva*, Poona, 36, p 441

recognized by Madhva. Here reality is dichotomized into ' Svatantra ' ( Independent ) and ' Para tantra ' ( Dependent ) This is the highest metaphysical and ontological classification in Madhva's system, whence his system derives its name ' Dvaita ' God ( Viṣṇu ) is the One ( Highest ) Independent Real All else is dependent on Him, including the goddess Lakṣmī, the presiding deity of ( Acit ) Prakṛti Dependence does not mean unreality The finite creation is always dependent on God, but is none the less real, even *He is* The ramifications of finite reality are then set forth in detail Madhva emphasizes that difference and disparity are found everywhere among finite selves in their constitution and equipment which points to a hierarchy ( तारतम्य ) among gods, demons and men A detailed cosmic scheme from the Supreme Being down to inanimate creation is then given Three classes of souls are distinguished among those that are *now in bondage* : Muktiyogyas ( salvable ), Tamoyogyas ( those that will eventually qualify themselves for eternal perdition ) and Nityasamsārins ( those that will always be subject to transmigration ) Those who want to be released from bondage must learn to look upon God as the One Being who is responsible in various ways for the preservation, control, absorption, enlightenment etc of the world

## TATVA



## ( 15 ) TATTVAVIVEKA

This, in 13 granthas (metrical), covers the same ground as the TS, and need not, therefore, be separately noticed.



## ( 16 ) TATTVODYOTA

This is one of the fighting works of Madhva, in which he has discussed and refuted some of the leading doctrines and fundamental concepts of the Advaita Vedānta. It is traditionally believed to embody some of the arguments actually employed by Madhva, in his historic debate with two celebrated Advaitins of his day: Pundarīka Purī<sup>1</sup> and Padma Tīrtha, recorded in the *M. Vij.* xii, 1-54.

( i ) Madhva maintains, at the outset, that "Difference" ( भेद ) is the fundamental concomitant of nature. It persists even in Mokṣa, between Brahman and freed souls and among the latter. The more should it hold good on *this side* of release ( ससारावस्था ). It is hardly convincing to dismiss it as an unreal projection of the mind. The concept of Anirvacanīya is warranted neither by the facts of life nor by the force of logic. It is a figment of the Monist's imagination, having no support in the Scriptures, Madhva denies that there is any basis for this idea in the Nāsadiya Sūkta ( R. V. x, 129 ). If what is left over ( परिशिष्ट ) after the denial of "Sat" and "Asat" ( in R. V. x, 129, 1 ) were to be viewed as necessarily Anirvacanīya, one would have to characterize Brahman also as "Anirvacanīya; for its existence is affirmed ( अनौद्वार्तं स्वयया तदेकम् ) immediately after a series of denials नासदासीन्नो सदासीत्तदानीम् earlier<sup>2</sup>.

( ii ) Syllogisms advanced by the Monist in support of the unreality of phenomena ( मिथ्यात्व ) are shown to be full of fallacies and contradictions: दृश्यत्वाद्यनुमानेऽप्यते एव दोषाः। The minor term and grounds of inductive generalization in these cases, are refuted in great detail. The reality of the world, which is borne in upon us by our own consolidated experience, cannot be suppressed by any amount of specious reasoning. If the verdict of experience is to be set aside, it can only be on the strength of a

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1. See also Nārāyaṇa Pandita's own c. *Bhāṭapralāśika* on *M. Vij.* and Jayatīrtha's com. on Td (end).

2. Cf. "Moreover, it ignores the previously postulated "That" which by its terms, eliminates non-being. The poet, here, unquestionably entangles himself in sham profundity." Bloomfield, *Religion of the Veda*, 1908, p. 238.

more powerful and subsequent experience (बाधवानुभव), here and now And we know only too well that such is not the case, here

(iii) Long before Madhva, the Advaitins had been suspected of inward sympathies and leanings towards Buddhism<sup>1</sup> Advaita was openly denounced as Buddhism in disguise by such early writers as Bhāskara<sup>2</sup>, Pārthasārathi Mīśra,<sup>3</sup> Yādevaprakāśa,<sup>4</sup> and Ramanuja<sup>5</sup> From early days, Advaitins have been vehemently protesting<sup>6</sup> that theirs was certainly *not* a Buddhism The prejudice and antipathy to Advaita was very strong in Madhva's days It is not to be wondered if he chose to exploit this prevailing antipathy of his times, to the Advaita both in learned quarters and among the people<sup>7</sup> to further the interests of his new system What is important, however, is that unlike most of his predecessors, he took it upon himself to substantiate his allegations against Advaita, in this respect, *with chapter and verse*, in his *Tattvodyota* and to a lesser extent, elsewhere So much so, that academically speaking, we have to look up to Madhva, for a really exhaustive treatment of this question The charge of 'crypto Buddhism'

1 Vide *Gaudapāda Kārikas*, iv, 99 and the remarks of Sankara and Anandagiri, thereon See also p 85, f n 3 (*ante*)

2 दिगीत विच्छिन्नमूल माहायानिकबौद्धगमित मायावाद व्यावर्णयन्तो लोकान् व्यामोहयन्ति (B S B Choul S S 15 p 85 and 124)

3. तद्वर मायावादान्माहायानिकम् ।

4 वेदोऽनृतो बुद्धकृतागमोऽनृत प्रामाण्यमतस्य च तस्य चानृतम् ।

बोद्धानृतो बुद्धिफले तथानत यूय च बौद्धाश्च समानसम्पद ॥

(Quoted by Deśika in his *Tattvamuktikalapa* Medical Hall Press, Benares, 1900, p 363)

5 *Vedārtha Samgraha*, Pandit Rep p 86

6 Vide G K नैतत बुद्धेन भाषितम् (iv, 99) and comm on it See *Vitarana*, यस्तु कश्चिज्जल्पति सुमतविज्ञानवादसमानोऽय वेदान्तवाद इति \* \* (Viz Sl t. Ser 1892 p. 84) and *Saml sepasarivāla*, ii, 25 27.

7 As reflected in the verses of the *Padma Purana*

मायावादमसच्छास्त्रं प्रच्छन्नं बौद्धमुच्यते

(Cited by Vyāsa Bhikṣu)

was not certainly invented by *Madhva*<sup>1</sup> But he shared the general belief of scholars, then as now, that it bore a very strong family resemblance to Buddhism and that for all practical purposes it was but a restatement of Buddhistic ideas in Upanisadic and Vedantic phraseology. *Madhva* makes this the vantage ground of his attack on the Advaita. He quotes extensively from the standard Buddhistic works current in his days,<sup>2</sup> and from

1. *Madhva* has not used the expression "प्रच्छन्नबौद्ध" in any of his works, tho' he has made it quite clear that in his opinion the Advaita is indistinguishable from Buddhism, in its metaphysics. The term 'प्रच्छन्नबौद्ध' first occurs in *M Vy* 1 51 and secondly in the *Satadusani* of Vedānta Deśika, who calls upon the faithful followers of Rāmānuja to gird up their loins and fight the "Pracchanna Bauddhas" to the finish. प्रच्छन्नबौद्धविजये परितो यत् त्वम् ॥ Bratindra Sen Gupta (J O I. Baroda, Sep 1955) seeks to establish that the formulations of the Sāṃkhya system are distinct from the Buddhistic enunciations, in respect of the problems of illusion, ultimate reality and Liberation. It is precisely in these vital respects that *Madhva* and Jayatirtha have shown the fundamental affinity in thought between Buddhism and Advaita (See J's remarks on pp. 23 b and 23 Tdt). Until their arguments value could be attached equation of Advaita and

Unfortunately, the names of these Buddhistic works (metrical) from which he has quoted these verses, have not been mentioned by *Madhva*. It is difficult to trace these to their sources as most of the old Buddhistic works are now lost to us. But I have it on the authority of Prof. Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya, of Shantiniketan, that tho' the passages cited by *Madhva* in Td could not be traced in extant Buddhistic works, the ideas have many clear parallels in the extant literature of Buddhism. I have also come across many close correspondences, in the course of my own studies of old Buddhistic texts, for this purpose.

(1) अपरप्रत्यय शान्त प्रपञ्चैरप्रपञ्चितम् ।

निर्विकल्पमनानात्वमेतत् तत्त्वस्य लक्षणम् ॥

*Madhyamaka Karika* 24, p. 372 which may be compared with No. 8 of *Madhva* द्वे सत्ये समुपाधित्य (*Madhyamaka Karika*) with No. 1 quoted below.

(b) नैव भावो नवाभावो न पृथक्त्वेन लक्षणम् *Madhyantavibhanga-Sutra* 1 14 (text) and Sthiramati's com. thereon तत्र लक्षणं नवाभावप्रतिषेधात्मकं शून्यताया ।

(C O S 24, p. 38 ab) cf. ver. no. 6 of *Madhva*



well known Advaitic works like the *Samksepa Sariraka*<sup>1</sup>

" अनृतजडविरोधिरूपमन्तनयमलवन्धनदु खताविरुद्धम् " (1, 1) इति च मायावादी।

Madhva contends<sup>2</sup> that the attributeless Brahman of Advaita can hardly be distinguished from the Sunya of Buddhistic Nihilism<sup>3</sup> Both are अखण्ड, beyond thought and word (अवाच्य) and can only be expressed thro' negatives (व्यावृत्ति = अपाह) The so called व्यावहारिकसत्य of the Advaitin is nothing but the 'संवृतिसत्य' of the Buddhist writ larger<sup>4</sup> The ideal of Nirvāṇa and the goal of Brahmabhāva, were nearly the same In view of so much striking affinity of Prameyas (basic doctrines), Madhva asserts that Advaita is indeed Buddhism न च शून्यवादिन सकाशाद् वैलक्षण्य मायावादिन । The Advaitin's belief in the Vedas turns

1. Not from *Murari Sataka* (of Saṅkara) as stated by Dr Nagaraja Sarma, *Reign of Realism in I Phil.* 1937, p. 207

2 There are altogether eight verses quoted by Madhva from Buddhist sources They are as follows

सत्यं तु द्विविधं प्रोक्तं सावृतं पारमार्थिकम् ।  
सावृतं व्यवहार्यं स्यान्निवृत्तौ पारमार्थिकम् ॥ 1  
विचार्यमाणे नोऽसत्त्वं सत्त्वं चापि प्रतीयते ।  
यस्य तत्सावृतं तत्स्यात् व्यवहारपदं च यत् ॥ 2  
निर्विशेषं स्वयंभातं निर्लेपमजरामरम् ।  
शून्यं तत्त्वमविज्ञेयं मनोवाचामगोचरम् ॥ 3  
जाड्यसंवृतिदु खान्तपूर्वदोषविरोधि यत् ।  
नित्यभावनया भातं तद्भावं योगिनं नयेत् ॥ 4  
भावार्थप्रतियोगित्वं भावत्वं वा न तत्त्वतः ।  
विश्याकारं च संवृत्या यस्य तत्पदमक्षयम् ॥ 5  
नास्य सत्त्वं न वासत्त्वं न दोषो गुण एव वा ।  
हेयोपादेयरहितं तच्छून्यं पदमक्षयम् ॥ 6  
अवाच्यं सर्वशब्दैस्तल्लक्ष्यते चाखिलं पदैः ।  
अज्ञेयं ज्ञानलक्ष्यं च तच्छून्यं पदमक्षयम् ॥ 7  
यदखण्डं पदं लक्ष्यं सर्वैरपि विशेषणैः ।  
सर्वैर्विशेषणैर्मुक्तं तच्छून्यं पदमक्षयम् ॥ 8

3 Das Gupta, *op cit* 1, p. 493 5

4 द्वे सत्ये समुपाश्रित्य बुद्धानां धर्मदेशना ।

लोके संवृतिसत्यं च सत्यं च परमार्थतः ॥

(*Madhyamaka Karika*s, xxiv, 492) This is q. by Jayatīrtha in his c on Td but the Buddhist verses quoted by Madhva do not appear to be from Nāgārjuna as Dr R. Nagaraja Sarma (p. 209) thinks The Advaitic view of "Sattā tvaividhya" has also a striking Buddhist parallel See *Abhidharma* ccaya of Asaṅga, p. 25 (ed. I. B. R. R. A. S. 1949)

out to be a veritable deception when it is remembered that they dismiss the entire Karmakāṇḍa and large slices of the Upaniṣads which teach dualistic views as “not-truth-declaring” (अतत्त्वावेदक)<sup>1</sup>. Madhva, naturally, protests against such high-handed treatment to the Vedas, which is worse than even the Buddhists’ open abjuration of them. The Advaitins’ attitude is, moreover, inconsistent: (नहि कुक्कुट्या एको मागः प्रसवायापरः पाकाय कल्पते !). If one part of Scripture can speak untruth (अतत्त्वम्) what guarantee is there for the other parts alone? Madhva winds up with the observation that the refutation of Buddhist idealism and Nihilism in the *Vedānta Sūtras* is thus tantamount to a refutation of Advaitism itself:<sup>2</sup> ‘नासतो दृष्टत्वात्’ । ‘नाभाव उपलब्धेः । ‘वेधर्म्योच्च न स्वप्नादिवत्’ । इत्यादि भगवद्वचनेनापि निरस्ताः । नच शून्यवादिनः सकाशात् वैलक्षण्यं मायावादिनः<sup>3</sup> ।

(iv) There is a constructive side of the *Td.*, wherein Madhva quotes passages to show that Theism is the only philosophy accepted by the Śāstras. Such texts as have been claimed by the Monist to support अखण्डाय (such as “Tattvam asi”) according to which, passages of the Śruti are believed somehow to refer to an attributeless Absolute are reinterpreted, in conformity with Theism. The work concludes with a brief criticism of Eka-jivājñānavāda. The last seven verses do not belong to Madhva. They are in the nature of tributes paid to him by the admiring witnesses of his debate with Pundarīka Purī and incorporated into the body of his discourse (*Td.*) at the request of his disciples.<sup>4</sup>

1. The phrases “तत्त्वावेदक” and “अतत्त्वावेदक” are pretty often used by the *Samkṣepaśārīraka*, which seems to have been specially referred to (along with the *Iṣṭasiddhi*) by Madhva. See *Samkṣepaśārīraka* ii, 43; iii, 287.

2. Cf. Bhāskara on B S ii, 2, 29 : ये तु बौद्धमतावलम्बिनो मायावादिनः तेष्वनेनैव न्यायेन सूनाकारेणैव निरस्ता वेदितव्याः । p. (124).

3. Some think that Madhva uses the term “मायावादी” with a sting. Far from it. It is merely a description chosen by the Advaitin himself. Madhva was a close student of *Iṣṭasiddhi* which uses the term very often (See pp. 93; 157; 158 etc. (G.O.S.)) He also uses other expressions like “चित् and चैत्य” in the opening verse of *Td.* with which compare चित्चैत्य (*Iṣṭasiddhi*, p. 2) and the use of ऋते with accusative (pp. 151, 153, ii, 19, iii, 58 etc.).

4. See Jayatīrtha’s c. on these verses (*Td.*)

## ( 17 ) VISNU-TATTVA-NIRNAYA

This is the biggest (540 granthas) and most important of the Prakaranas and contains an exhaustive refutation of Advaita a brilliant criticism of Advaitic interpretation of Srutis and an equally impressive exposition of their interpretation on new lines and a masterly vindication of the concept of "Difference" It has three chapters ( Paricchedas ) The scope of the work is thus outlined

सदागमैकविज्ञेय समतीतक्षराक्षरम् ।  
नारायण सदा बन्दे निर्दोषाशेषसद्गुणम् ॥  
विशेषणानि यानीह कथितानि, सद्गुणानि ।  
साधयिष्यामि तान्येव क्रमात्सज्जनसन्निधौ ॥

( 1 ) Before establishing the central thesis of his thought that Brahman ( Nārāyaṇa ) is the highest subject matter ( महातात्पर्य ) of the Vedaśāstra, Madhva discusses the place and importance of Śabda among Pramāṇas and argues a strong case for the infallibility and Apauruseyatva of the Vedas He is the only Vedantin ( after the Mīmāṃsakas ) to have given this question serious attention. The Vedas are self-valid ( स्वतः प्रमाण ) and cannot be ascribed to any known author, human or divine<sup>1</sup> The eternity of the Vedas rests on the eternity of Śabda<sup>2</sup> It is convincingly shown that no system of philosophy can do without some kind of Apauruseya *śakya*, for its ultimate validity Even the Buddhists and the Carvakas are forced to admit some kind of Śabdapramāṇa, which is incapable of being ascribed to any author

( 11 ) Madhva pleads strongly that ineradicable difference between God and man is the purport of the Śāstras This difference is a corollary of the supremacy of Brahman अतः सर्वप्रमाणविरुद्धत्वान्नाभेदे तात्पर्यम् । किंतु, विष्णोः सर्वोत्तमत्व एव महातात्पर्यं सर्वाणिमानाम् ॥ With cogent reasons, he repudiates the Advaitic view that all those Scriptural texts which speak of Difference are to be looked upon as being merely अनुवादक ( repetitive ) in spirit Our knowledge of the existence of God is derived solely from Scripture ( B S 1, 1, 3 ) Such being the case, it will never do for Scripture, to

1. तत्प्रामाण्यं च स्वतः एव सिद्धम् । वेदकर्तुरप्रसिद्धे ।

2. अतः आकाशगुणे शब्दे व्यज्यमाना यणादियं तत्क्रमात्मको वेदश्च नित्यः



cut its own ground from under its own feet. The monistic texts are considerably weakened by their conflict with the consolidated experience (अवधितानुभव) of humanity and inference (based on it). Tho' it is no doubt true, that Āgama has, as a rule, precedence over other means of proof, it cannot be considered valid when it goes against its very prop and support उपजीव्य viz those texts that establish Brahman *ex hypothesi* to be Sarvajña etc., in contradistinction from the human soul. It is equally absurd to dismiss the difference between the Jīva and Brahman taught in such Srutis as दृष्ट सुपर्णा as an ignorant doctrine. If Srutis can play false, what guarantee is there that the Monistic texts can be relied upon to speak the truth? Madhva is honestly surprised how a person, with such a low opinion of the Sruti can claim to be a Veda-vādin कथं चैववादिनो वेदवादित्वम्? It is thus extremely unlikely that the identity between Jīva and Brahman could be the ultimate teaching of Scripture. Texts which appear, on a superficial view, to favor such an identity are shown on closer scrutiny, to emphasize the unutterable majesty of Brahman and the complete metaphysical dependence of all else on It तद्वशमवाक्तम् । तद्वशत्वात् ज्ञापनार्थं च 'सदव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' इत्यादि सङ्ख्ययाम् ।

An implicit and ineradicable dualism is shown to underlie all the well known Upanisadic texts paraded by the Monist. Madhva gives a brilliant analysis of the "Tattvam asi" and "Vacaram bhana" texts among others here and lays bare the defects in their Advaitic interpretation. The points raised by him are new and deserve careful attention. Several other passages also are similarly discussed.

(iv) The reality of the world of difference is clearly taught in many Scriptural texts, even as admitted by the Monist. Madhva repudiates the suggestion that this reality is of a lower order : नचावात्तरसत्यमिदम्, and cites passages to show that difference persists even in Mokṣa. Individual consciousness is unalienable and indestructible in release अविनाशी वा अयमात्मा अनुच्छित्तिधमा (Brh Up 17, 5, 14) इति तद्वर्माणामप्यनुच्छित्ते प्रस्तुतत्वात् ।

1 See under "Chāndogya-Bhāṣya" of Madhva and under "Vyāsarāya" (Vol II)

2 See under *Clan Up Bhāṣya*

(14) The *FTN* gives the best classical exposition of the concept of Bheda as developed by Madhva. A 'Pluralistic Universe' is grounded on the reality of difference. The concept of "Bheda" has been vigorously assailed by hosts of Absolutistic writers from the days of Samkhya. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Realism had been the chief target of attack of the early Advaitic Dialecticians. The *Istasiddhi* of Vimuktātman, has a powerful critique of Bheda.<sup>1</sup> Other writers like Ānandabodha<sup>2</sup>, Śrīharsa<sup>3</sup> and Citsukha followed suit. Among the philosophers of the 10th-12th century a heated controversy was raging over the concept. Madhva took note of the criticisms poured forth by the Advaitic dialecticians. He had to draw and defend the concept of 'Difference,' which was so foundational of all reality and on which the entire edifice of his Theistic Realism rested. The Monists had placed many obstacles in the way of a really valid definition of Difference. It was impossible, said they, to give a satisfactory and logically commensurate definition of Difference or demonstrate its reality, in any metaphysical sense. Any attempt to conceive of it in a logical way, is doomed to failure. The idea of difference is thus riddled with all kinds of fallacies and contradictions. अनवस्थार्यो दोषा सत्ता निघ्नन्ति वस्तुन ।

Difference is not cognised by itself, but only in relation to its terms either as qualifying them or as being qualified by them. It may be looked upon as residing in either or both of them. But, in any case, unless the terms are previously grasped, their difference from each other, which is either attributive or is bound up with the cognition of the correlate and the counter-correlate, cannot be. But then, the cognition of the terms, is dependent on that of the difference referred to. There is, thus, mutual interdependence in any attempt to define the concept of difference.

1 भेदस्य वस्तुनो भेदे, भेदाभेदे च तस्य तस्य, भेदात् वस्तुनश्चान्योऽप्यो भेद इत्यनवस्थानात् न कश्चिद्भेदो वस्तु सस्पृशेत् । अभेदे तु, एकमेव । तच्च वस्त्वेव न भेद एव, वस्त्वभावे तस्याप्यभावात् ॥ (p 23, G O S. 187 '33).

2 भेदस्य विदारणात्मनो वस्तुस्वरूपत्वे, न किञ्चनैक वस्तु स्यात् । \* \* एवञ्च शून्यतैव तात्त्विको विश्वस्य स्यात् । ( *Nyayamakaranda*, p 45-6)

3 यदि च स्वरूप भेद स्यात्, तदा धर्मिणि दृष्टे, स्वरूप दृष्टमिति क्वचित् सन्देहः स्यात् ॥ क्वचिदपि गत्वा, भेदभेदाश्रययोः भेदास्वीकारे च तदैक्यद्वारिका मूलपर्यन्तमेवता धावेत् ॥ ( *Khandanakhandakhadya*, 1, pp 210, 212 ).

Madhva refutes these contentions by pointing out that difference is *not* an attribute of *both* correlates, but of only *one of them*, signalled by the other. This difference is of the nature of the object itself. To know an object is to know its difference from another. Hence, there is no interdependence here.

It may be objected that an object is cognised independently but *not so its difference from another*. If difference were the same as the object, it should be capable of being perceived *independently of its relata*, which is not the case. Madhva answers this by pointing out that there is no such absolute necessity. The 'thing in itself' may be perceived independently, but its difference from another may yet be cognizable only mediately thro' the relata. There is nothing illogical in this. The Advaitin himself, recognizes that the cognition of the Self is immediate, but its identity with Brahman, tho' not essentially different from the Self,<sup>1</sup> is yet only mediately realizable thro' the terms Jiva and Brahman. What applies to identity would hold good in the case of Difference, which is as much a relation as its opposite!

The Advaitin advances a further argument, objecting to Difference as "Dharma svarupa", that if the 'thing' and its difference are one and the same, they must always be cognized together. The admission of Viśeṣa, however, helps Madhva to account for the perception of an object without involving a *specific perception* of its difference from another. Difference is only "सविशेषमिदं" from its धर्मः. Even here, the monist can have no cause for complaint, as he admits that tho' the Self is established in all cognitions, its identity with Brahman (which is the same as the Self) is *not* नच धर्मप्रतियोग्यपेक्षया भेदस्यास्वरूपत्वम् । ऐक्यवत् स्वरूप-स्यैव तयात्वात् । स्वरूपसिद्धावपि तदसिद्धिश्च जीवेश्वरैक्यं वदत सिद्धं (VTN). This is indeed a penetrating argument that confutes the monist with one of his own admissions.

From one point of view, it may be asserted, says Madhva, that when an object is cognized, its difference also from other

1 Cf तच्चार्द्धतम — 'ग्रहणवेद सर्वम्' इति श्रुत्यर्थेन सहैक्यमापन्नं ग्रहणं स्यात् । (Khandana, 1, p 220)

Cf also एव ब्रह्मात्मानदभेदे भ्रान्तिगृहीते जनं, तद्व्युदासेन अभेद एवो द्यते न भेदगन्धोपि स्पृश्यते ॥ (Istasiddhi, 1, p 28)



things, is cognized in a general way and for the most part. Otherwise, one may even mistake his own self for any one of the numerous objects around him. None ever falls into such an error. It follows, therefore, that difference is cognized *simultaneously with the perception of the object*. It may be objected that if this were so, all doubts and misapprehensions would be impossible. Since doubts and imperfect cognitions do arise, at times, it could not be that difference is part and parcel of the 'thing in itself' (वर्ग). Madhva answers this by saying that Difference is only *one* in a given thing. But it has innumerable shades (विशेष) such as that of being the counter correlate of X, Y, or Z. Where, in a particular case, this particular shade of difference is missed with reference to a particular (counter)-correlate, on account of such factors as resemblance, doubts arise. The particular doubt, however, does not mean that Difference in general has not been grasped at all.

It has been contended that if Difference were of the nature of the object, it would, in effect, abolish its own self or the object, or it may mean that difference is synonymous with the object.<sup>1</sup> Madhva points out that such antinomies are avoided on his view, which recognizes only a "Sv-Viśeṣābheda", (colorful identity) between the object and "difference" conceived as "Dharmisvarūpa". The identity (abheda) prevents the possibility of such mutual interdependence in perception as has been threatened, and the "Viśeṣa" guarantees the existence and reality of both the object and the difference. Viśeṣa is just the representative of Difference, not difference by itself. भेदप्रतिनिधिर्न तु स्वयं भेदः । There are reasons why such Viśeṣa should be recognized in all objects commonly regarded as undifferentiated. Even the Advaitin cannot altogether evade or do without them. For, in such texts as "Neti neti", Brahman is said to be different from all else. This distinction can neither be different from the Brahman, nor partly different and partly identical with It, as the judgment arising from the sentence is admitted to be in the form of an undifferentiated cognition (अखण्ड). If, therefore in these circumstances, an absolute and colorless identity were assumed, it would be futile to have a number of terms in the negation as in नेति, नेति, सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं

1. अभेदे, तु, एकमेव, न भेद एव, वस्त्वभावे तस्याप्यभावात् ।

ब्रह्म Just as identity is recognized between Brahman and its attributes एवमात्मनि भात्यपि, आनन्दोऽभिन्नोऽपि न भाति । ( *Istasiddhi*, p 27 ) whether negative or positive to avoid conflict with the नेह नानास्ति text even so, Viśesa must be recognized to prevent overlapping among the things negated and the faults of redundancy and synonymy (पर्यायत्व)

It can make no difference to the question of overlapping, whether Brahman is regarded as वाच्य (expressible by words) or as merely लक्ष्य (suggestible) For, in any case of elimination, there would be no point in resorting to more than one elimination, if the object thus marked off from its opposite (attributes) does not gain or assume a new aspect or additional significance every time a fresh elimination is brought about

व्यावृत्ते निर्विशेषे तु, किं व्यावर्त्यबहुत्वत् ?

This argument of Madhva is hard to rebut

Lastly, when difference is presented to cognition, it cannot be denied altogether on the ground of interdependence स्थितस्य गतिश्चिन्तनीया. Interdependence, even admitting there is one cannot annul the reality of things so interdepending<sup>1</sup> अन्यान्याश्रयस्य प्रमात्वा-प्रतिबन्धकत्वात् (Jayatirtha, c VTN) One must try to explain the process of perception of Difference But failure or inability to do so cannot mean that the thing itself is unreal ! There is, of course, no cause for anxiety or interdependence, if difference is recognized as घमिस्वरूप but yet सविशेषाभिन्न from it

Madhva has thus really gone a long way in clarifying the concept of difference and demonstrating its reality He enunciates

1 The ideas of "father" and "son" are for example intertwined You cannot know X as "father" unless you know his son Y But you cannot know Y as son unless you know his father But no one asserts from this fact that both father and son are unreal unaccountable beings ! Cf in this connection, the humorous instance of the twin babies named Ram and Lakshman, described interdependently by their mother, in O V Joshi's Marathi novel 'Amca Pan Gav' (Poona, 52)

the doctrine that Difference is "Dharma-svarūpa",<sup>1</sup> part of the 'thing in itself'. It is perceived simultaneously with the perception of an object, a relation or a concept. In one and the same act of perception, the object and its individuality (which is the same as its difference from all else) are both perceived *in a flash as it were*. If it were not so, the question will have to be answered why and where that individuality had been lurking and how it comes to be apprehended later on. Madhva says that because of this flash like simultaneity of apprehension there is hardly any time, *at the moment*, to frame linguistic expression for the adequate expression of experience of individuality. When we *know a thing* we know it *as distinct from everything else, in a general way*. Closer thought and ratiocination reveal further items of difference, light and shade. Otherwise, one may expect to mistake the perceiving self to be something other than what it is. यदि न स्वरूप भेद, तदा पदार्थे दृष्टे, प्रायस्तस्य सर्वतो वैलक्षण्यं न जायेत । अज्ञातं च वैलक्षण्ये, आत्मनि घट इत्यपि सशयं स्यात् । नहि कश्चित्तथा सशयं करोति । ज्ञात्वाैव प्रायः सर्वतो वैलक्षण्यं, कस्मिंश्चिदेव सदृशे सशयं करोति (VTN) This is a correct rejoinder to Śrīharsa's यदि स्वरूप भेद \* \* (Khandana, 1, p. 210)

(vi) Sankara has nowhere given evidence in support of his doctrine of "Adhyasa", beyond a mere assertion that erroneous transference of the qualities of the Ātman to anatman and vice versa (इतरेतराध्यास) is natural in life, and is beginningless and endless सोयमनादिरनन्तो नैसर्गिकोऽयं लोकाव्यवहारः । But when one asks for proofs, only excuses are given. Illusions and dream phenomena have been cited by monistic writers *ad nauseam*. This is most unsatisfactory. Even these illustrations betray certain unmistakable realistic foundations. They are only exceptions to the rule. It is no use saying that because our senses have deceived us once or twice, they must altogether be put down as untrust

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1 This coupled with the doctrine of "Viśeṣas" with which the perception of difference is linked in Madhva's epistemology, would be seen to effectively dispose of the difficulties and antinomies raised by Vimuktātman and others in their critique of difference. The Advaitin is purposely perverse in his attitude to Bheda. See Rama Tirtha, o on *Samkṣepaśārīraka* p. 59. भेदस्य वस्तुस्वरूपत्वं वा, तद्व्यभिचयं वा नास्माकं सम्मतम् । किंतु वस्तुस्वरूपातिरिक्तो भेदः प्रामाणिको नास्तीति ॥



worthy In that case even Scripture would be in no better position, for *some* of its statements are, according to the Advaitin, obviously untrustworthy in the last resort

( vii ) No scheme of illusions can be demonstrated *without* the aid of *at least two distinct reals* भ्रातिकल्पितत्वं च जगत् सत्यं जगद्वयमपेक्षितम् । (VTN) As a matter of fact, illusions are *as impossible* without the reality of an *āraṇya* (elsewhere) as without that of an *Adhīstāna* The Advaitin is thus guilty of an *abhyāsa*, when he grants the necessity of the latter alone and denies the former *āraṇyas* प्रतीतिरप्युज्यत न वस्तुसत्ता ( *Bhāmali*, 1917 Bby p 17 ) On all occasions of normally constituted perceptions, the subject and the object are grasped distinctly Madhva denies that there is any proof for the assumption that *Adhyāsa* is double edged ( *īśvara* ) The *Ātman* has never been mistaken for the not self in the wildest of our *Adhyāsas* नचात्मन्यनात्मभ्रम इवापि दृष्टः । नहि कश्चित् अहं न भवामीति भ्रान्तो दृश्यत (VTN p 27) The bottom is thus knocked out of Śaṅkara's sweeping remark एवमविरुद्धं प्रत्यगात्मन्यप्यनात्माध्यासः ॥ अन्योन्यस्मिन्नन्योन्यात्मकतामन्यान्यधर्मश्चाध्यम्य which is itself inconsistent with his own plea सर्वोप्यात्मास्तित्वं प्रत्येति न नाहमस्मीति ।

Madhva concludes the I Pariccheda with a criticism of the *Ekajīva* and *Bahujīva* *anavādas*, the concept of *mithyātvam*, *upāśi*, *āpādhikabhedāda* and *avijñāduṣṭatvam* ।

( vii ) The last two Paricchedas deal with Madhva's conception of Godhead The second Pariccheda emphasizes the lordship of Viṣṇu over the *Kṣara* (souls) and *Akṣara*-( *Prakṛti* ) *Purusas* Passages from the *Rg Veda*, the *T Ā*, *Bhallaiteya Sṛuṭi* and other *Khilas* are cited

In the last Pariccheda, God is taught to be absolutely free from all taint and imperfections (cf *apahuta* *pāpma* *viśero* *vimṛtyu* ) He is full of an infinite number of infinite attributes *matyasa* *matyasa* *matyasa* सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्येशान । The limitations to divinity seen in the *Avatars* are explained on the basis of certain widely accepted theological and Puranic fictions and conventions of theodicy <sup>1</sup>

1 Vide *Bhagavata* xi, 3, 39, v, 19, 36, ix, 10, 11

(ix) The question of the exact relation between the personality of God and His moral and metaphysical attributes has always resisted the ingenuity of Theists all the world over. It is an intriguing problem of philosophy also<sup>1</sup>. No close student of Madhva can fail to see in him one of the world's foremost thinkers who has successfully tackled the problem of the Divine Personality, its nature and constitution. God, in Theism, is *ex hypothesi* unlimited by time and space and attributes. He is One, but many are His attributes. This raises the question of how far God is homogeneous in constitution. Is God different from His attributes? If not, what is the basis of the mutual distinction among His various attributes? If there is no such distinction, how is the multiplicity of the attributes to be established? By what law of harmony are these attributes, equally poised and manifested at different times? How does God manage to retain His unity amidst a sea of attributes? These are some of the many questions which confront all Theists and all kinds of Theistic approaches, be they rational religions, or metaphysical. Madhva has answered them in his own way, with the help of his peculiar theory of Viśeṣas, which he has developed in the last section of the *VTN*, and elsewhere and his solution is perhaps the best that could be thought of.

Viśeṣa is a distinct thought category or ontological principle that is entirely self sufficient and wholly self determined and self determining. It comes in handy in many a metaphysical exigency. It is Viśeṣa that bridges the gulf between substance and attributes. Kriyā and Kriyavat etc. It connects God with His infinite attributes and the attributes mutually. But it is *not* different from the nature of God Himself or distinct from his personality. It is भेदप्रतिनिधि (a representative of Difference) not भेद itself, in short a thought fiction. It is an altogether internal relation capable of working both ways. It is capable of connecting substance and attributes without being external to either. Madhva refuses to recognize any distinction between God and His attributes activity.

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1 Cf. The views of Maimonides and St. Thomas Aquinas (1226-74) on the same problem in the *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, Vol II p 153-4 (Govt of India Ministry of Education) George Allen Unwin, 1953. Vādirāja in his *Sruti tattvapraśaṅga*, (Udipi, 1954) poses the problem in his attractive way.

and will Absolute identity reigns between God and His innumerable attributes as well as among the attributes themselves There is not even a semblance of differentiation, no element of heterogeneity in the Deity He threatens those who set up such barriers between God and His attributes, with the horrors of hell fire  
 नेह नानास्ति किंचन । मृत्यो स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति ( *Katha Up* )  
 एव धर्मान् पृथक् पश्यस्तानेवानु विधावति । The doctrine is known as "Savisesabheda" or "Acintyābheda", and language secular, scriptural and scientific has many instances of it

राहो शिर । पुरुषस्य चैतन्यम् । समवायस्यैकत्वम् । सत्य ज्ञानमनन्त ब्रह्म ।

आनन्द ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् and so on

भेदहीने त्वपर्यायशब्दान्तरनियामक ।

विशेषो नाम कथित सोऽस्ति वस्तुष्वशेषत ॥ ( AV )

Madhva shows that it would be impossible to do justice to such texts as सत्य ज्ञान \* \* without the help of the said Viśesas For fear of synonymy ( पर्यायता ), even the Advaitin, says Madhva, would have to recognize Viśesas<sup>1</sup> Viśesa, in short, is to be a सर्वतन्त्रसिद्धांत He has cited passages from the *Brahmatarka* and the *Paramopaniṣad* ( *Pāñcarātriṇa* ), elucidating "Viśesas" Apart from the authorities quoted, the concept itself ranks as one of the most important contributions of Madhva to Indian philosophic thought<sup>2</sup>

## ( 18 ) KARMA NIRNAYA

( 1 ) Next in extent to the *VTN*, comes the *KN* running to 276 granthas Tradition has it that this work was composed by

1 Cf अखण्डवादिनोऽपि स्याद्विशेषोऽनच्छतोऽप्यसौ ।

व्यावृत्ते निविशेते तु किं व्यावर्त्यबहुत्वत ?

सच्चिदादेरपर्यायसिद्धमर्थं मायिनापि हि ।

अद्वगीकार्यो विशेषोऽयं ( AV p 37 b )

Cf also आनन्दा विषयानुभवश्चेति सन्ति धर्मा अपृथक्त्वेऽपि चैतन्यात् पृथगिवावभासन्ते ( *Pañcapādika* )

एवमात्मनि भात्यपि, आनन्दोऽभिन्नोऽपि न भाति । ( *Istasiddhi*, p 27 )

2 For further light on the theory of Viśesas, see vol II under "Vyāsarāja"



Madhva, in reply to a challenge from certain contemporary Pandits to exhibit his proficiency in the ritualistic portions of the Vedas and their exegesis<sup>1</sup>. The ultimate object of the work is to work out and illustrate the attunement of the Karma Kānda too, with Brahman, which the avowal of Brahman as the highest and most intimate subject matter of the Vedas, necessitates. The work deals, thus, with the higher interpretation of certain abstruse and complicated sacrificial hymns such as the Mahānāmni (A A iv) verses, to be recited in connection with the Prstha Stotra at the Naiskevalya Sastra, consisting of Khandas 1-4 of the iv Pāṇika of the xvi Adhyāya of the *Āitareya Brahman* and various groups of Rks to be used in the Sodasi śastra R V 1, 16, 1-3, 1, 82, 1-3, 4, viii, 12, 25-27, iii, 44, 1-3, vii, 34, 4, viii, 6, 21, vii, 29, 2, x, 96, 1-3, ii, 22, 1-3, x, 133, 1-3, viii, 58, 1-3, viii, 58, 8 10. Das Gupta is not therefore quite correct in describing this work as "a discussion on the proper reading and order of A B iv, 1 4, A A iv, 1 and the Vedic hymns cited therein" (op. cit iv, 54 55).

Madhva shows himself fully conversant with the genius of the Vedic language and its idiom. His interpretations have a ring of confidence and originality.

(ii) Taking his stand on the mystic doctrine enunciated in A A. ता वा एता सर्वानृच सर्वे वेदा सर्वे घोषा एकैव व्याहृति प्राणानृच इत्येव विद्यात् (ii, 2) एत ह्येव ब्रह्मचा महत्युक्तये \* \* (iii, 2, 3) etc. Madhva insists upon interpreting the whole of the Scripture (not excluding the so called Karma-Kānda)<sup>2</sup> directly, as a glorification of the Supreme Being. The Mahānāmni are but an instance in point, of the possibility of such an interpretation ताश्च विदा मधवन्' इत्याद्याः । Once the general principles of such a higher interpretation are laid down, it would not be difficult to tackle particular hymns or groups of hymns. Let us take Rg Veda viii, 58, 8 for example (अर्चत प्राचत प्रियमेधासोऽर्चत) अर्चनं यज्ञादि । प्राचनं ज्ञानध्यानादि । श्रेयान्द्रव्यमयाद्यज्ञात् ज्ञानयज्ञ इति भगवद्वचनात् । प्रियमेधासं

1 See *M V* xvi, 42 45. The *KN* was evidently the last of Madhva's works and was probably composed while he was camping at Uccabhuti or Ujhre in S. Kanara.

2 Cf. वेदैश्च सर्वैरहमेव वेद्य ( *Gita* )

वेदा ब्रह्मात्मविषयास्त्रिकाण्डविषयाऽपि ( *Bhag* )

अवस्वराति गर्गोरा \* \* \* ( *RV* viii, 69, 9 )

प्रियज्ञाना अप्यर्चत । पुत्रका अल्पज्ञाना अप्यर्चत<sup>1</sup> । न बुद्धिभेद जनयेत्' इति च ।  
उतशब्दात् ज्ञानिनामर्चनं युक्तं स्वाश्रमानुसारेणेति । अथा ते विष्णो विदुषा  
चिदव्यं ( RV 1 156 1) इति श्रुते । धृष्णु वासुदेवाख्य । पुर देह नार्चत ।  
प्रत्युद्गमप्रश्रयणाभिवादनं विधीयते साधु मित्य सुमध्यमे । प्राज्ञै परस्मै पुरुषाय  
वेधसे गुहाशयायैव न देहमानिन ( Bhāg 14, 22) पुनरर्चतेति तात्पर्यम् ॥

As a preliminary to such a higher interpretation, Madhva vigorously attacks the theory of Nirguna Brahman in the opening section of the *KN* Passages ascribing various attributes to Brahman are cited in profusion. There is good reason to suppose that an Intelligent Creator like Brahman must indeed be Saguna: कर्तृत्वात्सगुणं ब्रह्म पुरुषं पुरुषर्षभम् (Bhāg 11, 39, 12). The denial of attributes to Brahman in certain passages of Scripture must be interpreted in terms of the purely Prākṛtic attributes नच एको देव \* \* \* । सत्त्वादिगुणामावोक्तेस्तेन । अन्यथा 'एको देव सर्वभूतेषु गूढ' इत्यादीनामपि गुणत्वान् स्वीकृतिविरोधः ( *KN* )

The conception of "Nirviśesa" is then dialectically refuted. The predication of "Nirviśesatva" involves a contradiction: निर्विशेषत्वेन विशिष्टं तत् न वेत्युक्ते, यद्यविशिष्टं, न विशेषनिराकरणम् । विशेषवत्वमेव भवति । यदि तेन विशिष्टं स एव विशेष इति व्याहृतिः ॥

It cannot also be a negative elimination व्यावर्त्यविशेषः तद्व्यावृत्ते ब्रह्मणि विशेषमापादयति चेद्विशिष्टा वाक्यार्थता । न चेन्न ब्रह्मज्ञानाधिने पदान्तरं वाच्यम्, अजिज्ञासितत्वात् ।

Madhva emphasizes that Karma can never be regarded as the terminus of Scripture, as is contended by the Pūrvamīmāṃsaka<sup>2</sup>. The Veda, by its very nature, stands for the achievement of happiness eternal, by man, and such eternal happiness is obviously and admittedly beyond the power of Karma. In this connection, Madhva repudiates both and nāh, the Prabhākara doctrine of कार्ये व्युत्पत्तिः. The *KN* shows Karma its proper place remarking.

ध्यानं त्वल्लिलकर्मभ्यो ध्यानाच्च ज्ञानमुत्तमम् ।  
न ज्ञानसदृशं किञ्चित्पुरुषार्थप्रसिद्धये ॥ इति प्रवृत्ते ॥  
हूरेण ह्यवरं कर्म बुद्धियोगात् ( *Gītā*, 11, 49 )

अशेषकर्मपूगोऽपि न विष्णुध्यानलेशभाक्  
 तच्च ध्यान हरेर्ज्ञानिकाटघशाय न पूर्यते । इति कर्मविवेके ।  
 तस्माद्विरुद्धवत् प्रतीयमानानि प्रशसादीनि ज्ञानसहकार्यपेक्षया योजनीया-  
 नीति ॥ ( *KN* ).

Rituals have to be performed in a spirit of devotion, discrimination and detachment भगवद्भक्तिज्ञानवैराग्यपूर्वकं कर्म वर्तव्यम् ॥

The work is concluded with an indication of texts to this effect.





## CHAPTER XV

### UPANISAD-BHĀSYAS AND RG BHĀSYA

The Upanisads had all been interpreted by Śaṅkara and his successors, in a monistic sense. Their writings had left the impression in the minds of people at large, that whatever might be the teaching of the Epics and the Sūtras the Upanisads were unquestionably in favor of an absolute monism which had come to be regarded as the one and only "Upanisadam Darsanam". In the interests of the success of the Theistic reaction led by him, Madhva had then to disillusion the people in this respect by producing fresh commentaries upon all those Upanisads that had been commented upon by his predecessors. He had to show that Theism was after all the basic philosophy of the Upanisads, despite their occasional indulgence in the language and imagery of Monism in moments of great mystic fervor. He had to vindicate the claims of a Personal God,<sup>1</sup> the reality of the cosmos and its values and the fundamental difference between the human and the Divine souls in the philosophy of the Upanisads.

He had already set forth the logical and metaphysical bases of his thought and expounded them in his *Dasa-Prakaranas*. He had refuted the premises and conclusions of the Advaita system in the AV and in the *Prakaranas*. The only other task that remained to be accomplished was to settle the kind of systematic interpretation that should be given to the Upanisads in conformity with the requirements of genuine Theism. This was what his commentaries on the major Upanisads undertook to do. They (1) draw attention to the full measure of support that the Upanisads have to give to Theistic Realism and the impossibility of interpreting such texts in any but their literal and express sense. (2) They also show the ways in which certain other texts, more or less ambiguously or mystically worded and which, on very superficial

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1 There is however, nothing physical about Madhva's conception of God as a Person. See pp. 5, 92, 163, 65, 201, 3 and 205.

grounds had been appropriated by Monists, should be reinterpreted consistent with the underlying Theism of the Upanisads (3) They also suggest a variety of standpoints both mystic and philosophical from which the monistically worded texts could be adequately reconciled with the bulk of texts that propound a radical Realism (4) In explaining the possibilities of such a reinterpretation of texts, Madhva makes considerable use of grammatical and etymological sanctions and of a large body of interpretative and expatiatory literature<sup>1</sup> (5) Logical argumentation, too, is not wanting

Some of Madhva's interpretations are quite happy and unexceptionable and are supported by continuous literary tradition. Some others are logically well-argued and command respect even when they do not compel agreement. Some others are a bit artificial and far-fetched and rest upon grammatical considerations and etymological analysis. In pursuing such methods of textual interpretation, Madhva is merely following the footsteps of his brother commentators in the field. An Indian commentator or system-builder, so long as he is obliged to philosophize within the four corners of given texts, is not at liberty to reject any text however badly, inadequately or even inconveniently worded. Short of rejecting texts, he is given full freedom to cut, quarter or expand the text, read between<sup>2</sup> or into the lines or read them inside out<sup>3</sup> and so on, in accordance with the famous dictum व्याख्यानतो विशेषप्रतिपत्तिर्नहि सन्देहादलक्षणम्. The only plausible justification for such departures from the express sense of passages is the firm conviction of the commentators in question in the correctness of their fundamental philosophical position. But as this conviction could not be sustained merely as a matter of personal faith, but must be capable of being justified before the bar of reason and able to impress others, the truth of that philosophical view had, naturally, to be demonstrated in the light of experience, reason and other grounds. Where these reasons were

1 See Chap. V

2 Cf. केवलोऽनिगुणश्च (Vādirāja) असमूति च \* \* \* (Sāṃkhya-Isa Up. Bhasya, 14)

3 Cf. the interpretation of तद्वैव माहुरसदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् । in the *Advaitasūdhā* of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī

specious or opposed to universal experience, consistency of thought and the permanent values of life, the starting point itself would have to be rejected as a species of false philosophy and distorted metaphysics. But where, as in the case of Madhva, the premises of a realistic philosophy are well supported by reason and ratified by the Śaṅkara the basic thought comes to be established on such firm foundations that all other approaches whether really or apparently different from it, wherever adumbrated in the original texts, must, if they cannot be reasonably accommodated, be explained in the only way open to commentators viz., by reinterpreting them mystically or figuratively or else esoterically, but not from a duality of standpoints of truth and falsehood  
गुणे त्वयार्थकल्पना । तत्सिद्धिजातिसारूप्यप्रशसाभूमलिङ्गसमवायात्

(Mīmamsā sūtra 1, 4, 23)

The question of the acceptability of the *details* of the particular lines of interpretation of monistic-looking texts worked out by Madhva, is thus of *comparatively less philosophical* importance than their logico philosophical merits. If these could be convincingly established and if the philosophical bases of monism could be shown to be untenable on equally convincing grounds, a slight verbal change here and there or even a departure from the literal sense in the interpretation of a particular passage could not be said to constitute a serious metaphysical drawback to the acceptability of that philosophy or philosophical line of interpretation, as a whole. In assessing, therefore, the value and admissibility of the reorientation of Upanisadic Monism given by Madhva, these considerations should be *carefully* borne in mind, before pronouncing a verdict on his philosophical approach and achievement.

The merit of his new line of interpretation lies in the foundations of his realistic metaphysic which go to the very depths of the intuitional experiences of the Śaṅkara and the consequent logico-philosophical necessity for a proper reconciliation of Upanisadic monism with the findings of such Upajivya pramāṇa. It also lies in the abiding value of his all comprehensive metaphysical ideology of 'Svatantra' which constitutes the apex of his thought. He attaches the least value to literalism or mere speculative flights of philosophical imagination and its glamour.



## (19) ISĀVAŚYA UPANISAD BHĀŚYA

This is a short Upanisad of 20 mantras Madhva interprets it as a valuable document of Theism The very first verse here touches the twin principles of Theism—the immanence and the transcendence of the Deity The reality of creation is affirmed squarely in याथातथ्यतोऽर्थान् व्यदधात् शाश्वतीभ्य सामाभ्य (verse 8) which the Advaitin struggles hard to escape<sup>1</sup> The doctrine of disinterested performance of one's Svadharma (the precursor of the Gita doctrine) is inculcated in ver 11 The need for divine grace in realising the highest truth is foreshadowed in ver 15

Madhva's commentary is original in many respects He is direct and pragmatic in explaining ईशावास्यम् and तेन त्यक्तेन-ईशस्यावासयोग्यमीशावास्यम् । तेन ईशेन त्यक्तेन दत्तेन भुजीथा । His explanation of स पर्यगात् as referring to the human soul placing itself under the protection of the Supreme and thereby casting off all misery is an ingenious improvement on that of his predecessors<sup>2</sup>

एव सर्वगतं विष्णुं पश्येत्तस्य विजानत ।

को मोहः कोऽथवा शोकः सविष्णुं पर्यगाद्यत ।

या विष्णुं कविर्मनीषी \* \* शाश्वतीभ्य सामाभ्यर्थान् व्यदधात् ।

Madhva teaches "as one having authority" There is a strong missionary fervor behind his bold and interesting explanation of अन्ध तमः प्रविशन्ति ये (12) "Those who are content to revel in ignorance go to perdition Into greater hell do they sink, that rest content in their own knowledge, without taking the trouble to denounce false teaching and propagate the true"<sup>3</sup> This is a remarkable interpretation No Christian missionary could have been more solicitous of the need to propagate what he conceives to be the truth The 'aggressive' attitude that is supposed to characterize Madhva writers, is probably traceable to the teaching contained in this interpretation of Isa 9

1 See *Advaitasiddhi*

2 See *A Critical Study of the Isa Up*, F. O. Schrader, J. A. lxii, 1933 pp 206-7, where the Professor construes more or less in the same way as Madhva, dismissing Samkara's rendering as "forced"

Even more historic is Madhva's explanation of the famous passage \* योऽसावसौ पुण्य सोऽहमस्मि ( ver 17 ) As the late Sriś Chandra Vasu pointed out, long ago, this line "contains the great ineffable name of God "I am that I AM" "SO AHAM ASMI" In the Zoroastrian faith also, this is one of most secret names of the Lord, as shown by the following extract from the Hormuzd Yasht

"Thus spake Zarathustra 'Tell them O Pure Ahuramazda, the name which is thy greatest, best, fairest and which is most efficacious for prayer'. Thus answered Ahuramazda—My first name is Ahmi I AM \* \* \* \* \* My twentieth name is— " Ahmi yad Ahmi Mazdo I am That I AM " (*Avesta*, xvii, 4 6)

This was also the most secret name of God among the Jews, as one learns from the *Old Testament*

"And Moses said unto God, ' Behold, when I come unto the children of Israel and shall say unto them 'The God of your fathers hath sent me unto you, and they shall say to me 'What is His name?' What shall I say unto them? And God said unto Moses, "I am that I AM and He said Thou shalt say unto the children of Israel—'I AM' has sent me unto you " (*Exodus*, iii, 13 14) <sup>1</sup>

Madhva, too, has explained "Aham" and "Asmi" in this Upanisad as the two secret (esoteric) names of God<sup>2</sup> and construes That Supreme Being which indwells in Asu ( the Chief Breath ) is the I AM

## ( 20 ) KENA or TALAVAKARA UPANISAD BHASYA

This Upanisad seeks to demonstrate the supremacy of the Brahman over all presiding deities of phenomenal forces of Nature as well as of the microcosm, by means of an interesting parable of the gods and the "Yakṣa" The sovereignty of God has thus two aspects "adhidaiva" ( celestial ) and "adhyātma" ( psychical ) The so called ' Spiritual Agnosticism ' of the *Kena* ( Ranade op

1 The extracts from the *Avesta* and the *Old Testament* are quoted from Sriś Chandra Vasu's Introd to his tr. of the *Iśa Up* S B H Series, Allahabad, Vol 1 ( 3rd edn )

2 Cf. "अ" इति ब्रह्म तन्नागतमहमिति । ( A Ā ii 3, 8 ) तस्योपनिषदहमिति । ( Brh v, 2, 4 ) उपनिषत्—रहस्यम् । ( *Bhamatī* ) and Madhva's interpretation of तदात्मानमेवावेदह ब्रह्मास्मीति ( Brh Up 1, 4, 10 ) and न वा अरे अहमिम विजानाति ( iv, 5, 14 )

cit p 177 ) in 11-12, is nothing more than a plea for the spirit of prayerful devotion to God that is to spring from inner humility of self. While it remains true that none of us can know God in all His fullness and glory,<sup>1</sup> the Upanisad does not seem to negative the possibility of our knowing Him *at all*, each one to the best of his or her capacity. Madhva says well

नातिवेद्यो न चावेद्यस्तस्मात्स परमेश्वर<sup>2</sup>

It is very remarkable indeed that Madhva's comment on नैद यदिदमुपासते ( 1, 4, 8 ) नद जीवस्वरूप तत् ब्रह्म ' This Jīva, who is near to the body, is *not* that Supreme Self ', should be endorsed by Hertel who, like Madhva, contends that " the *Kena* wants to fight against the doctrine of the identity of the world soul and the individual soul " ( *Die Weisheit der Upanisaden*, München, 1921, pp 23 32 ff )<sup>3</sup>

1. Cf को हि त वेदितु शक्तो यो न स्यात्तद्विधोऽपर ।

तद्विधश्चापरो नास्ति तस्मात्त वेद स स्वयम् ॥

( q in *Mbh T N* 11, 74 )

2 Cf " It doth not at all follow that because God is incomprehensible to our finite and narrow understanding, He is utterly inconceivable by it, so that we can't form any idea of Him at all. For, it is certain that we have not such an adequate and comprehensive knowledge of the essence of any substantial thing so that we can perfectly master and conquer it. Truth is bigger than our minds and we are not the same with it but have a lower participation only of the intellectual nature and are rather apprehenders rather than comprehenders thereof. This is indeed one badge of our creaturely state \* \* \* \* Yet, many rational souls frame certain ideas and conceptions of whatever is in the orb of being, proportionate to their own nature and sufficient for their purpose. Tho' we can't fully comprehend the Deity, nor exhaust the infiniteness of its perfections, yet may we have an idea of a Being absolutely perfect, such a one as is agreeable and proportionate to our measure and scantling *nostro modulo conformis* as we may approach near to a mountain and touch it with our hands, tho' we cannot encompass it within our arms ". Ralph Cudworth, ' *True Intellectual System of the Universe* ' quoted in *Chamber's Encyclopaedia of English Literature*, Vol 1, 1894, p 373. The sentiments expressed by this 17th century Platonist have been fully anticipated and shared by Madhva who, surprisingly enough, has given us the very same analogy of a mountain

पश्यतोऽपि न पश्यन्ति मेरो रूपं विपश्चित ( B S B 1, 1, 5 )

3 Quoted by Ranade, op cit ii, p 474 ( Notes )



## (21) KATHA UPANISAD BHASYA

Is the sovereignty of God over His creatures limited to *this* side of release, or does it continue even on the other side of it? This, according to Madhva, is the theme of this Upanisad and the subject matter of the third boon of Naciketas. The passage ये य प्रेते विचिक्षत्सा मनुष्ये (1, 1, 20), has been accordingly interpreted by him. प्रेतं मुक्त्वा मनुष्ये नियामकत्वेन भगवानस्तीति ज्ञानिना वदन्ति नास्तीत्यज्ञा । तस्य नियामकस्य स्वरूपं यथावत् अहं विद्याम । Śaṅkara has interpreted the text (1, 1, 20) in terms of the survival of the soul after death. This has been criticized by Ramanuja in his *Śrībhāṣya*. It seems advisable to refer the text, on the whole, to the condition of the 'great beyond' (Samparāye mahatī) 1 = release 1

In emphasizing this aspect of God's government of the released state,<sup>2</sup> Madhva as a true mystic philosopher, attributes the activities of the individual on the waking and dream planes also to the activity of God. Considered in bold relief, this idea runs thro' every line and chapter of this Upanisad—that the human soul is dependent at all stages and states of its existence on the guidance and control of a Higher Power.<sup>3</sup>

"Rtam pibantau . ." (1, 3, 17) is a strong plea for the subordination of the individual to such a Power. In the series of assertions "Etat vai tat" in the first Vallī of the 11 Adhyāya, this dependence is fully brought out. The waking and dream states are there directly ascribed to the Supreme

येन रूपं रसं गन्धान् शब्दान् .. ..... ।  
एतन्नेव विजानति \* \* \* ।  
स्वप्नान्तं जागरितान्तं चोभौ येनानुपश्यति  
महान् विमुमात्मान \* \* \* ॥

1 "Sāmparāya" is evidently the final release, Cf यमप्येति भुवनं साम्यराये ॥ ( *Ghṛta Sūkta* ).

For a detailed discussion of the issue, see my paper "Śaṅkara's Rendering of *Yeyam Prete*,—A Critique', *AUJ* 1, 2 (1933)

2 उत्तमृतत्वस्य ज्ञानं

3 Madhva's interpretation of the four forms Viśva, Taijasa etc receives full support from

स विश्वस्तेजसः प्राज्ञस्तुरीय इति वृत्तिभिः ।

अथेन्द्रियाजयज्ञानैर्भगवान्परिभाष्यत ॥ ( *Bhag* XII, 11, 22 )

Madhva's interpretation of these in terms of a Supreme Power that enables us to see our dreams is clearly supported by *Brh Up* iv, 3, 11 where these experiences and dreamless sleep are alike attributed to the superior activity of the Chief Purusa (Hamsa) who "covers the soul while asleep and enlightens the sleeping self, Himself remaining awake all along

स्वप्नेन शरीरमभिप्रहृत्यासुप्त सुप्ताननिचाक्सीति ।

शुक्रमादाय पुनरेति स्थानं हिरण्यं यः पुरुष एक हस ॥ (*Brh Up* iv, 3, 1)

Interpreters of *Katha* have been puzzled by the description in i, 3, 1 of both the individual and the Supreme as "tasting the fruits of action" (*nam pibantau*). Samkhya has recourse to the *chaitanya* or the analogy of the umbrella bearers, to save Isvara. But this is entirely pointless as, in reality, there is no room for the "nyaya" at all since even the individual, on his view, is not really a *bhokta*. Madhva takes the text to refer to the two forms of the Divine Being. He has the support of the *Gita* which ascribes real *bhoktva* in the esoteric sense, to God (ix, 24)<sup>1</sup>

The gods no less than the forces of Nature, obey the behests of God य एवं तपसो जातम् (ii, 1, 6) and यतश्चोदेति सूर्यो . . . (ii, 1, 9). This difference between God and Soul is also brought out in the earlier sections pointing the way of realization i, 2, 7 9, 23-24. We have almost a clear formulation of the doctrine of Grace<sup>2</sup>, in *Katha* i, 2, 22. God must choose the devotee before the latter can hope to attain Him. This confirms what Madhva says in *AV*

\* \* \* \* \* इत्यादेनं हरिं विना ।

ज्ञानस्वभावताऽपि स्यान्मुक्तिः कस्यापि हि क्वचित् ॥

1 Ranade thinks "the author of the Upanisad had not before his mind's eye, a definite conception of the difference between the individual and the Supreme especially as he describes them both as being obliged to taste the fruits of action, and that is why *Mund* iii, 1, 17, corrects the thought and makes only one of them taste the fruits of action" (p 265). But in view of *Gita* ix, 24, this explanation is hardly acceptable.

2 "It seems that in a rudimentary way at least the *Katha* knew the uselessness of human endeavour unaided by Divine grace" (Ranade, op cit ii p 269)

## ( 22 ) MUNDAKA UPANISAD BHASYA

( 1 ) This contains 120 granthas . Like others, it is also made up, mostly, of quotations from authoritative sources . Madhva's comments are few . He prefers to interpret in the words of older authorities, drawn upon by him .

( 11 ) His first contribution to the interpretation of this Upanisad is his repudiation of the "invidious distinction" between the Parā ( higher ) and Aparā ( lower ) Vidyas in the sense in which these terms are understood by Saṃkhya . The difference between the four Vedas and that by which the Imperishable is known is one of *outlook*, not of *status*, according to Madhva . It is a question of intellectual approach rather than one of material classification . As a staunch believer in the supreme authority of the entire Sāstra as a whole to reveal the Supreme, Madhva feels he cannot be a party to any unmerited censure on the Pre Upanisadic literature which its condemnation as Aparā ( lower ) Vidyā would lead to . He gives a new orientation to the conception of Parā and Aparā Vidyā by which the four Vedas and their connected literature would be designated as Parā and Aparā, according as they are correlated or *not correlated* to the Supreme Being . He bases this interpretation on a text from the *Parama Samhita*<sup>1</sup> of the Paucaratra .

ऋगाद्या अपरा विद्या यदा विष्णोर्न वाचका ।

ता एव परमा विद्या यदा विष्णोस्तु वाचका ॥

( 111 ) Modern writers on *Mundaka* have made much of the conflict between ritualism and the path of knowledge that is supposed to be in evidence, here . It may be admitted that the claims of rituals have been fully recognized in 1, 2, 16 . Yet it is not oblivious of the limitations of Karma ( 1, 2, 7 12 ) . One writer remarks that " the yea and nay of Ritualism have rarely been so

1 The verse is not traceable in the *Parama Samhita* published in the G O S . Is the work cited by Madhva a different text of the Pañcarātra from the one known to Rāmānuja ? Saṃkhya's restriction of the designation ' Para Vidyā ' to the Upanisads, is thus criticized by Jayatīrtha . एतन्नापनिषद परविद्या इति व्याख्यानमपि परास्तम् । ऋगादियहणेन तासामपि गृहीतत्वात् । ब्राह्मणपरिव्राजक-यायश्चा-गतिकागतिः । तज्जन्यं ज्ञानं परविद्येत्यपि न युक्तम् । अविगतिकरणत्वात् नुपपत्तेः । अनेकायताकल्पनापत्तेश्च ( NS p 4 )



splendidly exhibited in two short sections, as we have in this Upanisad " (Ranade, *op cit* p 279). " We may say, these two parts constitute the thesis and the antithesis of the philosophical argument of this Upanisad and the synthesis of the two, if implied, is not clearly stated " ( *ibid* ) In the light of Madhva's interpretation of Para and Apra Vidyas, the synthesis would lie in a shifting of emphasis

वेदा ब्रह्मात्मविषयास्त्रिकाण्डविषया अपि ( *Bhag.* xi, 21, 35 ) as explained in his *Gita Bhasya*

( iv ) It has been recognized that the *Mundaka* affirms a Realism,<sup>1</sup> both psychical and physical ( 1, 3, 1, 1, 7 ) The distinction between the fruit-eating souls and the unaffected witness ( God ) has always been an uncomfortable reminder to the Monist The analogy of the arrow and the target is quite realistic शरवत् तमयो भवेत् And so is the declaration in जुष्ट यदा पश्यत्यन्यमीक्षाम् The only occasion where a doctrine of impersonal identity is approached is in iii, 2 7

गता कला पचदश \* \* \* \* \*

कर्माणि विज्ञानमयश्च आत्मा परेऽव्यये सर्वे एकीभवन्ति ॥

But there is no smooth sailing for Monism here The mention of liberated souls becoming ' one with the Brahman ' along with their works ( *karmāṇaḥ* ) creates a serious difficulty for the Monist, according to whose beliefs, Karma gets destroyed ( not unified with Brahman ) at the time of Brahman-realization<sup>2</sup> There is no such difficulty for a Realist of the type of Madhva, who recognizes that all good acts performed by an enlightened soul from the moment of his realization ( *Aparokṣa* ) of God vision, are ( not destroyed but ) " credited " so to say, to his account in release न ह्यस्य कर्म क्षीयते<sup>3</sup> Since Karma is not thus destroyed, in release,

1 Ranade, *op. cit.* ii, p 281-4

2 Cf यथा यथा कर्म कुरुते तथा तथाधिको भवति ।

आनन्दो हसतेऽकार्याच्छुभं कृत्वा तु वर्धते ॥ ( *Madhva*, B S II iii, 4, 8 )

स य आत्मानमेव लोकमुपान्ते न ह्यस्य कर्म क्षीयते । ( *ibid* iv, 1, 10 )

ज्ञानोत्तरस्तु धर्मो मुक्तावानन्दोत्पत्तेहेतुः ( *Jayatīrtha*, G. B. com Introd. )

the term एकीभवन्ति ( used as a single common predicate of both कर्माणि, and विज्ञानमय आत्मा, could only mean that the souls together with their Karma<sup>1</sup> are bound up in the Lord with their different potentialities intact

### ( 28 ) SAT PRASNA UPANISAD - BHASYA

( 1 ) This Upanisad is made up of the answers to the six questions put to sage Pippalāda. Section 1, teaches the twin-principles of Rayi and Prāna to be the sources of creation. Madhva equates these with Vayu and Bharati of his theosophy. He explains that this divine couple presides over the various principles of life in different capacities and carries on the work of creation

भतृम्य स म्वय वायुभर्यास्या तु सरस्वती ।

\* \* \* एव जानन् विमुच्यते ॥

( 11 ) The next two sections plead for the supremacy of Prāna over the psychic and the physical world. The high and unique place given to Prāna in Madhva's theology, derives its support from these sections of this Upanisad and others of its kind in the *Chandogya* etc. "Prāna-Vidyā" is indeed one of the favorite topics in the Upanisads

The analysis of dreams made in sec. iv seems to ascribe the endless activity thereof to the powers of the individual. Madhva makes but a slight change in the account here, ascribing these to the Supreme Being in consonance with the famous passage in the *Brh Up* ( iv 3, 11 )

The Upanisad leans to the view that the knower ( विद्वान् ) loses himself in the infinite light of the Deity, like rivers into the Ocean. Utter annihilation of name and form of the individual, is asserted. भिद्येते चासा नामरूपे. But, as we have seen, there is always some vagueness and obscurity in the analogies of the Upanisads, which leaves room for doubt and speculation. Madhva

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1. स्वरूपैक्याभिप्राये, कर्माणि विज्ञानमयश्चेति न युज्यते । नहि तत्पक्षेऽपि कर्मणा ब्रह्मैक्यं मुक्तावस्ति । निवृत्यभिप्राये च पञ्चदशकलानामपि समत्वात् अन्यासा कलानां गमनमुक्त्वा, कर्मणा विज्ञानात्मनश्चैकीभाव-  
वयनं व्यर्थं म्यात् । विशेषाभावात् ( VTN )

contends that भिद्येते नामरूपे could not mean that names and forms are destroyed but that they "differ" from one another even after mingling with the Sea, in a hundred ways. He quotes the text अनन्त वै नाम ( *Brh Up* iii, 3 12 ) On the analogy of the setting Sun suggested by the phrase अस्त गच्छन्ति he argues that the dissolution of the rivers in the Sea can only legitimately imply their invisibility to the naked eye thereafter अस्त गमन तु, नादि त्यक्त अज्ञानामविज्ञेयत्वमेव । Reading "समुद्रे इत्येव प्राच्यते" in the locative, he writes further अज्ञैरनवगतान्यपि समुद्रे स्थिताना, विष्णो स्थिताना च मुक्ताना, भिन्नान्येव रूपाणि सन्त्यवत्यर्थ । It is perhaps literalism to insist, as does Madhva that भिद्येते ' in the first place is mere "splitting up" into smaller units or parts, but never total annihilation or *ananyayadhramsa*" न च भेदशब्दा नाशे प्रयुज्यमान क्वापि दृष्ट । घटादिष्वपि बहुभाव एव भेदशब्द प्रयुज्यते । नाशस्त्वर्थत एवावगद । न चानार्थतोऽपि नाशोऽवगम्यते । नहि नामानि रूपाणि च कपालदत्त बहुधा भूतानि तिष्ठन्ति । अतो "भिद्येते" इति पृथक्त्वमेवोच्यते ॥

## (24) MANDUKYA UPANISAD BHĀŚYA

(1) This runs to 127 granthas. The most significant Theistic contribution of Madhva, to the understanding of this Upanisad, is the identification of the four forms of the intuiting self with the four Forms of the Deity presiding over the four stages of our psycho physical and transmundane existence : the waking (jāgrat) dream (svapna) deep sleep (susupti) and Moksa (turya) Modern scholars, following Samkara, have however, been content with identifying the four forms of the self postulated here, with the ego in various states of consciousness. That theirs is a narrow interpretation of the facts of the case would be clear from *Brh. Up* vi 3, 11, and 21, where the "Taijasa" and "Prājña" are sharply distinguished from the individual Purusa

स्वप्नेन गारीरममिप्रहृत्यामुप्त सुप्तानभिचाकशीति ( *Brh Up* iv, 3, 11)  
एवमवाय पुरष प्राज्ञेनात्मना सपरिण्वक्तो ( *ibid* ) and from B. S. मुमुक्षु  
त्क्रान्त्योर्भेदत ( 1, 3, 42 )

(ii) Monistic commentators have naturally underlined the acosmic negativism of the text in its description of the Prājña and Taijasa. Madhva has, therefore, taken pains to repudiate the



monistic implications of such terms as "Advaita", "Prapañcopaśama" and "Avyavahārya"

प्रपच देहवन्धास्य तुरीय शमयेद्यत ।

प्रपचोपशमस्तेनाप्युक्त स भगवान् विभु ॥

By all these Madhva has tried to bring out how the Upanisads as dealing with the Adhyatma, in the sense of the immanent Supreme Being, is the true active principle behind all our psycho physical existence and activities. This line of thought that lies buried in the Upanisads clearly represents a very old and, in all probability, the correct view intended to be taken by the seers of the oldest period.

(ii) The Māndukya is divided into 4 short Khāṇḍas. The text, as it has come down to us, is found mixed up with a sort of verse summary of some of its ideas, in 29 Ślokas. This, combined with the fact that the teaching of the Māndukya had very early inspired the composition of a metrical dissertation on the Advaita-vedānta by Saṃkara's Paramaguru, Gaudapāda, bearing a strong resemblance to the Ślokas already referred to, had given rise to a controversy in Vedāntic circles, as to the exact status of these 29 verses. Madhva commented on them as part of the *Māndukya Upanisad*. This has been questioned and criticized by certain commentators and later day critics owing allegiance to the school of Saṃkara, holding the opposite view that these constitute the first chapter (Āgama Prakaraṇa) of Gaudapada's work of four chapters and as such were composed by him. A large section of modern scholars also which generally follows the Advaitins in such matters of literary tradition, as the one widely current, shares this view. But the issue has been complicated by the fact that (1) some of these disputed Kārikas have been cited by writers (Advaitin and Viśiṣṭādvaitin) both *before*<sup>1</sup> and *after*<sup>2</sup> Madhva, as Śruti texts, forming part of the Māndukya. The sum of evidence available on the issue establishes beyond doubt that the 'Upanisadic theory'

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1 Saṃkara Sūtras, Vimuktātman and Rāmanuja

Dīkṣ  
Brat  
and *Rel. Poona* ii, 1, iii, 1, iv, 2 and *Poona Orientalist*, i, 2, ii, 1

of the Kārikas now regarded as forming part of Gaudapada's work, is a much older affair than Madhva and that he was not in any case, its originator. Since the publication of my five papers on this subject in the *RPR* and *PO* (between 1931-37) two learned works on Gaudapada have appeared in print. They are (1) the 'Agama Sāstra of Gaudapada' by Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya (Calcutta Uni 1943) and (2) Dr T M P Mahadevan's 'Gaudapada A Study in Early Advaita' (Madras Uni 1952). The Upanisadic theory of the Agama Prakarana of Gaudapada has naturally been touched upon by both these writers who have also passed in review the evidences that had been urged by me in support of it from Advaitic, Viśiṣṭadvaitic and Dvaita sources. Prof. Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya has admitted frankly that the evidence of Ramanuja, quoted by me, is conclusive and that there were, in his time, some authoritative teachers according to whom the Kārikas of the I Prakarana of Gaudapada were regarded as Śruti and as such they formed part of the *Mandukya Upaniṣad*' (Introd. p. xxxv-vi *Op. cit.*). Dr Mahadevan has not been so outspoken. He merely opines that "the rival view has been there since a long time" (how long he does not say), but the earliest to advocate it, so far as we can trace, were *not* the Advaitins' (*Op. cit.* p. 44). Now, as Rāmanuja is certainly earlier than Madhva and as it was not obviously to his advantage to have needlessly raised the status of the Kārikas of a rival school to the rank of Śruti, the conclusion is irresistible that Rāmanuja could not help recognizing the disputed Kārikās as Śruti, as they had already come to be so regarded in the other school. Thus, in fairness to Rāmanuja, Dr Mahadevan must either admit that some prominent Advaitins before Rāmanuja should have done so in their own interests, or that from the earliest times, such a view was current in Advaitic circles (as pointed out by me on the evidence of the works of Saṃ'ara, Sureśvara, Anandagiri, Brahma vidyābhāṣanākara etc.). Anandagiri was most probably a contemporary of Madhva and his evidence, in his *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* gloss, is clearly in favor of the Upanisadic theory. It would involve a serious redundancy of expression to interpret Anandagiri's introductory remarks in his *Mandukya* gloss as referring to one and the same set of Kārikās instead of two (one revealed to Gaudapada by Nārāyaṇa i.e. Śruti and another composed by Gaudapada himself). This is the view of Upaniṣad Brahma Yogi also.

In his recent edition of *Gaudapada Karikas* (Poona, 1953), R. D. Karmarkar makes a feeble attempt to dismiss the Upanisadic theory on the ground that (1) in several mss., of the Upanisads, only the mantras are given, as in the Nirnaysagar edn of the Upanisads and that (2) it is only the commentators who seem to regard the two as forming part of a composite whole (Op cit p xxix introd). He does not seem to have realized that the evidence of his mss., would stand very much circumscribed by the fact that none of them could be possibly older than either Kuranārayana or Madhva, to mention only two of the commentators who have held them as forming part of a composite whole. Karmarkar has maintained a discrete silence over Rāmānuja's citing G K 1, 16 (the very one cited by Śaṁkara under B S II, 1, 9) as a Śruti and challenging its interpretation by Śaṁkara, in terms of his Brahmajñānavada. This could not be explained away as a "loose" use, Rāmānuja was not a follower of Śaṁkara and his interpretation of the verse is diametrically opposed to Śaṁkara's. Śaṁkara's reference under B S II, 1, 33 to "Āptakāma Śruti", is obviously to the Karikā देवस्यैव स्वभावाज्यमाप्तकामस्य का स्पृहा । (G K 1, 9). The attempt to explain it away as a reference to Brh Up. 17, 4, 6, is not convincing, as the reference there, is to the enlightened soul on the eve of release, whereas in B S II, 1, 33, Śaṁkara is concerned with the God of creation. It is not also without significance that Appayya Dikṣita, in his *Parimala*, under this very Sutra, introduces a discussion on G K. 1, 9, which he definitely treats as a Śruti. No one would dare to accuse Appayya of ignorance of Advaitic tradition! Lastly, the inconsistencies in thought and expression of some of the disputed Karikas, with Advaitic positions (pointed out by Jayatīrtha and others) as in स्वप्नमायासह-पेति सृष्टिरन्यैविवल्लिप्ता, the use of the निर्धारणपद्धती in अद्वैत सर्वभावानां देवस्तुर्ग, and the difficulty involved in applying the mode of *reductio ad absurdum* argument envisaged in the syllogism प्रपञ्चो यदि विद्येत निवर्तते । are very real difficulties which call for careful consideration, in this context. The absence of any obvious advantage to Pealists and Dvaitins in raising the status of these Karikas, needlessly, is another strong point against making either Rāmānuja or Madhva the originator of this theory. Whether rightly or wrongly, the theory must have originated in Advaitic circles originally, before Rāmānuja and Madhva. They have taken it



accordingly, reserving to themselves only the right of reinterpreting them, as in the case of any other Advaitic Sruti. This would be the most sensible view to take of this problem and absolve them both of any responsibility for the Upanisadic theory. The whole problem has been re-examined by me in the light of all that has been said on the subject by Dr Mahadevan and others, in the *Bharatiya Vidya* Bombay, Vol xvii, pts 3-4, (1959) pp 96-121, to which further attention is invited.

(iv) Verses 7-9 afford material for a Theistic reconstruction. After a review of various theories of creation, theistic and anti-theistic, it is said the Deity cannot be supposed to engage in word-creation out of any desire to achieve any unfulfilled desire. Creation is a spontaneous activity—*द्वस्यैव स्वभावोऽयम्*, just a welling up of the Divine ecstasy. It is difficult to reconcile such an exalted idea with a purely monistic or acosmic attitude, which treats the Universe as a huge fancy of beginningless ignorance. The use of the term "Deva" to denote the "individual Soul" would also be unconvincing, as Advaitic commentators would have to take it.

Verses 17-18 are also interpreted in the same realistic spirit. At first sight, they seem to be a wholesale repudiation of all realism. But a careful attention to the wording and drift of the argument posed by the verses, obliges us to revise our judgment, says Madhva.

प्रपञ्चा यदि विद्येत निदत्तं and त्रिकल्पा विनिदत्तं कल्पिता यदि . . . ।

is not a mental projection but a reality Dr Mahadevan has missed this point in trying to evade the consequence of the "Prasangha" necessitated by the argument

Madhva also points out that as there is no logical concomitance between 'existence' (vidyamanatva) and negation (nirvrtti) in the Advaitic sense, the term "vidyeta" in the text should more properly be taken in the sense of "produced" (utpadyeta) He thus sees in the proposition here, an argument for the beginningless reality (anadisatya) of the Universe

प्रपचा यदि विद्येत (= उत्पद्येत) [तर्हि] निवर्तते, न निवर्तते ।

तस्मात्तात्पद्यत, किंतु अनादिनित्य ॥

He also draws attention to the use of the "selective genitive" in अद्वैत स्वभावानाम (VTN p 10 Bby) which would imply the existence of other reals (sa dvitīyatva) If the "Turya" alone were meant to be real (and all other "Bhāvas," unreal), the use of the (nirdharana saṁsthā) selective genitive would be out of place He explains "मायामानम्" as "created by God's will and sustained by it" (मानम् being made up of two roots √माह् to measure, create and √त्रा to protect) There are precedents in Yāska for deriving words from more than one root at a time अद्वैत परमाद्यंत is explained by Madhva from the standpoint of his Svatantradvitiya Brahman

### (25) AITAREYA UPANISAD BHASYA

This runs to 1500 granthas The term "Aitareya Upanisad" is generally restricted to that portion of the A, A beginning with आत्मावा.. (ii 4, 1) and running up to ii, 7 The second and third Āranyakas together are known as "Bahvṛca Brāhmaṇa" or "Mahaitareya Upanisad" The third book has its own title of "Samhitopanisad" As commented upon by Ānandagiri and as at present available, Saṁkara's commentary covers only the portion of ii, 4-6 Till recently, Madhva's procedure in having commented on the whole of the ii and iii Āranyakas was deemed a departure But the evidence of mss<sup>1</sup> and the testimony of Śāyana, show that like Madhva, Saṁkara too had commented on the whole of the Mahaitareya The Madhva textual tradition, in this respect

1 See Ranade, op cit ii, p 477 B (Note)

also, is endorsed by the Advaitic commentator Upanisad Brahma Yogi, whose commentary has been published by the Adyar Library

The *Attareya* is Madhva's favorite Upanisad<sup>1</sup> Much of the Upanisad, however, when *literally interpreted*, appears grotesque, unintelligible and even nonsensical Madhva's mystic and esoteric explanation of the text in terms of the highest Brahman and its worship and meditation, thro' all its immanent aspects, should be deemed a revolution in Upanisadic interpretation The intimate connection of this Upanisad with the *Rk Samhita*, in which mysticism and symbolism play no insignificant part, also lends weight to Madhva's new line of explanation There is no doubt also that the general trend of the text favors some kind of an allegorical explanation of sacrifice The aim of ii, 1, 3, is to enable men to acquire concentration of thought by meditating on the accessories of sacrifice This section deals with the allegorical significance of the Uktha (hymns) also called Niskevalya Śāstra, three sets of 80 tristichs in the Gayatri, Brhati and Usnik metres, prescribed for recitation at the Mahāvratā ceremony, on the twentyfourth day of the Gavamayana Sattrā The second part comprises chapters 4-6 and enlarges on the doctrine of the Atman The iii Āranyaka is taken up with the theories of word combination and permutation with the mystic meaning of various forms of the Samhitā text, its vowels, consonants etc

Madhva interprets the whole Upanisad in a mystic and "Vaisnavite sense",<sup>2</sup> on the basis of एत ह्येव वन्द्यं महत्युक्त्ये भीमास ते (A Ā

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1 *M. Vyj* iii, 55, vi, 1-4, xvi, 16, 54

2 Keith, in his *Attareya Āranyaka* (Oxford, 1909) has confounded Ānandatīrtha (Madhva) with Ānandagiri, glossator on Śaṅkara's Bhasya on *Attareya* Hence his supposition that Ānandatīrtha "wrote two commentaries on the *At*, first the super-commentary (tippani) on Śaṅkara's bhasya and second an independent commentary in which he interpreted the Āranyaka, in a Vaisnavite sense" (p 12) His further explanation that "Ānandatīrtha was a Madhva and so not unlikely to be disposed to adopt a Vaisnavite interpretation" is worse! Further down are fathered on Madhva other glosses of Ānandagiri on Śaṅkara's bhāṣyas on *Praśna*, *Īśa* etc The same confusion is betrayed again in the remark that "he (Ānandagiri) is indifferently called Ānandatīrtha and Ānandagiri"!



iii, 2, 3) The Uktha is identified with the Brahman उत्पापनादु-  
 क्यनामा स एव पृथिवीस्थित The fivefold hymn (पञ्चविध उक्तम्) in  
 ii, 3, 1, is explained as the five forms of Visnu, Nārāyaṇa, Saṁkar-  
 sana, Pradyumna and Anuruddha The meditation on the Sam-  
 hita text and its constituent parts (Art. iii) is similarly dealt  
 with There is bound to be considerable difficulty in working out  
 the details of such an interpretation Madhva is alive to these  
 difficulties Such esoteric interpretations involve on his part a  
 good deal of "loose and unscientific etymologizing." The inter-  
 pretations are perhaps "weak, farfetched" and etymological with  
 a vengeance But all said and done, it has to be recognized that  
 the interpretation of these portions is far from certain or easy.  
 While one may agree that the general tone and wording of Āra-  
 nyakas are in favor of a mystic interpretation of Karma, it is  
 difficult to establish any logical connection with Visnu, in all cases  
 The supremacy of Prāṇa as the central theme of the Vedas is  
 obvious in ii, 2, 2 and perhaps also in the equation of that  
 Prāṇa with Brahman in B S i, 1. 29 But not so perhaps the  
 further equation of that Prāṇa with Visnu attempted by Madhva  
 on the strength of णकारो बल षकार प्राण आत्मा<sup>1</sup> (A Ā. iii, 2 6)

Madhva selects four passages from the Āranyaka as represent-  
 ing its quintessence and from which he draws his doctrine of  
 "Sarvaśabda samanvaya" in Brahman (Visnu) This he adopts  
 as the master key to the interpretation of the *Mahātāreya* The  
 whole of this Upanisad is to him but an exemplification of this  
 thesis

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1 Adroit as is Madhva's attempt to correlate the two  
 syllables ष and ण to Visnu in iii, 2, 6, it cannot be deemed  
 convincing to an outsider Apart from the "V<sub>1</sub>" which has to be  
 imported from outside, the transposition of the syllables na and sa  
 (instead of sa and na in the order found in "Visnu") is to be  
 satisfactorily accounted for Bloomfield (*Religion of the Vedas* p  
 168) notes the splitting of Vi snu on the basis of *Sama Veda* ii,  
 1042. The only possible explanation of the transposition of the  
 syllables "sa" and "na" that could be advanced on behalf of  
 Madhva is the usual mystic motive "The gods love the cryptic, as  
 it were".

सर्वेश्च वैदिकपदैरपि लोकशब्दे  
 मेषाग्निवारिधिसलादिरयैश्च सर्वे ।  
 एकोऽभिधेयपरिपूर्णगुण प्रियाऽल  
 नारायणो मम सदैव स तुष्टिमनु ॥

( Concluding Verse of Madhva's Bhasya on *Aitareya* )

With a feeling of profound mysticism, he writes that not only the names of the gods and Rsis in the Vedas but even the very music of the spheres, the sounds of the ocean, the thunder of the clouds, and the noise of falling trees voice the majesty of God :  
 एवमृपिशब्देषु च व्यवहियमाणानि सर्वाणि नामानि विष्णोरेव मुख्यतः । किमु  
 देवतानामानि ? 'योदेवाना' ( R V x 82, 3 ) 'इन्द्र मित्रम्' ( 1, 164, 46 )  
 'यमिन्द्रमाहु' ( T B iii 7, 9, 3 ) 'नामानि सर्वाणि' ( *Bhallaaveya Śruti* )  
 इत्यादिभ्यः श्रुतिभ्यः न केवलं ऋष्यादीनां नाम भगवतः, सर्वे वेदा अपि तस्यैव  
 नामानि । किमु च वेदा ? समुद्रमेघवृक्षपतनभेरीताडनादिसर्वे घोषा अपि तस्यैव  
 नामानि यथायोगं योजनीयानि । उक्तं च बृहत्संहितायाम्—

“हुकारेण सहैवान्वि ” \* \* इति ॥ ( P 11, op cit )

Save for the immediate 'partiality' for "Visnu", which is the result of theological exigencies, these are lofty sentiments of which the greatest Theists of the world may be proud and to which any Mystic might rise in moments of highest divine ecstasy. When one recalls that "Visnu" stands only for the Highest Being, there is no difficulty in admiring the dizzy heights of mysticism to which Madhva rises in these contexts.

He has differed on many occasions from the interpretations of Śaṅkara. Until the latter's commentary on the other parts of the *Mahātāreya* is published, nothing definite could be said about the extent of mutual differences between the two. There are instances where Śāyana has indirectly attempted to answer some of the objections raised by Madhva ( cf Śāyana on ii, 3, 3 )

Madhva takes the opportunity afforded by the various controversial passages of the text of the *Aitareya* to discuss the points at issue between Dualism and Monism. The doctrine of identity between Jīva and Brahman is refuted in connection with the dialogue between Indra and Viśvāmitra ( ii, 2, 3 ), which is the subject of an *adhikarana* in B S i, 1, 29. The doctrine of attributeless Brahman is opposed and gradation ( *tāratamya* ) and

difference of various kinds are shown to exist in Mohsa ( pp 15-16 ) The monistic interpretation of योऽहं सोऽस्मी याऽसौ साऽहम् ( 11, 2, 4 ) यन्न देवा सर्वे एक भवन्ति ( 11, 3, 8 ) and others of its kind are refuted He points out that except for the phrase "योऽहं सोऽस्मी" the other expressions used in the text like अप्येति, are inconsistent with identity If identity were meant to be conveyed the repetition of "योऽहं साऽस्मी" "याऽसौ सोऽहम्" would be unnecessary, whereas on a realistic interpretation, such repetitions in the reverse order would be expressive of close community of interests and friendly feeling between the two as in चैनो मैत्र , मैत्रश्चैन । He also argues that the terms "Aham" and "Asmi" are used as secret names of God, the entire passage meaning 'That which is called "Aham", is in the Asu ( Chief Breath ) and that which is in the Asu is "Aham" ( 1 ■ 'Aheya" ) The text चक्षुर्मित्रस्य वरुणस्याग्ने preceding सूर्य आत्मा जगत्स्तस्थुषश्च is sufficient to show that "Ātmā" is used in the sense of inner ruler or guiding principle and that no identity is meant

## ( 26 ) TAITTIRIYA UPANISAD BHĀSYA

Here too ( granthas 250 ), a mystic line of interpretation is adopted At the very outset (Śikṣavallī), the meditation on Brahman in the six constitutive elements of letter, accent, quality, effort, modulation and combination is insisted upon The Supreme ( Viṣṇu ) presides with his five forms over the five spheres of Loka, Jyotiṣa, Vidyā, Prajā and Atma.<sup>1</sup> The same Lord again rules over the five sheaths and indwells among them and is therefore designated by the epithets Annamaya, Prāṇamaya, Manomaya etc It is worthy of note that Madhva unlike all other commentators on the B S 1, 1, 12, regards all the five 'sheath-forms' as Brahman Sankara dismisses all of them including Ānandamaya, as Kosas or Prākṛtic sheaths, while Rāmānuja treats all except Ānandamaya

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1. This is an interesting and remarkable application of the Vyūha doctrine of Pāñcarātra of which another example is seen in Madhva's interpretation of the esoterics of the Pāñcāgni Vidyā, in *Chān Up* This confirms the point that the Vyūha doctrine was closely connected with the Upāsanāmārga in the Upanisads and was not a meaningless accretion



as Kośas. But the ruling of the Sutrakāra that the suffix *maya* here ought to be taken in the sense of profusion ( *prācurya* ) and not of modification ( *vikara* ) and the repetition of the term "Brahma" in connection with Anna, Prāna etc., in the Upanisad lend greater probability and consistency to Madhva's view that all the five forms of Brahman are meant to be taught here as immanent in the different kośas and therefore designated by those very names for purposes of meditation. The mystic and esoteric correlation of the workings of the psycho-physical world with the immanent activity of Brahman could be brought about properly, only on such a view as Madhva's. He urges strong grounds against accepting the superficial interpretation of his predecessors (1) The *annam* referred to ( as Brahman ) is pointedly described as *अद्यते अति च भूतानि* " that which eats creatures and is eaten " by them ( 11 2 ) The description ' *अति* ' would be unsuitable for ordinary food ( *kośa* ) His own explanation of " *atti bhūtāni* " as that which dissolves everything at the end ( *pralaya* ) suits the Brahman well, as also his explanation of " *adyatvam* " ( being eaten by others ) as " *Upajīvyatvam* " ( metaphysical dependence ) In the same way, *Prānamaya* etc., would signify *Mahāprana* etc. The clear statement in the beginning that Bhṛgu approached his father and asked him to teach him Brahman, and the latter's equally clear statements— " Know *Annam* to be Brahman " and so on, also, render it quite possible that the real teaching right thro' all the five stages, is about Brahman and nothing but Brahman, clothed in esoteric phraseology of the *Antaryāmi* aspect. There can be no doubt that this interpretation places the teaching of this Upanisad, in an altogether new and edifying perspective, consistent with the highest ideology of Upanisadic thought and the principle of " *Samanvaya* " of Vedāntic texts in Brahman.

The crucial point emphasized in the last *Vallī*, according to Madhva, is gradation of bliss in *Mokṣa* ( *ānandatāratamya* ) On the basis of " *अयं सोऽमयं गतो भवति* " ( 11, 7 ) which points to the state of release, and in view of the significant terms " *Śāntiṛya* ", " *Avṛjina* " and " *Akāmahata* " used in an identical context in the *Bṛh Up* iv, 3, 33, he maintains that the gradation referred to here, has reference to the highest state of release itself. *संपादयन् आनन्दस्य भीमासा भवति इति मुक्तानन्दो भीमास्यते । 'योऽत्रियस्य चाक्षामहतस्ये'ति सर्वत्र विशेषणात् । न ह्यमुक्तस्य मुख्यं योऽत्रियत्वं सम्भवति, ना*

While the emphasis laid by him on the context and the parallel passages in Brh Up is pertinent, his explanation of "Śrotriya" as "Prāptaśrutiphala" (i. e. a redeemed soul) tho' in itself highly suggestive and ingenious, rests only on an untraceable text from the Epic. There is, however, one difficulty raised by him against the other explanations which refer the text to the Samsāra-stage, that the description here of Brahmā as श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य would be pointless as there can't possibly be a Brahmā "who has read the Vedas" (Śrotriya) and one who has not, which cannot be easily rebutted. His own explanation, therefore, is that "Śrotriya" should be taken in the specialised sense of यस्य श्रुतिफलं पूर्णं स श्रोत्रियः<sup>1</sup> which would be completely fulfilled, only in Mukti state.

### ( 27 ) BRHADĀRANYAKA UPANISAD BHĀSYA

This is the biggest of the Upanisad Bhasyas (granthas 1860 ). The heterogeneity of contents of the original renders a connected summary of the Bhāsyas impracticable. A few salient features alone might be brought out here.

Madhva gives, as usual, an esoteric and theological explanation of the ritualistic sections of the Upanisad ( 1, 1-2 ). The entire "Āśvamedha Brāhmaṇa" is explained in terms of Brahman and its meditation, thro' nature symbolism.

He takes the opportunity to discuss monistic texts like Vācārambhanam . . . " ( p 11 ) and digresses into multifarious topics ( pp 12-18 ) such as ( i ) the persistence of Difference and gradation in Mokṣa, ( ii ) the lordship of Brahman over released souls, ( iii ) plurality of released souls; ( iv ) homogeneity of the Divine Personality ( p 14 ), ( v ) nature and grades of Bhakti etc. The doctrine of identity is elaborately refuted ( p. 15-16 ) A full discussion of the thesis of Siddhārthe-Vyutpattiḥ " ( that the mechanism of speech has reference to an established order of reality and not to 'kārya' as contended by the Prābhākaras is dovetailed into 1, 4, 8, and, in its wake, the self validity of the Āgamas, the characteristics of the three Pramānas, the concept of Viśeṣas etc., are touched upon.

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1 Cf तदा गन्तासि निर्वेद श्रोतव्यस्य श्रुतस्य च ( Gīta )

Madhva construes the example of the drum and the lute (i, 4, 7-9) as emphasizing the substantial *dependence* of everything on God दुद्भ्यादिदृष्टान्ताऽपि सर्वस्य तदधीनत्व तत्कारणत्व च ज्ञापयति. There is no place for a monism in any of these illustrations वरुणवन अपा खातवत् वा, अनन्ताऽपारो भगवान् . समुद्रजल च एवाथयम् ( p 34 b )

In i, 4, 12, the tables are turned upon Śamkara by reading Yājñavalkya's famous declaration यद् हि द्वैतमिव भवति as a *reductio ad absurdum*. The goal of man cannot possibly be a blank unconsciousness न सर्वज्ञानं पुरुषार्थः । Yājñavalkya himself, later on, (iv, 5, 14) asserts that the self is verily undying and its attributes are indestructible. The familiar objection of the monist that the subject of all knowledge cannot itself be the object of an experience simply begs the question. The Upanisad, at any rate is not prepared to deny self-consciousness to the Atman (i, 4, 10) <sup>1</sup> The attitude taken by Śamkara, is in conflict with several texts here and elsewhere ( *Chan Up* viii, 12, 3, viii, 2, 1-10 ).

Sections 6 and 7 of the iii Adhyāya greatly reinforce Madhva's Theism. The expression अतोऽयदात्मम् ( iii, 7, 23 ) signifies to him that the human souls are subject to misery and have therefore to look up to God, who is free from *arbitrariness* (imperfection), for grace and redemption.

यदि स्वतन्त्रा, नैवेते दुःखिनः स्युः कदाचन ।

अत आर्तिमतामार्तिदाता मुक्तिप्रदश्च स ।

भगवान् परमो विष्णुः स्वतन्त्रः सर्वदेकराट् ॥ ( iii, 7, 23 )

Paradoxical as it may seem, the presence of evil and imperfection in the world is a proof of the existence of an Omnipotent God.

As at the conclusion of his Bhāṣyas on the *Āitareya*, *Taittiriya* and *Chandogya Upanisads* and the *B S*, Madhva claims, here also to be an Avatar of Vāyu, and calls two sets of passages to witness

1. "Is it not strange, to find Yājñavalkya, here, confessing that the ultimate Brahman which we might characterize only in negatives, is itself the ultimate knower and intuitor—marks far too positively characteristic of Brahman to allow merely a negative description of it?" (Ranade, ii p 199-200) Vide also Madhva's *At Bh* pp 15-16 b, VTN p 26.



(28) CHANDOGYA UPANIṢAD BHĀṢYA

(ii) Madhva launches a severe attack on the monistic interpretation of ii, 21, 2-4, (p.14-15) : तेभ्यो न ज्यायः परमन्यदस्ति । यस्तद्वेद स वेद सर्वं सर्वमस्मीत्युपासीत । The onus of proving the world to be false is on the Monist : दृष्टवस्तुनो मिथ्यात्वाङ्गीकारे च युक्त्यपेक्षा (p 15). He discusses in this connection the Śrutis : प्रपचो यदि and विक्ल्पो विनिवर्तते । His rigorous Monotheism meets us everywhere in his commentaries on the Upaniṣads. He is untiring in

2. The belief that the untouches leads the souls to deliverance (स एनान् ब्रह्म गमयति) as *Brahmā*, are the corollaries of this. For similar treatment of the Prāna cult see *A, A*, ii, 1, 4; ii, 1, 6; *Bṛh. Up* i, 3, 23, *Praśna Up.* i, 2, 3. In the *Jaiminiya Brāhmaṇa* (iii, 1, 1-2) Vāyu is declared to be the one "entire deity" that there is—the rest are all half-deities. See also my article on 'Jivottama-tattva' in the *Kannada Journal Jivottama* published from Kumbha (N. K.) i, 1958.

his efforts to refer the laudations of the minor gods to Visnu as their one Inner Ruler. What, on a superficial view, may appear to be a sectarian fiat, turns out, on calmer scrutiny to be the very crux of Monotheism. His 'partiality' to Visnu, should not blind us to the energy and consistency with which he has carried out the Monotheistic attunement of the Upanisads<sup>1</sup>

(iii) It is somewhat surprising that Madhva should have discarded the generally accepted splitting of 'तज्जलान् (iii 14, 1) into तज्जत्वात् तल्लत्वात् तदनत्वात् (सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म) This would not necessarily lead to a Monism. Even a realist may feel that the world is God—not because of any literal identity between them, but because it is His, for He made it<sup>2</sup> Qua deriving its very existence and capacity to function, from Him, it is figuratively identified with Him, its source as in विश्वमेवेदं पुरुषस्तद् विश्वमुपजीवति । As Madhva himself puts it in his GB सर्वं ब्रह्मेत्युच्यते तदधीनसत्ताप्रवृत्तिमत्त्वात् । This is practically the interpretation of "Tajjalan" adopted by the followers of Nimbarka यथा छान्दोग्ये स्वरूपेण भिन्ना नामपि इन्द्रियाणां प्राणाधीनतया प्राणाभिन्नत्वं श्रूयते—'न वै वाचो न चक्षुषि न मन इत्याचक्षते प्राणा इत्येवाचक्षते' (Chan. Up v 1, 15) तस्मात् स्वरूपतो भिन्नानामपि तज्जत्वादिना तदभिन्नत्वमाह भगवतो श्रुति "सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म तज्जलानिति शान्तं उपासीत" इति (Śukadeva on Bhag 14, 2, 5)

Such is also the idea contained in Bhag 1, 5, 20 इदं हि विश्वं भगवानिदं यतो जगत्स्थाननिरोधसंभव । Madhva himself is no stranger to this idea, as may be gathered from his comment on the above and from his remarks on Gītā 14, 24.

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1 Cf "The real Monotheist denies that other gods exist or have jurisdiction over the Cosmos. Wherever real Monotheism has flourished, it has been militant and hostile to the worship of any but the true God. It was so in Israel after Amos, in Zoroastrianism, in Christianity and in Islam" (George A. Barton, in his review of "A Study of Religion", J A O Dec 1935, p 481 Madhva, also, as a Monotheist looks upon Visnu as the Real and ultimate doer, in every act B S B. II, 3, 13 Only, he does not deny the existence of "minor gods".

2 तस्य लोकः स उ लोक एव (Satapatha, XIV, 7, 2, 17) The text has been explained by Madhva in a different way.

It would appear, therefore, that he departed from this interpretation, just to give Vaisnavism a footing in *Chandogya*, III, 14, 1, by splitting "Tajjalān" into "Tat" and "Jalān" (jala +  $\sqrt{\text{an}}$ ) i. e. the Being that breathes in the primeval waters. This would signify *Visnu breathing in the primeval waters*<sup>1</sup>

तच्च ब्रह्म जलान् .. योऽसौ विष्णुर्जलेऽनिति

अनीदवातमिति य वेदवागवदत स्फुटम् (Chān Bhāṣya III, 14, 1)

(iv) The sixth chapter of *Chandogya* is admittedly the most important one. It is here we have the two most important utterances of Upanisadic philosophy वाचारभण विकारो नामधेय मूर्तिवैत्येव सत्यम् (vi, 1, 4) and स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि (vi, 9, 4). These have generally been looked upon as unquestionably monistic. But Madhva shows that this is a baseless assumption. As for vi, 1, 4, the fundamental fallacy in the Advaitic interpretation is that a knowledge of the One (Real) *destroys* rather than produces the knowledge of the "all" or many. The Advaitin is thus *least justified* in speaking of 'the unknown becoming known, the unheard of becoming heard' (vi, 1, 3) "एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानमपगच्छति" would be a more appropriate description of his thesis! From the words actually used in the text, it does not seem to follow that all effects are *ipso facto* false and unreal. There is nothing to justify the twisting of "Vācārambhanam" into "vācārambhana-matram" and "nāmadheyam" into "namadheya-matram" (merely verbal) as has been done by Saṃkara. The presence of the words "eka," "manu" and "pinda" makes it impossible to establish any relation of material cause and effect between the pairs named. How ill fitting the thesis of Parināma-vāda is, to the context, can be seen from the example of the nail-cutter (*nakhaṅkṛtāna*), which can never be the cause of all that is made of lead (एकेन नखनिकृन्तनेन सर्वं वाष्पयिस विज्ञात) The causal argument breaks down completely in this instance and *partially* in the other two instances where the term "eka" and the terms "Pinda" and "manu" affixed to "mrt" and "loha" respectively, render the proposition untenable, as it stands. The Mayavāda interpretation of एकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानम्

1 See T. A. x, 1, 1 *Mahānarayana Up.* 1, 1

R. V. x, 129, 2c *Manu*, 1, 10



is even more inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the text एकेन मृत्पिण्डेन and its preamble येनाश्रुतं श्रुतं भवति । From the point of view of superimposition (Adhyāsa) of the world of effects on Brahman, it would have been proper to say येन श्रुतं मश्रुतं भवति, मतममतं भवति and so on. By knowing Brahman (as the truth) all else that is empirically known, is dissolved (प्रपञ्चस्य प्रविलयः शब्देन प्रतिपाद्यते) The monistic dictum अधिष्ठानज्ञानेनाध्यस्तानां निवर्तते would strictly require a reversal and restatement of the thesis in some such way. By knowing the One, the falsity of all is known' Madhva, naturally emphasizes this incompatibility of the Advaitic interpretation with the *wording of the text as we have it* and requirements of logic and pleads that in view of such difficulties, the causal argument whether Pantheistic or superimpositional (Vivarta) has to be abandoned and a purely Theistic line of argument adopted, in terms of the primacy of the Divine knowledge over all other kinds of (lesser) knowledge ज्ञानानां नानां सुत्तमम् । यज्ज्ञात्वा नेह भूयोऽयत् ज्ञातव्यमवशिष्यते (Gita)

His interpretation is that knowledge of Brahman is the end and aim of all kinds of secular and religious learning. Without such knowledge of the Supreme Being, even the most comprehensive secular knowledge would be futile. The primacy of the knowledge of God over every other kind of knowledge is stressed in तमर्वकं जानय आत्मनमन्या वाचा विमुचय (Mund. II, 2, 5) नारायण महान्त्यम (Purusasukta). That, when acquired, confers the benefit of all else that is known or worth knowing by effecting a proper correlation between secular knowledge and divine insight thro' the subsidiary and dependent character of all worldly knowledge. Svetaketu, despite his great secular and religious lore, was bereft of such primary knowledge. Hence, his father impressed on him the necessity for its acquisition. It is the crowning point and fulfilment of all other knowledge. The most comprehensive and up to date knowledge of the world would be a vain and useless burden if not *informed* and permeated by the spiritual knowledge of the Brahman<sup>1</sup>. To know the Brahman as सवसत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् is to

1 Cf. यस्तु न वद किमुच्चा करिष्यति (R. V.)

'स्याणुरय भारहा' किलामदधीत्य वेद न विजानाति योऽयम्' ।

have derived the true benefit of knowing all that is worth knowing in the world. The examples of the "mrt, loha" etc., are simply intended to illustrate how the knowledge of one distinguished specimen is sufficient to confer a general knowledge of all others similar to it. Madhva takes the declaration वाचास्मन् विकारो . मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम् as an additional example intended to supplement the thesis of the primacy of knowledge of God over other kinds of knowledge by means of a philological analogy based on the limited currency and sphere of influence of words of Prakṛtic origin (like *mṛti māṭi*) with the wider and universal currency of their corresponding Samskrta forms like "mṛtika". The idea is that one who has mastered the classical language or the *lingua franca* of a country, is able to make himself understood in other provinces where a different dialect of it may be spoken. The knowledge of the greater includes that of the lesser. By means of a similarity of form, the knowledge of the primary, may make the secondary as good as known . प्रधानज्ञानादप्रधान ज्ञातमाय भवति । God and the world, both being reals, the knowledge of God (the creator as Pradhana) is sufficient to give a knowledge of the world as created and sustained by Him, as depending on Him . सत्यस्य सत्यम् . The knowledge of the father enables one to know the offspring by sight in virtue of similarity of features. Madhva thus tries in various ways to bring out the thesis of the preeminence of Divine knowledge over secular learning and empirical knowledge, as the teaching that this passage is trying to convey.

(v) Now for the "Tattvam asi" text. It does not necessarily lead to a monism when we are told that man returns to his original abode in God after his vicissitudes on earth. In this he resembles a bird tethered to a post by means of a string, wandering here and there and returning finally to its roost. The trend of this illustration (Chān vi 8, 2) is that the finite selves after a career of earthly existence, return to their original home in the bosom of the Infinite. There they rest like rivers in the Ocean. There is no "Advaita" in this. The career of transmigration is exclusively for the Jivas. The Infinite remains unperturbed by the comings and goings of the finite beings or their doings. Rivers may come and rivers may go, the Sea remains the same and as full as ever maintaining its *status quo ante* . स समुद्र एव भवति as Uddālaḥa tellingly puts it. To all ordinary appearances, the rivers

may get mixed up with the Ocean and be lost. But they are there all the same. There is, of course, no realization on the part of the rivers of their differences from the Ocean, but *neither is there any realization on their part, of any identity with it* assuming such identity to exist in reality! The point, moreover, is that Uddalaka is trying to make his son know and behave better than the rivers. If the rivers or the various flower-juices are unable to know that they are in the Ocean or in the honey ( Cf सति सपद्य न विदुः सति न्य धामह इति; there is certainly an obligation on the part of Svetaketu to know that he is here and now in the hands of the Supreme. That loss of individual consciousness is not a desirable goal as proved by the example of the dying man ( vi, 15 ). It is a telling repudiation of identity and the undeserved self glorification of the finite self in life. That at the time of death the vital forces are surrendered to a more powerful and inexorable agency must be conceded. If anything, man realizes his littleness on such a solemn occasion. It cannot be that this instance is given simply to answer a question as to the steps by which a knower of Brahman reaches the goal. In that case, the reply should have simply stopped with indicating these steps अस्य वाङ्मनसि \* \* \* देवतायाम् and the rest of the 15th *khandā*, including the reference to the sick bed, would be out of place. It is clear, therefore, that it is meant to stress the point in the *dārśantika* that the individual is utterly dependent on a higher power. The example of the blind folded person brings out the thesis of difference all the more vividly. The kindly traveller who removes the bandage and guides the struggling wayfarer is the Guru in metaphysical parlance. The individual who is enabled to see God by the Guru's *upadeśa* is thus different from him even as the traveller is from the goal he has to reach. The example of the thief and the impostor is most significant. It brings out the thesis of difference between God and soul very tellingly. A person accused of some offence of robbery is brought before the judges. He is committed to a trial by ordeal and is asked to grasp a piece of red hot iron. If innocent he would come out unscathed, if guilty, perish. Shorn of the figure, the example could only be meant to warn the individual against claiming what is not his by right viz., the sovereignty of God by claiming identity with Him. Such would obviously be the suggestion behind the *dārśantika* pairs conveyed by the significant use



of the phrase 'अपहर्षीत', 'स्तेयमकार्षीत्', used in the Upanisad. As pointed out by Jayatīrtha, the analogy would be utterly inappropriate to a monistic construction. For, from an Advaitic point of view, the Jīva, who has, for some mysterious reason, *forgotten* or *forsaken* his Brahmanhood, which is his *by right*, cannot, with adequate regard for language or justice to logic, be branded a 'thief' and an 'impostor' (vi, 16, 1) 'he has taken away another's', 'he has committed theft'. Such a worthy can, at the worst, be deemed a saint or a fool (in giving up what is his own), but not certainly a thief! It cannot, therefore, be said that Madhva has missed the spirit behind Uddālaka's *upadeśa*, in interpreting the text स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि as emphasizing the difference between the individual and the Supreme and the utter dependence of the former on the latter, so forcibly expressed in the phrases सम्मूला सोम्य इमा सर्वा प्रजा । सदायतना । सत्प्रतिष्ठा । and accordingly, proposing to adopt the reading स आत्मा अतत् त्वमसि in conformity with the spirit and drift of the illustrations employed by Uddālaka, which are indisputably in favor of the thesis of difference and quite out of tune with the doctrine of identity. No doubt, Madhva could have conveyed the same idea of difference and dependence by adhering to the familiar reading "Tattvam asi". It is open to the theist to declare that God is indeed verily all that is or matters, as everything else depends on Him for its very existence, activity etc.

पुरुष एव सर्वं तद्विश्वमुपजीवति ।

We come across this idea in his comment on *Chan Up* ii 22 अद्वैत नाम यदुच्यते, तत् स्वतन्त्रभगवदपेक्षया । and in his remark नहि तदधीन पृथगित्येवोच्यते (*Brh Up* com ). From this point of view then, "Tattvam asi" would be no more than an epitomization of "Ātat tvam asi". But he chose to put it as "Ātat tvam asi", to clear possible misapprehensions about the ultimate point at issue, which the other reading might produce in the unwary. That he himself did not make much of splitting the text this way or that, but looked to the spirit of the passage to decide the *purport* of the *upadeśa* is clear from his adopting both kinds of "pada cchedas", in his works, and explaining the reading "Tat tvam asi" in line with

'इदं हि विश्वं भगवानिर्वेतरो यतो जगत्स्थाननिरोधसम्भवः ।' ( *Bhag* 1, 5, 20 ) His interpretation of "Atadātmyam idam sarvam" as "Tattatratrāḍ atadātmyam", is a clear indication of his willingness to subscribe to the unity of existence of the entire cosmos under the One Source of all existence and activity

यदधीना यस्य सत्ता तत्तदित्येव भण्यते ।

विद्यमाने विभेदस्य मियो नित्यं स्वरूपतः ॥

In his *Gītālāparyā*, he adopts "Tattvam asi" as the reading and takes "tat" as a correlate of the earlier phrase—एतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं which is interpreted as 'having the Supreme as one's sustainer'<sup>1</sup> एष ( ईश्वर ) आत्मा ( स्वामी, अन्तर्यामी ) यस्य तत् । तस्येदं ऐतदात्म्यम्

In his *V T N* he makes a special point that none of the illustrations used by Uddālaka has any support to give to the thesis of identity स्यान्ननवकेऽपि भेद एव दृष्टान्ताभिधानात् । This point has been conceded by some of the Advaitic commentators themselves, like Vācaspati<sup>2</sup> and Madhusudana Sarasvati<sup>3</sup>, which goes to strengthen Madhva's stand. He has also drawn attention to the burden of song of Uddālaka सम्मूला सोम्य इमा सर्वा भ्रजा सदायतना सत्प्रतिष्ठा । which refers to Brahman as the source, shelter and support of all creatures, a description which obviously suggests the dependence of all finite existence on an Unseen Power. The idea of all creatures finding solace and ultimate rest in the Supreme finds picturesque mention in Brh Up iv, 3, 19, which mentions the wanderings of a hawk and its finding rest, at last, in its nest. This analogy recurs in the present context of the *Chandogya*. These instances are clearly incompatible with the thesis of identity. So great is the difficulty presented by them to the Advaitic interpretation, that even the clever Advaitic dialectician Madhusudana could not think of any better explanation of them than that analogies do not run on all fours or that they are indifferent to actual difference and identity and are merely

1 The "taddhita" suffix (syañ) has been explained by Jayatirtha on the basis of the ruling विचित्रा हि तद्वितगतिः । ( *VTN* t p 65 )

2 नदीपाथ परमाणूनां तु समुद्रपाथ परमाणुभ्यो भेद एव । नाभेदः । एव, समुद्रादपि तेषां भेद एव । ( *Bhamati*, on *B. S.* II, 4, 29 )

3 तद्विभेदस्य भिन्नविधानेन \* \* \* ( *Adiātmasiddhi* ).

intended to refer to the absence of clear difference<sup>1</sup> These are indeed very weak defences We have already seen that failure to grasp the existing differences between the rivers and the Sea, or the honey and the juices, salt and water etc, is no proof of the unreality of such differences Taking all these facts into consideration, Madhva has thought it fit to discard the fashionable interpretation of "Tattvam asi", based on a superficial adherence to the literal sense of the text 'तत्त्वमसि' without going deeply into the wording and spirit of the illustrations or the context of the Upadeśa revealed by the keyword स्तब्ध एवाय ।

It is worthy of note that Madhva was the first Indian philosopher and critic of Samkara's interpretation of "Tattvam asi" to draw attention to the inappropriateness of the illustrations used to the thesis of identity Quite apart from the new reading "Atat tvam asi" suggested by him, he has made out a strong case for giving a reorientation to the interpretation of the text in terms of the dependence of all finite reality on the One Supreme, in other words, an identity based on Śāstra-dṛṣṭi or the mystic perception of metaphysical dependence of all finite reality on Brahman

तत्तन्त्रत्वादतदात्म्यम् ।

'यदर्घाना यस्य सत्ता तत्तदित्येव भण्यते' ।

In 'एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' we have another favorite text of Monism. Here again, it is the appearance that is misleading The passage (vi, 2, 1) has reference to the precreation stage (āgre) If, at that stage, the Śruti should say that Brahman alone existed *unaided* (अद्वितीयम्) by anything else, the Dvaitin has no reason to be upset by it Nor would it be difficult to reconcile such a position with the subordinate existence of the Prakṛti etc The existence of Prakṛti (or Tamas) in Pralaya, is already accepted in the Nasadiya Sūkta तम आसीत् Madhva, therefore, interprets "अद्वितीयम्" as without a peer or a superior" (समाधिकरहितम्) The denial of a "second" would more naturally refer to an equal or a rival, rather than to inferior realities<sup>2</sup> We have texts to confirm this line of interpretation

1 सर्वसाम्यस्य दृष्टान्ततायामत्रत्वात् ) स्फुटतरविश्लेषाभावेन स्वरूप-  
प्राप्त्युक्तिः । स्पष्टभेदाभावाभिप्रायेण, वास्तवभेदाभेदयारोदासीन्यात् ।  
(op cit )

2 Vide the maxim "अस्य गद्वितीयोऽन्वेष्टव्यः ।" from the  
Mahābhāṣya, cited by Samkara, in his B S B 1, 2, 11.



एक शास्ता न द्वितीयोऽस्ति शास्ता ( *Mbh* xiv, 27, 1 )

न त्वत्समोऽस्त्यन्यधिक कुतोऽन्यः । ( *Gita*, xi, 43 )

न तत्समश्चाम्यधिकश्च दृश्यते । ( *Svet Up.* vi, 8 )

( vi ) The last chapter of the *Chandogya* brings further support to Dualism and the view of Moksa as a state of active enjoyment of bliss for the released souls. These two sections ( viii, 2 and viii, 12 ) have always been irksome to monistic commentators. Śamkara, in his commentary on B S iv, 4, 6, has tried his best to explain them away as some sort of "arthavādas" or praises of the released and so on.

### ( 29 ) RG ( VEDA ) BHĀSYA

( i ) It may seem curious that a professed Vedāntin like Madhva should have taken the trouble to write a commentary on the hymns of the *Rg Veda*. This is because men have come to believe after a fashion that a Vedāntin has nothing to do with the Vedas! This is a tragic fallacy. Madhva has no sympathy with such an attitude of lofty indifference or antipathy to the Vedas. To him, there is as much philosophy in the Vedas, as in the Upanisads, if only we could see it from the proper point of view. Small wonder, then, that he should have striven to raise their earliest representative, the *Rg Veda*, to great philosophical dignity by the side of the other source-books of Indian philosophy, not only by quoting from it, off and on, in his interpretation of the *Prasthānatrayī*, but also, by writing a separate commentary on a portion of the text, bringing out its hidden philosophical content. By this, he raised the *Rg Veda* to the rank of a fourth *Prasthāna* the *Rk Prasthāna*, which is, in a sense, the source and head of all the others. For this remarkable service, his name should be remembered with gratitude by all true lovers of the *Rg Veda*.<sup>1</sup>

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1 In recent times, Madhva's stand on the *Rg Veda*, has been vindicated by the distinguished scholar-mystic Aurobindo Ghosh, by his exposition of the mystic thought of the Vedic hymns clothed in symbolic terminology. Prof Maryla Falk, writing in the *Journal of Psychology* ( xviii, pts 3-4, 1913 ), has denounced the "time-honored Western methods in wholesale

Madhva views the whole of the Rg Veda and for that matter, the Vedas as a whole as an essentially theosophic document. He takes the words of the *Gīta* ( xv, 15 ) the *Kātha* ( 1, 2, 15 ) and the *Bhagavata* ( 1 2, 29, 11, 5, 15, ix, 21, 42 43 and 35 ) literally and views the entire sacred literature thro' a pair of Vedāntic spectacles.

( 11 ) Already, in his commentaries on the Prasthānatrayī, he had maintained the doctrine of threefold interpretation of the Vedas. The Supreme Being is the highest subject matter of the Vedas. All Scripture, primarily and in the first place, sings the glory of the Supreme ( B § 1, 1, 10 ). The popular view that the Vedas only sing the praises of a plurality of gods ( Devas ) and are

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mythological interpretation of any and every text with the astonishingly poor apparatus of a few ever-recurrent naturalistic and ritualistic standards" and shown that "in a large group of hymns, a specific technical terminology and phraseology relating to a set of psycho-physiological and functional hypostases which constitutes the basic data of the earliest Yoga theory", is elaborated. An orthodox Viśiṣṭādvaita scholar D. T. Tatacharya, in his K. Krishnaswami Rao Endowment Lectures, at the Madras University, ( 1948 ) on the subject of " Rg Veda and Purvottara Mīmamsā interpretations " has shown great anxiety to give a better philosophical status to the Rg Veda than has been accorded by the Purva-Mīmamsakas and by the Vedāntic schools of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. He would have been able to establish his thesis conclusively, had he discarded the narrow view of the Vedas taken by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja and boldly followed the lead of Madhva in this respect. His halting and hesitant remarks show, all the same, that he realizes the importance of the question tho' he is not bold enough to cut the Gordian knot and follow the lead of Madhva. However that may be, we have, in his concluding remarks, a complete vindication of the principle of ( Vedāntic ) interpretation applied by Madhva to the hymns of the Rg Veda— " The Rg Veda has the idea of Brahman underlying it. If we apply and I don't know why we should not apply, to the Rks and hymns of this Veda, the principles of interpretation enunciated and employed by Bādarāyaṇa in determining the passages of the Upanisads as meaning Brahman, we cannot escape the conclusion that this Veda is as much concerned with the Brahman as the Upanisads " [ Italics mine ]. The full text of Tatacharya's Lecture has been published, it is learnt, in the Journal of the Venkatesvara Oriental Institute, Tirupati.

mostly made up of hymns to be addressed to them on the occasion of numerous sacrifices is opposed by him. While admitting the popular view that the Vedas do serve this purpose,<sup>1</sup> he contends that they have a higher aim also, viz., to convey the knowledge of the One Supreme Being. This latter is, in his view, the highest and most fundamental object of the Vedas,—of all parts of them without exception or distinction. The distinction of Karma and Jñāna Kāndas, is thus, to a large extent, superficial and misleading. Even the Karma Kānda is capable of being interpreted in terms of the highest wisdom of Brahman by the initiate. The popular distinction is one of convenience and adopted for practical and schematic reasons (Vide his com. on B S i 4, 22). Since all persons are not equally endowed with the highest spiritual light and capacity to rise to the highest sense of Scripture, the distinction of Karma and Jñāna Kāndas has a place in the scheme of things and is adopted as an ordinary working hypothesis. But, it is, in truth, only a means to an end. True wisdom can be attained only when one rises to the level of direct attunement of the entire sacred literature including the Mantra and Brahmana portions (B S iii, 1, 1), of course, within the limits of one's capacity, with the Supreme Being after purifying oneself by going thro' the disciplinary schemes laid down in the Karmakānda and discharging one's obligations, social and religious, which it entails on him, in a spirit of prayer, devotion and dedication to the Supreme. Such, in a nutshell, is the theosophic teaching of the Vedas according to Madhva.

(iii) The details of his threefold interpretation of the Veda are worked out by him in the opening section of the work (grantha 780). He illustrates his thesis with reference to the first three Adhyayas of the I Astaka (Mandala 1, Suktas 1-40). Rks as lauding particular forms of the Supreme like Āgni, Mitra are easily susceptible to higher attunement with the One than other parts of the Vedic literature like the Brahmanas. This is one reason why they are selected to demonstrate the thesis, to begin with. The purpose being illustrative, some forty Suktas of

1 तद्धि अन्यादेरपि वेदादावस्ति—

‘त्वमग्ने इन्द्रो वृषभ सतामसि’।

‘विश्वस्यादिन्द्र उत्तर’। इत्यादिपि। (G. R. ii 26)



the I Mandala are chosen for comment. In his commentary on the *At Up* and in his *K. N*, he has, similarly, dealt with some representative texts from the Brāhmaṇa and Āraṇyaka portions. His commentaries on the *Sūtras*, the *Gīta* and the Epic apply the same principle to these texts.

(iv) At the outset, Madhva offers some interesting remarks on the evolution of the present text of the Rg Veda, the scheme of its Rsis, its deities and the metres of hymns, a knowledge of all of which is insisted upon, in traditional circles<sup>1</sup>. Three redactions of the Samhita text are presupposed by Madhva: the first stage of Mūlaveda<sup>2</sup> when the hymns were yet in a floating stage. The second is that of Upavedas or Proto Vedas when the floating materials came to be arranged into three groups: the Proto Rk, Proto Yajus and Proto-Saman and from these the text of the four Samhitas representing the present text was constituted by Vyāsa.

ऋच स ऋच उद्धृत ऋग्वेद कृतमान् प्रभु ।

यजूषि निगदाञ्चैव तथा सामानि सामत ॥

( quoted from a Purāṇa by Madhva )

Modern scholars might be agreeably surprised to hear that besides recognizing these three stages of Vedic redaction, Madhva also considers that certain passages have actually been displaced from their original contexts, while passing thro' various redactions, while a few have been lost. Examples of both kinds have been cited by him, in his commentary<sup>3</sup>.

1 यो ह वा अविदिताप्यै छन्दोऽधीते \* \* (Kātyāyana, *Anukramani*, 1. 1)

2 This corresponds to the stage वाच्ये अव्यावृत्तासीन् । तामिदो मध्येऽत्रम्य व्यावृत्तात् ( *T S* vi, 4, 7, 3 ).

3 Sunāśsepa is credited with the composition of 100 rks in the I Mandala. But we have only 97 rks of his there and the rest are found distributed between 11 (two rks *स्य ना अग्ने वस्यस्य* (ii, 1, 4) and 1. 2, 7 ( *शुनश्चिच्छेष* \* \* ) Madhva contends that these were originally in I Mandala. In *मा नस्तेनेम्या* ( ii 23 16 ) there is a gap *ऊनता दृश्यतर्ज्यत* । which is supplied by Madhva in his *B S B* iii, 4, 49

( v ) Madhva has an elaborate scheme of Rsis devata<sup>s</sup> etc, for the hymns, peculiar to himself. Visnu is the chief and the highest of all the Rsis यस्य वाक्यं स ऋषिः and it is He that reveals the Vedas to Brahma at the beginning of creation (*Siet Up* १,18). Excluding him, there are four other grades of rsis primary, secondary, tertiary and the fourth. Brahma is the primary Seer of the entire Veda. Then come in order, Garuda and Sesa who are the Seers of the Vedas and the Pancaratras. Among the tertiary Indra is the Seer of Rk<sup>s</sup>, Surya of Yajus, Soma of Samans and Agni of Atharvan. The fourth are the individual Seers of the various rks and sūktas, whose names are given in the *Anukramanika* and other works. Some kind of unseen merit attaches to a knowledge of the first three kinds of seers and tangible results (*dṛṣṭa phala*) to the last. The 'wives' of the gods take rank as Seers in the order of their husbands. They preside over the metres as follows

1 Gayatrī	Wives of Garuda and Brahma
2 Tristubh	Svaha
3 Anustubh and Brihati	Tārā
4 Gāyatrī and Jagatī	Vartini and Rohini
5 Panktī	Śaci
6 Usnik	Saurī
7 Jagatī	Sarvadevastriyah
8 Aticchandās	—do—
9 Virat	Wives of Mitra and Varuna

So too, in the case of Devatas of hymns. Next to the Supreme Being Sri is the devata (subject) of all those hymns save those specially applying to Visnu. And so on down to Indra and the wives of the gods. There are numerous other details of like description set forth by Madhva on the authority of works like the *Rk-Samhita*, *Svādhyaya*, *Vyasanirukta*, which are obsolete.

( vi ) Madhva teaches that salvation could be obtained only by realizing the supremacy of Brahman ( Visnu ) and his lordship over the gods and by attuning the entire Scripture to Him. These ideas he says, are clearly indicated in the R V, and he quotes relevant texts. According to him the R V upholds Visnu ( among the adhidaiva tattvas ) as the Supreme Being that is free from all taint and imperfection. The other devatas like Brahma, Indra etc, are subject to various imperfections like *duhkhopapatti*

जाता परि ता बभूव, अविभेत् ब्रह्मा, नामीत्<sup>1</sup> इत्यादिकानपि ।

Similar defects are found in Rudra also :

दोषान् रुद्रे च तानेव मिनन्तीति<sup>2</sup> पूर्वकान्

य कामये (x, 125, 5) अस्य देवस्य (vii, 40, 5)

मा निश्नदेया अपि गुह्यं (vii, 21, 5) इत्यपि

घ्नन् निश्नदमान् (x, 99, 3) इत्याद्या दोषा बहव ईरिता ॥

In the same way, the Goddess Laksmi is also represented as inferior in many respects :

ततो वितिष्ठे (x 125 7) योनि स (x 125, 7) एतावती अह (x 125, 8)  
इत्यपि अन्याथयत्वं देव्याश्च कथित बहुशास्त्रिहि ॥ (Rg Bhasya)

The other gods like Brahma, Rudra, Indra, Maruts, are, in the same Sukta, represented as being under the control of Laksmi.

अह रुद्रेभिर्वसुभिश्चराम्यहमादित्यैरुत विश्वदेवे । ( x, 125 ).

Passages are cited from the *Suparna* and *Bahirca* Śrutis establishing a hierarchy of the gods. The *Tura Śruti* makes Vayu superior to Indra. Soma, Agni, Surya and Indra. The R V vouches for the supremacy of Vishnu over Indra वि हि सोतोऽसृक्षत (x, 86, 1) न यस्येन्द्रा (ii, 38, 9) and of Indra over Surya य सूर्यं य उपस जजान (ii, 12, 7) अयन्ते पञ्च देवा ( ) विष्णोर्वीतोऽजनिष्ट ( )

( vii ) There is thus sufficient evidence in the Vedas, says Madhva, for the hierarchy of gods and for the suzerainty of Vishnu over all the gods of the Vedic Pantheon. The entire Scripture refers to Him in the first place and not to the individual gods, who do not, moreover, exist during Pralaya. At least to safeguard the eternal validity of the Śruti ( which cannot be done unless a Vacyartha is recognized for them, all the while ) during the time of Avāntara Pralaya, the higher attunement of Scripture in the Brahman must be recognized. Otherwise, the Vedas would be bereft of vacyārtha during Pralaya and thus lose their title to eternal validity.

( viii ) It is for this reason also that Madhva reiterates the scheme of triple interpretation of Scripture from the historical, the mystic, and the transcendental points of view. The first one

1 वामुदेवो वा इदमग्र आसीन्न ब्रह्मा न च सवर ।

2. R V ii, 38, 9.



is more or less in agreement with that of Sāyana and other Vedic commentators. Such differences as exist are of no vital importance. The mystic interpretation is that by which a hymn or text in praise of a particular deity is made to refer to the particular form of Brahman (Visnu) presiding over the act for which the deity is noted and over the deity also, under the same name (Cf the case of Naciketas fire in the *Katha* and Visnu also denoted by the same name)<sup>1</sup>. In this case, the names and epithets find their fullest etymological sense only as applied to the Antaryamin इन्द्रे होन्द्रशब्दोऽपि न मुख्यतो वतते । परमेश्वर्यभावात् । इन्द्रशब्दोऽपि विष्णावेव वतते । स हि परमेश्वर ॥ (*At. Up. Bhasya*, II, 2, p 13) The historical sense is the "rudhārtha", while the mystic is one of "yoga" or "mahayoga", as it is termed by Madhva. It is grounded on the doctrine of "Sarvasabdāsamānvaya" in Brahman, which we have already noted, in connection with his interpretation of the Sūtras. Even those who would not go to the same length as Madhva in the application of this doctrine must concede that the author of the Sūtras is really insisting on the "yauṅikārtha" of "Akāśa" in seeking to equate "Akāśa" referred to in *Chān. Up.* 1, 9-1, with Brahman (*B. S.* II, 1, 22). A little thought would show that only a doctrine of Samānvaya such as that envisaged by Madhva, based on a dual denotation of words, could give the Samānvayādhyaya of the Sūtras its true explanation and *raison d'être*.

The third or "Adhyatma" line of Vedic interpretation sponsored by Madhva pertains to the metaphysical or philosophical relation between the Jīva and Brahman and centres round it. To illustrate the three lines of interpretation with reference to the opening rk - अग्निमीळे पुरोहितम्.....

"In the outward sacrifice, Fire is the first to be worshipped. The Supreme Being immanent in fire, is next lauded under the same name of Agni (in its yauṅika or mahāyoga sense). Lastly, in the realm of the inward sacrifice of knowledge (atmajñāna) the Supreme is praised as the author (hotr) of the right kind of

1. Cf. भूत, भूताभिमानी च, तद्देहोऽन्तर्नियामकः ।

हरिश्चाकाशशब्दावता, मृदयता हरिरेव च ॥ (AV)

rapprochement between the senses and one's external environments, or as the Immanent guide that controls (*agraṣatīṣat agraṣatī-*  
*trā*) the consuming fire of external reality by the flame of the intellect."

इन्द्रियाग्निषु चार्थानां यद्वोताग्निनामक ।

These and other details of interpretation are worked out on the basis of grammatical and philological sanctions which are elucidated by Jayatīrtha, in his learned commentary on the *Rg Bhasya*

(ix) Madhva's Bhāṣya is taken up mostly with the details of the mystic line of interpretation and rarely with the other two. The ordinary (historical) explanation is often passed over as being quite obvious. The Adhyātma interpretation is here and there elaborated with great skill e.g. the Indra-Vṛttra episode. Scholars are familiar with the 'scientific' explanation of this episode given by Yāska and the modern savants, according to which, the slaying of Vṛttra, by Indra is but a figurative description of the production of rain. Yaska calls his explanation that of the Etymologists तत्को वृत् ? मेघ इति नैरुक्ता । He refers also to the views of Traditionalists त्वाष्ट्राऽमु र इत्येतिहासिका । Madhva has given us a 'philosophical' explanation, no less suggestive. According to him, Vṛttra represents the concentrated essence of Ajñāna or false teaching of Māyā, figuratively described as a "cloud", a "serpent" (*ahi*) or a "mountain" (*adri*). Indra is the enlightened soul or the Supreme Lord who slays this demon of Ignorance with his weapon of *rajra* or enlightenment (*samyajjñāna*). Ignorance falls vanquished, sundered of its hands and feet (1, 32, 7 a) that is to say, put out of court, by reason and revelation. In his Bhāṣya on the A. A., Madhva has similarly given a philosophical explanation of the Rātri Sūkta (R. V. x, 127)

We are in an age when Vedic scholarship is taking wonderful strides. Scholars are not wanting who have boldly broken the bonds of language and tradition and discovered in the hymns hidden mysteries of the physical, psychological, biological and psycho-physiological cross sections of reality. Maryla Falk's thought provoking paper on 'The Oldest Psychology--Terminus a quo and Aspects', published in the *Indian Journal of Psychology*, xviii, 3 4, (1943), has brought to light the presence in the hymns of the Rg

and Atharva Vedas, a well developed theory and practice of Yoga and of a terminology and phraseology relating to a set of psycho-physiological functional hypostases which constitute the basic data of the earliest Yoga theory.<sup>1</sup> Madhva's approach is designed for the satisfaction of the spiritual and mystic thought needs of humanity. It is broad based enough to accommodate the purely 'historical' explanations of Sāyana and the modern scholars, but goes far beyond them in certain directions. The older Vedic commentators have themselves, here and there, recognized the presence of "Adhyatma line" of interpretation of the text, tho' they had not systematically worked them out, in the manner attempted by Madhva. The Monotheistic tradition of Vedic interpretation followed by Dnyananda Sarasvati, the founder of the Arya Samaj, is directly inspired by the lead given, long ago, by Madhva. It is gratifying to note the handsome tributes which have recently been paid to Madhva and his commentators, for their pioneering work in bringing to light the mystic and symbolic meanings of Vedic hymns, in the new edition of the *Rg Veda Samhita* (with a new commentary) published by the Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry.

Madhva does not expressly quote or criticize the interpretations of earlier Vedic commentators. But there is no doubt that he differed from many of them, in the general interpretation of the hymns too. Traces of such implied criticisms are to be met with in the commentary of Jayatīrtha<sup>2</sup> on the *Rg Bhāṣya*.

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1. "ious texts of the 1 and 2  
189 My thanks are due  
Psychology Dept of the  
in Psychology, Bombay  
the above paper

2 See my paper on "Yatra diavira jaghana (R. V. 1, 28. 2) in the *Poona Orientalist*, 1950 Cf also इन्द्रवायू (॥ 8. 3) एन मह-  
स्त्राक्ष अपरस्मिन् लक्षणा इति व्याख्यान, मुरये मत्स्ययुक्त इत्येवमस्येनाह।  
(Jayatīrtha, *Rgbhāṣyatīka*)





## CHAPTER XVI

### POEMS, STOTRAS AND MISCELLANEOUS WORKS OF MADHVA

Besides the commentaries on the *Sūtras*, the *Upanisads*, the *Gīta*, etc., in which he dealt with the problems of his metaphysics, Madhva composed a few Stotras and other works of a miscellaneous character, dealing with religious worship, rituals etc. These minor works reflect his deep religious spirit and devotional fervor. Their composition must have taken place late in his life, when he had sufficient leisure after the completion of the arduous task of producing his major works and organizing his philosophical system and strengthening its hold on the people.

#### ( 30 ) YAMAKA-BHĀRATA

This is a short Yamakakāvya in 81 verses, in various metres, dealing with the exploits of Kṛṣṇa and his help to the Pandavas. It may be pronounced to be a successful work from the point of view of skill in handling a variety of metres and the use of *yamakas* (rhymes), *prasa anuprasa* (alliteration) etc. There are verses with four quarter rhymes and *ekakṣaras* ( 76, 78 ). The work appears to have been composed in a gush of ecstatic devotion ( Ver 80 )

#### ( 31 ) NARASIMHA-NAKHA-STUTI

This is a short eulogy of the nails of God Nṛsiṃha, in two *Sragdhara* verses. They are found prefixed to the *Paṇḍita-stuti* of Trivikrama Panditācārya, one of Madhva's favorite disciples. According to tradition, Madhva composed these two verses and had them prefixed to his disciple's *Paṇḍita-stuti*, extolling Madhva in his three 'incarnations,' as he did not approve of the disciple's praising him, exclusively. They are now recited as part of the *Paṇḍita-stuti*, at the beginning and at the end.

## (32) DVADAŚA STOTRA

This Stotra in twelve short *adhyayas*, is believed to have been composed by Madhva, at the time of his acquisition of the image of Sri Kṛṣṇa, which he installed in his Mutt at Udipi. There is also another tradition about the origin of this Stotra. There are 126 verses here, in a variety of metres, handled with distinct musical effect and impressiveness. The order and arrangement of verses and chapters as generally current, differs in some respects from the text preserved in the oldest transcript of the 'Sarva-mula' reputed to have been left by Madhva's favorite disciple Hṛṣikēśa Tīrtha, in the Palimar Mutt at Udipi.

The author has woven many beautiful and profound truths of religion and metaphysics into this short inspiring poem. It may, in a sense, be said to have given the first impetus to the birth of the great devotional literature of the Haridāśas. It ranks as one of the foremost Stotras in Dvaita Literature, in Sanskrit. Echoes of Jayadeva's *Gītāgovinda* could be detected here and there. It is capable of being set to music.

(33) KṚSNAMṚTAMAHARNAVA<sup>1</sup>

This is an anthology of 242 verses (including five of a benedictory nature) in praise of Viṣṇu, from various sources. It is mostly in Anuṣṭubh, but other metres also are found. The verses include those attributed to Siva, Narada, Pulastya, Dharma, Brahmā, Markandeya, Marici, Atri, Āṅgiras, Pulaha, Ātreya, Kauśika, Agastya, Suta, Vyasa and Rukmangada. A noteworthy fact is that two verses (52 and 66) occur also in the *Mukundamala*<sup>2</sup> of Kulasekhara.

The work emphasises the efficacy of fasts on Ekādaśī days, gives rulings for the correct determination of Ekādaśī and Dvādaśī *tithis*, the worship of Śaṅkara (stones), the wearing of

1 There is evidence in the *M* 1.2 (xvi, 38-40) that this work was composed at a place called Idetude (Skt. Saridantara) or of doab between the Kumaradhara and Netravati rivers in S. Kanara, when Madhva was camping there. "Saridantara" is not certainly the name of a "chieftain" as made out by Dr. Saletore (*History of Tuluna*, i, p. 425).

2 Cf. *Mukundamala* verses 25 and 14 (ed. Annamalai University Sanskrit Series, no. 1, 1933).

Urdhva pundras etc (224-30) The author enjoins a complete fast on Ekadāśī (172-94), whose rigorous observance is, even today, kept up among his followers, —even Śrāddhas falling on that day being postponed to the next day, on that account. Verse 10 refers to the worship of Viṣṇu with *bīṭa* leaves, which is rather uncommon among Vaiṣṇavas

The author concludes his work with an exhortation to his followers to cultivate love and devotion to God at all times From the fourteenth year of his or her life, a man or a woman does good or bad deeds, which at the very lowest calculation, entail not less than ten future births ! There is thus not the slightest hope of our attaining freedom from transmigratory career by annihilating Karma and exhausting its effects Bhakti, then, is the only way to release from the ills of Karma

जीवश्चतुर्दशादूर्ध्वं पुरुषा नियमेन तु ।

स्त्री वाप्यनूनदशकं देहं मानुषमार्जयेत् ।

दशावराणां देहानां कारणानि करात्मकम् ।

\* \* \* \* \*

अतः कर्मक्षयान्मुक्तिं कुत एव भविष्यति ? (Ver 14-18).

## WORKS ON WORSHIP

### (34) TANTRA-SARA SANGRAHA

The rules governing Vaiṣṇava modes of worship and initiation (*dīkṣā*) fall under the Tantras There is a substantial element of Tantric mysticism in Mādhva worship and rituals including *nyāsa*s, *mudra*s etc These are dealt with in this work It claims to be an abridgement of a bigger work of that name by Vyāsa (Ver 77) Mādhva's work is metrical in form and is divided into four chapters and contains 442 verses, mostly in Anuṣṭubh

The first chapter gives in detail, the countless forms of the Lord presiding over the letters of the alphabet, their special characteristics and *mantras* together with the *minutiae* of their meditation, chanting and *nyāsa*s

The second deals with the auxiliaries of Homa and *Kalāśapūja* The third has many valuable points to record on matters of iconography, temple architecture, consecration of idols etc The choice



of proper materials for the casting of Images<sup>1</sup>, their poses ( iii, 2 ) and standard measurements ( iii, 44-46 ), the choice of the proper site for the erection of temples ( 52-54 ), the area required for the purpose ( 55-56 ), the nature of the building materials ( xx 57 ), the construction of domes, spires and gopuras for temples, the number of Prākāras ( enclosures ), the nature of Sabhas ( courtyards ), *mandapas* the religious ceremonies connected with the "Ankurārpana," "Pāṇikāpujā " Bali and other ceremonial, to be gone thro' are some of the subjects dealt with. Then comes the actual installation of the idol, its bathing in holy water (*abhiśeṣa*) amidst recitation of Vedic mantras ( 104-111 ) and subsequent festivities connected with the feeding of guests and the final bath ( *avabriti* ) after the rites ( iii, 127 ). The subject of renovating temples fallen into ruins or disrepair is touched upon ( 132-35 ) The section ends with a reference to minor deities to be set up and worshipped in a temple. Madhva's exposition has reference primarily to the worship of Viṣṇu and consecration of Vaiṣṇava temples. He also refers ( iii, 159 b ) to other kinds of Tantras ( probably Vaiṣṇava ) prescribing other modes of consecration. He himself would appear to follow the Pāñcaratra Āgama, in his exposition. The last chapter is a *resume* of the special mantras bearing on the entire subject, set forth in the original *Tantrasara* of Vyasa ( iv, 1 )

### ( 35 ) ŚADACARA SMṚTI

This is a small compendium of codes governing a man's daily life and activities drawn up from a strictly orthodox point of view, in keeping with the ancient ideal of Varnaśrama dharma and an ideal Brahminical life. It gives the routine of duties of various orders and Varnas, from morn till night. Much of what is said here has no bearing on present day conditions of life. The topics

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1 Madhva speaks of two kinds of wood or stone " the male and the female " and their respective uses ( iii 50 )

स्वरे स्थूलत्वमेदेन पुरुषाद्या जातित शिला ।

पुशिला प्रतिमार्थं तु स्त्रीशिला पीठकल्पये ॥

These are confirmed by other standard treatises on the subject  
Of शिलारश्च त्रिविधा पुरुषोत्तमपुसकाश्चेति । घण्टानादसमा पुशिला ।

*Vaiṣṇavasāgama* of Marici, Chap x p 34, Trivandrum Skt Ser x

touched upon include Sandhya, Brahmajājña, Vaiśvadeva, duties of ascetics etc. This work is also said (Ver 40) to be a short anthology of the precepts of Vyasa on religious life. There are 41 verses in all, mostly in Anustubh. It is known to have been commented upon by Viśvanatha Vyāsa, father of Tarāṅgī Rāmācārya, (16th cent.)

### (36) YATI PRANAVA KALPA<sup>1</sup>

This is another small handbook in 28 Anustubhs, explaining the correct mode of adopting Sannyāsa and entering the fourth order of life. The method of initiating the disciple *mantraprdeśa* and administering the Oath of Asceticism to him are briefly, but forcibly dealt with here. The treatment is, naturally, from the standpoint of the uncompromising Vaisnava Realism of Madhva. The Oath of Loyalty to the Order administered to the new entrant is most significant.

न विष्णु वैष्णवाश्चैव ह्युत्सृजेयमिति निश ।  
न चान्यदेवतासाम्य तदेक्यमथवा हरे ॥  
चित्तयेय मृतो वापि, न चाप्येकत्ववादिभि ।  
समत्ववादिभिश्चाह सगच्छेय कदाचन ॥

[ Never shall I forswear Viṣṇu and the Vaiṣnavas. Never shall I deem Viṣṇu to be on a par or identical with the other gods. Never shall I associate with those who hold the doctrine of identity or equality of God and soul. ]

The initiated shall spend his time trying to improve his knowledge of the Śāstras. He shall worship the Lord, practise the Pranava japa regularly and try to realize God.

### (37) [KRSNA] JAYANTI NIRNAYA

This short work in 17 Anustubhs deals with the Kṛṣṇajayanti Vrata (the birth anniversary of Śrī Kṛṣṇa). It would be easy to realize the importance of this day to such ardent Vaiṣnavas as the followers of Madhva. Madhva himself had attached special importance to the worship of Kṛṣṇa and the anniversary of his

<sup>1</sup> Not "Yatipranakalpa" as in Saletore, *History of Tuluvā*, p. 441.

birth is hailed by him as a Vrata, to be observed with due sense of devotion and austerity. He enjoins on his followers a *complete fast* on that day which is still rigorously observed by them. Special worship is held at midnight ( when the incarnation is believed to have taken place ) on the eighth day of the dark fortnight of Bhādrapada, when Arghya is offered welcoming the Lord. The fast is broken the next morning.

### [ ( 38 ) KANDUKA STUTI ]

*Kṛṣṇastuti*. *Kṛṣṇagadya* or *Kandukastuti*, as it is variously called, is a short *stotra* in praise of Kṛṣṇa, in two smart, alliterative verses said to have been composed by Madhva, as a boy. It is not included in the traditional list of his works. The name "Kanduka-stuti" is fancifully taken to mean that it is "generally repeated by Hindu girls at the time of playing with a ball" ( M. Rangacharya, Descriptive Catal. of Madras Govt. Oriental Lib. vol, xxvi, no. 14801 ). There is no warrant for any such surmise. The verses are :

अम्बरगगाचुम्बितपादः पदतलविदलितगुस्तरशकटः ।  
 कालिदनागक्ष्वेतनिहन्ता सरणिजदलविकसितनयनः ॥  
 कालघनालीकबुरकायः शरशतशकलितरिपुस्तनिकरः ।  
 सन्ततमस्मान् पातु मुरारिः सततगसमजयखगपतिनिरतः ॥





## EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE MĀDHVA SCHOOL AND ITS INSTITUTIONS

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### EMERGENCE OF THE ASTAMATHAS OF UDIPI AND OTHER MUTTS

#### TABLES OF MUTTS

(1) Towards the close of his life, Madhva had ordained eight monks<sup>1</sup> for the conduct of worship at the Mātha of Kṛṣṇa, founded by him at Udipi (*M. Vij.* xiv, 131 and *Tīrthaprabandha* 1, 8). These established lines of their own by ordination and these lines of ascetics became the precursors of the Astamāthas of later times<sup>2</sup>. The early history of these Mutts is still vague and we have no information about the extent of religious and secular influence wielded by them, until much later times. The Svāmīs of the eight Mutts hold office as High Priests of the Kṛṣṇa Mātha by turns, for two years each. This biennial change of office is known as "Paryāya", which takes place during Makara. When not in office, the Svāmīs look after the affairs of their own individual Mutts and tour the country for purposes of religious propaganda and obtaining supplies to last them during their next turn of office. We have, thus, at Udipi, a unique and well organized system of religious worship and administration, which reflects great credit upon its organisers, whoever they might have been. The system is generally believed to have been introduced in its present form by Vādirāja Svāmī, one of the celebrated Pontiffs of Udipi, in the 16th century<sup>3</sup>. There is no evidence that it existed earlier, tho' certain

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1. Hṛṣīkeṣa Tīrtha, Narasimha, Janārdana, Upendra, Vāmana, Viṣṇu, Rama and Adhoksaja Tīrthas (*M. Vij.* xv, 128-9).

2. Palimār Adamār, Kṛṣṇāpur, Puttige, Sirur, Sode, Kānur and Pejāvar Mutts.

3. This is confirmed by the *Vādirāja Gururara Caritamṛta* (iv, 49), which states that the older system established by Madhva, was a rotation once in two months.

inscriptions from Udipi<sup>1</sup> (Insc Madras, II, p 871, nos 236 and 241) relating to the Kṛṣṇāpur Mutt, recording gifts to Vidyā (dhi) rāja Tīrtha, in 1409 A D and (260) to Adimar Mutt in 1443 A D) go to show that the Svāmīs had come to be recognised, widely, long before the 16th century.

Besides the eight Mutts above referred to, there are two others tracing descent from Acyutaprekṣa with Satyatīrtha at their head. These go by the names of Bhandārkere and Bhīmanakatte Mutts. Their bifurcation seems to have taken place at the time of the fifth successor of Satyatīrtha. No outstanding contribution to Dvaita Literature seems to have been made by the Svāmīs of these two Mutts except the illuminating commentary on the *Īktimallikā* of Vādirāja, by Surottama Tīrtha, the fourteenth in descent on the pīṭha of the Bhandarkere Mutt. Even as between the "Astamathas" of Udipi and the up Ghat or "Deśastha Mathas" descended from a group of four itinerant disciples of Madhva, the place of honor for literary activity and spread of Dvaita philosophy should be given to the latter. The Svāmīs of Udipi have mostly confined their attention to their own community of Taulavas, devoting themselves for the most part to the worship of Kṛṣṇa at Udipi,—one of the purposes for which they were ordained. It would, however, be far from proper to conclude from the circumstance of Madhva's installation of the image of Sri Kṛṣṇa at his Matha in Udipi, that the eight monks ordained by him were only intended to officiate as Priests therein. The pen picture we have of these eight disciples in the *M. Vy* (xv, 128-31) is decidedly against any such narrow interpretation of their rôle as envisaged by Madhva. It is, however, the Mutts represented by the other group of four disciples of Madhva, viz., Padmanābha, Narahari, Mādhava and Aksobhya Tīrthas and continued by Jayatīrtha and his successors that have made the most solid contributions to Dvaita Vedānta and its literature and their propagation in different parts of India. In this sense, the appellation "Mūla-Mathas" (original Mutts) given to them, is fitting. There is, however, no evidence, apart from tradition, that Mādhava and Aksobhya were both personally ordained by Madhva. Nor do the terms "Ācārya Pīṭha" or "Mūla Matha" appear to have acquired

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1 The donors are Harihara Raya II (1377-1402) and Deva Raya Mahārāya I (1406-18)

any significance yet, during the lifetime of Madhva or his immediate disciples. The *M. Vij* gives absolutely no indication of Madhva's headquarters having been anywhere else than at Udipi, where he spent most of his time. It is thus quite misleading till the days of Jayatīrtha to speak of X or Y as having "succeeded" Madhva on the "pītha" and "ruled" for so many years. The four (presumably) immediate disciples of Madhva viz, Padmanābha, Narahari, Mādhava, and Aksobhya Tīrthas, and others like Viṣṇu Tīrtha, might have passed away, one after the other, in the cyclic years recorded for them in the various Mutts. Beyond this we cannot go and represent them as having "occupied" a particular "Pītha" (vacated by Madhva or his successor) and "ruled" one after the other, "handing over charge" to the next in order, at the time of his death. This is a popular assumption for which there is no conclusive evidence.

The whole question is still vague and complicated. The Udipi tradition does not accept the view about the "four direct disciples" of Madhva.<sup>1</sup> This, by itself is not an insurmountable difficulty as the *M. Vij* itself clearly admits (xv, 127) the existence of *direct disciples* ordained by Madhva both *before and after* the ordination of Padmanabha and Viṣṇu Tīrtha. Actually, however, the *M. Vij.* refers by name, only to Padmanabha and the eight monks of Udipi and leaves out Narahari, Madhava and Aksobhya. These may be taken to be included among those collectively spoken of as "others" from different parts of the country (x, 127).<sup>2</sup> But Jayatīrtha, in his TP has paid homage only to Padmanābha and Aksobhya ignoring the other two in between them. But that he knew of Narahari Tīrtha is clear from his criticism of some of his interpretations of Madhva. All the same, it seems curious that he should have ignored them, had they been his "predecessors on the Mahāsamsthāna." The terms in which a later Pontiff Raghutāma Tīrtha clubs together the last three as distinguished from Padmanābha Tīrtha, in an introductory verse of his *Nyayavivaranagloss*

1 Cf चक्रे शिष्यान् नवाग्रव (Vādirāja, *Sarasvāharatī*, vii, 22)

2 These, naturally, must be different from the eight monks who succeeded to the Astamathas and who were all of them from the Tula country



सुगुणरहरिश्च्रीमाधवाक्षोभ्यरूपान्  
हरिभजननियुक्तान् शुद्धधर्मार्थिकामान् ।  
सुजननियमनार्थं य प्रसाध्यापरोक्ष  
स भवतु मम भूत्यै पद्मनाभार्ययोगी ॥४॥

lends some color to the view that those three were in some way or other particularly and specially connected with him ( probably by way of initiation ? ) But, then, such a supposition is negatived at least in the case of Narahari Tirtha whose Srikurmam Inscription shows that he was Madhva's direct disciple Another inscription of Narahari establishes that his ordination had taken place in or before 1264 A D It is also claimed that Prāṇesa Vithala ( a late Dasa ) refers to Alsobhya Tirtha as the " करजात " of Narahari, which term is generally taken to denote direct initiation

It would thus be clear that there seems to have been a good deal of vagueness and uncertainty about the floating traditions which had gathered round " the four early ( direct ) disciples of Madhva " These do not appear to have been put on an authentic basis and recorded until after the establishment of the three main Mathas, about the middle of the 15th century The *Gurucarya*, a hagiological work on the Pontiffs of the Uttarādi Mutt ( from Madhva down to Satyanidhi Tirtha ) ( d 1648 ), says that these floating traditions of the Mutt came to be defined and recorded during the days of Śrīpādarāja ( c 1460-86 ) and Raghunātha Tirtha<sup>1</sup> ( 1444-1502 ).

This work is of considerable importance from many points of view It is a fairly ancient work, ending as it does, with the life of Satyanidhi ( 1638-48 ) It records, probably for the first time, the tradition about the " four direct disciples " of Madhva and their " succeeding " to his Pītha one after the other, as now accepted It is also of great chronological value, as it gives the cyclic years ( month and tithi ) of the succession and demise of the various Pontiffs ( of the Uttarādi Mutt ) and records Madhva's date of

birth as Kali 4224 corresponding to Śaivahana 1039<sup>1</sup> and mentions Vilambi and Pingala as the year of his birth and disappearance respectively. The first and the second bifurcation of the "Mūlamatha" in the days of (1) Vidyādhirāja and (2) Rāmacandra Tīrtha are also mentioned here. Ignorance of this tripartition has been responsible for Das Gupta's rejecting the entire line of Gurus descended from Rajendra Tīrtha, cited by Baladeva Vidyābhūṣana, in his *Prameyasaratnāvalī* and by Kavikarnapura in his *Gaurāṅganoddeśadīpikā*, as fictitious, under the impression that there is really but one line of Madhva Gurus viz., that represented by the Uttarādī Mutt.

The seniority of the lines of Rajendra Tīrtha and Vibudhendra Tīrtha is also expressly admitted here. This point is of vital importance to the understanding of the true historical order of evolution of the three Mutts. The recognition of seniority in ordination (*aśramajyaisthya*) of (1) Rājendra Tīrtha to Kavindra and (2) of Vibudhendra to Vidyānidhi, in this work, is significant and noteworthy, as it is a work written avowedly from the point of view of and dealing mainly with the succession list of the Uttarādī Mutt.

The Uttarādī and Raghavendra Svāmī Mutts have preserved the succession list of their Gurus in the form of certain "Carama-śloka"<sup>2</sup> or verses in their memory. These verses are supposed to be composed by the each succeeding Pontiff in memory of his immediate predecessor on the Pitha and embody the main events in his Pontifical career.

1 This date corresponds to 1117 A. D. which is actually two cycles behind the true historical date acceptable for Madhva on the basis of epigraphic and other data. This gap of 120 years was sought to be filled, later, by uncritically assigning to two Pontiffs Vidyādhirāja and Vidyānidhi, a rule of 64 and 68 years respectively, so as to bring the established dates of the later Pontiffs, in line with those of the earlier ones.

2 Those of the Uttarādī Mutt have been published by Kaljani Nagarajacharya, Sarvadhikārī, Uttarādī Mutt, Bangalore, (V. V. Subbiah and Sons, Printers, Bangalore City), 1952. Those of the other Mutt have been published in the annual almanac of the Mutt.

There are, however, serious discrepancies in vital points, affecting the seniority and number of years of rule of Pontiffs, in at least two cases, between these "Carama ślohas" and the statements of the *Gurucarya*, which cast a legitimate doubt on the genuineness and antiquity of the former. The "Carama śloka" for Kavindra is

‘वीन्द्राख्यपदासक्त राजेन्द्रमुनिसेवितम् ।  
श्रीकवीन्द्रमुनि वन्दे भजता चन्द्रसन्निभम् ॥’

This is quite misleading as it is generally admitted on all hands<sup>1</sup> and expressly stated in the *Gurucarya* and in the *Satkalpa*,<sup>2</sup> that Rajendra was the senior disciple ordained by Vidyadhiraja. H K Vedavyasachar, in his *Gurucarite*,<sup>3</sup> seems to have been misled by this "Caramaśloka," into reversing the historical order between the two disciples of Vidyadhiraja.

The "Caramaśloka" of the Uttaradi Mutt, assigns sixty eight years of Pontifical rule to Vidyānidhi<sup>4</sup> which is contradicted by the clear evidence of the *Gurucarya* which assigns to him but seven years nine months and thirteen days' rule. It is also invalidated by the chronological data for the subsequent Pontiffs and cannot therefore be accepted.

The "Caramaśloka" for Jayatīrtha<sup>5</sup> is suspiciously identical with one of the introductory verses in Vijayīndra Tīrtha's (1539-95) *Madhmadhāntakoddhara*. It is difficult to suppose that Vijayīndra who was an author of outstanding merit and has left many fine verses in honor of several other Gurus had borrowed or plagiarized from such a non-descript source as the "Caramaślohas !"

1 And by the Svāmī of the Uttaradi Mutt

2 Edn 1931, p 32

3 P. 110 Hence also V. Shingre's mistake in indicating Rajendra Tīrtha's line to the right of Kavindra, in his "Genealogical Tables" of the Uttaradi Mutt, Sarvodaya Press, Poona, 1953

4 'यद्भक्त्या मूलरामस्य पेटिका त्यक्तभूमिका ।

विद्यानिधिधिय दद्यादद्वयपञ्चमपूजकम् ॥'

5 'यस्य वाक्कामधेनून् कामितार्थान् प्रयच्छति ।

सेवे त जययोगीन्द्र कामब्राणच्छिद सदा ॥'



heirs to the legacy of Madhva and Jayatīrtha. They have also fully justified this position by their own monumental services to the cause of Dvaita thought and its literature, thro' centuries. The history of Dvaita Literature and its philosophical development, set forth in this volume (from Part III) and in the next, would amply bear this out.

Each one of these has been as great as the others in respect of its services to the system, the beneficial influence exercised on society and the eminence of the Pontiffs who have adorned their seats. The only disparity that might be seen among them is that of worldly wealth, number of disciples under their jurisdiction or the extent of popular allegiance in particular parts of the country. But these are obviously the results of contemporary socio political and economic conditions in the regions in which these different institutions carried on their work, and should not vitiate our judgment of their true historical origin and relation. Conditions in upper Karnatak and Maharashtra, where the Uttarādī Mutt had its roots, from the beginning were more propitious to popular response to Dvaita philosophy than in the South, where the other two Mutts came to function. The powerful Smārta and Śrī Vaiṣṇava communities in the South offered much stout resistance, as will be clear from the history of the heated religious and sectarian controversies in which Madhva teachers like Vijayīndra and Satyanātha were involved in the South with redoubtable champions of other creeds like Appayya Dīkṣita<sup>1</sup>. It is also significant that none of the Madhva Mutts in the South was able to establish a community of Tamil speaking Madhvas while it was possible in respect of other languages like Telugu, Marathi and even Hindi.

The Mutts believed to have been separately established by Padmanābha, Madhava and Akṣobhya, tho' now comparatively insignificant, in point of wealth, position, prestige and following are as much historically connected with Madhva as those descended from Jayatīrtha. Later, the phenomenal glory attained by Vyāsarāya under the second and third dynasties of Vijayanagar pushed his Mutt into supreme power and prestige in the early XVI century and this position was zealously maintained by his successors. Soon after, the Uttarādī and Rāghavēndra Svāmi

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1 For details see Volume II

Mutts rose to fame under the illustrious leadership of Pontiffs like Raghūttama and Vijayīndra. These three Mutts now enjoy the status of "Mātha traya" or the three premier Mādhva Mathas descended from Jayatīrtha.

But any exclusive claim by any one of them to be accepted as the sole heir and rightful representative of Mādhva's Pītha has, however, to be rejected as untenable<sup>1</sup>. Whatever the justification for such claims and controversies based on such claims among these Mutts in the past, they are clearly outmoded in the context of the modern age. If the mutts should survive as useful institutions, now, they should eschew such idle controversies and learn the art of peaceful co-existence.

In the last analysis, then, all controversies regarding "Mūla" and "Bīdi" (sub-idiary) Mathas turn out to be a distortion of facts for power politics. There is nothing to support such claims even in the designations of these Mutts. The Udipi and other Mutts are named after their (village)-headquarters. The Vyācarāya and Rāghavendra Svāmī Mutts have been known after their most illustrious Pontiffs from time to time. The Uttarādī Mutt has a territorial designation as its Pontificate has been occupied by Uttara Karnātakas or Uttarādī Karnātakas ever since the time of Vidyānidhi Tīrtha, the first Head of the Mutt after the second bifurcation of the original Mutt under Rāmacandra Tīrtha, in 1435 A. D. There is, however, no evidence or probability of such a designation having been current in or before the days of Vidyānidhi, as he himself was admittedly a Taulava<sup>2</sup>, and there were at least three non Uttarādīs (i. e. to say Dakṣiṇādī Karnātakas) on the Pītha, among the early successors of Mādhva and Jayatīrtha, before him. These were Mādhava Tīrtha, Vidyādhirāja, and Vāgīśa Tīrtha<sup>3</sup>. These

1. This would be clear from the judgment of the Madras High Court dated the 20th Nov., 1929, on the 'first tīrtha' dispute relating to the Śrī Mādhva Siddhānta Unnāhini Sabhā Tiruchanur, Tirupati.

2. See *Satkatha* edn. 1896 and 1931 (p. 35). See also *Gurucarya* II, 24.

3. The evidence about these three would be found under their lives, in Vol. II.

facts would suffice to show that the name "Uttaradi Matha" must have come into vogue only from the time of Raghunatha Tirtha (1444-1502), as an appropriate name for the Mutt. It is an established fact that from Raghunatha Tirtha to the present Head of the Uttaradi Mutt (Sri Satyapramoda Tirtha), the Pontiffs of the Mutt, have all been chosen, without a single exception from the (Kannada) Desasth Brahmin families of Uttara Karnataka (or the districts of Dharwar, Belgaum and Bijapur and beyond in (the former) Bombay Karnatak and the adjacent Kannada areas of (former) Hyderabad State). This practice has been maintained to this day. We have the relevant details of the personal history of every one of these Svamis, in the *Gurucarya*, which uses the terms कर्नाटकोत्तरम्, कर्नाटोत्तरम्, कर्नाटोत्तरादिम् regularly, in describing them on a regional basis<sup>1</sup>.

This seems to be the most rational and natural explanation of the term 'Uttaradi Matha', assumed by the second line of successors of Ramacandra Tirtha and by which it is now generally known<sup>2</sup>. There is no epigraphic or literary evidence of any earlier use of the term<sup>3</sup>. This disposes of the fanciful and far fetched metaphysico-theological interpretations of the term

- 1 (a) समधीतमहाशास्त्र कर्नाटोत्तरमादरात्  
रघुनाथसुतीर्थेति वासयामास सन्निधौ ॥ (ii, 38)
- (b) रघुवर्यसुतीर्थोऽपि स्वपूर्वाश्रमगस्वसु ।  
पुन कर्नाटोत्तरादि आत्माधीतान्यशास्त्रकम् ॥ 35  
पट्टाभिपिन्य समाव्य रघूत्तमसमान्दयम् ॥ (iii 36)
- (c) कर्नाटमुत्तरादि च ब्रह्मचर्यस्थित सदा ।  
तस्य चाक्षोष्यतीर्थेति नाम चक्रे यतीश्वर ॥
- (d) उत्तरादि माधवाख्य कर्नाट शास्त्रिण मुदा  
रामचन्द्राभिष कृत्वा \* \* \* ॥ (ii 37).

2 This is confirmed by the passage from Mysore Gazetteer 1927, viii, 321-22 (cited by M S Katti, in his book.) that "the Uttaradi Mutt is so called because it was presided over by men drawn from the north or Uttaradesh."

3 Even as late as the 18th century, there is evidence of the practice of the Mutt having been designated by the name of the ruling Pontiff (cf सत्यसन्धमठ \* \* \* \* *Gurucarya*, v).



given by M S Katti, in this Kannada booklet entitled 'Sri Madhva's Mula Samsthana' ( or *Gurucarile-Vimarsa* )<sup>1</sup>

Till recently, the Mutts at Udipi have not been evincing that much of interest in the spread of Dvaita Literature which was expected of them. Vast collections of Sanskrit manuscripts exist in many of them in a neglected condition. Many have been damaged and thrown away from time to time moth-eaten. It is high time that a consolidated catalogue of all the available mss material, is published by these Mutts and an attempt made to publish the works themselves<sup>2</sup>. It is some consolation that one or two of these Mutts have established regular Libraries for the care of their manuscript treasures, notably the Pejavar and the Palimar Mutts. But others lag behind. A definitive edition of the Sarvamula based on the Taulava readings of Trivikrama, Vadiraja and others and of the Tulu manuscript of the Sarvamula believed to have been written by Hrsikeṣa Tirtha, must be undertaken if the important variants in this oldest manuscript source ( already in a decaying condition ) are not to be lost to the world, for ever.

Of the group of four disciples entrusted with the task of propagating Dvaita philosophy outside the S Kanara district, three founded separate Mutts also of their own, which exist to this day. In about 1412 A D the main line descended from Jayatirtha branched off into two, the younger of which was again subjected to a further split in or about 1435. These three branches, which now go by the names of ( 1 ) the Vyāsārāya Mutt, ( 2 ) the Raghavendra Svāmi Mutt, and ( 3 ) the Uttarādī Mutt, occupy a premier

1 Kelkar Printing Press, Dharwar, 1950, pp 15-17. Even the late Svāmī Satyadhyaṇa Tīrtha of the Uttarādī Mutt was satisfied with the simple and rational explanation of the term in a territorial sense. Such breath-taking explanations, as have been attempted by Mr Katti, do not seem to have occurred to him.

2 The Sode Mutt has already made a beginning in this direction, by publishing some of the works of Vadirāja. It has a valuable collection of mss.

position among the Mādhva Mathas in the Desh<sup>1</sup> Most of the makers of Dvaita Vedānta and its literature who are to be noticed in vol. II of this book, have a place either as Pontiffs or as their (lay) disciples in one or the other of these Mutts. It would be helpful then to know the exact places of these Pontiffs in the Succession Lists of their respective Mutts. For the sake of convenience, certain dates (sometimes of inscriptions and sometimes of the demise of the Pontiffs) have been given. The latter are based on the entries in the genea-chronological Tables preserved by (some of) the Mutts. Complete dates are available only for the Rāghavendra Svāmi, Uttarādi and Kundapur Mutts and none for the Udipi Mutts. For the Vyāsaraya Mutt, dates are partially calculable. The dates of the Mutt Lists have, however, to be accepted with considerable modifications in many cases in the light of epigraphic and other data. Many Svamis of the Udipi Mutts also have made important contributions to Dvaita Literature. The Genealogical Tables of all the important Mādhva Mathas and particularly those which have made outstanding contributions to Dvaita Literature and philosophy, thro' their Pontiffs<sup>2</sup> and lay followers, have therefore been given here, for ready reference. In-  
scriptural dates and dates of demise of Pontiffs as finalised in the light of other data have been given in brackets for the Pontiffs of the "Mathatraya", to which a majority of the authors belong. The dates of individual authors have been discussed in the body of the book. In the Tables following the ascetic title "Tirtha" should be read uniformly after the names of all Pontiffs whether indicated by dots or not.

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1 (Opp "Konkan") These are appropriately designated as the Deśastha Mathas or the Mutts situated in the Desh. The term signifies the region above (east of) the Western Ghats. The term "Deśastha" tho' often loosely used in the Madras State to denote a Maharashtrian Brahmin, has nothing to do with language. It has only a geographical significance. In the Bombay State, wherefrom the term is borrowed, a "Deśasth" Brahmin might be a speaker of Marathi or Kannada. See *Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol. II, 1884, pp. 56-88 (Dharwar).

2 The Tables of the Gobarna and Kasi Mathas of the Gauda Sarasvatas and the Kundapur Mutt have not been included for this reason.

# TABLE I

## THE AṢṬAMATHAS OF UḌIPI

(1) <i>Palimar Mutt</i>		(2) <i>Adāmār Mutt</i>	
1 Hṛikeśa	Tīrtha*	1 Narasimha	Tīrtha
2. Samatmeś (var)a	..	2. Kamaleśana	..
3 Sambhava	..	3. Ramacandra	..
4 Aparājita	..	4 Vidyādhiśa	..
5 Vidyāmurti <sup>1</sup>	.	5. Viśvapati	..
6 Śrīnidhi	..	6. Viśveśa	..
7. Vidyēśa	..	7 Vedanidhi	..
8 Śrīvallabha	..	8 Vedaraja	..
9 Jagadbhūšana	..	9. Vidyāmūrti	..
10 Ramacandra <sup>2</sup>	..	10 Vaikuntharāja	.
11. Vidyānidhi	..	11. Viśvarāja	.
12 Sureśa	..	12. Vedagarbha	..
13 Rāghavendra	..	13 Hiranyagarbha	..
14 Rāghunandana		14 Viśvadhīśa	..
15 Vidyāpati	.	15 Viśvavallabha	.
16 Raghupati	..	16 Viśvendra	..
17. Raghuttama	..	17. Vidyāpati	..
18. Rāmabhadra	.	18 Vibudhapati	..
19 Raghuvarya	..	19 Vedavallabha	..
20. Raghupungava	..	20 Vedavandya	.
21. Raghuvara	..	21. Vidyēśa	..
22 Raghupravira	..	22 Vibudhavallabha	.
23 Raghubbhūšana	.	23 Vibudhavandya	..
24 Raghuratna	.	24 Vibudhavarya	..
25 Raghupriya	..	25 Vibudhendra	.
26 Raghumaṇya	.	26 Vibudhādhiraja	
27 Raghuvallabha Tīrtha		27. Vibudhapriya	.
( Present )		28 Vibudhamanya	..
		29 Vibudheśa	Tīrtha
		( Present )	

1 His disciple Rājarājeśvara (author of *Mangalastakam*) did not succeed to the Pīṭha

2 According to *Guruparamparamṛta*, ed 1904, this Pontiff also ordained Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, the founder of the Gokarna Matha of the Gauda Sarasvatas in 1476 A.D.



## (3) Kṛṣṇapur Mutt

## (4) Puṭṭige Mutt

- 1 Janardana Tirtha
- 2 Śrīvatsaṅka
- 3 Vāgisa
- 4 Lokeśa
- 5 Lokanatha
- 6 Lokapriya
- 7 Vidyā (dhi) raja
- 8 Viśvadhira
- 9 Viśvadhīśa
- 10 Viśveśa
- 11 Viśvavandya
- 12 Viśvarāja
- 13 Dharanidhara
- 14 Dharadhara
- 15 Prajnamurti
- 16 Tapomurti
- 17 Suresvara
- 18 Jagannatha
- 19 Sureśa
- 20 Viśvapungava
- 21 Viśvavallabha
- 22 Viśvabhūṣaṇa
- 23 Yādavendra
- 24 Prājnamurti
- 25 Vidyādhira
- 26 Vidyāmurti
- 27 Vidyāvallabha
- 28 Vidyendra
- 29 Vidyānīdhi
- 30 Vidyasamudra
- 31 Vidyapati
- 32 Vidyādhīśa
- 33 Vidyāpūrṇa
- 34 Vidyāratna Tirtha

- 1 Upendra Tirtha
- 2 Kavindra
- 3 Hamsendra
- 4 Yādavendra
- 5 Dharanidhara
- 6 Damodara
- 7 Raghunatha
- 8 Śrīvatsaṅka
- 9 Gopinātha
- 10 Ranganatha
- 11 Lokanatha
- 12 Rāmānatha
- 13 Śrīvallabha
- 14 Śrīnivāsa
- 15 Śrīnīdhi
- 16 Gṛhanīdhi
- 17 Ānandanīdhi
- 18 Taponīdhi
- 19 Yādavendra
- 20 Kavindra
- 21 Raghavendra
- 22 Vibudhendra
- 23 Surendra
- 24 Bhuvanendra
- 25 Yogindra
- 26 Sumatindra
- 27 Sudhindra
- 28 Sajanendra Tirtha  
(Present)

( 5 ) *Sirūr Mutt*

1. Vāmana	Tīrtha
2. Vāsudeva	..
3. Puṇyaśloka	..
4. Vedaramya	..
5. Vedavyāsa	..
6. Vedavedya	..
7. Maheśa	..
8. Kṛṣṇa	..
9. Rāghava	..
10. Sureśa	..
11. Vedabhūṣana	..
12. Śrīnivāsa	..
13. Vedanīdhi	..
14. Śrīdhara	..
15. Yādavottama	..
16. Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa	..
17. Viśvabhūṣana	..
18. Trailokyapāvana	..
19. Lakṣmīkānta	..
20. Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa	..
21. Lakṣmīpati	..
22. Lakṣmīdhara	..
23. Lakṣmīramana	..
24. Lakṣmīmanohara	..
25. Lakṣmīpriya	..
26. Lakṣmīvallabha	..
27. Lakṣmīsamudra	..
28. Lakṣmīndra	Tīrtha
( Present )	

( 6 ) *Sode Mutt*

1. Viṣṇu	Tīrtha
2. Vedavyāsa	..
3. Vedavedya	..
4. Vedagarbha	..
5. Vareśa	..
6. Vāmana	..
7. Vāsudeva	..
8. Vedavyāsa	..
9. Varāha	..
10. Vedātma *	..
11. Viśvavandya	..
12. Ratnagarbha	..
13. Vedāṅga *	..
14. Vidyāpati	..
15. Viśvavandya	..
16. Viśva	..
17. Viṭṭhala	..
18. Varadarāja	..
19. Vāgīśa	..
20. Vādirāja*	..
21. Vedavedya	..
22. Vidyānīdhi	..
23. Vedanīdhi	..
24. Varadarāja	..
25. Viśvādhīrājendra	..
26. Vādivandya	..
27. Viśvaveda	..
28. Vibudhavarya	..
29. Viśvanīdhi	..
30. Viśvādhīśa	..
31. Viśveśa	..
32. Viśvapriya	..
33. Viśvādhīśa	..
34. Viśvendra	..
35. Viśvottama	Tīrtha
( Present )	

## ( 7 ) Kanur Mutt

- |                       |        |
|-----------------------|--------|
| 1 Rama                | Tirtha |
| 2 Raghunatha          |        |
| 3 Raghupati           |        |
| 4 Raghunandana        |        |
| 5 Yadunandana         |        |
| 6 Visvatma            |        |
| 7 Visvanatha          |        |
| 8 Vedagarbha          |        |
| 9 Vagisa              |        |
| 10 Varadapati         |        |
| 11 Visvapati          |        |
| 12 Visvamurti         |        |
| 13 Vedapati           |        |
| 14 Vedaraja           |        |
| 15 Vidyadhisa *       |        |
| 16 Vibudhesa          |        |
| 17 Varijaksa          |        |
| 18 Visvendra          |        |
| 19 Vibudhavandya      |        |
| 20 Vibudhadhiraja     |        |
| 21 Vidyaraja          |        |
| 22 Vibudhapriya       |        |
| 23 Vidyasagara        |        |
| 24 Vasudeva           |        |
| 25 Vidyapati          |        |
| 26 Vamana             |        |
| 27 Vidyanidhi         |        |
| 28 Vidyasamudra       |        |
| 29 Vidyavandhi Tirtha | }      |
| ( Present ,           |        |

## ( 8 ) Pejānar Mutt

- |                  |        |
|------------------|--------|
| 1 Adhoksaja      | Tirtha |
| 2 Kamalaksa      |        |
| 3 Puskaraksa     |        |
| 4 Amarendra      |        |
| 5 Vijaya *       |        |
| 6 Mahendra       |        |
| 7 Vijayadhvaja * |        |
| 8 Damodara       |        |
| 9 Vasudeva       |        |
| 10 Vadindra      |        |
| 11 Vedagarbha    |        |
| 12 Anucaruprajna |        |
| 13 Visvaprajna   |        |
| 14 Visvesvara *  |        |
| 15 Visvabhūṣana  |        |
| 16 Visvavandya   |        |
| 17 Vidyadhiraja  |        |
| 18 Visvamurti    |        |
| 19 Visvapati *   |        |
| 20 Visvanidhi    |        |
| 21 Visvadhisa    |        |
| 22 Visvadhira    |        |
| 23 Visvabodha    |        |
| 24 Visvavallabha |        |
| 25 Visvapriya    |        |
| 26 Visvavarya    |        |
| 27 Visvaraja     |        |
| 28 Visvamanohara |        |
| 29 Visvajna      |        |
| 30 Visvamanya    |        |
| 31 Visvesa       |        |
| ( Present )      |        |



## TABLE II

## ŚRĪ MADHVAĀCĀRYA ( 1238-1317 )

Padmanābha T (d 1324)	Mādhava T (d 1350)	Akṣobhya T (d 1365)
Lakṣmīdhara	Madhuhari	Trailokyabhusana
Samkarsana	Nārāyana	Lokavandita
Parasurāma	Paramjyoti	Sulabha
Ādirāja	Maunivarya	Raghupungava
Satyavrata	Jagannātha	Raghunātha
Svarṇavarṇa	Juānivarya	Raghuvarya
Lakṣmīnārāyana*	Raghupati	Raghunandana
( alias )	Hayagriva	Vidyānidhi
[ Śrīpādarāja ]		
Hayagriva	Raghupungava	Raghupati
Śrīpati	Raghuvarya	Nārāyana <sup>2</sup>
Śrīdhara		
Gopālasvāmī	Raghunandana	Mukunda
Rāmacandra	Raghupati	Raghupati
Raghunātha	Rama Mādhava	Rāmacandra
Lakṣmīmanohara	Keśava Mādhava	Raghurāja <sup>3</sup>
Lakṣmīpati	Prājña Mādhava	Ramcandra
Lakṣmīkanta	Dhīra Mādhava	Raghuvarya
Lakṣmīnātha	Yogi Mādhava	Raghuvalabha
Lakṣmīnidhi	Vāsudeva Mādhava	Raghupriya
Śrīkānta	Śrīnivasa Mādhava	Raghuvara
Śrīnidhi <sup>1</sup>		Raghuttama
Tejonidhi	( incomplete ? )	
	[ Majjigehalli Matha ]	

1 c 1746-72 author of *Srīpādarānastaka*

2 Donee of a grant in 1527 A D by Kṛṣṇadevaraya ( Shī moga 84, EC ) This Narayana Tīrtha is referred to by Somanātha Kavi in his *Vyasayogīcarita*, as the kindly ascetic who introduced him to Vyasarāya

3, Donee of a grant by Keladi Śomaśekhara Nāyaka in 1659 ( Pingala ) ( Vide *Shīmoga*, 98 )

TABLE III  
SRĪ MADHVĀCĀRYA ( 1238-1317 )

1. Padmanābha (d. 1324)	2. Narahari (d. 1333)	3. Mādhava (d. 1350)	4. Akṣobhya (d. 1365) 5. Jayatīrtha (1368) 6. Vidyādhirāja (1412)*
7. Rājendra (1435)* 8. Jayādhvaja (1448)* 9. Puruṣottama (1460)* 10. Brahmanya (1478)*			7. Kāvīndra (1421)* 8. Vāgiśa (1429)* 9. Rāmacandra (1435)*
11. Vyāsaīya ( 1539 ) 12. Śrīnivāsa 13. Rāma 14. Lakṣmīkānta 15. Śrīpati	10. Vibudhendra <sup>1</sup> ( 1470 )* 11. Jitāmītra ( 1475 )* 12. Raghunānanda ( 1504 ) 13. Surendra ( 1539 ) 14. Vijayīndra ( 1595 ) 15. Sudhīndra ( 1623 )	10. Vidyānīdhi ( 1444 ) 11. Raghunātha ( 1502 ) 12. Raghuvarya ( 1557 ) 13. Raghūttama ( 1596 ) 14. Vedavyāsa ( 1613 ) 15. Vidyādhīśa ( 1631 ) 16. Vedanīdhi ( 1630 ) 17. Satyavrata ( 1638 )	
16. Rāmacandra ( g. 1627, 1631 )			
17. Lakṣmīvallabha			

18. Lakṣmīnātha  
(g 1642, 1663)
- 19 Lakṣmīpati (g 1690)
- 20 Lakṣmīnārāyaṇa
- 21 Raghunātha (g 1709)
- 22 (Lakṣmīnātha) +
- 23 Jagannātha (1760)\*
- 24 Srinātha
- 24 Vidyānātha (g. 1787)
- 25 Vidyāpati
- 26 Vidyāvallabha (g 1809)
- 27 Vidyākānta (1827)
- 28 Vidyānātha (g 1845)
- 29 Vidyā (śrī) ānātha (g 1863)
- 30 Vidyādhara (g 1884)
- 31 Vidyānivāsa
- 32 Vidyāsamudra
33. Vidyāratnākara
- 34 Vidyāvarānātha (1940)
- 35 Vidyāprasanna  
[ Present ]
- 10 Raghavendra (1671)  
(Yādavendra) +
- 17 Yogīndra (g 1679)
- 18 Śrīndra (1692)
- 19 Sumatīndra (1725)
- 20 Upendra (1728)
- 21 Yādīndra (1743)\*
- 22 Vasudhendra (1761)
- 23 Varadendra (1774)  
(Dhīrendra) +
- 24 Bhuvanendra (1799)
- 25 Subodhendra (1835)
- 26 Sujanendra (1836)
27. Suśāntendra (1861)
- 28 Sudharmendra (1872)
29. Sugunendra (1884)
- 30 Suprajñendra (1907)
31. Sukrtīndra (1912)
- 32 Suśīlendra (1926)
- 33 Suvratīndra (1933)
- 34 Suyamīndra ( Present )
- 18 Satyanātha (1648)
- 19 Satyanātha (1674)  
(Satyananda) +
- 20 Satyābhīnava (1706)
21. Satyapurna (1726)
- 22 Satyaviṇaya (1737)
- 23 Satyapriya (1744)
- 24 Satyabodha (1783)
- 25 Satyasandha (1794)
- 26 Satyavara (1797)
27. Satyadhama (1830)
- 28 Satyasamkalpa (1841)
- 29 Satyasamtusta (1842)
30. Satyaparāyana (1863)
- 31 Satyakāma (1870)
- 32 Satyesta (1872)
- 33 Satyaparākrama (1880)
- 34 Satyavīra (1884)
- 35 Satyadhīra (1907)
- 36 Satyajñāna (1913)
- 37 Satyadhyaṇa (1912)
- 38 Satyaprajña (1945)
- 39 Satyābhījña (1948)
- 40 Satyapramoda ( Present )  
[ Uttarādī Mutt ]

[ Vyāsārāja Mutt ] [ Raghavendra Svāmi Mutt ]  
+ Denotes those who did not occupy the Pīṭha



### Chronological Note

\* Dates in brackets against the names of Pontiffs represent their dates of demise as recorded in the Mutts. Those indicated with an asterisk ( )\* denote dates tentatively fixed or revised in the light of other data. 'g' stands for grants made to the Pontiffs in particular years. It will be noticed that for the period between Jayatirtha and Vyāsarāya, the chronology of Pontiffs is uncertain.

I H. K. Vedavyasachar (*Gurutarite*, p. 115) places Vibudhendra's demise in 1490 A. D., on the strength of an alleged grant to him, by Emperor Krishnadeva Raya in that year, after his return from the Udayagiri campaign. (*Mys Arch Rep* 1944, p. 71). But he has overlooked the fact that Krishnadeva Raya's reign was between 1509-30 and that his Udayagiri campaign was undertaken about 1513. For these and some other technical reasons, the Editorial Note in the *Mys Arch Rep*, has raised grave doubts against the genuineness of the grant. Even if the facts of the grant are explained on the basis of a confirmation of a grant made by a previous Ruler, the chronological and other difficulties raised would remain.

I am inclined to place Vibudhendra between 1400-1470 and his Pontifical rule between 1435-70. He is reputed to have been a student of the celebrated Rajendra Tirtha (1412-35)\* and himself a teacher of the great Sripadaraja (1460-80)\*. He is also reported to have lived for some years during the Pontificate of Raghunatha Tirtha (1445-1502) of the Uttaradi Mutt and met him.

But it would complicate matters to extend his life upto 1490 as has been done by Vedavyasachar. For, Vyāsarāya had already come to the Pitha by 1478 A. D. and there is no tradition of his having met or studied under so great an authority on Dvaita Vedānta as Vibudhendra, had he been alive then. Instead Vyāsarāya (in Somanatha's biography) is represented as going to Sripadaraja, at Mulbagal, at the express advice of his Sannyāsa Guru, Brahmanya Tirtha for study of Madhyasastra. These considerations would show that Vibudhendra could not be pushed up as far as 1490 and that his demise, in all probability, had taken place some years before the accession of Vyāsarāya to his Pitha. We may not be far wrong then, if we place his date of birth in circa 1400 and his Pontifical period as 1435-70.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### TAULAVA DISCIPLES, THEIR LIVES AND WORKS

#### 1 HRSIKEŚA TIRTHA (c 1250-1330)

We possess some fragmentary details of Hrsikeśa. He is mentioned in *M Vj* xiii, 40, as a favorite disciple of Madhva, who used to read out from the *Bhagavata Purana*, at the discourses of the Master. He was one of the monks ordained by Madhva at Kanvatirtha (Manjeshwar). He was the founder of the Palimar Mutt and its first Pontiff. In token of his premier position among the disciples of Madhva, he earned the sobriquet of "Astothista" and his Mutt is popularly regarded as having the place of honor among the Astamathas of Udipi. He wrote *Sampradaya Paddhati*<sup>1</sup> in 26 verses, dealing with the early life, career and work of Madhva. He refers to the safe depositing of Madhva's works at Katatala (Setutala),<sup>2</sup> and the rehabilitation of his faith, by Visnu Tirtha, at a future date. He gives valuable information about the nativity of Padmanābha Tirtha, calling him the "Guru of the Karnātakas and other good men."

य कर्नाटकपूर्वसज्जनगुरु शीष्यनाभाह्वय । (18)

which makes it probable that Padmanābha was a native of Karnātak<sup>3</sup> and spread his system predominantly among the people of that region, who still form the majority among the followers of Madhva, particularly in the region of Bombay Karnatak and former Hyderabad States.

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1 Sri Krishna Press, Udipi, 1912.

2 See my paper 'Madhva's Underground Library at Katatala' *ABORI*, 1935.

3 This interpretation is corroborated by the *Gurucarya*, which expressly refers to him as an 'Uttara Karnātika.' See under "Padmanābha Tirtha."

There is a complete set of palm leaf Mss of the Sarvamula in Tulu script<sup>1</sup>, said to be transcribed by Hrsikeśa in his own hand. This Ms is in a much-injured condition but is carefully preserved in the Palmar Mutt<sup>2</sup>. From my examination of it thro' the kind courtesy of the late Raghunāya Tīrtha,, I have found that it contains a number of variant readings of important passages in the works of Madhva, differing from those of the Vulgate text familiarized by the commentaries of Jayatīrtha. It would be advantageous if these readings are rescued and made available to the public by the coordinated efforts of the Svāmīs of the Udipi Mutts as representing the Taulava text of the Sarvamula. The Ms is contemporaneous with Madhva and is the oldest datable Ms in Tulu Script ( 13th century )

## 2 VISNU TIRTHA

The only other important person among the early Pontiffs of the Udipi Mutts is Visnu Tīrtha, the younger brother of Madhva. He sought initiation from his brother, after the death of his parents and after leading a householder's life for many years (*M Vy* xv, 91-96). He is stated to have been a great Yogi and set a high standard of religious austerities and penance. His rigid austerities on the Kumara Parvata ( Western Ghats ) are described at length in *M Vy* xv, 97-114. He is believed to be still doing penance in the sylvan retreats of Kumāra Parvata, near the Subrahmanya Ksetra, in S. Kanara. Tradition says he will appear again in Kaliyuga, to rehabilitate Madhva philosophy<sup>3</sup>. This is also alluded to by Hrsikeśa Tīrtha, in his *Sampradaya Paddhati*:

तिरोहिते सन्मतेऽस्मिन् विष्णुतीर्थो गुहाचलात् ।

आगत्योद्धृत्य तत्रत्यान् ग्रन्थान् स प्रथयिष्यति ॥

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1 The impression that Tulu has no script of its own, is incorrect so far as Ms evidence goes. No doubt, it has close affinity with the Malayalam script. But then there is much in common between Grantha, Tamil and Malayalam scripts also.

2 The Ms includes also an " *Anu Madhvacaritam* " in 10 verses, presumed to be by Hrsikeśa himself. It gives the cyclic years of Madhva's birth and exit as Vilambi and Pingala and states that he lived for *seventynine years*.

3 See also 'Madhva's Underground Library at Katataka' *ABORI*, xvi, pp 152-4



यस्मात्सर्वहृदिस्थसशयचय ज्ञात्वा यतीशो महत्  
 सद्धर्माश्च तिलाशतोप्युपदिशेत्याज्ञानिवन्ध व्यधात् ।  
 तस्मात्सेतुतिलेति लोकगदित क्षेत्र सुतीर्यात्मक  
 स्वन्दाद्रेविलतीऽधतीर्णयतिना सशोध्यते कालत ॥ ( verses 21 22 )  
 and by Vādirāja in his *Sarasabharati-Vilasa*  
 म्वानुज विष्णुतीर्थं तु तपसा धूतल्कमपम् ।  
 प्रेययिष्यति सत्तत्त्वकथनाय कलौ किल ॥ ( vii, 26 ).

He founded a Mutt of his own at Subrahmanya, which exists to this day, presided over by a line of Balasanyasin monks. He was also the original founder of the Sode Mutt (of Vādirāja) at Udipi.

The only work of Visnu Tirtha, that is known, is a metrical digest in four chapters (granthas 699) on the duties of Sannyāsins (Yatidharma). The work is called "Sanyasavidhi", in the manuscript (Tulu) preserved in the Sode Mutt. It was published from Udipi in 1931. We have another Ms of it in the Mysore O. L. The author says that his main sources of information are the Samhitās of the Pañcarātra<sup>1</sup>. The first chapter deals with miscellaneous topics like the importance of Visnubhakti, types of Adhikāris and shows the superiority of the principles of Madhva's Theism over those of Advaita. The author warns his readers to avoid Advaitins as teachers of Brahmayidyā<sup>2</sup>. The ii chapter explains the different modes of initiation of Sannyāsins according to the Vedic Śākhās of Rk, Yajus and Sāman and their subdivisions *Talarakara* and *Chandogya* (S. V) *Āpastamba* and *Bodhāyana* (Y. V). The iii expatiates on the daily routine of Grhasthas and Sannyāsins pertaining to Sauca, Snāna, Pundra, Japa, Pūjā, Nai-vedya, Fasts and Caturmāsyā Vrata. The last is miscellaneous in contents dealing among other things with the construction of tombs and the burial of ascetics. The treatment of Yatidharmas is far from exhaustive. Passages are cited from the *VTN*, *Bhagavata*, *Bhārata* and the *Pañcarātra Samhitās* quoted by Madhva, in his various works (i, 18).

1 नत्वा च देवान् यतिवर्म सम्यक् वक्ष्ये मूलादान्तमीशसादात् ।

\* \* \* पञ्चरात्रीकृतमार्गेण तु सप्रहेण ॥ ५ ॥

2 Samkhya is equally intolerant of Advaitins as teachers of Brahmayidyā. See his comment on *Kātha Up* 1, 2, 8 a.

### 3 KALYANA DEVI I

To Kalyāna Devī, a sister of Madhva ( *M. Vij* 11, 35 ), are ascribed three minor works ( 1 ) a Kṛṣṇa Stotra, in 8 verses ( Printed Kumbakonam ), ( 2 ) an *Anu Vayu Stuti*, and ( 3 ) a *Laghutaratamya-stotra* dealing with the gradation of the gods. No further details about the later life or descendants of the authoress are known.

### 4 KALYĀNA DEVI II

Tradition speaks of another Kalyāna Devī, a sister of Trivikrama Pandita of whom is recorded the curious fact that she remained unmarried. Her only work is a *Laghu Vayu Stuti*, in six verses ( *S. M.* pp 249-50 )<sup>1</sup>

### 5 TRIVIKRAMA PANDITĀCĀRYA ( C 1258-1320 )

The most outstanding personality among the Taulava disciples of Madhva, was Trivikrama Pandita, the father of Madhva's illustrious biographer Nārāyaṇa Pandita. He seems to have been the Court Pandit of Jayasimha, Ruler of Kumbha and converted to the Vaiṣṇavism of Madhva, in or about 1300. After his conversion, he wrote a learned and animated commentary on Madhva's *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, known as *Tattvapradīpa*. His early life and career are fully described by his son in cantos xiii and xiv of his *Madhva-vijaya*. This account has been supplemented by me in my paper on the 'Life and Works of Trivikrama Pandita' ( *Journal of the Annamalai University*, 11 2 ) with information gathered from the descendants of Trivikrama now at Kāvugolī ( near Kāṣargod, now in Kerala ) and from other sources.

#### LIFE

Trivikrama was by birth a Tulu<sup>2</sup> ( Shivalī ) Brahmin, like Madhva. Svārāma, Kāvu or Kāvugolī, as it is called, lying about two miles north of the modern town of Kāṣargod, was the village of his birth. His father, Subrahmanya Pandita, belonged to the Āṅgīrasa gotra. He had three sons, the eldest of whom was Trivikrama. While yet in his teens, Trivikrama gave unmistakable

1 *Stotra Mahodadhī*, ( a Collection of Mādhva Stotras ) Belgaum, 1923.

2 The alleged Nambudri parentage of Trivikrama ( K. R. Pisharoti, I. H. Q. Dec 1929 ), has been refuted by me in my paper on Trivikrama in the *A. U. J.* 11, 2.

proof of his poetic calibre and future greatness, by producing a Sanskrit Kavya of great beauty the *Usaharana*, in 9 cantos, treating of the love affair of Usa and Aniruddha. Soon he mastered all the Sastric learning of his days and emerged as a great scholar and a master of his faith, the Advaita Vedānta. But his mind was not at rest with his ancestral creed. It was at this time that news reached him of the growing success of the new system of Vedānta that was being propounded by Madhva. His younger brother Samhārācārya, was already in the employ of Madhva as his Librarian and thro' him Trivikrama managed to get hold of copies of some of Madhva's works, particularly his *Brahmasutrabhasya*. He felt attracted by the new approach of the new Teacher. When Madhva himself came later to Visnumangala and camped there, Trivikrama, urged by his curiosity and longing to hear the new Teacher, went and heard his discourses. His heart was stirred to its depths by what he heard. His blood began to boil within him, as he sat there watching the citadel of Monism being razed to the ground without fear or favor. He rose and offered himself for a debate. Madhva was only too glad to meet such an adversary as Trivikrama—the scholar who had the proverbial “*likh and a quarter*” granthas of the Sāṃkhya Vedānta at his fingers' ends. The debate lasted full 15 days at the end of which Trivikrama felt dazed and completely routed. He owned himself vanquished and begged to be admitted as a disciple. It was done. The profound sincerity and prodigious scholarship of Trivikrama had not escaped Madhva. The Pandita was commissioned to write a commentary on the *Brahmasutrabhasya* of the new system, which he did under the name of *Tattvapradīpa*. His last days were eventless. He seems to have had three sons, the youngest of whom was Nārāyaṇa Pandita, the author of the *M. Vij.*<sup>1</sup> We may place Trivikrama between c. 1258-1320 A. D.

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1 त्रिविक्रमगुणनिधे मुनिप्या मुता

मतामभिप्रतास्थया यस्तृतीयोऽत्र नारायण ।

(Concluding verse in the *M. Vij. Bhavaprasāṅga*, of the author himself (Ulipi))



## WORKS

(1) USAHARANA (p)<sup>1</sup>

This is an ornate Kavya in nine cantos dealing with the *affaire de coeur* between Usā the fair daughter of Bānāsura and Aniruddha. The author uses the Pañcalī style and displays all his mastery of the niceties of the Kavya style and makes copious use of slesas, yamaka etc. He is a master of *bandhas* and other poetic feats too. We have *Murajabandha* (viii 25) *ardhabhramaka* (viii 57) *gomutrika* (viii 61) and *calrabandha* (viii 75). The first canto begins with the birth of Kṛṣṇa and ends with the slaying of Kama. The ii deals with the encounter with Kālayavana and the building of Dvārakā. The iii narrates the abduction of Rukminī and the iv with the love scenes between the divine couple, the birth of Pradyumna and the kidnapping of the baby by Sambara etc., till the return of Pradyumna after slaying the demon and the birth of Aniruddha. The v gives an account of the sport of Aniruddha, the dream of Usā, the nocturnal abduction of Aniruddha, his secret meeting with her and their love scenes. The vi ends with the discovery of the clandestine love affair and the imprisonment of Aniruddha. The vii touches on the arrival of Kṛṣṇa and his army at Sonitapura and the viii describes the sensational fight between Kṛṣṇa and Śiva and the defeat of both Bana and Śiva. The ix rounds up the story with the return home of Aniruddha and his marriage with Usā.<sup>2</sup>

There are sufficient indications that the author intended Kṛṣṇa to be the hero of his Kāvya (i, 5). He handles the Upajāti, Campakamallikā, Mālinī, Rathoddhatā, Praharsinī, Śārdūlavikṛidita and other metres with grace. Tho' describing battle scenes and ministerial meetings, he is essentially a love poet (iv, 10-12, ii, 57 and v, 68-76). The work was commented upon in the 18th century, by Sumatindra Tīrtha.

## (2) TATTVAPRADIPA (p)

Trivikrama's *Tattvapradīpa*, in 5000 granthas is a lucid com-

1 Sri Krishna Press Udupi (with commentary)

2 For a full literary appreciation of the work, see my paper on Trivikrama in *AUJ.* ii, 2

mentary on Madhva's *B S B*. It is written in a somewhat exuberantly ornate style that is characteristic of the author. It is more a running and discursive commentary on the original than a strictly word for word *tika*. Barring the *Sattarāḍipavali* of Padmanābha Tīrtha, it is the earliest commentary on the *B S B* of Madhva, coming from the pen of one who had the privilege of trying conclusions with Madhva and afterwards sitting at his feet to learn the inmost secrets of his system. There is striking resemblance in style between the *TD* on the one hand and the *Samksepaśarīraka* of Sarvajnatman and the *Prakāṭārtha* (on Śaṅkara's *B S B*), on the other, in richness of diction and exuberance of fancy. With all its embellished style, the *TD* was early superseded by the *Tattvapraśaṅga* of Jayatīrtha, a more measured writer. His method of treatment was also fuller more technical and substantial. A fragment of the *TD* covering the first five adhikāraṇas, was published by me<sup>1</sup> in 1934. The full text has been published in 1958, by the Akhila Bhārata Mādhva Mahamandala, Udipi.

Trivikrama displays great dialectic ability and erudition in his commentary. He is deeply read in the works of Madhva and comes out often in the course of his commentary with high flown tributes to the Master<sup>2</sup>. He quotes from many of the works of Madhva, including his *AV* and the *Upaniṣad Bhāṣyas*, as well as from Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on the *B S* and from the *Samksepaśarīraka* (under 1, 2, 12) and mentions by implication Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the *Gīṭā*<sup>3</sup>. Some idea of the other portions of the *TD* could be gathered from my paper on Trivikrama in the *AUJ* (II, 2, p. 224). He gives a rare glimpse into the personality of Madhva as seen by him. He also throws light on some of the 'untraceable' passages cited by Madhva.

His attacks on the Advaita are tinged with bitterness and satire, are those of the *Prakāṭārtha* on the Realists, but his criticisms are, as a rule sound and difficult to parry.

1 Law Journal Press, Madras, 1934

2 Cf. जगति सुरवरपुरसुरविजयमन सरसिजसहस्रविरणेभ्यो भाष्यवार-  
मद्वारवेभ्य एभ्य \* \* \* \* \* (Ms)

3 See p. 80 of my edn. of *TD*

The two or three other works attributed to him<sup>1</sup> are all *Stotras*. His (3) *Nṛsimhastuti*, comprising 22 verses in Mahnī, has been published in the *S M*. His (4) *Viṣṇustuti*, in 33 Sragdharas, was printed at Punganur in 1890. His most popular Stotra is the *Vayustuti* (p),<sup>2</sup> in 39 Sragdhara verses lauding the triple incarnations of Vayu, as Hanuman, Bhīma and Madhva.

## 6 SAMKARACĀRYA

He was the younger brother of Trivikrama<sup>3</sup> and was in the employ of Madhva as his Librarian, even before his brother's encounter with Madhva. In *M Vi* xv 136 he is clearly mentioned as a disciple of Madhva. That he was free to retain his "Smārta" name is a clear proof of the catholicity of Madhva's temperament. Samkara was by no means a mere book-keeper. He was a scholar of some merit. We have a short and somewhat puzzling comment by him on the AV, of which two good Mss in Devanāgarī, are deposited in the T P L nos 7877-8. The commentary called *Sambandha dīpikā* (m) is an abstract of the adhikāraṇas of the B S, in something like a code language. It is quoted by Rāghavendra Svāmī, in his *Parimala* and by Raghunatha Tīrtha, in his *Sesacandrika*. The work contains 400 granthas. On p 6058 of the T P L Cat, (Vol xiv) the author has been dismissed with a curt remark that "nothing more is known about him" save that his name "is said to have been Samkara"!

## 7 NARĀYANA PAṆḌITACĀRYA

Trivikrama's third and youngest son,<sup>5</sup> Nārāyana has earned lasting fame for himself by his great metrical biography of

1 The attribution to him of the *Manimanjari*, in the *Catalogus Catalogorum* (iii, p 52) and of the *Nayacandrika* in the Catalogue of the Mys O L (C 2066) are unfounded, both being the works of his son.

2 Printed at Udipi with a of Viśvapati Tīrtha.

3 See *Bhūtaprakāśika* on *M Vi* xv, 136.

4 Contrast in this connection the absurd and malicious charges of sectarian bigotry, against the followers of Madhva, by Mm Anantakrishna Sastri, in his *Introd* to the edn of the *Advaitasiddhi* etc (Calcutta Skt Ser. IX,) For their refutation see *N I A* 1940.

5 Not his brother's son, as in *S K* 1931 (p 173).



Madhva Nothing is however known of his brothers Like his father, he too was a good poet He has more than established his claims to poesy by his metrical biography of Madhva and other compositions An ardent Madhva, the fire of religious zeal seems to have burned in his heart with a steady glow and with all the freshness and vigor of recent converts Part at least of the fiery language which he, like his father, uses towards the professors of Advaita, must be put down to his passion for his new found religion

### WORKS<sup>1</sup>

Nearly twenty works have been ascribed to him, of which just a dozen have been printed Of the rest, some six are yet to be attested by mss A few others are known thro' references in later works

#### (1) TATTVA MAÑJARI\*

This is not, so far as I am aware, attested by any ms But a quotation, purporting to be from the *Tattvamañjarī* of Narayana Panditacarya, occurs in the *Bhasyadīpikā* of Jagannatha Tirtha (p 39) Judging from the nature of the reference, the work seems to have been a commentary on the *VTN*

#### (2) PRAMANALAKSANA TIPPANI\*\*

In the Catal of the G V L (p 96) m c on the *Pramana-paddhati* ( of Jayatirtha ) has been ascribed to Narayana This is obviously an erroneous entry for the *PL* The same mistake occurs in the Catal of the Mys O L ( C 2333 )

#### (3) NAYACANDRIKA (p)

This running c on the *AV* is a short one in 2750 granthas The exposition is clear and spirited and free from digressions and polemical discussions of an elaborate kind such as we have in the

1 The following marks of reference have been used in connection with the works noticed already and those to be noticed

\* placed after the name of the work shows that it is not known thro' any Ms, but is supported by some literary reference

Double stars \*\* mean there is neither a ms. known nor a reference, but only tradition in favor of the ascription (p) means printed and (m) still in manuscripts

*Sannyayaratnavali* and the *NS* He quotes the *TD* ( p 5 ) and the *Sannyayaratnavali* of Padmanābha, referring to them both with respect

सन्नायरत्नावलय सन्नायामृतविन्दव ।

श्रीमत्तत्त्वप्रदीपाश्च सन्तु न शरणप्रदा ॥

He also quotes from the *B T* of Madhva ( p 34 ) and is profuse in his admiration and regard for the memory of Madhva and lavish in his praises of him ( p 54 ) He helps in fixing the source of many of the texts from unspecified sources in the *AV* ( see p 52, lines 9 10, p 44, lines 4 5 ) ( 4 ) *Bhavadiipa*\* is another work ascribed<sup>1</sup> to him in the *G V. L. Cat* No Ms is traceable and nothing can be said about its contents Glosses on ( 5 ) *Iamakabharata* \*\* and ( 6 ) *Krsnamrtamaharnava*\*\* are not traceable His ( 7 ) *Samgraha-Ramayana*(p)<sup>2</sup> is a metrical epitome of the *Ramāyana*, in six cantos, each divided into *Sargas*

### ( 1 ) MADHVA-VIJAYA (p)<sup>3</sup>

The life and achievements of Madhva are narrated here in this *Kāvya* of 16 cantos It is the earliest extant biography of Madhva, tho' not the earliest ever composed The author quotes in his own gloss on it, from another and perhaps a shorter metrical account ( Vide his *Bhavaprakāśika*, on *M Vij* v, 8 12, v, 46; x, 21-22, 50 51, xi, 1, xii, 2, 46, and xiii, 1-3 ). The details of the life and career of Madhva, as furnished by him, have already been brought together, in an earlier context. The work deserves to be translated into English for the sake of the valuable historical materials in it The account is, in the main, fairly full, reliable and accurate, even as regards details Tho' the theme is religious and hagiological, the author has managed to infuse a genuine poetic feeling into his work and it stands as one of the

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1. There is no basis for the ascription of the *Adi utakalanala* to him, in the *S K.* ( p 174 ) and in the *Vij Sexcent Vol* ( p 297 ) or in Prof Hanumantarao's approval of it ( *Madhvamunidas* ), Dec 28 p 157, f n This work will be noticed in vol II

2 Printed, Belgaum

3 (p)B means printed at Belgaum ( Ramatattva Prakāśa Press ) and (p)D denotes that the work was printed and published from Dharwar ( by G R. Savanur ).

leading Kāvya in Dvāita Literature and as a good specimen of a Mahākāvya in Sanskrit. Despite his religious outlook, the author was a poet of merit and the son of a gifted poet. Even as a piece of Kāvya, it stands on a much higher level than similar "Vijayas" in the field like the *Samkaravijayas* of Anandagiri and Mādhavācārya. As Madhva and his biographer were not far removed in time from each other, the work is able to achieve a far greater measure of historical accuracy and wealth of contemporary details, than was possible for the authors of Saṅkara's biographies, who were removed from their subject by more than five to six centuries.

### (9) ANU MADHVA VIJAYA (p)

This is otherwise called *Prameyanavamaliḥa*,<sup>1</sup> and is a metrical outline of the *M Vij* in 32 stanzas. Towards the close of the work reference is made both to the *M Vij* and its commentary by himself.

सुमध्वविजयामिष व्यधित भावदोषाह्वय

प्रमयनवमालिका पुनरिमा च दक्षा च ताम ।

सता श्रवणमूपण व्यतनुत्तप नारायण ॥ (Madras O L, D C XXI,  
no 12144)

### (10) MADHVAVIJAYA-BHAVAPRAKĀSIKA (p)<sup>2</sup>

The object of this short gloss on the *M Vij* is to elucidate the obscure references and passages in the original and provide historical notes and comments, where necessary, to identify the names of places and persons belonging to S Kanara, appearing in their Sanskritised form (from the original Tulu), in the *M Vij*. This gloss is, thus, of immense value for a historical appreciation of those incidents in the life of Madhva, whose scenes have been laid exclusively in the Tulu country.<sup>3</sup> It also helps to throw light on the correct name or identity of certain persons also referred to by other epithets and sobriquets (e g Cola-ja

1 Not "*Aprameyamalika*" as in *Catal Cat*, p 291. The work is also preserved in the India Office Lib with a com (KEITH, I O C II, no 6062. It has been printed at Udipi.

2 Sri Krishna Press, Udipi, 1925 (Published by the Svami of the Kanur Mutt).

3 Some of these details from the *Bhavaprakāśika* have been utilized in my English introd to the edn of the *Madhva Vijaya*, with the aid of Viśvapati, Udipi, 1951.



Padmatirtha and Dvīpī Purī Pundarikā Purī) With this gloss we can easily reconstruct, fairly accurately, the movements of Madhva, within the Tulu country

As already mentioned, there are references in this gloss to another metrical biography, or may be to more than one such earlier work, on the life of Madhva That they are different from the *Anumadhvanijaya* is obvious We are unable to say anything more about these earlier 'Lives of Madhva' The gloss adds considerably to our knowledge of the incidents in the life of Madhva, briefly alluded to in the *M Vj*

The author assures us in the Epilogue that he has made a conscientious attempt to record all details as accurately as possible He makes it more or less clear that he was not an eye witness to *many* of the events narrated by him This may show that he must have been too young to have a clear personal recollection of his early contacts with Madhva, if not that he had never seen him, in his life The former hypothesis seems probable in view of certain other hints in his work ( xii 34 ) and seeing he was the youngest of the three sons of Trivikrama His main sources are the earlier biographies cited by him, his own father and certain other eye witnesses mentioned by him (Epilogue, verses 6-8)

#### ( 11 ) MANIMANJARI (p)

This is a Prologue to the *M Vj* in 8 cantos, providing a sort of mytho poetic background to the rise of the Dvaita Vedānta The first four cantos are a summary of the story of the Rāma and Krishna Avatars The fifth deals with the persecution of the Buddhists and the stifling of Avedistic beliefs by the activities of the Purvamīmāṃsakas The sixth leads up to the emergence of the Advaita Vedānta, and the seventh with its growing success, victory of Saṅkhya over Mādhya and Sūśrīva ( who are rightly distinguished from each other, unlike in the *Saṅkharanijayas* ) and the campaign of religious persecution set on foot by the followers of Saṅkhya against the forerunners of the Dvaita creed The eighth continues the story of the persecution and gives a graphic account of it and the steps taken by the disciples of the Dvaita teacher Prajñā Tirtha, in self defence and for preservation of his line The account is brought up to the birth of Madhva

His (12) *Subhodaya* (p) is an allegorical Kāvya in five Kāndas, each divided into Vargas made up of groups of ten verses. Each Varga is in a different metre. The subject matter is a philosophical allegory depicting the transmigratory career of King Subha (the individual soul) caught by the blandishments of the temptress Abhikāmini (Prakṛti), and his ultimate emergence (Udaya) from the snares of Prakṛti by the grace of God. The details of the allegory are vividly portrayed. The characters are representations of spiritual values and psycho physical principles.

The work is obviously a primitive of the author. He displays full mastery over the intricacies of Sanskrit metres and indulges in all kinds of metrical *tours de force* such as bandhas, Ekāksara, Ekāccha, mīrosthya etc. Till recently known only thro' a solitary reference in Sumatindra's gloss on the *Usāharana*, this poem has recently been published by the Sode Mutt, Udipi, with my English introduction (1951).

(13) *Parijatahāranam* (m) is a Kāvya in three cantos dealing with the story of the 'theft' of the celestial tree, by Kṛṣṇa, at the request of Satyabhāmā. Aufrecht (III, 62) notes a work of this name, ascribed to Nārāyaṇa Pandita. There is a much injured palm leaf ms. (Nandināgarī) of this work in the Madras O. L. (D. C. 11860)<sup>1</sup>. The author revels in *yamakas*. The Madras ms. contains also a commentary, probably by the author himself.

(14) His *Yoga Dīpikā* (p)<sup>2</sup> is a work on ritualistic worship (pujā) in 730 granthas. He bows to his father Trivikrama and gives a complete account of the daily duties of the householder. The work is divided into ten chapters called Patalas. Mantra dhikṣa by the Guru is described in ch. 1, daily rites in II, Chāḍaśī

1. Glasenapp (*Madhva's Philosophie des Viṣṇu Glaubens*, p. 85) refers to an edn. of this work from Punganur, in 1890, which is not now available.

2. A Devanāgarī ms. in good condition is preserved in the T. P. L. (xiv. no. 8126). The Editor *airily remarks* that the work is 'an explanation of the word Yoga in Vedāntasāstra' (p. 6228)! The work has been printed and published by the Admar Mutt, Udipi, 1956.

Vrata, Homa and Pārana in v, and Pratimāpūja in the last Details of image worship (Devapūjā) are given in iii The meaning and significance of Vedic mantras to be used in the daily worship of Mādhvas are explained in this work, which is sometimes quoted in the commentaries on Mādhva's *Tantrasara saṃgraha*

### MINOR WORKS

His (15) *Śrīstuti*, in 13 verses has been printed from Belgaum (S M pp 283-6) with and without a commentary<sup>1</sup> It is positive proof of the fact that the Mādhvas are *not* bigots opposed to the worship of Śiva Other Stotras of the author include (16) *Anu Vayustuti*, (17) *Laghutarāmyastotra* and (18) *Nṛsimhastuti* in 39 verses (S M pp 125-6) His (19) *Tīkṣṇatānirṇaya* is a tract for the proper ascertainment of the three *tūhis* *daśamī* *ekādaśī* and *dvādaśī* The *Mādhvamantrārthamañjarī* is *not* as stated in the S K (p 75) a work of this author, as will be clear in Vol II Yet another work ascribed to him is (20) an *Aṃśamśinirṇaya* \* \* of which nothing more is known

### 8 "TRAIVIKRAMĀRYADĀSA"

A son (?) and disciple of Nārāyaṇa Panditacarya<sup>2</sup> who describes himself merely as "Traivikramāryadāsa" – a disciple and 'slave' of the son of Trivikrama, wrote a gloss on the *Anu Bhasya*, entitled *Anandamālā* of which a Devanagari Ms is preserved in the Mys O L (C-2088) A passage from it is quoted in Jagan nātha Tīrtha's *Bhāsyadīpikā* (p 1097) dismissing the explanation given by Vādirāja of the passage सच्चिदानन्द आत्मति with the remark that his explanation is opposed to that of the *Anandamālā* The S K (p 20) wrongly attributes this work to Padmanātha Tīrtha<sup>3</sup> Internal evidence leaves no room for doubt that the

1 Of Visvapati Tīrtha (printed Udipi)

2 Cf अक्षयवेदात्तकृता तस्यारव्याख्याविहारान हरिभक्तिसिद्धयम् ।  
त्रिविक्रमार्थान्वरमा गुरु मे नारायणार्थश्च गुरुन् नतोस्मि ॥

(Introductory verse 3 *Anandamālā*)

3 The mistake is repeated in the *Vijayanagar Sarcen* Vol (p 297)



author was a disciple of Nārāyana Pandita. He has not, however, chosen to reveal his name<sup>1</sup>

The commentary which is the earliest known on the *Amu Bhasya* is full and informing (See p. 26 Ms ब्रह्मणेत्यादेरयमय \* \*) His ornate style bears a family resemblance to that of Trivikrama and his son. In him, too, we meet with the same gushing rhapsodies of admiration for Madhva. The following passage is a typical example :

नहि बहुविशेषज्ञचूडामणि सर्वज्ञभास्करमन्तरेणैव तादृशभाष्यानुभाष्यविरचने चतुरचेताश्चतुर्दशभुवनेष्वस्ति । किं पुनरेवेनैव वाक्येन पदेनाक्षरेण वा तत्तदधि करणार्थसंग्रहभाषणे कुशलमतिनस्तीति । यद्भिप्रेताभिमतमशाशमपि लेशत एव वक्तु सप्रति यतामहे । न चास्माक तत्प्रतिपादनपाटवमपटुधियाम् । यद्यप्यस्मदाचार्याभियान्मध्यसूर्यसदृशितार्थान् तत्प्रसादैकग्रल्वलव्य कथंचित् प्रायश प्रकाशयितु शक्नुमः । किं तर्हि मनावागभिमततद्भाष्यभावावर्तनलोत्यादेवायमस्मत्सनाहविजृम्भ ।  
(p 6 Ms)

Quotations are made from the B S B and AV of Madhva and reference is made to the *Nayacandrika*<sup>2</sup> of Nārāyana Pandita

Two other short works of Traivikramāryadāsa have recently been brought to my notice by my friend Shri K T Panduranga of the Karnatak College, Dharwar. They are (2) a gloss (m) on Madhva's *Kenopaniśad Bhasya*, and (3) and another (m) on the *Mandukya Bhasya*. Both are available in complete Devanagari mss, with Sri Gurjāli Śrinivasacharya of Malkhed. Their identity of authorship is established by the style, the introductory statements<sup>3</sup> and the colophon<sup>4</sup>.

1 In the colophon of the work, he is simply called "Traivikramāryadāsa."

2 तदर्थश्च नमचद्विवाया गुरुभिरेव व्यक्त विवृत ।

3 अथेदानी एतदभाष्यकारमहृत्कोऽस्मद्गुरुणाभपि गुरुतम सुरवरपुर सर-  
सुजननिवरनिरन्तराराधितवरणसरोरुहो \* \* इति ॥ ( *Kena. Up. Bh gloss* )

4 त्रैविक्रमायानुचरकृता समाप्ता । ( *op cit* ).



## CHAPTER XIX

### PRĀCĪNA TĪKĀKĀRAS

#### 1 PADMANĀBHA TĪRTHA (C 1318 24)<sup>1</sup>

Padmanābha Tīrtha was a native of the Kannada country. The reference to him in the *M Vj* as "having come from the region of the Godāvarī" (या गोदाया उपाययी xv, 120) is not a conclusive evidence for the general presumption of earlier writers that he must have been a Telugu by birth and a native of the Andhra country. The borders of Karnatak stretched, according to the *Kavrajamarga*, as far as the Godāvarī<sup>2</sup> and the reference to Padmanābha in the *Sampradaya Paddhati* of Hṛṣikeśa Tīrtha, as "the teacher of the good folk of Karnataka and others"

य कर्नाटकपूर्वसज्जनगुरु श्रीपद्मनाभाह्वय ।

raise an equally strong presumption in favor of looking upon him as a native of Uttara Karnataka. The *Gurucarya* clinches the matter by clearly stating that he *was* an Uttara Karnataka.

कर्नाटकोत्तरादेहि पद्मनाभमुनेरसौ ।

\* \* \* 11 ( 11 )

Padmanābha's former name is stated to have been Śobhana-bhatta<sup>3</sup>. He was met by Madhva on his way back to Udipi from his first north Indian tour. Sobhanabhatta was a distinguished

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1 In respect of Pontiffs, the dates in brackets, unless otherwise stated, represent their dates of succession to the Pītha and demise. Dates of birth have also been given in some cases, wherever determinable.

2 There is evidence of flourishing settlements of Vaiṣnavas, presumably Kannada speaking, even as late as the xvi century in several parts of the Ahmednagar district, such as Jeur, and Puntāmbā, on the Gojavari.

3 *M. Vj* ix, 17a. Bhandarkar (*Collected Works*) gives his name as Ānandabhattachāraka. Baladeva, in his *on Jivago-svāmīn's Tattvasandarbha*, refers to the great Padmanābha Tīrtha proficient in fourteen branches of learning, having been silenced by Madhva in fourteen seconds.

scholar of his day and master of all the branches of learning, a good student of the Vedas, Purāṇas and the Epic and an accomplished logician (Tārṇikāśikḥāmanī) <sup>1</sup> He tried conclusions with Madhva and was worsted by him in disputation. He sought and obtained the favor of admission to the new faith and afterwards became a monk under the name of Padmanābha Tīrtha. The event may be placed about 1265 A. D. He soon became one of the trusted disciples of Madhva. Unstinted praise is lavished upon him<sup>2</sup>, in the *M. Vy.* xv, 120-26. He was probably the seniormost of the disciples from outside the Tulu country, which probably made it possible for him to be constituted the first "successor" of Madhva on the 'main Pītha'. He was, according to the Mutt lists, Pontiff for seven years and passed away at Navabṛndāvana, near Hampi, on the *Tungabhadra*, in 1324. His mortal remains lie entombed there.

### WORKS

Nearly fifteen works have been ascribed to him of which only a few have so far been printed. A small fragment of his commentary on the *B. S. B.* has been published by me<sup>3</sup>. All his unpublished works, save three, are preserved in mss.

Padmanābha was the leading commentator of the system in the Pre Jayatīrtha period. He is even more important to the history of Dvaita Literature than Trivikrama, as he is the earliest known commentator on Madhva's *Daśa Prakāśas*, the *B. S. B.* the *AV* and the *G. B.*, while Trivikrama had contented himself with writing a commentary on the *B. S. B.* alone. In the wider sense of the term, Padmanābha is the "*Tīlākara*" of the system. No wonder, that Jayatīrtha, who is again the next great commentator on a majority of the works of Madhva, eulogizes Padmanābha as the pioneer commentator of the Dvaita system, but for whose guidance the works of Madhva would have presented serious difficulties to posterity and gives him the title of "*Tīlākāra*" (*NS* 1, 4, p. 222 Bby):

<sup>1</sup> *M. Vy.* ix, 17-19

<sup>2</sup> Cf. वेदान्तार्थि न यो जातु जहो विद्वत्तिमिगिल ॥

<sup>3</sup> See na,



स पचनामतीर्थायगौगणोऽस्तु दृशे मम ।

न सत्त्वमार्गगमनं विना यदुपजीवनम् ॥ ( *G. T. Nyayadīpikā* )

### COMMENTARIES ON THE TEN PRAKARANAS

Commentaries on all the ten Prakaranas have been ascribed to him. But no mss., of his commentaries on the *TS*, *TV* and *KN* are available. His commentaries on the rest of the Prakaranas are brief and pointed. He is not discursive like Jayatīrtha and is seldom polemically inclined, here. His lucid and impressive style has been perfected by Jayatīrtha. Most of his commentaries are presupposed by Jayatīrtha in his and laid under contribution and this debt is handsomely acknowledged. As a matter of fact, all the earlier commentaries of Trivikrama, Narahari and Padmanābha have been completely superseded by those of Jayatīrtha. They are no longer studied and have ceased to have any but a historical interest.

A Nāgarī Ms of ( 4 ) his c on the *Td* is preserved in the Mys O L ( 2974 f 76-81 ). That on the *VTN* ( Mys O L. 2974 f 82-108 ) would seem to go by the name of *Nyayaratnavali*. It is quoted by Jagannātha Tīrtha in his *Bhāṣyadīpikā*. Interesting is Padmanābha's explanation of the phrase Yathārtham Yathajneyam. Arthaśabdasya jñeyavācītvāt yathajñeyam pramānam ityuktam bhavati. His commentaries on two of the *Khanda* *natraya* the *MK* and the *UK* have been published by that doyen of Mādhva publishers T R Krishnacharya ( Sri Vidya Press, Kumbakonam, 1929 ). That on the *PMK* known as *Nyayaratnavali* quoted by Śrinivasa<sup>1</sup> in his c on the *Kīranavali* on the *G T Nyayadīpikā* of Jayatīrtha ( Bby 1906, p 60 ). Mss of his cc on the ( 9 ) *KL* and ( 10 ) *PL* are available both at Mysore ( 2974 ) and Madras ( 3928 ).

### SUTRA PRASTHANA

The c on the *B S B* is known as ( 11 ) *Sattarādīparalī* ( *m* )<sup>2</sup>. We have no ms of it in any of the O Ls at Tanjore, Madras or

1 Pupil of Satyapurna Tīrtha ( 1707-26 ) of the Uttarādī Mutt. See his introd. verses 4-5.

2 Not *Sattarakaratnavali*, as in Vy. Sreen. Vol. p 293.

Mysore I have with me a ms of this rate  $\alpha$  upto  $\alpha, 2$  It seems the work was left unfinished by the author as all mss, hitherto available, come to a stop with  $\alpha, 2$  of *B S*, some even earlier. The  $\alpha$  is referred to by name in one of the introductory verses of Satyanātha's *Abhinavacandrika* and is quoted eight times (from portions anterior to  $\alpha, 2$ ) in the *Bhāṣyadīpikā* of Jagannātha The portion of the work now available runs to 1700 granthas, nearly. The author keeps close to the original He quotes from the *Dvadaśa-stotra* of Madhva (under 1, 3, 8) and mentions the *AV*. by name (1, 4, 27)

(12) *Sannyasaratnaratnā* (p)D,  $\alpha$  on the *AV*. is the biggest of his works (granthas 6304) It is quoted occasionally by Jayatīrtha and often by Vyasarāya in his *Candrika*, where an attempt is made to reconcile some of the views of Padmanābha and Trivibrama with those of Jayatīrtha This  $\alpha$  has however been completely eclipsed and superseded by the *NS* of Jayatīrtha, which is seven times its size Dignity, elegance, clearness, brevity and avoidance of digressions and controversies mark his style None of the Pre Jayatīrtha  $\alpha$  has however found any subsequent glosses The *NS* of Jayatīrtha is much indebted to this work both in manner and matter The same is the case with the  $\alpha$  on the *Prakarana*s

(13) Padmanābha's *Gitabhāṣya Bhavadīpikā* ( $\alpha$ ), is not so well known as his other works A complete Devanagari ms of it, exists in a private collection at Bangalore<sup>1</sup> The number of granthas is 1700 The name of the  $\alpha$  is not given either in the colophon or in the introductory verses<sup>2</sup> But the language and style make it clear that it is a work of one of Madhva's direct disciples. There are no references here, to any earlier  $\alpha$  on the *GB* There are many references to and criticisms of the interpretations of

1 Since purchased by the Bangalore Press, Bangalore

2 The opening verse

गुणगणनिलय प्रणम्य कृष्ण जगदधदहन च वासवीमुनुम् ।

मुनिकुलतिलक सुपूज्यं वाच गुरुमपि विदूषोमि गीतिकाभाष्यम् ॥

bears a strong resemblance to the one in J's  $\alpha$  on *GB* which is significant, as the latter often models his expressions on those of Padmanābha Cf *Sannyasaratnaratnā*  $\alpha$ , p 18 with *NS*

Samkhya.<sup>1</sup> It avoids digressions, as usual. A Nāgarī Ms of his (14) *Gl̥latalparya-nirṇaya Prakāśika* (m) is preserved in the Mys O L (2969 ff 35 58). Jayatīrtha, in his c on the *GT*. (introd 3) acknowledges his indebtedness to it. The work runs to 900 granthas. The colophon gives the commentator's name as Padmanābha Bhaṭṭāraka. The expositions and criticisms are lucid as in the case of the examination of "Svapraśaṅga". The n is quoted in the *Kṛānarali* of Śrīnivāsa on Jayatīrtha's c on *GT* (Bby 1905, pp 175, 207).

## 2 NARAHARI TIRTHA (1324-33)

Narahari Tīrtha was presumably a native of the Telugu country. The *M V* does not mention him, but we have clear evidence of his inscriptions at Śrīkūrmam and elsewhere, to show that he was a direct disciple of Madhva. There is no reliable information about his early life and career. A short praise in 13 Śragdharās, called *Narahariyatistotra* (*S M* pp 349 52) professes to give full details of his life. But this is legendary and late in date and hence unreliable for historical purposes. Tradition has been persistent, however, that he was, for sometime, Regent in Kalinga. The *Narahariyatistotra* and some other works also,<sup>2</sup> allude to this regency which is said to have lasted twelve years. The fact of the regency is confirmed by the evidence of inscriptions<sup>3</sup> from the Śrīkūrmam and Simhācalam temples. There are altogether nine inscriptions of Narahari with whose help we can easily test and verify the information supplied by tradition and the later chronicles. These epigraphs are distributed over thirty years between 1264 and 1294 A D.

1 मयटो विकारयं एवार्थान्तरमेव नास्तीति कश्चित् । त प्रत्याह नहीति ( vii 13 ) अव्यक्ताक्षरशब्दाभ्यां तिगुणं ब्रह्मेत्यपव्याख्यानद्वयशाय्याव्यक्तपद सप्रमाण व्याचष्टे उपासत चेति ( xii, p 46 ms )

2 Cf *Raghavendrarajaya* (ii 7) of Narayana 17th century (N S Press Bby 1898)

3 "द्वेषामुन्न सथान योजयति जनान् कालिगभूसम्भवान् (Śrīkūrmam Insc E I vi 263 5) M Rama Rau (*Journal of Andhra Historical Research*, XI pts 2 4, pp 154 9 and *Purnabodhararsanī*, ii, 1) is precipitate in dismissing the alleged regency of Narahari as a myth. The term अवति जना कालिगभूसम्भवान् of the insc is significant and difficult either to dismiss or to explain away



The *Narahariyatisloka* makes out that he went to Kalinga at the orders of his Guru, Ānandatīrtha, to procure the idols of Mularāma and Sītā ( which had a legendary history behind them and ) which happened then, to be in the State treasury of Kalinga. An opportunity presented itself when the Kalinga King died. His ministers, in timehonored fashion, sent out the state elephant to pick up and bring them a proper regent. By some stroke of luck, the choice of the elephant fell on Narahari and he was placed on the throne. After 12 years when the Prince came of age, he relinquished his office. The King, in gratitude, bade him choose any presents he would like and the monk asked for the idols, for which he had come there and got them. These he presented to Madhva.

Such is the account of the *Stotra*. We are yet far from knowing the real purpose or duration of the Regency. One thing is certain that Narahari was at the zenith of his power in Kalinga in 1281, the year of his Śrīkurmam insc, which makes a special mention of his rule over Kalinga and his teacher Ānandatīrtha. There is good reason to believe that he was by no means a stranger to Kalinga or to court-life. His own father seems to have held high office in the state, probably as a minister<sup>1</sup>. In that case it would not be difficult to understand his choice for the regency. The episode of the state elephant is too legendary and antediluvian to have any place in sober history. The fetching of the Mularāma idols must thus have been a purely incidental affair in the political life of Narahari.

The earliest epigraph of Narahari is dated 1264 A D, in which he is already designated by the ascetic title of "Śrīpāda". His conversion, then, at the hands of Madhva, must have taken place in or before<sup>2</sup> 1264. His former name is said to have been Svami Śāstri<sup>3</sup>. The Śrīkurmam Insc refers to his powers as a

1 The expression पित्राचारमुपैति सूनुरिति सद्गीतिस्त्रितो धर्मतः । is significant. The father of the famous Ālamkārika, Viśvanātha, was similarly a "Sandhivigrahika" at the Orissa state.

2 Saletore is not right in placing the first meeting as late as 1270 (*His of Tuluva*, p 449).

3 C M P Achar *Life and Teachings of Madhva* S K. has it as Sāmā Sastri.

swordsman We may assume, then, that he was about forty years old at the time and calculate his date of birth as circa 1241 He might have been about 22 years at the time of his first meeting with Madhva and three years younger than he.

Of a total of nine inscriptions of his, in Kalinga, only *two*<sup>1</sup> are dated *before* 1281 The rest are all found distributed between 1281-93 The tone and wording of the *inse* of 1281, make it clear that he was the virtual overlord of the country in that year and seeing that there are five more grants between 1281-93, the period of regency may well be placed between 1281-93 In 1324, he "succeeded" Padmanabha Tirtha<sup>2</sup> and "ruled" for nine years, as Pontiff He died in Srīmukha, 1333 A D and was laid to rest at Cakratirtha, near Hampi (at some distance from the present Vithalasvami temple)

## WORKS

No less than fifteen works have been ascribed to Narahari, of which *only two* are available in Mss (1 10) The only authority for ascribing to him *cc* on *all* the ten Prakaranas, is the *S K* p 22 Of these, only the *cc* on the *VTN* and *KN* are quoted and criticised by Jayatirtha, in his *cc* No mss of any of these or the others have been traced Mm Vasudeva Sastri Abhyankar (edn *SDS* Bby p 567) ascribes a *n* on the *B S B* to Narahari, without any specific authority, even naming it "Bhavaprakāśikā" There is no reference to any such *n* in the later works of the system,

His (11) *n* on the *Glābhasya* called *Bhavaprakāśikā* (m) is quoted with approval in Jayatirtha's *Prameyadīpikā* on *G B* (u 50 and by Raghavendra in his *Virtti* (u, 16) A ms of it is preserved in the library of the Bangalore Press It breaks off abruptly with viii, 4 and is full of gaps It contains only 950

1 P P S Sastri, (Mādhva Chronology, *Kuppusvami Sastri Com Vol*, Madras, pp 167-9) makes a desperate attempt to emend the date of Śrīkurmam *Inse* to 1181, in order to support the date of the Mutt lists for Madhva (1119-99) For a refutation of his views see my paper in *ABORI*, i xix, 306-9)

2 S N Rajapurohit (*Pracīna Karnāṭaka*, Dharwar) attempted a revision of the order of succession among the four disciples of Madhva, placing Narahari, last For a criticism of his views, see my paper *Date of Madhva and His Immediate Disciples*, *AUJ* v 1.

granthas The author avoids digressions and writes an unaffected tho' sometimes verbose style. A glowing tribute is paid to Padma-nābha Tirtha, in the opening verse. He throws good light on many obscure lines in the *G B*. In such cases, where his predecessors have thrown sufficient light, Jayatirtha has naturally cut short his remarks. The interpretations of Saṅkara and Bhāskara, disapproved of in the *G B*, are pursued further and criticized by Narahari. He refers once to Rāmanuja *by name*. The ff extracts containing references to rival commentaries, would be of interest:

(1) तत्र मायो "किमाश्रय काम जह्यादिति, उच्यते" इति श्लोक ( 10, 42 ) अवतायं, सर्वदृश्येभ्यो बुद्धयन्तभ्योऽभ्यन्तर य देहिन कामो मोहयतीत्युक्त स 'बुद्धे पर' आत्मा इति वर्णयति ।

(2) तद्वितरस्तु ( 1 e Bhaskara ) कस्मिन् कामास्तिष्ठन्तीति दर्शयितु आहेत्यवतायं 'बुद्धे परतस्तु स ' इति काम एव परामृश्यते, तस्य प्रकृतत्वात्' इति । तदुभय चानेन निरस्त भवति ।

(3) अन्यस्तु-भगवतोऽप्यात्मन एवानादित्व वर्णयति । न तु तद्देहस्य । तद्दूषयति । ( 17 )

(4) अत्र केचिदकर्तार इति पदभ्रान्ता सर्ववदाद्युक्त भगवत सर्वकर्तृत्वमिष्येति वर्णयन्ति ( 17 13 )

(5) न च तयोरेकत्वचिन्तन होम । अश्रुतकल्पनाप्रसगात् ॥

(6) अपाने जुह्वति ( 17 29 ) इत्यादिना श्लोकस्य पूरणरेचनकुभकपरत्वेन यदपव्याख्यान तन्निराकुर्वन् यथायमाचष्टे ।

(7) इन्द्रत्याग एवात्र सत्यास न माय्युक्तप्रकारेण निष्क्रिय परमात्माह इति ज्ञानेन सास्त्रीयसर्वकमंप्रहाण इति भावेनाह—' सत्यासशब्दार्थस्तु ' इति ( 17 p 57 ).

(8) Other references occur in 17 p 57, vi and vii p 70 His ( 12 ) *Yamalabharata-Tīka* ( m ) is preserved in the Mys. O L ( 2985 ) in a Nagari ms ( f 8 11 ) In addition to his attainments in the field of Śāstras, Narahari Tirtha is regarded by tradition to have been the forerunner of the Vaisnava devotional movement of the Dāsa Kuta, in Kannada. His contribution to this branch will be dealt with in Part V 1 ( Vol. II )

### 3 MADHAVA TIRTHA ( 1333 50 )

He was the third " in succession " to Madhva, on the " Pītha " and is generally regarded as a direct disciple of Madhva. His



former name is said to have been Viṣṇu Sāstri. The *Gurucarya* clearly states that he was a Southern Karnataka<sup>1</sup>

तत् कर्नाटकमेति ( ? ) शब्दित कृष्णशानिणम् ।

सन्यस्य सौख्यतीर्थस्तु ब्रह्मचर्यस्थित सदा ।

श्रीमन्माधवतीर्थेति \* \* \* \* ॥

He is a comparatively obscure figure in the history of his school and no works of his have come down. Jayatīrtha has completely ignored him in his works. He had probably no literary leanings. Yet the *S. K.* ascribes to him competence in the Rg, Yajus and Sama Vedas. No mss. of any of these have been found. He died in 1350 A. D. (Vikṛti) after a 'rule' of 17 years. He founded a Mutt of his own which now exists under the name of Majjagehalli Matha near Mulbāgal. His mortal remains, said to have been laid to rest originally at Hampi, are now believed to be entombed at Manur, on the Bhīma river (Indi taluq of the Bijapur district).

#### 4 AKSOBHYA TIRTHA (1350-65)

Aksobhya Tīrtha was the last "in succession" among the disciples of Madhva. The *Gurucarya* mentions that he was a native of Uttara-Karnataka. His former name is given as Govinda Sāstri. The *S. K.* attributes to him a *Madhvatattvasarasamgraha*, of which nothing is known. It was probably a manual of Dvaita doctrine, to judge from the title.

Tho' not distinguished as a writer, Aksobhya figures as an outstanding personality in the history of his school. He is recognized to have been a contemporary of the great Advaitin scholar and writer Vidyaranya (who took a leading part in the foundation of Vijayanagar in 1336) and of the celebrated Viśiṣṭādvaitin polymath of the 14th century Vedānta Deśika. His chief claim to recognition rests on the incident of his historic disputation with Vidyaranya, on the purport of the "Tattvamasi" text—a disputation which is believed to have taken place at Mulbāgal ten miles from Kolar. It is said to have been referred to Vedānta Deśika for arbitration, and he is reported to have given his verdict in favor of Aksobhya, in the following verse, oft-quoted in traditional circles.

1 Cf. also the statement in the *M. Vij.* xv, 127 d

अनन्तबोवस्थानेके यतीन्द्रा बहुदेशजा ।

असिना तत्त्वमसिना परजीवप्रभेदिना ।  
विद्यारण्यमहारण्यमक्षोभ्यमुनिरच्छिनत् ॥

This tradition is corroborated<sup>1</sup> by the *Vedantadeśika Vaibhava-pra-lasika* of Mahācārya (16th century) and by the still earlier (15th cen) work of Brahmatantra Svatantra Jeer III, accounted to have been the third in spiritual succession from Deśika, at the Parakāla Matha, in Mysore. It is also recorded in the *Jayatīrthavijaya* of Vyāsātīrtha (a direct disciple of Jayatīrtha) in canto 11, 54-68 in the *Jayatīrthavijaya* of Chālārī Samkarsanācārya, and in the *Raghaṇendravijaya* (17th cen). There is also some kind of epigraphic evidence at Mulbāgal, where a commemorative stone pillar of victory has been discovered, tho' in a grossly mutilated form.<sup>2</sup> A covert allusion to Aksobhya's victory is perhaps intended by Jayatīrtha, in one of the introductory verses of his TP

दुर्वादिवारणविदारणदक्षदीक्षमक्षोभ्यतीर्थंमृगराजमहं नमामि ॥ ४ ॥

Later, Aksobhya seems to have moved north to Pandharpur on the Bhīmarathī river. Tradition has it that it was somewhere on the banks of that river that his first meeting with his future disciple, Jayatīrtha, took place. However, it seems that after the latter's initiation, he moved further north to Malkhed (or Mānyakheta, the historic capital of the Rāstrakutas) on the Kāgini river. It was here that he seems to have spent the closing years of his life devoting himself heart and soul to the training

1 A V Gopalacharya first made an irresponsible statement, in his introd to the *Īadarabhyudaya* (Srirangam, 1907) that the Advaitins claim that the judgment was in their favor, expressed in the following way

अक्षोभ्य क्षोभयामास विद्यारण्यो महामुनि ।

without indicating the source of his information. This opinion has been blindly echoed by certain writers in the *Vijayanagar Sereen-tinary Vol* (pp 49 and 301) unmindful of the facts that the Viśiṣṭādvaitic tradition (recorded) is emphatically against such a view and that such an emendation of the second line would be palpably inconsistent with the first line which is clinchingly in favor of 'difference' and the metaphor underlying the word 'asi' (sword)

2 On the entire question of the historicity of the Aksobhya Vidyāranya debate see my rejoinder to S N Rajapurohit, in the AUJ, v 1 pp 103-7. The *Jayatīrtha Vijaya* of Vyāsātīrtha also refers to the erection of a stone pillar to commemorate the victory  
स्तम्भं प्रतिष्ठाप्य जयाद्द्वयममन ।

and instruction of his gifted disciple Jayatirtha, in all the niceties of Dvaita thought. Jayatirtha's affectionate regard for Aksobhya comes out in the warm tribute that he has paid him for all the affection and learning which his Guru had lavished upon him. Aksobhya's mortal remains lie entombed at Malkhed.

## 5 PART PLAYED BY THE EARLY DISCIPLES OF MADHVA

The period of Madhva was one of creative evolution of thought. His philosophy was the outcome of his own cogitation. He had not only to design the entire plan of his system, but also to work out its main details. He had, of course, a large body of texts to draw upon. But their thoughts were far from being connected coherent or systematic. There were only a bundle of ideas to be carefully sifted, sorted and refined before they could be turned to practical advantage. This was by no means an easy task, having regard to their innumerable contradictions. It needed an expert eye, a deep philosophic insight and keen logical penetration to evolve and build up a complete and self-contained system out of them. It is clear from the results achieved by Madhva that he had the requisite ability for this task. The chief merit of his system lay in its groundwork. The foundations of the system of Sankara and Ramanuja had been laid by a number of their distinguished historical predecessors like Gaudapada and Bodhayana. Madhva's thought was exclusively his own. He had no historical predecessor to fall back and draw upon. He was the architect of his own system, in its outlines, as in all its architectonic details. The hints contained in the original texts drawn upon by him had more to do with questions of theology than with logical and metaphysical problems. Thus, the boldness, originality and distinctiveness of most of the metaphysical concepts and categories of his system and their definition and organization into a system, prove him to be a philosopher of outstanding merit. It was naturally difficult for one in his position, preoccupied with so many aspects of system building, such as its formulation, organization, exposition and propagation to give whole time attention to the perfection and elucidation of every one of its minute details and paraphernalia of thought. Much of his exposition of the philosophy of the *Brahmasutras* and the *Upanisads*, thus, appears



to be insufficiently coordinated, and wanting in depth of argument, richness of detail and fulness of exposition. An extraordinary brevity of expression envelops his views in some obscurity. The treatment of topics seems scrappy and sketchy and hence diffused and unimpressive Cf —

यद्यपि भगवत्पादेरेव प्रमाणलक्षणादिकमभिहित, तथापि गभीरया वाचा विक्षिप्य वर्णितं न मदौ सुखेन शक्यते बोद्धुम् । (Jayatīrtha PP) 'गभीरया' गूढाभिप्रायया (Janārdana Suri) 'विक्षिप्य'—लक्षणविभागादेः स्थूलभेदमाश्रित्य (Rāghavendra) 'गभीरया' अस्पष्टायंतया (Śrīnārāyaṇa Tīrtha) दुर्निरूपवचनं च पण्डितैरप्रमेयहृदयम्' (M Vy 15, 10).

Hence the limited appreciation of the true merits of his metaphysics and its misapprehension in many quarters

Madhva rarely goes into the intricacies of doctrines and their minutiae in the manner of other Bhāṣyakaras. He merely outlines his views with a few bold strokes, — be it in constructive exposition of his own Siddhanta<sup>1</sup> or criticism of other theories<sup>2</sup>. Lengthy and seemingly irrelevant quotations from a bewildering variety of sources, extant and other, and interpretations and logico philosophical discussions of topics, piecemeal cause distraction of thought and mar unity of appeal. Tho' an expert logician, he did not think much of the contemporary logic or the fashionable doctrines of the Schoolmen and did not, therefore, pay sufficient attention to the defence or demonstration of his views in the light of prevailing modes of thought and their scholastic paraphernalia or presenting them in the familiar moulds and patterns of thought patented by his contemporaries<sup>3</sup>. We have, thus, very little of scholastic legerdemain and technical embellishment of arguments in his works. There are more of crucial ideas than meticulously argued theories. There is no patient working out of the organic methodology of doctrines (Prakriyā)

1 Cf His sententious definition of Bādha

विज्ञातस्यायमा सम्यक् विज्ञान इव तमतम् (AV) without entering into details, which are supplied by Jayatīrtha, so as to refute all other Khyātivādas

2 Cf न चायत् कल्प्यम्, अप्रामाणिकत्वात् । नान्यथा तददृष्टे । न च जीवे समन्वय उक्त (B S B).

3 Cf. श्रीमदाचार्ये । पूर्वमीमांसाया अनश्रयणात् ।

(Abhinavagada)

These *lacunae* in thought, methodology, details of exposition and finesss of Siddhānta had naturally to be made good before the system could attain to a position of equality of technique with other established systems in the field. This need for such technical reconditioning and rounding off of the system does not appear to have been adequately realized or met till the days of aśJatirtha

There were no doubt a few immediate disciples of Madhva who wrote cc on his basic works. But they could not be said to have made any distinctive contribution to Madhva thought or its methodology as such. Their works merely represent the early stages of the religious and secular expansion of the system in the province of its birth (Tulunād) and outside, by means of founding of Pontifical seats and centres of learning and religious propaganda. The four itinerant disciples made frequent tours all over the country – particularly in Karnatak Maharashtra Āndhra and Tamil areas, and expounded the new philosophy to the faithful followers and the learned public and engaged the champions of rival schools in public disputations and brought about the conversion of large numbers of people to the new faith and sought, in various ways to cultivate and develop mass contacts for the faith. This period of initial expansion may be called the period of the “Prācīna-Tīkākāras”<sup>1</sup>

It was at this time, that pursuant to the needs of the new faith, biographical accounts of Madhva and hagiological works came to be composed by other prominent disciples like Trivikrama and his son. Mutts were founded in various parts of the country running cc and expositions of the works of Madhva came to be undertaken by prominent persons like Trivikrama, Padmanabha, Narahari and Nārāyana Pandita. Their works have already been noticed

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1 The expression is first used by Raghavendra Svami, in his gloss on the TP. I have adopted it as a convenient and handy designation

The secular advantages flowing from such local or wide spread political influence as individual leaders of the school possessed<sup>1</sup>, must have been fully utilized for furthering the fortunes of the system. The historic disputation of Aksobhya with Vidyāranya on the moot text at issue between Monism and Dualism: "Tattvam asi" was rightly a turning point in the history of the new faith. That memorable event and its result enhanced the prestige of the new school as nothing else could have done and gave it a chartered place in the estimation of all philosophers. Leading philosophers and 'historians of Indian philosophy', were henceforth obliged to take note of the new "Darsana" the "*Purnaprajña Darśana*," – as Madhavācārya respectfully designates it, in his *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* and reckon with it.

Notwithstanding these many sided activities of the immediate disciples and the "*Pracīna Tīkāhāras*", the full worth and philosophical merits of the new system were still obscured by an inadequate presentation of the philosophy contained in the original works of Madhva, in all its cantours and richness of detail. Its possibilities could only be fully drawn out by a master mind well trained in the art of critical analysis of thought, orderly presentation and attractive writing. Despite their strength of conviction, remarkable enthusiasm and abilities, the immediate disciples like Trivikrama, Padmanābha and Narahari, were not so fully equipped for this task. Their works as they stand could never have pushed up the philosophy of Madhva to that status of Sastric equality with the Advaita or Viśiṣṭādvaita, which the labors of Jayatīrtha, in the next generation were able to do. They merely spread the message of Madhva to a wider circle of adherents and popularized it in the country. They widened the ambit of its religious, secular and political influence. But no distinctive contribution to Dvaita thought or its exposition was made, till the days of Jayatīrtha.

The period of Madhva and his immediate disciples might, therefore, be described as the seed-time of Dvaita thought. The ecc of Padmanābha and others were merely content with a faithful

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1 Narahari was regent of Kalinga for some years, as established by the Sri Kurmam Insc. The *Gurucarya* says that Aksobhya had some influence at the court of Illeri.



rendering of the originals. They left much to be accomplished still. The exuberant style of Trivikrama, tho' flashy and fighting was not suited to a calm, passionless, analysis or logical exposition and evaluation of doctrines. Padmanābha's style was doubtless more restrained, but not yet perfectly measured and classical in its literary effect or doctrinal range and proportions.

On account of the activities of the Pracina Tikabāras, a compact community of the followers of the new school had been brought into existence in different parts of the country. Suitable measures had to be taken for the satisfaction of its religious and hagiological needs. The development of the community sense among the adherents and an urge for more propaganda and proselytization are revealed by the composition of hagiological works like the *Manimāñjarī*, *Vayustuti* and *Madhvarājaya*. Individual disciples like Padmanābha and Aksobhya and the Taulava ascetics founded separate lines of monks to consolidate the position of the system and speed up its propagation in different parts of the country. These Mutts continue, to this day, to be the nerve centres of the school and its social, religious and philosophical activities. Narahari's labors as Regent in Kalinga must have given considerable scope for the expansion of the system and its penetration into the Kalinga and Āndhra areas (where even to this day a substantial community of Mādhvas flourishes). The significant statement of Hṛṣīkeśa Tīrtha, about Padmanābha Tīrtha, proves that he was largely responsible for strengthening and extending the hold of Madhva's system in the areas near the Godavari and further south and throughout Uttara Karnataka which was his native region. The crowning point of this period was the historic debate of Aksobhya with Vidyaranya which must have opened the eyes of contemporary philosophers and focussed their attention on the new Darśana and forced them to give it an honorable place in the Vedānta. The "Dvaita" had thus not only come to stay, but had also to be reckoned with as a powerful limb of the Vedānta. This was done for the first time in Madhva's *Sarvadarśana samgraha*. Madhva's philosophy had, thus, fought its way slowly and steadily to recognition and had, at last, attained a secure place from which it could not be dislodged.

With this historic recognition of its place and merit as an independent "Darśana", towards the close of the 14th century,

may be said to begin the second phase of its life under its greatest expositor Jayatīrtha

The authoritative acceptance of the system in contemporary circles made it imperative that it should at once be raised to a position of the *highest technical perfection* and *richness* of detail and expository brilliance, so as to enable it to *hold its position* and compete on equal terms with the established philosophy of the day, the Advaita of Śaṅkara and his followers, perfected by a host of brilliant dialecticians like Ānandabodha Śrīharsa Jñānotama and Citsukha

It was Aksobhya a gifted disciple and successor of Jayatīrtha who was destined for this new contribution to Dvaita thought



# PART III

## STANDARDIZATION OF DVAITA THOUGHT UNDER JAYATĪRTHA

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### CHAPTER XX.

#### THE PLACE OF JAYATĪRTHA IN DVAITA THOUGHT

(1) The period of Jayatīrtha was one of remarkable development in the history of Dvaita thought and its literature. He gave final shape and form to its concepts and categories, standardized their definitions, formulated new ones where none had been given by Madhva, in the light of contemporary logic and philosophy. The commentators preceding him had done but preliminary spadework and gained a foothold for the system of Madhva, in contemporary estimation. But it required a master mind to give it not only staying power but also the power to be reckoned with and accepted on a footing of absolute Sastric equality with the other systems of thought in the field. Jayatīrtha had the necessary energy and equipment for the task, being more impressively learned in the six systems of philosophy and other branches of learning, than all his predecessors and he brought all that learning and penetrative insight into contemporary philosophy, to bear upon his exposition, elucidation and reinforcement of Madhva's philosophy and his interpretation of the Vedānta. He paid equal attention to the task of critical and constructive exposition of the Siddhānta and to dialectical refutation of hostile views. In the history of the Dvaita Vedānta, he might, therefore, be said to have played the combined role of Ṛ Vācaspati and Ṛ Citsukha in Advaita, with a thoroughness, ability and erudition equalling theirs, in the Advaita and other systems.



He was also a pioneer of methodology,—in the exposition of categories and concepts (Prakriya) His methodology of thought and exposition has been followed by all the subsequent writers of the system He has not also failed to review the Prakriyās of other systems and examine their merits and demerits As a result of these many-sided labors of Jayatīrtha, the Dvaita system was placed on a completely self sufficient basis, in every way. Its expository and dialectic aspects were equally enriched and balanced with each other Under the guise of commenting on the *Prakaranas* of Madhva, he gave sumptuous critical and constructive expositions of the logical, epistemological and ontological doctrines and categories of Dvaita, and its thought measuring devices, in the light of contemporary philosophical theories. (See his *Pramanalaksanatika*) His *cc* on the *G B* and *B.S B* and *AV*, drew conspicuous attention to the underlying the metaphysical ideology of Madhva-Siddhānta, which, in a later age, came to be overshadowed by the trappings of logical realism There is no mistaking his eagerness to emphasize the basic and fundamental keynote of Madhva metaphysics, the ideology of the Svatantra-advitiya-Brahma-vāda He loses no opportunity to stress this ultimate thesis of Madhva and remind us that the reality of the world and other principles should be assigned no more than its proper place as a doctrine of lesser philosophical value and prominence beside the highest truth of the independence and infinitude of the Supreme Reality

द्विविधः सत्सिद्धान्तः । परापरमेदात् \* \* अनेनापरसिद्धान्तान्तरमाह \* \*  
उपलक्षणं चैतत् । प्रपञ्चसत्यत्वादिकमपि ग्राह्यम् । (NS p 538 b) Also  
परतन्मप्रमेयं हि \* \* (TSr )

The same note of deep metaphysical insight is to be found in his impassioned statement of the grand synthesis of Upanisadic thought currents converging towards the ideology of the Svatantra  
सर्वोप्यपि हि वेदान्तवाक्यान्वयसत्येयगुणाकरः सकलदोषगन्धविधुर एकरूपमेव परं ब्रह्म  
नारायणाख्यं प्रतिपादयन्ति । किंतु (१) कानिचित् सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वेश्वरत्वसर्वान्तर्गामित्वसौन्दर्योदायंगुणाविशिष्टतया (२) कानिचित् अपहृतपाप्मत्वनिर्दुःखत्वप्राकृत-  
भौतिकविग्रहरहितत्वादिदोषाभावाविशिष्टतया (३) कानिचित् अतिगहनताज्ञापनाय  
\* \* (Quoted in full on p 5)

His unerring insight into the true philosophical bearings of the system enables him to pilot it out of sectarian moorings and

textual thralldom and launch it on the high seas of open speculation. His essentially philosophical outlook is also revealed by his choice of works of purely logical and philosophical interest from among the 37 works of Madhva for purposes of comment ignoring those of a purely religious or didactic appeal and theological value like the *Mbh T N*, *B T* etc. Even among the Upanisads he chose only two of the most concise ones preferring to discuss the interpretation of crucial passages from the rest *passim*, in his co on the *Prakarana* and in his *NS*. He has greatly enriched the system by his graceful style, the scintillating originality of his interpretations and the depth and logical subtlety of his arguments.

For these memorable services to Dvaita Vedanta he has been esteemed by the followers of Madhva and honored by the exclusive epithet and title of "*Tilacarya*" (the Commentator *par excellence*) conferred on him. Vyāsārāya pays him a significant tribute

गुरुभाव व्यजयन्ती भाति श्रीजयतीर्थेवाक । (Nym)

and Vādirāja enlarges on it, in fine poetic embellishment

माध्वप्रयान् स्ववन्धूनिव सरसहृदालिङ्ग्य विज्ञातभाव  
सयोज्यालकृताभि स्वसहजमतिसभूतवाग्निर्वन्धूभि ।  
कृत्वा योक्तीश्च दासीर्बुधहृदयगृह प्रौढवृत्तीश्च वृत्ती-  
र्दत्त्वा न्योपाभियोग जयमुनिरसकृद्वीक्ष्य रेमे कृतार्थ ॥

(Tirthaprabandha in 18)

Together with Madhva, and Vyāsārāya, he constitutes the "*Munirayam*" of Dvaita Vedanta

श्रीमध्व कल्पवृक्षस्तु जयाय कामधुक स्मृत  
चिन्तामणिस्तु व्यासार्थो मुनित्रयमुदाहृतम् (Śrīmusnamahatmya)

(ii) The main lines of technique of exposition followed by him are, in his own words स्पष्टीकरण चानेकविधम्—(१) क्वचिदनुक्ताशस्योक्ति (२) क्वापि अतिविक्षिप्तस्योपपादनम् । (३) क्वचिदतिविस्तृततया बुद्धयनारूढस्य संक्षेप । (४) क्वापि विक्षिप्तस्यैकीकरणम् । (५) कुत्राप्युक्तस्योपपादनम् (६) क्वचिदपव्याख्याननिराकरणेन दृढीकरणमित्यादि ॥ (NS p 8) and in every one of these directions he has achieved remarkable success

For instance, the definition of Bhakti given by Madhva, in his *Mbh T N* (1, 86) has been given classical form by Jayatīrtha

( NS p 17 ) • परमेश्वरभक्तिर्नाम निरवधिकानन्तानवद्यकल्याणगुणत्वज्ञानपूर्वक  
स्वात्मात्मीयसमस्तवस्तुभ्योऽप्यनन्तगुणाधिकाऽत्तरायसहस्रेणाप्यप्रतिबद्धो निरन्तर  
प्रेमप्रवाह ।

Its place in the scheme of spiritual discipline and its relation to Jnana the nature and kinds of possible karma after the dawn of knowledge ( NS p 604 ab ) and the fruits of such Karma are all set forth clearly and authoritatively ससारनिवृत्तिमात्र केवलेन ज्ञानेन भवति । आनन्दवृद्धिस्तु कर्मसापेक्षेणैव ज्ञानेनेति भगवतः पत्न्या ( NS p 560 ). The unique place assigned by Madhva to Divine grace ( prasāda ) as the only ultimate means of release, over and above Jnana, is very well brought out ( NS pp 521, 526 and 527 b ) अस्मिन् शास्त्रे यत्र यत्र ज्ञानस्य साक्षादधनत्वमुच्यते, तत्र तत्र ज्ञानमिति पदेन भक्तिरूपेण लक्ष्यते, कुत ? सब घात् । ज्ञानस्य भक्तिभागरत्वात् । माहात्म्यज्ञानस्नेहसमुदायो हि भक्तिरित्युक्तम् । ततो ज्ञानं भक्तेर्भाग एकदेश ( NS 604 ) The denotation of the term " Pramāna ", the different senses in which it is used, the types of Inference, the nature of " Pada-śakti ", in Dvaita philosophy ( PP p 399 Dharwar ), the formation of judgments thro' Anvitābhīdhāna ( NS p 520 ), the principles of exegesis on which the so called monistic texts could be made consistent with those pledged to the reality of the world and its values ( NS 595 6 ), the Dvaitins' attitude to the Universal ( Jāti ), the simplification of the number of fallacies of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika from 22 to 6 and the principles underlying such subsumption, the essence of ' Sat siddhānta ' and its constituents ( NS 637 b 36 ) are all clearly and brilliantly dealt with As already pointed out, he has given a masterly exposition of Madhva's ideology of how the different thought currents of Upanisadic philosophy converge to wards and find their fulfilment in the ultimate truth of " Sva tantra advitiya Brahman " ( p 124, NS cited on P 5 )

The nature and status of memory and recognition as forms of valid knowledge ( NS p 496 b ), the definition of Upamāna and Abhāva ( NS 475 6 ), the examination of the definition of Pramānas given by other schools of thought ( NS 250 ), the essential difference between the Mādhyama and the Buddhist theory of Error ( NS 46 and 48 b ), the place of " Tarika " in the scheme of Inference ( NS 477 50 ), and the application of the principle of Upacāra to cases of superficial identification of body and soul are



clearly explained (NS p 488 ff) The *raison d'être* of the doctrine of Saksi as the ultimate principle of validation of Knowledge, the limitations of the theory of self-validity of Knowledge in relation to the doctrine of Saksi, the epistemological necessity to distinguish between two kinds of knowledge mental perception and judgments of the Saksi (NS 593 b) are fully brought out. It is pointed out, with sound philosophical penetration, that that entire superstructure of Madhva's realism rests on the verdict of the Saksi and the infallible validity of its judgments (NS p 30). Among other outstanding contributions of Jayatirtha are his exposition of the doctrines of Truth and Error according to Madhva thought and of the process of ascertainment of Vyapti in inference; and an up to date review of the Critique of Difference given by the leading Advaitic dialecticians. He was also the first to discuss, in full, Madhva's doctrine of Error in relation to the "Khyativādas" of all the other leading schools (NS pp 40-57) and bring out the *differentia* of the Dvaita theory and give it a special name of "Abhinavānyathākhyāti".<sup>1</sup> This up to date treatment of the Khyativādas was intended to bring Madhva's theory of it, into line with contemporary theories and place it in proper perspective. The doctrines of Saksi, Svataḥprāmānya and Viśesa, which lie at the very root of Madhva's metaphysics and which have been tersely outlined by him have been fully drawn out and expounded by Jayatirtha, with a wealth of arguments.

We are indebted to him for compact and clear cut definitions of such metaphysical conceptions as "tattvam", Saksi, Viśesa, Svatantra, Paratantra etc., which play a vital part in the philosophy of Madhva. He was the first to define "tattvam" (reality) as "Anaropitam pramitivisayah" and explain its significance so as to make it proof against the quibbling criticisms of Śrīharsa (Vide TS. i). He elucidates, also, for the first time, the true nature of "Viśayaviśayibhava" (relation between Knowledge and its object) as acceptable to Madhva (Vadāvali, p 63). He defines "atoms", "Parinama vāda" and "Svabhavajñānavāda", coins a new name for Madhva's theory of Error, and for the operation of Viśesas thro' self linking.<sup>2</sup> He was, thus the earliest to formulate

1 वक्ष्यामि ह्यभिनवान्यथास्थितिम्। (NS p 46)

2 In terms of "Sa viśeṣābheda" which is a phrase coined by him

precise definitions of the fundamental categories and concepts of the system and lay down the proper methodology for treatment of topics (Prakriyā) <sup>1</sup> He also examines, where necessary, the basic principles and methodological devices of other schools and brings out their inadequacies and shows the necessity of formulating new or different Prakriyās <sup>2</sup> His new interpretation of "Tat tvam asi" in terms of "Bimbapratibimbabhāva" relation between Jīva and Brahman, accepted in the Dvaita system (See his c on Td) which is itself a corollary of the doctrine of the One Independent Real, is a very attractive departure from the generally accepted explanation, avoiding altogether the necessity of having to split the padas into "Atat", "tvam", as has been done by Madhva in his VTN, and Chan Up Bhasya This shows Jayatīrtha's boldness and originality to go ahead of Madhva (without prejudice to the Siddhānta) and explore fresh lines of thought and interpretation The same freshness of outlook is seen in his interpretation of "Neha nanasti" (NS p 29) He also brings the treatment of Advaita Śrutis and Smritis, in Dvaita, up to date by discussing several new texts not noticed by Madhva,

अहं हरिः सर्वमिदं जनादेन । ( NS p 435 )

विभेदजनकेज्ज्ञाने नाशमात्यन्तिकं गते \* \* ( NS p 435 )

आ मुक्तेर्भेद एव स्याज्जीवस्य च परस्य च ।

मुक्तस्य तु न भेदोऽस्ति भेदहेतोरभावतः ॥ ( NS p 508 )

यावन्मोक्षस्तु भेदः स्यात् \* \* \* ( p 509 )

As a critical expositor, Jayatīrtha displays a consummate skill in detecting hidden significances in the all but too brief utterances of Madhva and breathing a soul of wit and depth of meaning into them, capable of demolishing a number of hostile views that might be held on a given issue, at one stroke Thus, the simple looking text प्रत्यक्षवच्च प्रामाण्यं स्वतः एवागमस्य तु ( AV ) is made to

1 Cf अनेपा प्रक्रिया NS p 468, p 593, इयमत्र दर्शनपद्धति etc

2 See the doctrine of "Trishandbhāvidyā" and its refutation in NS p 561 2 Also the resume of the entire hierarchy of gods and sages up to the Supreme पुष्करो नाम सर्वावरो देव \* \* \* \* \*  
\* \* \* ततो भगवानिति ( NS p 564 ) and न च तथा पराभिमतार्थं किञ्चिन् प्रमाणमस्ति । प्रक्रिया तु मन्दजनमनोहरा निर्मूलत्वादुपेक्ष्या । ( VTN t p. 48 b )

dispose of *seven* different Purvapaksas and establish the validity of Sabda as an *independent* and distinctive source of knowledge, *in* against several ingenious objections of the Vaiśeṣikas and the Cārvākas ! The astonishing ease with which he wrecks all these powerful objections, on the rock of " *Pratyakṣa ( tacca )* " is truly an admirable *feat* of commentatorial ingenuity ( NS pp 76 78 ) which is absolutely unparalleled in Sanskrit literature The copulative " *ca* " in " *Pratyakṣatac ca* " is made to *imply* that Sabda *is* to be accepted as a distinctive Pramāna by the Vaiśeṣikas in the same way as Inference is, by them Another ingenious objection that Śabda, being an attribute of Ākāśa, cannot function as a source of knowledge because of its unintelligent character ( *avijñānatmaka* ), is deftly overturned by making the term " *Pratyakṣavat* ", a counter-illustration for the Siddhāntin -अत्र प्रत्यक्षवदिति व्यतिरेकदृष्टान्तः । ( NS 77 b ) Another text, " वैलक्षण्यं सतदत्रापि स्वयं सद्ब्रह्मवादिभिः ( AV ), is expanded to meet *twelve* alternative explanations of " *Sadasad-vailaksanyam* " that might be put forward in the conception of " *Mithyātva* ", defined as " *Sadasadvailaksanyam* " by the Advaitin A third text " गौरवकल्पनेऽन्यथा " ( AV ) is made to refute the different views of the Vaiyākaranas and the Mīmāṃsakas, on the formation of linguistic judgments by syntactic combination of words Sphotavāda, Anvitābhīdhāna etc. ( NS pp 87-9 ) All the five " *Khyātivādas* " as well as Rāmānuja's theory of Error are elaborately set forth and refuted in detail ( NS p 40 57 ) The whole of this critique of Khyātivādas of other schools is cleverly dovetailed into the Siddhānta definition of Badha ( stultification of wrong knowledge ) formulated by Madhva, in his concise way .

विज्ञातस्यान्यथा सम्यक् विज्ञानं ह्येव तन्मनम् ( AV ), where the particle " *hi* " is made the starting point of the whole discussion ! Such consummate ability to put so much dynamic energy into the simple innocent looking phrases of the original is a marvellous trait, almost unique in the whole range of Sanskrit commentary literature

In criticizing the doctrines of the Advaita, both on his own initiative and following Madhva, Jayatīrtha takes special note of the divergence of opinion among the leading commentators of the Advaita school, like Vacaspati, Vivaranakāra, Amalananda, Citsukha, and Vyāñānaghana, on moot-points of their philosophy



and throws considerable light on these differences in doctrine, which we are able to appreciate much better thro' his account of them. This is one of the rare advantages of approaching a system thro' the accounts of its eminent critics who, in Indian philosophical literature, could be relied upon for absolute impartiality and faithfulness of presentation. Jayatīrtha is an instance in point. His review of the "Abhinna nimittopādānavāda" of Rāmānuja under the "Prakṛtyadbhikāraṇa" of the B S, goes to the root of the matter and shows by a penetrating analysis of his position, that Rāmānuja is not justified in indulging in such ambiguous terminology when he does not actually subscribe to the direct transformation of Brahma caitanya into the world of matter and souls.<sup>1</sup> His exposition of the "Sacchaktyavacchinna Brahmaparināmanavāda" and its refutation in the NS, is most instructive and helpful to the understanding of the real metaphysical positions of schools allied to those of Śrīkantha and Vallabha (who adopt more or less the same views).<sup>2</sup> As a rule, Jayatīrtha's criticisms of the Sūtra interpretations of the Advaitic school are directed against the Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara, which is often quoted by him (pp 190, 295, 560, 653) and the cc of Vācaspati and Pralāsaśatman and the *Samksepasarīra*. The examination of the categories and principles of Advaitic thought are generally directed against the dialectic exposition of those topics found in the *Brahmasiddhi* of Mandana, the *Tattvapradīpika* of Citsukha and to some extent in the *Vivaraṇa*. The views of Śrībarsa are also refuted (NS pp 242, 381).

Another important contribution of Jayatīrtha is the regular and systematic exposition of the 'adhikaranaśarīras' of Madhva's interpretation of the B S. These had not been systematically made out in the earlier commentaries of Trivikrama and others, as they had been, in the *Bhamaṭī* and other commentaries of the Śaṅkara school. By meeting this need, Jayatīrtha brought the Sūtra interpretation of Madhva into line with the achievements of the other schools.

Of exegetic principles of Mimāṃsā, Jayatīrtha touches upon "Sabdāntara", in support of Madhva's interpretation of *Anna maya* etc, in *Tatt Up* as forms of Brahman (NS p 141 b).

1 Vide my *Catussūtrībhāṣya of Madhva*, 1934, p xxii xxiii

2 Vide my '*Svatantradrāṣṭa*', p 80

Doctrines of Advaita, like "Sabdaparoksa" (p 62), Jīvanmukta (p 561 2), Bimbapratibimba (VTN. p. 97) not discussed by Madhva, are examined by Jayatīrtha, on his own initiative. The futility of "Pramanyavyavastha", argued by Śrīharsa, is similarly controverted (NS. II, p 242)

Madhva's treatment of the so called Advaita śrūtis was, apparently, piecemeal and uncoordinated, and resting on considerations of language, syntax and etymology and the corroborative evidences of a large body of non extant texts. Disconnected and laboured explanations of texts occur (*Mand Up* 10, and "Tattvam asi" in *G B*, *B S B* and *Chan Up bhasya*). These had not been coordinated to a general or basic theory of Upanisadic interpretation and integrated with the ideology of the "Svatantra advitiya Brahman", recognized by Madhva. This comprehensive correlation of monistic texts to the metaphysical ideology of "Svatantra advitiya tattva", was undertaken by Jayatīrtha, for the first time, in the history of the school. He it was that gave the lead as to the directions and points of view from which the grand harmonization of "Advaitic" texts should be effected. सर्वस्यपि हि वेदान्तवाक्या यस्यैवैकल्याणगुणाकर सकलदोषगन्धविधुर \* \* \* \* (NS p 124, already cited). It is this harmonization that he has tried to illustrate with reference to his original interpretation of "Tattvam asi" in terms of "Bimbapratibimba bhava" relation between the Jīva and Brahman, in his ■ on the *Td*.

His *Vadañali* is a short powerful rejoinder to Citsukha's onslaughts on philosophical realism, in so far as they are applicable to Madhva's realism. Jayatīrtha has tried to show in this work, that the familiar criticisms of the Advaitic dialecticians are powerless against the new type of philosophical realism propounded by Madhva with the help of certain new devices and improvements designed to meet the deficiencies pointed out by the Advaitins, in the older realisms constructed under the limitations of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrines. Commenting on Śrīharsa's negative dialectic, Das Gupta writes Śrīharsa "did not and could not show that the ways of definitions which he attempted to refute, were the only ones of defining the different categories and even these could not be bettered or improved by using suitable adjuncts and qualificatory phrases" (op cit II, 147). Jayatīrtha's stand is identical.

नहि प्रक्रियापरिक्षयो वस्तुपरिक्षयात् गरीयान् ( *MK*: p 8 b ) The doctrines of Sākṣī and Saviśeśābheda propounded by Madhva, were precisely intended to overcome the difficulties raised by the Advaitic dialecticians against the older Realisms of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schoolmen. These would be inapplicable to a Realism founded on the new principles of Viśeṣa and Sākṣī. This point is made clear in the *Vadavallī*, where Jayatīrtha shows that the Advaita metaphysics rests on the most shaky foundations of "Mithyātva" which is fully examined and refuted. The Critique of Bheda and the Advaitic interpretation of "Neka nanāśi" are also examined and refuted. The doctrine of "Bhavarupājñāna" (in Advaita) is shown to be untenable. The reality of difference and the validity of experience are shown to rest on the unimpeachable evidence of Sākṣī pratyakṣa, and the verdict of normal perception, which cannot be discredited by any amount of so called incompatibility of relation between Spirit and matter. *Degārsya sambandhanupapatti*, made out by the Advaitin. The indispensable necessity for a sound practical theory of Pramāṇas for any kind of metaphysical thinking is shown, after exposing the hollowness of the absolutistic scepticism of Śrīharsa, in this respect ( *NS* 1, pp 31-34 )

Jayatīrtha, thus, stands out not only as the greatest standardizer of Dvaita thought and its categories, but also, as the leading dialectician of the system who led the way for a comprehensive examination of the entire edifice of Advaitism, in the succeeding centuries, by Viśnudāsa and Vyasarāya.

He was a master of graceful style, rich in vocabulary and chaste and polished in his expression. His sense of proportion and freedom from empty flourish and verbiage, add much to the beauty of his writings and the spontaneity of their appeal. The grace and dignity of his style have greatly enhanced the prestige of the system, among whose makers, there are not many good stylists. The *Vadavallī* pays the following tribute to his expository style

। नो घत्ते जडता न भगमयते नीचस्थल नेहते  
स्खालित्य न च याति नैति कृशता क्षाम क्वचिन्नाञ्चते ।  
मान नोज्झति नो जहाति च पद व्यर्थं न कोकूयते  
कल्येय जयतीर्थकोविदवच वल्लोलिनी सेव्यताम् ॥ ( *Pariccheda* 11 )



Jayatīrtha can be alluringly alliterative,<sup>1</sup> pithy and sententious<sup>2</sup> or cutting and caustic<sup>3</sup> in his wit, —as occasions demand. He is a balanced writer, cold and passionless in his logic and thoroughly unselfconscious.<sup>4</sup> We could hardly expect so careful a commentator as Jayatīrtha to pass over the many 'lapses' of Madhva from correct Paninian grammar and idiom, without proper defence. We have seen that there is almost a tinge of scholarly eccentricity in these peculiarities. Whatever pious followers might feel about them, critics were not likely to regard them with the same feelings of tenderness or reverence or fail to make capital out of them and attack the system at these vulnerable points.<sup>5</sup> In the interests then, of the public estimation of the system Jayatīrtha addressed himself to the task of 'legitimizing' these peculiarities of Madhva and establishing their acceptability in the light of approved canons and usages of the Vyākaraṇa Śāstra. He has brought to bear on his task a thorough going familiarity with the nooks and corners of the Paninian school and the rulings of other schools like Candra. He quotes from Panini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali, providing for such exceptional departures and also cites accepted usages of the

1 अथाविद्यापटलपिहितनपनैरघैरन्यथा व्याख्यातानि ( TP ) इह खलु ससारकातारे परिखितानामल्पास्त्यरसुखसद्वातिधासु विद्योतमानास्वपि मन प्रसादमनासादयताम् ( *Tdt* )

2 नहि ते सहस्रेणापि युक्तिशतेन ( NS 472 ) नहि भवति तरक्षो \* \* नहि सिद्धमसिद्धेनोच्यमानमसिद्धं भवति । निषिद्धयत्ता न नो हानि अथवा परस्यापि कुलीरस्येव ( NS 245 ) को हि ब्रूत रजत सदिति । नहि पराग दग्धमिति \* \*

3 नहि ते वणिग्गोध्या \* \* ( NS 645 ) नहि बाधकस्य शृङ्गमस्ति । मा त्वरिष्ठा ( 74b ) तर्हि, तत एव विशिष्टव्यवहारासिद्धिरिति तूष्णीमास्व ( PMK t 5 ), NS 645 ab 646 नाय लौकिको न परीक्षक इत्युक्त-वदुपेक्षणीय ( 580 ) तर्हि वेदोपरा वेदान्ता इति \* \* अहो पक्षपातो ( 382 1 4 ) चक्षुषी निमील्य तथेति वदत क प्रतिमल्ल ? ( 633 ), VTNt 81 NS 190 545 365 b

4 न शब्दाब्धौ गाढा न च निगमचर्चासु चतुर्ग \* \*

( opening verse in NS )

न वैदुष्यभ्रान्त्या \* \* ( concluding verse NS p 656 )

5 Cf प्रायेणासाधुभिरेव शब्दव्यवहार । \* \*

( Appayya Dikṣita *Madhvamata mukhamardana* )

learned *abhiyukta prayogas*<sup>1</sup> Some of the peculiarities are justified on grounds of Vedic<sup>2</sup> or Epic sanction On the whole, he has made out a strong case for according to these grammatical peculiarities of Madhva, the deference due to those of an 'Abhiyukta'

Except in a few cases, we do not, however, see Jayatīrtha enlisting the support of the sutras of Pāṇini or the principles of grammatical science in defence or justification of Madhva's interpretations of the Sūtras or to refute those of rival schools<sup>3</sup> It is only from the times of Viṣṇudasācārya and Vyāsarāya, that it became an established practice among writers of the Madhva school to seek to augment and justify their interpretations of texts with the help of grammatical sanctions of Pāṇini and the rulings of the *Mahābhāṣya* and its commentaries and with the nyāyas of Purva-Mīmāṃsā We have only a couple of instances of Jayatīrtha's resort to Mīmāṃsānyāyas, in his explanation of the "Neha nānāsti" text (in the *Vadaraṭi* and *NS*) and in one or two other cases In both these directions, remarkable results were achieved by Vyāsarāya,<sup>4</sup> who extended the range and scope of Dvaita polemics with these technical aids to argument from the realm of Vādagranthas

1 See his remarks on "Yina latam" (NS. p 529) "Ta upadhik" (GB 1), NS. p 534b, "mara" (p 606) and ref to *Mahābhāṣya* कोऽसावयमनुमान in defence of Madhva's 'बहव कर्मकारणा भवन्ति' (GB)

2 As विष्णवि (AV) - स्वस्य परमवैदिकत्वज्ञापनाय विष्णवीति वैदिक-प्रयोग ।

"यथोर्णनामिजनितृ (AV) जनितृशब्द प्रयुजान स्वग्रन्थस्य मन्त्रतुल्यता दर्शयति भावानाचार्य । (NS p 197) It may be mentioned that विष्णो is used in the very next line after "विष्णवि" by Madhva For the form "विष्णवि" see R. V. viii, 3, 8

3 Under B S 1, 4, 24, in his *NS* (pp 201-202). Jayatīrtha enters into a brilliant discussion over the correct interpretation and implications of the sutras of Pāṇini जनितृ प्रकृति । and ध्रुव-मपायेऽपादानम् (1, 4, 30 24) in the light of the *Mahābhāṣya* अयमपि योग शक्योऽवक्तुम् in showing how the sutra fails to support the Upadanatva view.

4 Cf. the estimate of his *Candrika*

आमूलाग्रनिबद्धतर्कजटिल शब्दैकजीवातुक

मीमांसानुनय च शकरवचोहकारभगप्रदम् ।

शास्त्र तन्त्रचतुष्टयात्मकमिद \* \* ।

( purely dialectical works ) to that of the Adhikarana Prasthāna ( constructive works of the system ) The whole of his *Candrika* was so planned and executed <sup>1</sup> But this new line of treatment is not to be found in Madhva<sup>2</sup> or his early commentators including Jayatīrtha

Jayatīrtha's criticisms and expositions are couched in dignified language, free from all trace of personal animosity or bitterness of feeling towards the followers of Advaita, such as are sometimes discernible in the writings of Trivikrama or his son Nor does he adopt a dogmatic or authoritarian air,<sup>3</sup> in dealing with his adversaries Such an attitude was probably inevitable in the earlier days of the system, in the tense atmosphere of mutual wrangle and rivalry between the opposing schools and the occasional manifestation of persecution and intolerance But Jayatīrtha was above all such petty feelings and never succumbs to their influence Vyāsarāya, who followed him in this respect was scrupulously fair to the Advaitins ( and all others whom he criticized ) and set the model of graceful and dignified parliamentary debate. The influence of Jayatīrtha on those who came after him was thus most wholesome and abiding.

As one concerned primarily with the logical and metaphysical expansion of the Dvaita system, Jayatīrtha did not allow himself to be swayed by mere authorities His general attitude to the numerous authorities cited by Madhva was one of respectful acquiescence, but for his own part, he relies more on extant texts <sup>4</sup> He

1 प्रतिसूत्र प्रकाश्येते घटनाघटने मया ।

स्वीयान्यपक्षयो सम्यक् विदाकुर्वन्तु सूरय ॥ ( *Candrika* )

2. Except in a couple of instances as in यथा द्वादशाहो \* \* \* ( B S B IV, 4, 12 ) यजमानप्रस्तरत्वम् । ( AV ) अगीकृत पदाना च ( AV. )

श्रीमदाचार्यै पूर्वमीमासाया अनाश्रयणात् ( *Abhinavagada* )

3 Cf. तथापि विप्रतिपत्तो न तावन्मात्रेण बोधयितुं शक्य ( NS p. 107 b )

4 It is remarkable that in the treatment of Viśeṣas, Jayatīrtha finds support for it ( in addition to logical arguments ) in the text of *Kātha* ( एव धर्मान्..... ) in preference to passages like गुणक्रियादयो विष्णो .....cited from a non extant source, in *VTN*.



makes due allowance for the views of his opponents and concedes their interpretations, wherever possible <sup>1</sup> He does not hesitate to differ from the interpretations of his own school, given by earlier writers like Narahari and Padmanābha, wherever, in his opinion, they had gone wrong or the spirit of the original had not been fully brought out by their explanations

His criticisms of the interpretations of other schools is concerned purely with their logical aspects and he does not make much of their verbal defects <sup>2</sup> He prefers to leave it to his successors to deal with these minor points and formal defects of the interpretations of hostile schools The intrepid Vyāsarāya, takes up Jayatīrtha's directive in this respect

प्रतिवादिस्वरूपं नोपेक्षणीयम् । (NS p. 464)

सूत्राक्षराणामार्जवानार्जवचिन्ता शिष्यैरेव क्रियताम् ॥ (NS 880b)

in right earnest and subjects the interpretation of the Sankara and Rāmānuja schools to microscopic analysis and criticism.

प्रतिमूत्रं प्रकाशयेते घटनाघटने मया ।

स्वीयान्यपक्षयोः सम्यक् विदाकुर्वन्तु सूरयः ॥ (TC)

1 न वयं भावरूपाज्ञानपरिपन्थिनः । (NS p 64)

ये तु देवतामीमांसाशास्त्रस्वरूपे तदनन्तरमेतत्सूत्रप्रणयने च विप्रतिपद्यन्ते (NS p 93b) See J on (VTNt) नैयातर्केण मतिरापनेया and Śamkara, *Kātha Up.* com on the same text, Ānandagiri's explanation of "OM" and J's comment on it (NS p 14 b) आप्तेरादिमत्वाद्वा इत्यादि, ओकारस्य नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभाव \* \* \* इति ब्रह्मशब्दस्य व्याख्यानं, तत्र व्याख्यानान्तरं दूषितं, अनुमतं च ॥ See also Śamkara's explanation of "atha" in terms of नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेक etc which is accepted by J (NS p 526) tho' criticized by Vyāsarāya, from the point of view of Advaita, in his *Candrika*

2 स्वादेव कश्चित् शब्ददोषाभावः । प्रमेयदोषस्तु स्यादेव । (VTNt p 62) तथा सति, 'आरम्भणादिशब्देभ्यः' इति स्यात् । अस्तु वा, कश्चिदादिपदोपात्तत्वं तेषां वाक्यानाम् । (NS p 504)



## CHAPTER XXI

### LIFE AND WORKS OF JAYATĪRTHA (1365-88)

(1) After Madhva, the next lodestar in the firmament of Dvaita Vedānta and its literature is Jayatīrtha. He is to Madhva even more than what Vācaspati Miśra is to Saṃkara. Renouncing the world at a very young age, he devoted himself to the service of Madhva's philosophy, and within a brief space of twentythree years, he raised it to a position of Sāstric equality with the Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita, by his remarkable industry, depth of scholarship and masterly exposition. For beauty of language and brilliance of style, for proportion, keenness of argument and fairness in reasoning, for refreshing boldness, originality of treatment and fineness of critical acumen, Sanskrit philosophical literature has few equals to place beside him. Tho' designated by the unassuming title of commentaries, his works are first-rate classics in Philosophy, displaying an extreme orderliness a masterly elaboration and an unchecked progress towards a predetermined effect. But for them, the works of Madhva would never have made headway in the philosophical world. Jayatīrtha is, thus, a name to be conjured with in Dvaita Vedānta and its literature. He stands supremely inimitable and belongs to the class of the great makers of style, especially Sanskrit philosophical prose—like Śaṅkara, Saṃkara and Vācaspati. In point of all-round brilliance, there is no one who could successfully hold a candle to him, in Dvaita literature, except perhaps, the great Vyāsarāya. Even he lacks the elegant diction that is Jayatīrtha's by right. Small wonder then, that Jayatīrtha has won for himself the honoured title of "Tīkācārya" *par excellence*. Vyāsaraya pays him a memorable tribute

चित्रे पदेष्व गभोरैवाक्यमर्मानैरखण्डिते ।

गुरुभाव व्यञ्जयन्ती भाति श्रीजयतीर्थवाक् ॥ (Nyām 1, 4)

Vādirāja, in his *Tīrthaprabandha* (III, 18), pays a similar tribute to the services rendered by Jayatīrtha to the cause of Dvaita Vedānta. So complete has been the domination of Jayatīrtha in

Dvaita Literature of the post Madhva period that, barring a few memorable exceptions, the entire course of its subsequent history has been one of commentaries and super commentaries on the *tikas* of Jayatīrtha ! He has not only dominated the subsequent history of his school, but has also totally eclipsed the *past* and thrown into the shade every one of the works and commentaries of his predecessors on the works of Madhva . By his own sheer brilliance, he has driven out of the field the works of Trivikrama Pandita, Padmanābha Tīrtha, Narahari and others and has caused their very names to fade away before his

### LIFE AND CAREER

( 1 ) Several narratives, in the form of “ Vijayas ”, have come down to us, of the life of Jayatīrtha . We have the *Anu Jayatīrtha Vijaya*, purporting to be from the pen of Vyāsātīrtha, who describes himself as a direct disciple of Jayatīrtha and we have also the *Bṛhad Jayatīrtha-Vijaya*, from the same hand . There is an other *Life of Jayatīrtha* by Chālārī Saṁkarsanācārya (1700 A D ) . The *Saṁkṛāṇḍa* makes use of some stories from these and other sources . We have no inscriptions or other historical documents relating to Jayatīrtha and it is somewhat curious that so remarkable a personality should have been left historically unrecognized by his contemporaries

I have already examined in detail and rejected as spurious two alleged epigraphs relating to Jayatīrtha in the *N I A* vol 1, no 7, October, 1938 . These alleged inscriptions are a clever patchwork of excerpts from ( 1 ) the published *■ p* grant of Madanapala and Govindacandra dated Vikrama Sam 1166 ( 1110 A D ) published in the *I A* for 1889, p 15, ( 2 ) a verse embodying chronological data from ch 64 verse 53 of *Aṣṭānemi-purāṇasamgraha* of Jināsena, composed in 783 A D [ altered a bit to suit the date Saka 1295 given for Jayatīrtha, and ( 3 ) some improvised passages in prose and verse giving the details of the place and time of the grant, description of the plot given and personal details about the donee and his attainments . Further attention is therefore invited to the discussion of the epigraph, in the *N I A* ( 1938 )



## LIFE

(iii) From the various biographical accounts of Jayatīrtha, it would appear that his former name was Dhondo Pant Raghānāth<sup>1</sup> According to the *S K*, his native village was Mangalvedhe about twelve miles S E of Pandharpur. Apart from the *S K*, there is no other recorded evidence on this point. The *Jayatīrtha vijaya* of Samkarsana and the short work of Vyāsātīrtha are silent on this point. The *Gurucarya*, moreover, makes him a chieftain of Vṛstikheta<sup>2</sup> —the Sanskritized form of the Kannada “Malakheda”, which again, is a wrong and corrupt *laddhara* of the original Sanskrit name ‘Manyakheta’ (the historic capital of the Rāstrakutas famous in Karnatak history<sup>3</sup>). If this is accepted, one may have to question the correctness of the prevailing impression among the followers of Madhva that Jayatīrtha came of a Maharashtrian family. If Malakheda was his native village, we may have to regard him also as an Uttara Karpātaka. The *Gurucarya* also places his first meeting with Akṣobhya, at Malkhed itself on the bank of the river Kāgiri.

सञ्चरित्वाथ मध्यान्हे तृपात कागिनी गत ।

\* \* \* \* \*

अपिबत्त तथा दृष्ट्वा स्मृत्वा [ \* \* ] गिरस्तदा ॥

\* \* \* \* \*

(Canto 1)

The location of Jayatīrtha's tomb, also, at Malkhed might lend support to this view. The name ‘Dhondo Pant’ would however raise a presumption in favor of accepting Maharashtrian descent for him. No definite conclusion is however, possible in the present

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1 His *gotra* is believed to have been Vaisrāmītra. Some others give it as Bharadvāja. Until the identity of his native village is conclusively established, no value can be attached to the claim of any family at Mangalvedhe, now, to represent his

2 वृष्टिखेटा, घषा घाण्डा रघुनाथाभिध प्रभु ।  
चतुरङ्गबलापेती मृगया प्रचरन् वने ॥ (*Gurucarya*)

3 Malkhed is now a village in ruins, in the Sedam taluk of the Gulbarga district of the enlarged Mysore State.

state of our knowledge<sup>1</sup> We might, therefore, leave it an open question, for the present

According to Ś K, Jayatīrtha's father was a nobleman of rank and importance,—a “Deshpande”<sup>2</sup> Born with the silver spoon in his mouth, young Dhondo Pant grew into a strong and sturdy youth He was a keen sportsman a good rider and an athlete Early in his life, he was married to two wives<sup>3</sup>

At twenty came the turning point in his life, which was charged with so much significance to the cause of Realism in Indian philosophy. It was in the course of one of his riding excursions that the young Dhondo Pant came, one summer noon, to the bank of the river (Candrabbāgā),<sup>4</sup> to quench his thirst He did not even take the trouble to dismount, but rode into the river and bending down from on horse-back, put his mouth to the water and drank. On the other side of the river sat an ascetic watching the sight It was Aksobhya Tīrtha He felt drawn to the cavalier, called him to his side and put him certain strange questions, which at once flashed before the youth's mental eye a kaleidoscopic vision of his past life He was strangely affected and sought to be taken as a disciple News of his son's resolve reached the father who came down to demand restoration of his son and took him home But the attractions of family life failed to turn the youth's mind, once made up<sup>5</sup> In the end, wiser counsels

1 It may also be noted that Pandharpur and its neighboring region were originally in Kannada area as borne out by the existence of old Kannada inscriptions there and the reference to Vitthala himself as a deity of the Karnatakas, in one of the *abhangas* of Jñāneśvara “कानडा विठ्ठल कर्नाटकु” There are also a number of Kannada speaking Vaisnava families in the Byapur, Belgaum and Dharwar districts, with surname of Mangalvedhe

2 This is a common title (now used as a mere surname) current in Maharashtra and Uttara-Karnataka

3 कान्तायुग्मे वसुवदने चैव लोके विरजिते ।

(*Samkarsana*, J V 10, 22d)

4 According to *Gurucarya*, it was the Kāgiri itself, in Malkhed

5 Cf. his own statement in his NS (10, 1)

prevailed and the young man was allowed to go back to his teacher. He was soon ordained a monk under the name of "Jaya Tirtha", and started learning the Śāstras under Aksobhya<sup>1</sup>

We have already seen that Aksobhya and Vidyaranya were contemporaries<sup>2</sup> The *Jayatīrtha Vijaya* of Samkarsanacarya makes Jayatirtha also a contemporary (younger) of Vidyaranya and refers to a meeting between them<sup>3</sup> In that case, it would remain unaccountable why Vidyaranya has not made any quotations from any one of the numerous and authoritative commentaries of Jaya tirtha on the works of Madhva, which have been cited by him, in the Purnaprajña darśana section of his *D S* (as he has done in the case of Vedānta Desika, in the section on Rāmanuja's philosophy) The explanation that Vidyaranya did not like to quote from one so much younger than he, does not appear to be convincing, as Jayatīrtha was an ascetic The reference to certain "tīkas" on the Bhasya of Madhva, in the concluding line of the Purnaprajña Darśana chapter of the *Saradādarśanasamgraha* is, very probably, to Pre Jayatīrtha commentaries of Trivikrama and Padmanabha Tirtha Internal evidence in the works of Jayatīrtha clearly establishes him as having come after Śrīharsa, Anandabodha and Citsukha,<sup>4</sup> whose works have all been quoted and criticized by him

1 अक्षोभ्यतीर्थगुरुणा शुकवच्छिदितस्य मे ।

(J's GB Prameyadīpikā)

\* \* \* \*

2 The date of Vidyaranya is given as 1302-87 Grants to him have been found dated between 1371-78 If an interval of at least 30 years is assumed between Narahari Tirtha (d 1333) and Aksobhya, we carry the latter as far as 1363, in which case, he could not but have been a contemporary of Vidyaranya

3 VI, 31-48

4 J has quoted several passages from the *Tattvapradīpikā* of Citsukha, both in his *c* on the *V T N* and the *AV* and in his *Vadānta C* Hayavadana Rao (QJMS, xxiv, 278) places Citsukha between 1220-84, on the basis of a couple of inscriptions from Simhācalam There are, however, objections to identifying the donee here with the ascetic dialectician We have no proof that Narasimha Muni was an alias of Cit even tho' he was, certainly a devotee of Nrsimha The Citsukha Somayājīn of the grant mentioned as a temple manager, could not, of course be the ascetic Citsukha I would, however, accept the date 1220-87 for Cit, apart from the above epigraphs



## WORKS OF JAYATIRTHA

Over ~~twentytwo~~ works have been ascribed to Jayatirtha, almost all of which have been printed (1) His *Tattvasamkhyānāṭika* (p) is a short c in 200 granthas, on the first of the ten *Prakaraṇas* of *Madhva*. The contents of the original have already been described earlier, and there is nothing more to be said about the *u*. The definition of "tattvam" (reality) given by Jayatirtha, here, is of great philosophical importance and interest तन्वमनारा-  
पित प्रमितिर्विषय इति ॥ So also the rationale of the classification of reality into "Svatantra" and "Paratantra", in *Madhva's* philosophy, as expounded by him, in his inimitable way (quoted on P 4) (2) His *Tattvaneṭika* (p) is a short c in 160 granthas and its contents are much the same as (1). The *u* on the *Tattvodyoṭa* (p) runs to 1500 granthas and is one of the best written among the minor works of the author. Under the brilliant exposition of Jayatirtha, the original assumes a newer light every time. It is a very clever and well thought out plea for the dualistic interpretation of "Tattvamasi" 'तत्त्वमसीति' वाक्येन परमात्मसादृश्य-  
विशेष प्रतिपाद्यते, अभेदस्य प्रमाणबाधितत्वात् । ननु, वक्तव्यमित्ते शब्दप्रयोगे, कस्मात् गौणप्रयोग ? अस्त्यत्र प्रयोजनम् । इह हि, महत्त्वादिगुणवन्त स्वातन्त्र्ये-  
णात्मान मत्वा तन्व स्वत्वेतु निमित्तीकृत्य, स्वातन्त्र्यमभिमानिनी जीवजातस्याह-  
कारान्तये 'तत्त्वमसी' त्युच्यते । तत्र यदि विज्ञानानन्दधनस्त्वमसीति ब्रूयात्, तदा  
नास्याहङ्कारस्तान्ति स्यात् । अभेदोक्तौ तु, मीमांसा जायते—न तावदन मुस्यायं  
सम्भवति, प्रमाणविरोधात् । अतः स इव त्वमसीत्यथ । न चायमपि सम्भवति ।  
अप्रसिद्धप्रतिपत्तये खलु प्रसिद्धमुपमानमुपादीयते, 'यथागोस्तथा गवयः' इत्यादौ  
दृष्टत्वात् । न चैव प्रवृत्ते । उभयोरप्यप्रसिद्धत्वात् । अतो नास्योपमानमात्रे तात्पर्य-  
मिति पश्यन्, सूर्यसूर्यक्रयार्थिब, ईश्वरस्य मम चास्ति सादृश्यविशेष इति पश्यन्, ।  
अहम्भार त्यजति । प्रतिविम्बे चात्मनि विम्बसमानधर्मानिविरुद्धान् सम्भावयतीति ।  
अतो, लाघवेन बहोरर्थस्य प्रतिपत्तये 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्युच्यते । पारतन्त्र्यमात्रोक्तौ,  
राजपुरुषवदेव प्रतीति स्यादिति ॥ ( P 29 ) he has given us  
Writing about the untenability of Rāmānuja's interpretation of  
the "Vācārambhana" text he says well that the example of the  
nail cressor entirely gives away the whole case for a *Parinamavāda*  
interpretation इदं तु, सर्वथानुपपन्नम् । मृत्पिण्डादहि मृण्मयादिक प्रति कारण-  
त्वमात्रमस्त्येव । नस्य निवृत्तनस्य तु स्वयमपि बाधस्य कार्णायस प्रति तदपि  
नास्ति । किमुत एवमनिवृत्तनविकार सर्वकार्णायस न भवतीति ? अतो विज्ञायते  
नैत दष्टान्ता कायकारणविवक्षयेति ॥ ( p 35 b )

His (4) *Viṣṇu tattva nirnaya tika* (p)<sup>1</sup> is the biggest of his commentaries on the Prakaranas running to 5120 granthas. He refers to the earlier interpretations of Padmanābha Tirtha and Narahari (p 8, lines 16 17), quotes extensively from the *Tattvapradīpikā* of Citsukha and repels his attacks on the concept of Bheda (difference)<sup>2</sup> and also alludes to certain attempted defences of the Advaitic interpretations in the light of the criticisms of Madhva (pp 68, line 4 92, 10). This is important in showing that Madhva's criticisms had gone home and had been taken serious notice of, by some of his critics. The *Mayarada khandana tika* (p) is a short one in 175 granthas. The author quotes Śrīharsa तच्चाद्वैत-‘ब्रह्मैवेद सर्व’ इति श्रुत्यर्थेन सहैक्यमापन्न ब्रह्मैव स्यात् । ( *Khandana khandā khadya*, p 220, Chouk, 1914 ) इति (p 12) and from Ānandabodha, the verse

न सन्नासन्न सदसन्नानिर्वच्योऽपि तत्क्षय ।

यक्षानुरूपो बलिरित्याचार्य प्रत्यपीपदन ॥

referring to the cessation of Avidyā as belonging to a fifth order of predication { पञ्चमप्रकारता } In (6) the *Prapañcamithyātānu manakhandana tika* (p), in 275 granthas, he explains at the outset, that it is incumbent on the Realist to expose the untenability of the doctrine of the unreality of the world for unless the world is shown to be real, the definition of Brahman given in B S 1, 1, 2 as the author etc., of it, would be a travesty. He quotes from Mandana (p 5 line 10) the famous passage सर्वं प्रत्ययवद्ये \* \* \* ( *Brahmasiddhi*, 20 ) (7) His c on the *Upadhā khandana* (p) in 330 granthas is otherwise known as “Tattva prakāśika”<sup>3</sup> It is later than the one on the *V T N* (See ref to Bimbapratibimbavāda pp 18 and 37 b). In the course of his exposition, J says that the Advaitin must either give up the idea of Ignorance attacking Brahman or else account for it in a rational way. It is foolish to take refuge in the “durgatātva” of

1 Nirnayasagar Press Bombay, 1898. A new edition has recently been published from Bangalore (1955)

2 Cf J p 48 line 13 p 49, 2 and Citsukha ii, 164 J p 51, 9 10 and 36, 3 4 with Cit p 83 (Bombay)

3 एवं समापिततत्त्वप्रकाशिकाव्याख्यो भगवान् दाकावर \* \* \* \* ( *Vyāsātīrtha*, c )

**Avidyā** He quotes from the *Nyayamalaranda* of Ānandabodha (under verse 1, of the *UK*) the passage beginning with ननु, सर्वं हि यो जानाति, स सर्वज्ञ । तिस्रश्चास्य विधा सभवन्ति \* \* \* \* सर्वज्ञत्वमप्यविद्यावत्वमाक्षिपति । न तु प्रतिक्षिपति ॥

( 8 ) The *Pramanalaksana Tika* (p) in 1450 granthas, goes by the name of *Nyāyakaḥḥalata* It is a lucid exposition of the original and has however been rendered superfluous by the exhaustive treatment of the same subject in the *Pramanapaddhati* ( 9 ) The *Kathalaksana Tika* (p) has 354 granthas The author gives a clear exposition of the subject of Kathā ( dialectic disputation ) and throws much historical light on various points He refers at the outset to the three different classifications of Katha adopted by Śāstrakāras

- ( 1 ) एक एव कथामागं इति बाह्या । ( 1 e. Buddhists )
- ( 2 ) वादवितण्डे द्वे एवति श्रीहर्ष ।
- ( 3 ) वादो, जल्पो, वादवितण्डा, जल्पवितण्डा चेति चतस्र कथा इति गोडनैय्यायिका ।

( 10 ) His c on the *Karma Nirṇaya* (p) has 920 granthas and was printed in 1900 The most interesting fact here, is that interpretations of the *KN* by Naraharī Tīrtha are criticized on three occasions, once at the very beginning of his c on the opening line तत्रैके आहुरगुणं ब्रह्मेति । न तत् युक्तम् । श्रुतियुक्तिविरोधात् । युक्तशब्द शोभनपर्यायः । यथाह भिक्षु ॥ तथा च, 'युक्तिविरोधात् युक्त' इति साध्या-विशिष्टता ॥ and for a second time on p 34 b on the statement of a syllogism and lastly, in connection with the interpretation of the somewhat ambiguously worded text वेदवाक्यस्य तु वाचनिकार्थं विना नैयायिको युज्यते ।

### SUTRA PRASTHĀNA

Except on the *Anubhāsyā*, J. has left cc on all the other works of Madhva, on the *Sūtra-Prasthāna* Of these, his c on the *AV* is acknowledgedly his *magnum opus* Next in importance comes his *Tattvapraśāṣika*

( 11 ) The *Tattvapraśāṣika* is the best known and most universally studied c on Madhva's *B S B* The extent of the work is nearly 8,000 granthas It has completely superseded other commentaries on the original, both earlier and later While the ear-



her once fell into oblivion, the *TP* has had the honor of not less than eleven commentaries written on it

A comparison of the *TP* with the *Sattarkadīparāḥ* would show that the former follows very closely, the footsteps of the latter. Jayatīrtha is familiar with the *TD*<sup>1</sup>, but passes over things, explained therein at length<sup>2</sup>. He keeps strictly to the original avoiding all digressions and criticism of rival interpretations of the Sūtras reserved for treatment in his *Nyayasudhā*. Occasionally, however, he does notice and refute the interpretations of Saṃkhya, when alluded to in the *Bhāṣya* (Cf *TP* on B S : 1, 3, 1, 2, 12, 1, 4, 27) and sometimes enters into discussions (1, 1, 3, 11, 1, 2, II etc.)

The Cat. of the Mysore O. L. (1107 Nagari) ascribes to him a c. on the *Anubhāṣya*. That this is by a later writer is clear from one of its opening verses

प्रणम्य नृहरिं मध्वमुनिं जयमुनिं तथा ।  
विवृतिं ह्यणुभाष्यस्य करिष्यामि ययामति ॥

### (12) NYĀYA SUDHĀ (p)<sup>3</sup>

(1) The *Nyaya Sudhā* (NS) is a first-rate classic, a superb controversial treatise and an illuminating commentary on the *AP*, all in one. It is more familiarly known to Mādhva scholars by its shorter title of "*Sudhā*" and runs to 24,000 granthas. सुधा दा पठनीया वसुधा दा पालनीया ' is a saying which attests the universal homage paid to it by traditional scholars. Its original name seems to have been "Visamapadavakyaarthavivṛti", tho' it is also called by the name of "*Nyayasudhā*"<sup>4</sup> in the penultimate verse of the last Chapter

1 See Raghavendra, *Bhāradīpa* on *TP* : 3, 17, p. 112, line 23. Also, under : 3, 3

2 See *Bhāradīpa* : 1, 1, 4 p. 30, line 21. The *Gautamasāra* episode is described by Trivikrama at great length which is disposed of by J. and Padmanabha, in one line.

3 The page references here are to the Nirnayasagar Press edn. (Bombay, 1895). The other edn. published by G. R. Savenur, (Dharwar,) contains the original AV and the gloss *Vakyaarthacandrika* and its supplement. Both the editions are now out of print.

4 इयं न्यायसुधा भोमैदिविजैः सेव्यता सदा ।

(ii) The views embodied in the Bhāṣyas of Saṃkara,<sup>1</sup> Bhaṣa-  
lāra, Rāmānuja<sup>2</sup> and Yadvaparakāśa<sup>3</sup> on the Sūtras and in the cc  
of Vācaspati,<sup>4</sup> Padmapada<sup>5</sup> Prakāśātman<sup>6</sup> and Amalananda (p 125 b)  
as well as those of the Samkhyatattvakaumudī<sup>7</sup>, the Tattvabindu<sup>8</sup>,  
Nyayakusumanjālī<sup>9</sup>, Khandanakhandakhadya<sup>10</sup> the Citsukhī<sup>11</sup>, Mana-  
manoharaśara<sup>12</sup>, the Nyayalīlāvatī<sup>13</sup>, Gaṅgeśa Upadhyāya<sup>14</sup>, Ātreya<sup>15</sup>  
Suresa<sup>16</sup>, Bhusanakāra<sup>17</sup>, Śrīdhara (Nyayakandalī)<sup>18</sup>, Prasasti-  
pada<sup>19</sup>, Nyayamārtika Tatparyatīka<sup>20</sup>, and Vyoma Śivacarya<sup>21</sup>, are  
quoted and refuted where necessary, in the course of the work.  
The doctrines of the Bhatta and Prābhākara schools of Mīmāṃsa,  
relating to the philosophy of propositions and the various views  
of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya Yoga realists as well as  
those of the Buddhists, Jains, Paśupatas and Śaktas, are review-  
ed and refuted in proper contexts, with a wealth of details. The  
doctrine of Sphota is criticized in vol 1, p 87 et seq. The passages  
of the AV are shown to brilliant advantage by making them cap-  
able of meeting a variety of objections<sup>22</sup>. In this respect, the NS  
may well be said to be a marvel at commentary writing.

It would be no exaggeration to say that in the whole range of  
Sanskrit philosophical literature, there is not one other work like  
the original AV or its epoch making c the NS. "One does not  
know what to admire most in this work. So remarkably perfect

1 Vol 1, p 294 b, p 195 b, p 653, ii, 1, B (adh) p 295,  
iv, 1, adh 2, pp 616 17

2 i, 1, 12, i, 4, adh 6 p 197 b, ii, 2, p 428

3 iv, 2, adh. 5

4 Vol 1, p 190

5 i p 100, 112 b (i, 1, 3).

6 i, 99, 102

7 ii, 2, p 316

8 p 89

9 ii, 1 (adh) 4, p 289 lines 20 26

10 i, 210 i 1, 31 (p)

11 i 1, p 29, pp 40 and 60 (Bhavarūpajñāna) Cf Cit p 62

Also cf i, p 62 with Cit pp 58 60 (Bombay)

12 i 4 (adh 6) p 216

13 ii, 2 p 359 ii, 4, p 215

14 See i, 1, p 96 (Parimala)

15 ii, 2, p 336 line 9

16 ii, 2, p 349 (Parimala).

17, p 406.

18 i 4, p 214

19 i, 4 p 214

20 ii, 1, p 251

21 i 4, p. 215, line 22

22 For instance the phrase "Pratyakṣasacca pramāṇam" is  
directed against seven different Purvapaksas (pp 76 79) and  
'Gaurāṇam lālpane anyathā disarms five different objections  
(p 87 9)

is it, in every way" <sup>1</sup> The style is throughout marvellously sustained. The eloquence is superb yet absolutely unadorned. There is no straining after effect as one often finds in the *Bhamati* or other works of Vācaspati. There is moderation in embellishment. The author shows himself to be a perfect master of all the Śāstras. He discourses on the grammatical and linguistic issues called forth by the exigencies of the context in defending the Un Paninian usages in the *AV* and on more important occasions of Sutra interpretation (1, 4, pp 201-2) and these reveal his penetrating grasp of the subjects dealt with. He has laid *almost all the leading works* of the various systems of thought studied in his days, under contribution. His disquisitions on problems of metaphysics, psychology and theory of knowledge, show a good deal of insight into things and vast powers of analysis and argument. This will be evident from his masterly treatment of the five "Khyātivādas" (1, pp. 41-57 b), the doctrine of Sākṣi (*passim*) pp 213 ff and 448-50, "Difference" or Bheda, (pp 380-82), and of "Viśeṣas" p 356.

(iii) It is from the *NS* that we learn that some of Madhva's interpretations in his *AV* had already been called into question by critics owing allegiance to the system of Saṃkhya. One of these objections, it would appear, had reference to Madhva's attempt at fixing the import of the term Brahman, in the first sūtra, by a process of elimination. Jayatīrtha points out that the critic objects to the roundaboutness involved in this kind of procedure, when the intention of the Sūtrakāra could be settled by a reference to the next sūtra. The critic is, of course, given a suitable reply with reference to Saṃkhya's Bhasya itself on which the objector himself would seem to have taken his stand <sup>2</sup>.

The rules of Pāṇini are frequently violated in the *AV* and other works of Madhva. These lapses must have given his critics many vulnerable points of attack. Not only in his *NS* but in his other works also, Jayatīrtha has ably defended his master and

<sup>1</sup> C M Padmanabhachar, *Life and Teachings of Madhva* p 197

<sup>2</sup> On the statement there अत एव न ब्रह्मशब्दस्य जात्याद्यर्थान्तरमाशङ्कितव्यम् ।



justified his oddities against all kinds of criticism<sup>1</sup>. The earlier works of Trivikrama Padmanābha etc., have not paid any attention to these points, presumably because, such criticisms had not been raised by the contemporaries of Madhva.

( iv ) It appears from certain references in the *NS*, that there were other commentaries also on the *B S B*<sup>2</sup> and *AV*,<sup>3</sup> besides those of Padmanābha, Trivikrama and Nārāyaṇa Pandita. Nothing is, however, known about these commentators. Some of them were perhaps direct disciples of Madhva.

( v ) As an instance of the lucidity of Jayatīrtha's exposition, attention may be drawn to the following passage in which he has brilliantly expounded the Dvaita view of the philosophical standpoint and ideology of the *Upanisads* - सर्वाण्यपि हि वेदान्तवाक्यानि असह्येयकल्याणगुणाकार सकलदोषगन्धविधुर, एकरूपमेव पर ब्रह्म नारायणाख्य प्रतिपादयन्ति । किन्तु, ( 1 ) कानिचित् सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वेश्वरत्वसर्वान्तर्यामित्व-सौन्दर्योदायादिगुणविशिष्टतया, ( 2 ) कानिचित्, अपहृतपाप्मत्वनिर्दुःखत्वप्राकृत-भौतिकविग्रहरहितत्वादिदोषाभावविशिष्टतया, ( 3 ) कानिचित् अतिगहनताज्ञाप-नाय वाङ्मनसागोचरत्वाकारेण ( 4 ) कानिचित् सर्वपरित्यागेन तस्यैवोपादानाय नद्वितीयत्वेन, ( 5 ) कानिचित् सर्वसत्ताप्रतीतिप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तताप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं सर्वा-त्मकत्वेन, इत्येवमाद्यनेकप्रकारैः परमपुरुष बोधयन्ति । ततो व्याकुलबुद्ध्या गुरु-संप्रदायविकला अश्रुतवेदव्याख्यातार सर्वत्राप्येकरूपतामननुसंधाना वेद छिन्दन्ति ॥ ( *NS* p 124 ) This is to be contrasted with Śaṅkara's account of the ideology of the *Upanisads*, expressed in his comment on 1,1, 11 ( introductory ) द्विरूप हि ब्रह्मावगम्यते वेदान्तवाक्येषु-नामरूपविकारो-पाधिविशिष्टम् तद्विपरीतं च सर्वोपाधिविवर्जितम् । ' यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति ' ' सर्वाणि रूपाणि विचित्य घोरो ' इत्येव सहस्रशो विद्याविद्याविषयभेदेन ब्रह्मणो द्विरूपता प्रदर्शयन्ति वेदान्तवाक्यानि । तथाविद्यावस्थायाम् ब्रह्मण उपास्योपासक-लक्षणं सर्वो व्यवहारः । तत्र ( 1 ) कानिचित् ब्रह्मण उपासनया अभ्युदयायोगिनि । ( 2 ) कानिचित् क्रममुक्त्यर्थानि ( 3 ) कानिचित् कर्मसमृद्धयर्थानि । एवमपे-क्षितोपाधिभेद ब्रह्म, उपास्यत्वेन, निरस्तसमस्तोपाधि तु, ज्ञेयत्वेनोपदिशति ॥

1 See also *NS* p 129 b अत्र केचित् व्यभिचारमुद्गावयन्ति \* \* \* \* \* ( 1, 1, adh 6 )

2 Under *B S* 1, 1, 23 ( TP ) J refers to the views of a certain " संप्रदायवित् " and the view is quite different from those of Trivikrama, Padmanābha and others, on the point.

3 See *NS*, 1, 1, 1 p 35 line 9 and 11, 2 p 302, lines 8-9 and *Parimala* 1, 4, p 199 line 22

## (13) NVAYA VIVARANA TIKĀ (p)

This is an *incomplete* commentary on the first two pādas of the first chapter of the NV, which was completed by Raghuttama Tīrtha, in the 16th century. Both the commentaries have been printed and published from Udipi.

## UPANISAD-BHĀSYA-TIKĀS

The catalogues of the Gopal Vilas Library (Kumbakonam) and the Mysore O L (C-40) mention a c on the *Aitareya Upanisad-Bhāṣya*, by J, which is baseless. The existence of a c on the *Ait Bhāṣya*, by Vyāsātīrtha, a direct disciple of J, might also be taken to be an indirect proof of the fact that no c on that Upanisad-Bhāṣya, has been left by J. There is, moreover, no reference whatever to any such c of J. in subsequent literature. However that may be, Mysore C-40, has, on examination, turned out to be nothing more than a ms of Viśveśvara Tīrtha's c on the *Aitareya Bhāṣya*.

(14) *Satpraśna Upanisad Bhāṣya Tīka* (p) (granthas 500), together with the gloss of Mankāla Ācārya, was printed in 1907. J gives here, the *akṣara-yojana* of the text, besides the *Bhāṣya-yojana* with *pratīkas*. It is a lucid and entertaining c, quoted by Raghavendra in his gloss on the TP ii, 4, 13 (p, 233b).

(15) The *Iśa Upanisad-Bhāṣya Tīka* (p) is a short c in 450 granthas, published in 1926, with the gloss of Chalāni Nṛsiṃhacārya from Kumbakonam. The Advaitic and Viśistādvaitic interpretations of the text are here severely criticized. Objecting to Saṃkara's interpretation of the very first verse, J says that the fact that everything in the world is "covered" by God, is hardly any reason why a man should be advised to give up his activity. Were it so, it would equally apply to the uninitiated (*ajñāni*). There would then be no point in recommending two different courses of action, in verses 1 and 2. It would be difficult to extract a monism from the passage in question as the *acchadala* and the *acchadya* should obviously be distinct. The use of the root *bhūj* in the *Atmanepada*, is also against the Advaitic and Viśistādvaitic interpretations.

The Advaita and Viśistādvaita explanations of mantras 8-14, in terms of Jñānakarmasamuccaya etc are criticized at length. The

Samuccaya pakṣa is dismissed as being opposed to the Śruti *Nanyah pantha ayanaya vidyate*. The view, moreover, that the mere knower of God has to suffer a greater state of misery in Samsāra than a mere performer of actions, is both arbitrary and illogical. The (Advaitin's) idea of Devatajñāna, introduced into Itā 11, is alien to the spirit of the Upanisads, which are mainly devoted to the science of Ātman. Pointed reference is made to the arbitrary way in which Śaṅkara explains away verse 14, after prefixing a negative particle before "Sambhūti" and turning it into "asambhūti".<sup>1</sup>

(16) In his *Rgṛhasya Tīla* (p)<sup>2</sup> otherwise known as *Samban dhādīpikā* (granthas 3500), Jayatīrtha gives a lucid exposition of the original, not only in the light of the authorities cited by Madhva, but of other standard works as those of Yaska. He discusses the grammatical derivation of many Vedic words, in the light of Pāṇinian grammar, the Unādis etc. The work shows his mastery of Vedic grammar, in all its intricacies. He criticizes the interpretations of other commentators on the Rg Veda<sup>3</sup> (pp 72 b and 76) and explains the details of the Adhyatma interpretation of the hymns.

His (17) *Gītābhāṣya Prameyadīpikā* (p) has been printed twice in S India and runs to 4,600 granthas. It is indispensable to a proper understanding of the hidden depths of thought and suggestiveness of the original Bhāṣya, whose terseness and brevity are such as to try even the apotheosis of patience among men. Following Madhva and sometimes of his own accord, J. draws attention to the interpretations of Saṅkara and Bhāṣkara and criticizes them. These references are very valuable to us, not only for purposes of Gītā interpretation, but also for text-criticism and solving problems connected with authorship and genuineness of the commentaries attributed to these two writers. The Vedāntin Bhāṣkara is a long forgotten commentator on the Gītā. From the various allusions and references to his commen

1 Those who generally object to Madhva's splitting of "Sa ātmā tattvam asi" into "Sa ātmā atat tvam asi", may well ponder over this *padaccheda*, which lacks the grammatical sanction which is available for the other.

2 Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1901

3. See my paper on "Yatra devata (1, 28, 2) P. O 1950



tary in the *Prameyadīpikā*, I drew the attention of scholars, for the first time, twenty-six years ago, to 'Bhāskara a forgotten commentator on the Gītā' (*I H Q* ix, 1933) and gave some definite details about his commentary and his identity. My identification was disputed by Otto Schrader (*I H Q* x, 2,) to which a suitable reply was given (xi, 1935). Indian scholars, however, refused to be drawn out on the issue. Prof Schrader had, however, informed me in one of his letters to me at the time, that Dr Chintamani of the Madras University had come across a manuscript of the work, which failed to support my identification. I am now happy to find that this fragment has been utilized by Dr Belvalkar, in his edition<sup>1</sup> of the Gītā with the c of Ānanda (vardhana) following the Kashmirian recension, in giving readings from Bhāskara. Dr Belvalkar has definitely accepted the identification of this Bhāskara with the Bhāṣyakara of that name on the B S, first propounded by me in 1933. Only, it is not clear why he has not at all mentioned the fact of his present conclusion having been anticipated and affirmed by me long before! It is clear from J's references to Bhāskara's commentary<sup>2</sup> that the latter was (1) a sharp critic of Saṃkara's c on the Gītā, (2) that he had followed at least one distinctive Kashmirian reading (vi, 7)<sup>3</sup>, not known to his brother commentators like Saṃkara and others following the vulgate text, and (3) that he was probably a Trimurtyuttirna Brahmanavadin. Dr Belvalkar says in fn 1, on p 8 of his Introduction to his edition of Ānanda's commentary, that "it is unfortunate that the existing fragment of Bhāskara's c does not cover vi, 7, where a Bhāskara is reported to have changed the reading"<sup>4</sup> \* \* \* (Italics mine). So, despite the fragment of Bhāskara's c on the Gītā now discovered, J's references to him still supply more substantial information about the work of this forgotten commentator!

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1. Bilvakunja Publishing House, Poona, 1941

2. For detailed information see my paper in *I H Q*, ix, 1933

3. The information is given for the first time, in Jayatīrtha's c on Madhva's G B as was first pointed out by me, in 1933

4. Dr Belvalkar ought to have mentioned that even for this 'report' we are indebted to Jayatīrtha!

Jayatirtha's c illumines many a dark and obscure corner of the text of *Gita* and draws out the hidden implications and rich suggestiveness of the all but too brief utterances of Madhva's bhasya, by breathing into them a soul of wit and a formidable array of details<sup>1</sup> He refers to the commentary of Narahari Tirtha twice He is ready with suitable defences of the grammatical 'lapses' of Madhva<sup>2</sup> (18) His *Gita Tatparya Nyayadipika* (p), has 3267 granthas and was published in 1905, with the gloss of *Kirana tal*<sup>3</sup> This commentary contains two new references to the c of Bhashara (ii, 16 and iii, 17 ), and clarifies many obscure points<sup>4</sup>

### ORIGINAL WORKS

(19) The *Vadatali* (p)<sup>5</sup> is an independent controversial tract in 500 granthas It is also known as *Vedantavadarali*. It is the same work designated *Vadamala* by Aufrecht (i, 119) The author hints that the arguments used by him are a *resume* of those in the *Khandana traya*, *Td*<sup>6</sup> and *V T N*<sup>7</sup> The work is a dialectic refutation of the illusionistic hypothesis with all its logical and metaphysical paraphernalia The famous syllogism विमत मिथ्या, दृश्यत्वात्, जडत्वात्, परिच्छिन्नत्वात्, द्रुक्त्वरूप्यवत् is analysed and refuted in minute detail The theory of the Monist that our senses always deceive us, being merely appearance interpreting, is effectively challenged,

1 See i, 30 ( p 59 Madras Edn ) ii p 147 This point has been brought out in my English Introduction to the trans of the *Gita* bhasya of Madhva, into Kannada, published by the M M S. Sangha, Udipi, 1954

2 See on परिपूर्णं गुरुश्चान् गीतार्थम् (pp 9 10)

"कृपालु" (p 13)

कथं चास्य कर्तुं न शक्यते (p 30)

आदिराज्ञाम् (iii, 4) and बहव कर्मकारणा भवन्ति (iii, 36)

3 The T. P. L. Cat (xiv, p 6095) is not correct in saying that this c. has not been published

4 See the reference to Visnudharmottara on p 200 (Madras edn )

5 Bombay, Belgaum 1937 and Adyar 1943 with English transla & Notes

6 वाङ्मुखात् वाङ्मुख भूयात् . ( last verse See Rāghavendra's comment on it )

7 Cf p 53 of *Vadatali* and *VTN*

and the fitness of sense knowledge to reveal objects as they are is vindicated. The following are some of the main topics dealt with

1. Definition of Avidyā and its refutation
2. Proofs in support of Avidyā examined
3. Definition of Mithyātva
4. दृश्यत्व, जडत्व and परिच्छिन्नत्व *hetue*, refuted
5. The opposition of Pratyaksa to the doctrine of Unreality
6. Opposition of Śruti to the doctrine of unreality
7. Self validity of Pramāna
8. Flaws in the doctrine of Aropa
9. Reality of Dream cognitions
10. सत्यत्वहेतूना प्रतिकल्पकोद्धार ।
11. Monistic texts reinterpreted नेहानानास्ति । एकमेवाद्वितीयम् ।
12. भेदस्य प्रत्यक्षाग्राह्यत्वे पूर्वपक्ष । Its refutation
13. Bheda is धर्मस्वरूप
14. Viśeṣas

The views expressed in the *Tattvapradīpikā* of Citsukha, the *Vivaraṇa*, *Nyayaśāntarā* etc., are quoted and criticised. Citsukha is once mentioned by name (p 27 Bby edn.)

J says well in the course of his work that there is no point in saying that dualistic texts in Scripture are concerned with establishing the phenomenal reality of the world, as no philosopher or layman ever disputes the phenomenal reality व्यर्थं च प्रपञ्चे व्यावहारिकत्वप्रतिपादनम् । नहि कश्चिल्लीङ्गिको वैदिको वा, व्यावहारिकसत्यता प्रपञ्चे नाम्युपैतीति । Even the Buddhist is no exception to this. He also remarks that the censure in असत्यमप्रतिष्ठ ( *Gītā* xvi, 8 ) cannot but recoil on the Advaitin and apply to his view of Mithyātva of the world, as there is no philosopher worth the name, who believes the world to be totally non-existent <sup>1</sup> न चान्न असत्यशब्दोऽत्यन्तासत्त्वपरः ।

1 The *Abhidharma Samuccaya* of Asaṅga (ed by V V. Gokhale in J B B R A S 1949,) refers on p 35 very clearly to the doctrine of three degrees of reality in Buddhism which corresponds exactly with the Advaitic theory of Sat traividhya Paramārthika Vyavahārika and Pratibhāsika यदुक्तं वैपुल्ये—'नि स्वभावा सर्वधर्मा इति । तत्र कोऽभिसन्धिः ? स्वयमभावतामुपादाय, स्वेनात्मनाऽभावतामुपादाय, स्वभावे वानवस्थिततामुपादाय बालग्रहवच्च लक्षणतामुपादाय । (1) अपि खलु परिकल्पिते स्वभावे लक्षणनि स्वभावतामुपादाय, (2) परतन्त्रे उत्पत्तिनि स्वभावतामुपादाय (3) परिनिष्पन्ने परमाथनि स्वभावतामुपादाय \* \* \*



अथ नानात्वान्तरादिना एतन्नाशनं, बहुवचनस्योक्तम् । Citakha's argument in respect of "Neha nāsti" that it cannot be interpreted in terms of "Sragatabhedanvedha" (denial of internal distinctions in Brahman) as has been done by the Drāṣṭins, on account of the absence of "tra pātava" there, is directly repelled = च द्रष्टा नानात्व प्रसक्त मतिविद्वत् इति चेत् हन्त, तर्हि, त्वयि एकेनाद्वितीयनित्यत्वात् नानात्वनिषेधस्त्वन्मन्युषात् कथं त्वान् ? नानात्वस्य भावप्रत्ययान्तत्वाभावात् चेत् । 'मुक्तोपसृप्त्यवशेनात्' (B S 1, 3, 2) इत्यादौ भावप्रत्ययान्तादेपि तदर्थत्वदर्शनात् (p 60)

The *Vedāra* is thus the earliest large-scale polemical tract of the Post Madhva period, acting, in many ways, as the forerunner of the *Vyākhyāna* of Vyasarāya. The *Vedāra Khāṇḍana* (Mrs O. L. C-755) is presumably a reply to it.

#### (20) PRAMANA PADDHATI (p)D

This is the biggest (granthas 750) of Jayatirtha's independent works. It has been published with eight commentaries including those of Vijayindra Tirtha, Rāghavendra, Vedesa Satvanātha etc from Dharwar. It is the standard work on Drāṣṭa Logic and Epistemology,<sup>1</sup> and all questions connected with those branches of metaphysics. It deals with the nature, scope and definition of Pramānas, their ways of functioning, theories of Truth and Error, the question whether the validity of knowledge is to be viewed as intrinsic to it (svataḥ) or extrinsic (parataḥ) etc. It is modelled on the *Pramana śāstra*, but reviews, in addition, the epistemological theories in the six systems of Indian thought, both orthodox and heretical. It is divided into three Paricchedas (chapters) Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and Śabda (or Āgama).

1 A brief study of it by P. Nagaraja Rao has been published as a Bulletin of the Adyar Library, 1918.

## MINOR WORKS

Among his minor works are to be mentioned ( 21 ) the *Padya-māla* ( p )<sup>1</sup> a work on daily worship, in essence a summary of the method of worship enunciated in the *Tantrasaraaangraha* of Madhva. It is an elementary work. His ( 22 ) *Salaparadhaslotra*, is a Stotra, praying for forgiveness of a hundred sins and delinquencies which a man commits every day. ( 23 ) A work of the name of *Adhyatma-Tarangini*, is attributed to him in the *S K.* ( p 30 ) and is described as a catechism of the principles of Dvaita philosophy. Nothing more is known about it.

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1. Belgaum.

## CHAPTER XXII

### JAYATIRTHA'S DIALECTICS

Jayatirtha's works disclose a thoroughgoing mastery of the dialectical method of argument adopted by veteran dialecticians like the Vivaranakara, Śrīharsa and Citsukha, for the establishment or refutation of thought categories. But inasmuch as most of his works are in the form of commentaries on the works of Madhva, he is prevented by the restrictions imposed by the exigencies of the text, from devoting full and unrestricted attention to dialectical treatment of topics. But within the limits of the opportunities afforded by the subject matter of the original texts, he has given us ample proofs of his dialectical mettle. Das Gupta has paid him a deservedly high tribute as one of the most eminent dialectical thinkers in Indian philosophy. His *NS* and *V T N tika* discuss numerous topics of interest to logic and philosophy. His *Vadavali* is a full fledged dialectical work tho' of limited range. It is modelled on the *Istasiddhi* and other works and attempts a close and reasoned refutation of the views of Ānandabodha, Śrīharsa and Citsukha, on philosophical realism and its concomitant problems of epistemology, and metaphysics. After reading this work, one wishes that Jayatirtha had given us a work of wider range, on the same lines.<sup>1</sup> Within the ambit of the topics dealt with by him, in this work, he has achieved remarkable effect, and his work set the model for and gave the impetus to the more elaborate and concentrated efforts of Viśnudā acarya and Vyāsarāya, in the succeeding centuries. His language is elegant, forceful and animated, without being excessively ornate or artificial. His controversial style is crisp and polished and free from excessive technical phraseology. He combines vast range of knowledge with an ability to synthesize and suit it to his requirements. He has a charm of language rarely excelled in or outside his system.

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1. The wish is fulfilled by Vyāsarāya in his *Nyayamṛta*.



In keenness and subtlety of arguments and minuteness of analysis, he is in no way inferior to the best dialecticians of the Advaita school. The dialectical output and achievements of the great makers of Dvaita Vedānta, such as Jayatīrtha and Vyāsarāya are, any day, far ahead of those of the dialecticians of the Viśiṣṭadvaita school. Das Gupta has drawn pointed attention to this indisputable preeminence of the dialecticians of the Dvaita school<sup>1</sup>, of whom Jayatīrtha is, undoubtedly, the master. Many of his arguments and lines of attack have been substantially incorporated into their works by subsequent authors like Viśnūdaśa and Vyāsarāya, as will be clear in vol. II. We may, therefore, look upon Jayatīrtha as the father of the dialectical movement in Dvaita thought. Of course, Madhva himself was no mean dialectician, as we have seen. But he was altogether too laconic in his comments and criticisms whether dialectical or expository. Providence has indeed favoured Madhva by harnessing such an all round genius as Jayatīrtha to the cause of explaining and reinforcing his Siddhānta. It is hardly possible to give even a fair idea of Jayatīrtha's dialectic abilities and contribution within our limited scope. That would easily require a separate volume in itself. I shall, therefore, content myself with a brief summary of his treatment of two important topics alone, to give the reader some idea of his mettle, as a dialectician.

### (1) CRITIQUE OF "MITHYATVA"

The concept of "Mithyatva" (falsity of the world) based on the familiar syllogism विमत मिथ्या, दृश्यत्वात् \* \* \* \* \* is vigorously assailed by Jayatīrtha. It is not possible to formulate a satisfactory definition of falsity. It cannot be viewed as (1) *anirvacanīya* (indefinable), or (2) as non existence, or (3) something 'other than real', or (4) not coming within the jurisdiction of proofs, or (5) being produced by Avidyā or its effects, or (6) the nature of being perceived in the same locus along with its own absolute non existence. None of these alternatives is free from defects. Indefinability has been authoritatively defined by Citsukha as . प्रत्येक सदसत्त्वानधिकरणत्वम्. But this is not, in any way, detrimental

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1 *History of I Phil* vol, III, p 111, (passage quoted in the Preface of th s vol )

to the position of the Dravida Vedāntin. For, as a believer in the uniqueness of attributes and as one who does not subscribe to the doctrine of "Anugatasattā" or universals, he would readily admit that a given real (sat) is *ipso facto* not the locus of another reality सद्देवादिनो मम, सतोऽपि भस्वान्तरानधिकरणत्वाङ्गीकारात् । (NS p 37). As for "Asatvānadhikaranatvam", it is readily accepted by the Dravida to whom, the world, as a reality is *ipso facto* Asatvānadhikarana (not the locus of non existence) The composite definition of Mithyātra combining the two ideas would thus involve a "Siddhādhana" or establishment of the established, as applied to the Dravida's view of the world

(2) Moreover, "Sadāsattvānadhikaranatvam" as understood by the Advaitin, would involve a self contradiction, in so far as existence and non existence are logical contradictories. They cannot coexist in the same locus. So too, their respective negations सदसत्त्वस्यैव विरोधेन, विधिवत् निषेधस्याप्यनुपपत्तेः । (Bauddha dhikara) If there is no mutual contradiction between the two, the Advaitin might as well accept the world to be "Sad asat", instead of going further! The reason for such non acceptance is presumably their mutual exclusiveness. Such an opposition would persist as much between "Sat" and "Asat", as between their negations विरुद्धविधिसमुच्चयवत्, विरुद्धनिषेधसमुच्चयस्यापि विरुद्धत्वात् । (J Mith Kh tika, p 8b) If there can be no conflict in निषेधसमुच्चय because it is unreal why not admit विधिसमुच्चय itself on the same condition and simplify matters and defy logic equally? तर्हि विधिसमुच्चय एव अतात्त्विक एवाङ्गीक्रियता, लाघवात् (Mith Kh tika, p 8b) It is of no use to plead, as does Citukha, that the conjoining of the two negations is not real निषेधसमुच्चयस्याप्यतात्त्विकत्वाभ्युपगमात्, न व्याधात् ; and that they have been put together merely to bring out the impossibility of defining the true nature of their counter correlates (sadasattā) satisfactorily तत्प्रतियोगिनो दुर्निर्णयत्वमात्रप्रकटनाय तत्तद्विरुद्धत्वमिलापः ॥ Jayatirtha points out that, in that case, the "Sadāśadvailaksanya" posited of the world would be essentially undemonstrable and the latter would have to be accepted as purely "sadasat" If "Sadāśadvailaksanya" were not true, "Sadāsattva" must be the truth of the matter!

That existence and non existence are mutually exclusive attributes with reference to one and the same thing (with refer-

ence to the same time and place), could be demonstrated with regard to the Ātman himself. We cannot, therefore, overcome a self contradiction in asserting the world to be "Sadasadvilaksana" (different from both 'real' and 'unreal'). If it be said that the "existence" found in the Ātman is *not* due to the absence of non-existence in him, but to the presence of Ātmanhood, one would have to ask for a proper definition of "Ātmatvam". It cannot be a class concept as the Ātman is *ex hypothesi* only one, according to the Advaitin. It would involve the fallacy of "Sadhyā viśistatā" (sameness of the major term and the reason) if Ātmatva is defined as "reality". Uncontradictability, also, cannot be deemed a proper definition of the Ātman as according to the Advaita, even the Asat is uncontradictable 'नासत्स्यास्ति वाक्यम्'. There is difficulty in defining the Ātman as "Jñānatvam" ज्ञातृज्ञेयगून्यस्य, ज्ञानस्यापि शून्यत्वात् (Mith Kh Tika p 7). The Ātman cannot be a substratum of knowledge (ज्ञानाधार), but simply consciousness according to Advaita. Other definitions like "Ātmapada vacyatvam", "tallaksyatvam" etc., are equally inadequate. No doubt, the "Ātman" is admitted by the Dvaita philosophers also. But it could be suitably defined within the limits of the alternatives given, on the Dvaita view. This is not possible for the Advaitin. It must, therefore, be admitted that existence is the logical concomitant of the absence of non existence and vice versa, and that the two are mutually exclusive predicates. Mithyātvā, then, in the sense of positing the coexistence of both their negations, at the same time and with reference to the same locus is, therefore, most illogical and could never pass muster.

It is not also possible to establish such a category on the strength of a syllogism—that existence and non existence, *qua* attributes, are capable of residing in one and the same locus as countercorrelates of their absolute negation. The inference is vitiated by the "Upadhī" of "Aviruddhatvam", inasmuch as only non contradictory attributes or their essence could be so accommodated together, as the absence of color and taste in air. Since the "thing" ( *vastu* ) in this context is synonymous with the existent, the syllogism would imply that "Sat" is the counter-correlate of the absolute non-existence residing in it, which is obviously impossible! There are also many "Kēvalānvayī" attributes like 'knowability' (*prameyatvam*) whose non existence is inconceivable in any substratum.



The attempt to establish the category of the *indefinable* (anirvacanīya) on Arthāpatti argument based on सच्चेन बाध्येत, असच्चेन प्रतीयेत is also beset with difficulties. In the first place the Monist would have to define—"Sattvam" Is it something possessing the class essence of *sattā* (सत्ताजातिमन) or something that is uncontradictable, or, simply the essence of Brahman (ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वम्)? The Advaitin concedes "Satta jati" to the world, but, he is not prepared, on that account to treat it as uncontradictable. It lands us in a pure "Sādhya-visistata" or non-difference of the 'hetu' and 'sādhyā', to be told that if the world were uncontradictable, it could not be contradicted यदवाध्य तदवाध्यम् । It is "Siddhasādhana" or affirming a truism, to say that if objects like silver in shell were of the nature of Brahman, they could not be contradicted. They are contradicted and therefore they are *not* of the essence of Brahman. This is endorsed by the Dvaitin.

The concept of Anirvacanīya is first propounded by the Advaitin, with reference to objects of *illusions*, which is sought to be extended to the world of *normal perceptions* as well. The Dvaita philosopher is not only opposed to this extension, but is also opposed to the acceptance of a third order of predication between the poles of reality and unreality, existence and non existence and the invention of a *tertium quid*. The objects of illusions could be legitimately treated as *unreals* appearing as *reals*. There is no need to invent a half way house between existence and non existence. The Advaitin, however, interposes a difficulty which is embodied in the second half of his *arthapatti* argument असच्चेन प्रतीयेत—the non existent could not be presented as existent. But since objects of illusions are perceived for the nonce and later on liquidated, they should be given an intermediary status. This is refuted by Jayatīrtha.

The category of "Anirvacanīya" is made to rest upon the presumption of the non presentability of Asat. This assumption is gratuitous and inconsistent with the conviction of Asad vaiśaksanya (difference from Asat) which the Advaitin has in respect of the world! The distinction from Asat could not be known and asserted, unless Asat is capable of being known and presented.

असद्विलक्षणज्ञप्त्यै ज्ञातव्यमसदेव हि ।

तस्मादसत्प्रतीतिश्च कथं तेन निवार्यते ? ( AV )

This objection is parried by the Advaitin by trying to explain that he denies only the *immediate* presentation of the non-existent as existent. Jayatīrtha replies that a dispassionate examination of the data of illusions and the verdict of the subsuming cognition would fully establish that the object presented in illusions is adjudged to be absolutely non-existent नास्ति नासीत् न भविष्यति रजतमथ । असदेव रजतं प्रत्ययात् । After all, experience is the acid test of what is possible and what is not possible नहि दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नं नाम ।

Apart from the evidence of the "Bādhaka jñāna," no illusions could be explained without accepting the apprehension of *something non-existent as existent*, or of *something existent as non-existent*.

असत् सत्त्वेन प्रतीतिः सतोऽसत्त्वेन प्रतीतिरित्यन्यथाप्रतीतेरेव भ्रान्तित्वात् ॥  
No theory of illusions could do without an element of असत् सत्त्वेनापराक्षतया प्रतीतिः । or direct perception or presentation of a non-existent as existent. The essence of illusions is that a "given" thing is mistaken for a projected "other." Let us grant for argument's sake, that the object of illusions is really Anirvacanīya, as the Advaitin would have it. Can he explain the illusion without involving an element of "a non-existent being perceived as existent"? Assuredly not. There can be no illusion unless and until the (in his opinion) "Anirvacanīya" silver is directly apprehended as a reality or as existing. If it is presented as Anirvacanīya (as it "truly" is, according to the Advaitin), there would be no illusion to speak of! If it were presented as non-existent, there would be no responsive activity on the part of the deluded percipient (Bhranta). If the anirvacanīya prātibhāsika is presented as "Vyavaharika," the question immediately arises, as to the status of this "Vyavaharika" appearance. Is it also Vyāvahārika or merely Prātibhāsika? In the former case, the silver, the status of whose appearance as Vyāvahārika is a vyāvahārika reality, would also be a Vyāvahārika and not merely Prātibhāsika, as it is regarded in the Advaitic theory. If the status of the appearance as vyāvahārika is merely prātibhāsika, the question would then

arise, if that status is apprehended in the course of the illusion, as "Pratibhasika", or as "Vyavaharika". It cannot be the first, as there would be no active response, in that case. In the other case, we would have a tacit admission of a "Pratibhasika" appearing and being presented as what it is not—viz., a "vyavaharika". This is a clear enough case of "*Asatas satvena aparoksataya bhānam*" which cannot be camouflaged. It is clear, then, that there is no escape from an element of "*Asatas satvena pratiti*", on any view of illusions. Granting that the object of illusions is, in point of fact, "*Anirvacaniya*", the present question is not one of what it is, but of *how it appears or is perceived*. Since we cannot speak of an illusion on any other alternative save of the *Anirvacaniya* appearing *as real and existent* (for the nonce), it is futile and disingenuous to deny the possibility and the fact of "*Asat*" appearing as "*Sat*".

There is no point, then, in Citsukha's trying to confuse the issue by seeking to explain that it is not the Pratibhasika silver that is apprehended as the vyavaharika, but that it is only the vyavaharika reality of the substratum (adhisthana) viz., shell, that is superimposed on the silver,—the nature of which (superimposition) is, however, Anirvacaniya. This is arguing in a vicious circle. Here, again, the Advaitin is employing the concept of Anirvacaniya as if it were an established fact. Jayatirtha asks, what is meant by all this roundabout explanation? What is the status of the apprehension of the vyavaharika reality of the substratum superimposed on the silver? Is it really vyavaharika or pratibhasika? If the former, the silver would be vyavaharika. In the latter case, is it presented as Pratibhasika or as vyavaharika? It could not be the first, for reasons already stated प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तिः । In the second case, it must be definitely stated if such vyavaharika appearance is true to its actual being or not. It cannot be true, as, in that case, the superimposed silver could not be dismissed on stultification, as purely imaginary (Pratibhasika). If then, the vyavaharika appearance is not true to its nature, it means simply that we are, at last, face to face with असत् सर्वेनापरोक्ष प्रतीतिः । If the Advaitin should still desperately continue to assert that the real nature of this second Vyavaharika is also Anirvacaniya and superimposed, one has necessarily to repeat the whole series of questions (vikalpas) ab ovo over again तदा,



अनिर्वचनीयमात कोऽर्थ इत्यादरावृत्या आरापपरपरापर्यवसानानुपपत्ति । यन्वारोप पर्यवसान, तत्रैव प्रवृत्यभावो, असतोऽपि सत्त्वेन प्रतीतिर्वा प्रसज्येत ॥ (V T N Tika p 58 b ) There is no point in pressing a series of Anirvacaniyas into service when the original and basic one itself is unproved Where the regressive series of Anirvacaniyas and superimpositions stop there again the old difficulties would have to be faced

## ( II ) REVIEW OF CITSUKHA'S CRITIQUE OF " DIFFERENCE "

Jayatirtha devotes considerable attention to the refutation of Citsukha's critique of ' Difference ' and to an exposition of the category of difference according to the Madhva's philosophy . He takes his stand on the perception of difference as a *fait accompli* and asks whether the Advaitin proposes to deny the perception of " difference " *as such* or whether he questions the fact of its being brought about by unimpeachable factors . Unless Difference is conceded, within the limits of perception it cannot be logically refuted . The second view may be held on the ground of difference not being an effect or its being an effect without having an assignable cause or its being brought about by something which is not its cause . The first one could not be endorsed by the Advaitin who regards the apprehension of difference as an illusion brought about by the flaw of Avidya . If the perception of Difference is uncaused, it could claim to be free from flaws and therefore valid and real . In the second case, there would be a palpable self contradiction of thought and the eradication of Difference might be equally adventitious, and one need not have to undergo the hard discipline of Vedic study and reflection in order to eradicate it . It would be absurd to say that difference is produced by something that is not its cause as cause is that which is actually responsible for an effect coming into being . What are the grounds for supposing that the perception of difference is caused by flaws ( *dosajanya* ) ? Does it rest on mere spurious reasonings or on the existence of strong stultifying cognition ? In the former case, even mental impress ( *antah karanavrtti* ) brought about by a study of Vedantic texts would be open to the same taint . For according to the Advaitin, the natural taint that lies at the root of all difference is Avidya and the same Avidya lies at the back of " Vedantavrtti " . This must indeed be so, to prevent the danger to the principle of Monism

( Advaita hāni ), in the event of its being a flawless reality. The Advaitin is, therefore, hardly justified in condemning Pratyakṣa, while hugging the Śruti to his heart. Barring certain flimsy reasonings based on the contingencies of interdependence, regress etc., there are no solid proofs in the form of stultifying Pratyakṣa which could be cited against the reality of the perception of difference. As for the fallacies of interdependence etc., it would not be difficult to turn the tables upon the notion of "identity" also, by repeating the same dialectical hairsplittings of Citukha<sup>1</sup> and asking whether the perception of identity manifests a bare identity, or the objects alone, which are identical, or both. In the last case, again, does it reveal them simultaneously, or the objects first and then their identity? It cannot reveal mere identity or first the identity and then the correlates or both at once. For, the objects proposed to be identified must be revealed before any identity could be grasped. If there is no identity apart from the Brahman, there is no difference apart from the objects! If the reasonings directed against the notion of 'identity' are invalid on account of their opposition to Śruti, those directed against 'difference' are equally so, on account of their being opposed to perception ( and Śruti )!

Assuming that perception of difference is liable to be sublated and therefore unreal, one would have to define precisely, the content ( viśaya ) of such sublating cognition ( badhakajñāna ). Would it emphasize (1) an element of difference from the previous perception, or (2) merely establish a "non difference", or (3) something neutral to both? The first would ratify the reality of 'difference'. The second would have to be still further clarified. There are only three possible senses in which the negative particle (in 'a bheda') could be employed—otherness, opposition, or absence (of difference). Every one of these alternatives would presuppose an element of 'difference', in its denotation. The stultifying cognition, in establishing the absence of difference would have to manifest its content as something different from its counter correlate viz., the difference previously cognized. वेदामावग्राहिणापि, प्रतियोगि- ( भेद ) विलक्षणतया स्वविषयो व्यवस्थाप्य ( Ādarāṇi )

1. प्रत्यक्ष भेदमेव गोचरस्य युतं वस्त्वपि? तथापि, भेदपूर्वकं तदगोचरयेत्? तत्पूर्वकं वा भेद, युगपदेव बोधयम्? \* \* \* ( Tatvapradīpikā, p 165 )

The form of the stultifying cognition also would present similar difficulties to the Monist. There are only three possible alternatives in which it could be put. "This is *not* difference" (नाय भेद) "there is no difference here", or "something else has been appearing as "difference". Every one of these forms (of the judgment) would have reference to a "difference" which it would cognize directly as in the judgment "नेद रजतम्" (this is not silver). No stultifying cognition can, thus, fly in the face of the category of difference, or disprove its entity as such. Difference is, thus, a settled fact of life and experience and cannot be allowed to be dismissed, just for fear of supposed difficulties of regress, etc. Such difficulties would have to draw back, when confronted with the presence of difference as a *fait accompli*. A repudiation of the category of difference is, thus, *ultra vires*.

At this stage, the Advaitin puts in a plea that he is not opposed to some sort of *provisional* difference (व्यावहारिकभेद) and that his criticisms of the category are directed against the conception of Difference as a *paramārtha* (absolute) reality. Jayatirtha rejoins that such defences are puerile. By all means let the Advaitin please himself with Vyāvahārikabheda! But what about the other Paramārthikabheda which he seeks to overthrow? Is that revealed by Pratyaksa and other Pramānas, or not? If it is, how could it be repudiated? If it is something *not* revealed by the senses or any other *Pramāna* (valid source), he is at perfect liberty to repudiate it, as the Dvaitin is in no way affected by the repudiation of such a category that is beyond or outside the Pramānas!

The very form of posing the fallacies of *reductio ad absurdum*, interdependence etc., calculated to gag the perception of difference,—“If there is a perception of Difference, there would be mutual interdependence”, or “if the perception of difference is real, there would be mutual interdependence” or, “if the perception of difference is bound up with its correlates, there would be interdependence” and so on, would be powerless to aid the Advaitin. The first argument would be met by the counter proposition that if there is no perception of difference, the monist would be cut off from all kinds of practical life and theoretical interest or activity. In the second case, there is no natural concomitance between reality and interdependence and the *apādāna* (objection) would be misplaced. Moreover, interdependence is



no bar to the validity of particular experiences अन्योन्याश्रयस्य प्रमात्वाप्रतिबन्धकत्वात् । In the second case, according to the laws of *tarka*, only the correlative *interdependence* would stand negated in the event of "Viparyayaparyavasāna" But the conception of difference would stand untouched<sup>1</sup> The argument would have to be posed in some such form यदि भेददर्शनं घर्मप्रतियोगिसापेक्षं स्यात्, तर्हि, अन्योन्याश्रयादिकं स्यात् । न च तद्युक्तम् । अतो न भेददर्शनं घर्म्यादि सापेक्षम् ।।

There is, however, no need to fear that the perception of Difference could not be demonstrated without involving interdependence of correlates The Dvaita philosophers have shown how it is possible to conceive of Difference without these difficulties The difficulties would have to be faced and met in an intelligible way, in any case, irrespective of the *status* which one might be inclined to assign to it as Vyavaharika or Pāramārthika They could not be liquidated by merely giving a bad name of "Vyavaharika" to difference and relegating it to a lower order किं च, अन्योन्याश्रयदुष्टस्य व्यावहारिकत्वमपि कुत ? नहि भूदवास्तवीत्येतावता, यस्य घटस्य कारणतत् एवोत्पत्ता इत्येतत् परस्यापि मनोगतं भविष्यति । ( *V T N. 1. 52* )

Even the "vyavahārika-prapañca" and its categories are not exempt from the laws of thought and are not erratic whimsicalities

किं च, स्पष्टदृष्टं भेददर्शनं प्रकारान्तरं कल्पयिष्यति । अस्मिन्नेव वा प्रकारे कल्पयवान्तरविशेषम् । स्वयं तु, न निवर्तते । नहि स्पष्टदृष्टोऽङ्कुरः परिचितचरबीजासम्भवमात्रेण स्वयं निवर्तते । अपि तु, बीजान्तरं वा, परिचितेष्वेव जात्यादिविशेषं वा कल्पयतीति लोके दृष्टम् ॥ ( *V. T. N. 1 p. 52* )

The Advaitin is not, therefore, justified in repudiating the category of difference, merely on account of these difficulties Otherwise, he would have to abjure his category of 'Identity' as well, which is as much in the grip of the same difficulties as 'Difference', as has been shown already प्रकारान्तरेण निर्वाहकल्पनस्य क्षयत्वेन, प्रतीतरपन्त्वायामात् । अन्यथा, स्वानिलयितस्याप्यभेदस्यासिद्धेरक्तत्वात् ॥ ( *Padarall, p 81* )

<sup>1</sup> भेददर्शनस्य विमायात् १ ( *VTN, p 52* )

The Siddhanta view of Difference is then briefly explained by Jayatirtha इयं चात्र दर्शनस्थिति \* \* \* ( *Vadavali*, p 81 seq ) — Difference is not the attribute of both the correlates, but of only one of them, signalized by the other एवस्य धर्मोऽपरेण निरूप्य । The use of the singular in cases like "Anayor bhedah", should therefore be understood in a collective sense ( *samudayārtha* ) as in "Anayos svarūpam", where, surely, two things cannot share the same Svarupa<sup>1</sup> The very idea of 'Svarupa' is limited to individuality Even so, in the case of difference This difference should, however, be accepted as the nature of things, revealed along with the perception of objects<sup>2</sup> If it were not so, anything known by us would be known as identical with all others and one would have to fall into frequent doubts, even when one's own personality is perceived, whether one is oneself or some one else<sup>1</sup> That such wild doubts do not arise is due to the simple fact that the difference of an object from all others is revealed in a general way, in the very act of its perception Such general awareness of an object as differenced from the rest of the objective sphere is not to be confused with omniscience ! But, it cannot be denied that in knowing a given thing the Sakṣi has a general awareness of its difference from all others Without the recognition of such a general awareness of difference, no conviction of the invariable and universal concomitance of hetus and sadhyas could be established, and without such conviction no inference would be possible. But a specific knowledge of each and every other thing in the Universe is neither suggested nor necessary for the perception of difference *per se* without reference to specific counter-correlates Doubts about

1 Cf त्वेकमनेकस्वभाव नाम । व्याघातात् ॥

( *Udayana, Kusumanjali*, 1 )

2 Madhva conceives of a "vastu" ( thing ) as having many facets These various characteristics or 'differences' are however "Sa viśeṣābhūna" from the "thing" अतो व्यावृत्तिरेव स्वरूपम् ( *Taṭtva Bhasya*, p 10 ). It is not then a correct statement of Madhva's position, to say, as does Mr Vasudeva Shastri Abhyankar, in his gloss on the *Sarvadarsana Samgraha* 'वस्तुस्वरूपेति' । घटादिवस्तुन स्वरूपं यत्कदुशीवादिकं स एव भेदः । नान्य, इति माध्वा ॥ ( p 130 second edn, 1951, Poona )

the nature of objects are due, however, to the perception of an object *qua* distinguished from certain things only, coupled with the obscuration of its distinction, for the nonce, from certain *other* objects that bear a close resemblance to it : व्यावृत्तिविशेषाग्रहणादेव संशयोपपत्तेः । Unless some such explanation is adopted, our doubts would be all-embracing (*sarvakotyaavalambī*), instead of being limited, as they usually are, to two or three alternatives only, in normal experiences.





# APPENDIX I

## LIST OF \*WORKS CITED BY MADHVĀCĀRYA.

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|-----------------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. Atharvāṅgīrasa Up.             | 33. Karmaviveka        |
| 2. Adhyātma                       | 34. Karmasamhitā       |
| 3. Anabhimlāna Śruti (S. V.)      | 35. Kalāpa Śruti       |
| 4. Abhidhāna                      | 36. Tantraprakāśikā    |
| 5. Ayāśya Śākhā (S. V.)           | 37. Kāpileya Samhitā   |
| 6. Antaryāmi Samhitā              | 38. Kāranaviveka       |
| 7. Ākalpa                         | 39. Kālakīya           |
| 8. Āgniveśya Śruti                | 40. Kālanirṇaya        |
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\* The list does not include well-known Vedic, Upaniṣadic, Epic and Purāṇic texts, which have also been cited plentifully.

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| 71. Talavakāra Brāhmaṇa    | 110. Pavamāna                  |
| 72. Tantra-Bhāgavata       | 111. Puruṣottama Tantra        |
| 73. Tatparya               | 112. Pavamānavijaya            |
| 74. Tantramālā             | 113. Padma                     |
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255 Śrīviṣṇu Purāṇa	292 Hiranyanābha Sruti

And other well known Srutis (Rg Veda Taitt Samhitā Upanisads, Āraṇyakaś ) Mbh Purāṇas Upapurāṇas, Smṛtis, Bhāgavata etc.



## APPENDIX II

### THE SRIKŪRMAM INSCRIPTION OF NARAHARI TIRTHA

( *Epigraphia Indica* Vol. vi, no 25 ).

१. देव श्रीकमलाविलासलहरीपात्र वलिप्रोल्लसत्-  
वलेशविलष्टजनेऽखिलक्षितितले सलीनबोधोदये ।  
स्वीयश्रीपदपङ्कजैकशरणान् तरक्षितु सन्मुनि-  
र्जात श्रीपुरुषोत्तमाभिधमहातीर्थं सुमत्यप्रणी ॥
२. तस्य ज्ञानकलाकलोदयकलो वैयासिक गोगण  
मन्दैभिर्मपथप्रचारितमल सुव्यक्तभेदे पथि ।  
नैतु सधृतदण्डमण्डितकरो य प्रादुरासीन्मुनि-  
व्रातं सेव्यपदारविन्दयुगलादानन्दनीर्थो मुनिः ।
३. यन्मुनिभाषितभाष्य भाष्य किल तीर्थिकप्रवरसर्धैः ।  
उन्मदवादिद्विरदप्रतिकुभमकुश भवति ॥
४. यन्मुखनि सूतभाषा ललिता ललितप्रकारपदविन्यासा ।  
कमलापतिपदकमल भजते भजमानभवभयारातिम् ॥
५. आनन्दतीर्थं भगवत्पादाचार्यं सरस्वती ॥  
लोकेऽन हरिपादाब्जयुगलप्राप्तये नृ सा ॥
६. तस्मात्लोकसुरक्षणातिनिपुणात् संप्राप्तवत्तव्यधी-  
द्वेधामुन तथान योजयति जनान् कालिङ्गभूतभवान् ।  
पित्राचारमुपैति मूनुरिति सनीतिस्थितो धर्मत  
शत्रुदमापतिवर्गदुर्गनिवहान् भीतानभीत स्वयम् ॥
७. तद्वच श्रीवर्मटाधिनायकमहाकार्यैकवद्धव्रत  
तस्य प्रच्युतिवारणाय शवरानीकक्षितिघ्रातनिम् ।  
धत्ते सत्करवालमस्य तटिता सत्यवतजीवे रिपो  
हन्तव्यान्वशेषणात् निजविधिर्नो यस्य बोध्यस्तराम् ॥
८. तेनानेन श्रीमन्नरहरितीर्थाख्यमतिवरेष्येन ।  
कलिसमयप्रह्लादप्रभावपरितोषितनृहरिरूपेण ॥

९. स्वस्ति श्रीशकवत्सरे हुतवहव्योमद्वयदमायुते (= १२०३)

मेपे शुक्लशशाङ्कशेखरदिने वारे च सौम्ये वरे ।

प्रासाद कमठाधिपस्य पुरतो निर्माय शर्मप्रदो

योगानन्दनृसिंह एष भगवान् प्रीत्या प्रतिष्ठापित ॥

*N. B* The second and third verses in the inscription seem to have been transposed, as no *bhāṣya* of Purusottama Tīrtha (Acyutaprekṣa) is known or could have been written as explained on P. 99. The two verses have, therefore, been given by me in the logical order, as I conceive it.





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9	f	summarising	summarising
10	36	( S B 1, 2, 5, 3 )	( S B 1, 2, 5, 5 )
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65	20	Carpentier	Carpenter
	22	Scepter	Scepter-
	f 4	belief	belief
79	7	batch of	<i>delete the two words</i>
82	6	Budhaghosa	Buddhaghosa
83	f 3	Carpentier	Carpenter
93	27	ananda	ananda
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110	14	sombre	serene
111	1	most	Tho' most
123	39	Satahāryavāda	Satkāryavāda
129	15	exhaustivee	exhaustive
130	20	Analysis Madhva's	Analysis of Madhva's
	21	B. S. B. of	omit " of "
132	7	necesrarily	necessarily
134	35	voilent	violent
135	8	Parkrti	Prakrti
	26	Parlkti	Prakrti
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137	f.1	वयमव्यक्तं	वयमव्यक्तं
148	f.1	publishep	published
151	14	porblem	problem
155	20	identity	identity
161	9	refutes	refutes
166	14	intersting	interesting
168	17	सदसच्चा०	सदसच्चा०
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		and	and
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274	4	Jayatīrtha ( 1368 )	Jayatīrtha ( 1388 )
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297	4	happened	happened
	22	chice	choice
299	30	movenent	movement
300	8	.g ored	ignored
304	7	a. Jatīrtha	Jayatīrtha
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306	8	community	community
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